The following article comes from Small Unit Actions, a study
produced by the Historical Division of the US War Department as part of
the American Forces in Action series published during and just after the war. It
is a detailed account of the 27th Division's fight on Tanapag Plain on Saipan.
The article describes the action of two regiments, the 105th and the 165th,
generally at a platoon and Squad level. As you read it, there are several
points to keep in mind.
One point is the inability of the Americans to spot Japanese positions. Despite the fact that the Japanese were producing a large volume of fire, including machine guns and anti-tank guns, the Americans could not identify the location of the firing positions.
Secondly, take note of the actions that involved the armor units. The Japanese infantry were capable of knocking out tanks using magnetic mines and Molotov Cocktails. When tanks found themselves being fired upon by antitank weapons or attacked by infantry, their most common response was to use descretion and fall back.
A third point was the lack of command control. During the actions there was very little command control by anyone higher than platoon leader. Company commanders could at times instruct their platoorrs to retreat or advance, but were not able to direct the platoon's tactical actions or coordinate the action of the platoons. Platoon leaders often had control only of those men close by and were usually too involved with actions directly affecting them to give direction to the squads. Most of the leadership came from squad leaders and the men themselves. Solutions and tactics generally came as suggestions from the enlisted men, and sometimes the men simply did what was needed without requesting permission. When the leadership did act it was usually an order to a couple of men to "go there" and do something, rather than an organized plan using all of the platoon or company assets.
Finally, note the effect of casualties on the units' progress. As soon as a soldier was hit, the reaction of a unit tended to focus on getting the man to safety and not on countering the enemy fire. When forward movement stopped, casualties grew and the unit found it very difficult to regain its forward motion.
To sum up, the fighting tended to be done by small groups of men struggling on their own to counter a direct threat to themselves. The plans of the battalion and Company commanders never survived contact with the enemy. The most important jobs done by the officers were to dig up additional resources, such as armor support and to re-organize the men after the fighting.
Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, Commanding General of the crack Panzer Lehr Division, was on a hill north of Singling on 6 December 1944, when tanks of the 4th Armored Division broke across the open hills to the south in a frontal attack on the town. After the war ended he remembered that sight and spoke of it with professional enthusiasm as "an outstanding tank attack, such as I have rarely seen, over ideal tank terrain."
General Bayerlein could afford a detached appreciation. At the moment when he saw the American tanks in motion, the attack was not his problem. His division, after ten costly days of trying to drive south to cut off the rear of advancing American forces, had just been withdrawn, relieved by the 11th Panzer Division. Bayerlein himself had remained behind only because some of his tank destroyer units had been attached temporarily to the relieving forces.
The attacks on Singling and Bining which General Bayerlein so admired were the last actions in Lorraine of the 4th Armored Division commanded (after 3 December) by Maj. Gen. Hugh I. Gaffey. For nearly a month the division had been fighting in the most difficult terrain and under the most trying weather condi- tions of its entire campaign in France. Casualties in men and ma- teriel had been very heavy, largely because constant mins prevented air cover and because swampy ground either confined the tanks to the roads or so reduced their maneuvembility in cross-country attack that they fell an easy prey to the enemy's prepared defenses.
Throughout the Lorraine campaign the division practice was to operate in small, flexible task forces (generally two to a combat command) which themselves were constantly broken up into smaller forces of company strength of tanks or infantry or both. These smaller "teams" were generally formed at need by the task force commander to deal with a strongpoint of enemy resistance which was holding up the advance of the main body, or to clean out a village or hold high ground to safeguard such advance. In this sense, the attack on Singling, though inconclusive, was typical of the campaign tactics. It shows some of the difficulties of the use of armor in terrain which naturally favored the defense, and which the Germans knew thoroughly and had ample time to fortify. In respect to weather, however, which all the tankers said was their toughest and most memomble enemy during the campaign, Singling was not typical. The day of the battle was overcast, but there was no min. Mud, except during the assembling stage, had no influence on the course of the action.
One feature of interest in the detailed narrative of the action lies in the picture of battle confusion, which extends to higher headquarters. At Corps nothing at all was known of the engagement described in the following pages, and the day's events were represented to the higher command substantially as the realization of the original plan. The G-3 Periodic Report (XIII Corps) Number 115, 071200 December 1944, reads:
- 4th Armored Division--Combat Command A began their attack on Bining around noon. The 38th (sic) Tank Battalion and 53d Infantry formed a base of fire to the south of town and the 37th Tank Battalion hit Bining from the west. As the attack on Bining (Q6549) progressed, Combat Command B passed Combat Command A and attacked Singling (Q6249). The opposition here consisted of infantry, tanks, and antitank fire from numerous, pillboxes, and artillery fire which came in 30- to 40-round concentrations. The fighting at Singling and Bining was very difficult, but by night fall Combat Command A was in Bining and Rohrbach (Q6549). Singling was not clear as of 1730...
In actual fact, as the narrative will show, Combat Command A attacked Singling and secured the southern and eastern portion of the town before Combat Command B came up; the attack on Bining did not begin until late in the afternoon and was made by only the light tanks of the 37th Tank Battalion supporting a battalion of the 328th Infantry; and, finally, no elements of Combat Command A ever reached Rohrbach.
More France: 4th Armored Division at Singling Part I
France: 4th Armored Division at Singling Part II
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© Copyright 1995 by Mike Vogell and Phoenix Military Simulations.
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