BACKGROUND

In September 1863, the Confederate Army of Tennessee lay scattered to the south of the important rail and communication centre of Chattanooga. Its commander, Gen. Braxton Bragg, had been maneuvered out of the city by the movements of the Union army under Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. As the Federals approached the city from the west, they did so scattered over an inhospitable countryside and with the idea that Bragg was in full retreat towards Atlanta. However, Bragg was not withdrawing and had instead placed his army behind Pigeon Mountain with every intent to give battle, but on his own terms.

An excellent opportunity to gobble up a couple of Union divisions at McClemore's Cove had been lost on September 10/11 due to the inactivity and disobedience of Maj. Gen. Thomas Hindman. On the evening of the 12`h another golden opportunity seemed to offer itself to the disappointed Rebel command. This time the opportunity fell to Confederate Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, an ordained bishop in the Episcopal ministry. A personal friend of Jefferson Davis, Polk had risen to command a corps in Bragg's army. Polk was also the leader of several attempts to oust Bragg from command, describing him as "a weakling, without the qualities requisite for his station".

Although personally brave, the Bishop never quite rose to his military duties and, despite his protests, was a far worse general than Braxton Bragg. After his disappointment at McClemore's Cove, Bragg instructed Polk to move with Cheatham's Division to Rock Spring Church, there to await reinforcements in the shape of Walker's Reserve Corps and Hindman's Division. With these troops, Polk was to attack the Federals deployed around Lee and Gordon's Mill.

HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE, La Fayette, Ga.,
September 12, 1863-12 o'clock at night.
[Lieut. -Gen. POLK:]

GEN.: We must force him to fight at the earliest moment and before his combinations can be carried out. Your generals who advise the concentration of the larger portion of the army with you only know of Crittenden's corps being opposed to you, and did not know of the advance again of a heavy infantry force in the cove upon this place, and of another from the south, preceded by a very large cavalry force. However, to avoid all danger, I shall put Buckner in motion in the morning and run the risk here. You must not delay attack for his arrival, or another golden opportunity may be lost by the withdrawal of our game. But I trust that the cavalry sent south may hold the enemy in check until you can finish the job intrusted to you. Action, prompt and decided, is all that can save us. The troops are ready to respond.

I am, general, very truly, yours
BRAXTON BRAGG.

The opportunity alluded to in the above communication involved Wood's division of Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's Twenty-First Army Corps, reputedly on its own in the area of Lee and Gordon's Mill on Chickamauga Creek. Crittenden's Corps formed the extreme left flank of the Union dispersal and was slowly moving south seeking information on the Confederate main body. So far, Crittenden had had a good war, rising from division to corps command and then being breveted for gallantry at Stone's River. A week later, his star was to plummet to earth as a defeated Rosecrans tried to blame him, among others, for the Union disaster at Chickamauga.

One of Crittenden's division commanders (Wood) was instrumental in bringing about that defeat and, although personally cleared by a court of inquiry, Crittenden was never fully trusted again and resigned his commission in December 1864. For the moment however, the near disaster at McClemore's Cove had given Rosecrans pause for thought, and over the next few days, he would begin to draw his army closer together.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga,
September 11, 1863--3.30p. m.
Maj.-Gen. CRITTENDEN, Comdg. 21st Army Corps:

Information has just been received that the enemy is in heavy force in the valley of Chattanooga Creek. In view of these facts the general commanding directs you to move your whole force across, by the most available route, as quickly as possible, to the Rossville and La Fayette road, to some defensible point between Gordon's Mills and Shields' house, and close Wood up with you or yourself to him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD, Brig. -Gen. and Chief of Staff

By early evening of September 12, Wood was no longer alone at Lee and Gordon's Mill. Crittenden had managed to concentrate all three of his divisions in the area. Polk, who now recognised that the Federals were in force at Lee and Gordon's Mill, was awaiting the arrival of Hindman's division. General Hindman arrived in person at Polk's headquarters at the Park House at 4:30 a.m. on September 13; his division turned up at 6 a.m. and started to deploy between Cheatham on the left and Walker on the right. Cheatham had three brigades up and two in reserve; Hindman two up and one behind; Walker three in the front line and one in reserve.

HDQRS. POLK'S CORPS, Rock Spring Church,
September 13, 1863-7 a. m.

The lieutenant-general commanding announces his intention of making the attack so soon as the division commanders are ready for it. The moment they are ready they will notify him of the fact. The attack will begin on left wing.

By command of Lieut.-Gen. Polk:
THOS. M JACK. Assistant Adjutant-Gen.

At 9 a.m. the Confederate dispositions were still incomplete. No one, it would seem, was in a hurry to bring on a general engagement. Crittenden, meanwhile, sent scouting parties out to his left, right and centre. Rebel cavalry spotted those approaching Rock Spring Church, and Strahl's Brigade was dispatched to investigate. Some heavy but inconclusive skirmishing followed at approximately 12:30 p.m. Strahl then attempted to draw the Yankees on to the main Confederate battle line by withdrawing, but the Federals merely withdrew themselves. Alerted now to the presence of Confederate infantry, Crittenden disengaged his command during the early evening and retired on Missionary Ridge.

Once again, a lack of urgency on the part of a subordinate had robbed Bragg of a chance to inflict a serious reverse on Rosecrans. Polk was to prove just as tardy nearly a week later, when the two sides eventually met at the Battle of Chickamauga. This time, however, Bragg would relieve him of his duties.

THE WARGAME

I had originally envisaged this game as a small campaign with some maneuvering before the battle. However, there is not a great deal of such available as both sides tended to keep fairly well closed up on each other. It should still serve to give the players, with the help of an umpire, a sense how to bring your army to battle.

The only thing the Rebel commanders knew for certain about the Union forces is that they were arrayed around Lee and Gordon's Mill. As Palmer approached on the 12`h, he was ordered to encamp on the east side of Chickamauga Creek. Another report puts Palmer to the left of Wood and Van Cleve to Palmer's left. However, as Van Cleve arrived before Palmer, and Palmer was given the job of scouting the Corps left on the morning of the 13`h and Van Cleve the front, I suspect Palmer was to the left of Van Cleve. The Confederate deployment is well documented (see above) except that Walker is noted as having four brigades in line, when in fact he had five under his control. This may be explained by Ector's small regimental sized brigade being deployed with one of the others.

Given Crittenden's vigilance and willingness to use scouts, it can be assumed that he would have been forewarned about the Confederate approach. Like his enemy, his deployment would have been typical of the time, with so many brigades in the front line backed up by a smaller number in reserve, usually two up and one behind. The length of the Rebel line, however, could necessitate putting at least one of the reserves in the front line to extend the Yankee frontage.

To this end, the map shows only the main deployment areas of each Union division. Players should mark the position of each brigade before setting up. Wilder's mounted infantry will set up on the Federal left, in reserve or as a flank guard. Although more restricted in their set up, the Confederate players will have to decide which brigades occupy the front line and which form the reserves.

The battle will take place at around noon, sunset being 6 p.m. An argument could be put forward that Hindman's brigades would be suffering from a lack of sleep having made a night march to get into position. However, the march was not particularly severe, and as they were still not ready by 9 a.m. despite having arrived at 6, this could point to a possible rest period.

Victory conditions are already resolved for each side. Crittenden must hold his ground and attempt to keep his Corps in one piece. Polk, on the other hand, must inflict such a heavy defeat on the Yankees that Crittenden's Corps should be regarded as `used up' and of no immediate use to Rosecrans in the next few days: possibly by forcing it to withdraw to the north.

This battle would benefit from the use of an umpire, at least in the opening stages, with the Confederates not expecting Crittenden's full corps and the Yankees completely unaware of how many and the exact whereabouts of the Confederates. It can be played out at both the brigade level or the regimental, although to do it justice the latter could take up to two days of combat.

Several plausible scenarios can be constructed from the above information. Firstly, the Confederates could be disorientated by the terrain and attack piecemeal, one division at a time. Secondly, the Union scouting forces could all be moved out and the action begun as Van Cleve runs into the approaching Confederates some way to the south of Lee and Gordon's. The Union forces are thereby caught off guard and must concentrate to save Van Cleve. You could also ignore Crittenden's vigilance and have him the victim of a surprise Rebel attack.

As mentioned above, this action does not lend itself very well to anything other than a pitched battle. This is due in part to the Confederate operations in McClemore's Cove, and the fact that only Cheatham and possibly Walker could have made an attempt at intercepting Crittenden's divisions as they made their way to Lee and Gordon's Mill.

Due to the distances involved, contact, if made at all, would more than likely have been made sometime on the 12th with the advantage being completely with Crittenden, who could have brought all three of his divisions to bear on both Cheatham and Walker, a situation which both Polk and Bragg would not have contemplated.

The positions of the various forces during the period September 11-13 are as follows:

September 11

Wood's Division to Lee and Gordon's from Rossville arriving at 8:30 p.m. Harker's brigade arrived earlier at 3:30. Van Cleve and Palmer both at Ringgold. Wilder at Tunnel Hill. Cheatham at Dr. Anderson's. Walker at La Fayette.

September 12

Van Cleve to Lee and Gordon's via Peelers arriving early afternoon. Palmer to Lee and Gordon's via Gilbert's, arriving 4:45 p.m. Wilder arrives at Lee and Gordon's via Leet's Tan Yard at 9:45 p.m. Cheatham marches for Rock Spring Church. Walker arrives at Rock Spring Church at 8 p.m. Hindman marching to Rock Spring Church from McClemore's Cove passing through La Fayette at 11:30 p.m.

September 13

4th U. S. Cavalry arrives early morning at Lee and Gordon's, then scouts towards McClemore's Cove. Cruft and Wilder's Brigades scout to the left of the Corps' position, while Van Cleve's division moves towards La Fayette; Beatty in the lead, followed by Dick and Barnes. Crittenden withdraws his forces north during the late afternoon / early evening. Hindman's Division arrives at Rock Spring Church at 6 a.m. Strahl's Brigade scouts towards Union position, skirmishing with Beatty of Van Cleve's Division at 12:30 before withdrawing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lost Victory: Lee and Gordon's Mill 1863

Background and Campaign
Order of Battle: Union
Order of Battle: Confederate
Map (174K)