By Gerard S. Lannigan
Like chess afficionados, DNO players can experiment with a number of opening moves. My favorite German opening has already been described a variation on the Barbarossa theme. Nevertheless, the veteran player might want to experiment with reversing the "Super-Cannae" of 1914 -- a crushing blow with eighty percent of the forces committed to the right flank south of the Pripet Marches. However, let us assume that the initial, planned crumbling operations succeed. What then? At least three large pockets of Russian troops have been created. One in the Riga area, a second larger one in the vicinity of Minsk and a third in the vicinity of Lwow. Be certain to eliminate these pockets quickly and whatever 'sacrifices' Stavka may offer to slow you down. A piece eliminated early is one less to contend with in front of Moscow. Infantry can clean up these pockets quite efficiently but only when protected and supported by armor. In addition this slows the armor down and prevents a rash advance which might see it isolated or defeated in detail. This also lacks the panache of the bold rushes of Guderian but guarantees a methodical grinding down of the enemy force. One basic maxim true of any East Front game can be stated here for both sides to pay attention to: For the Russian player to have a chance of winning he must maintain a force in being sufficient to protect his major cities. The Russians must contend with the reality that these pockets have been created on turn one. First and foremost, unless a German Panzer or Motorized unit has been left out in the open the Russian cannot counterattack. Besides the foolhardiness of attacking a vastly superior opponent on unfavorable terms there is always the chance of suffering from the Russian unpreparedness rule on the first two turns of play. Without counterattacking it will be difficult to take your losses, retreat as best you're able and bring up reserves. The Russian's best friend at this point is the rail net. It should be utilized as frequently as possible both to avoid the Russian unpreparedness rule and to move reserves quickly. However, it may well be the case that the rail net will be disrupted by German pinpoint bombing attacks. Generally, reserves both of ground troops and aircraft must be committed in miserly fashion for the worse days which are sure to come, The Middle GameBy turn six the Russian player will be digging in on the outskirts of Leningrad. Hopefully, there will be two lines of fortifications for the German to struggle through. Leningrad, Russia's window on the west, will undoubtedly come under a great deal of pressure from Finland to the north and Germany to the west. To counter this pressure it's axiomatic that the reserves and replacements formed there be sent to the front lines in the Leningrad vicinity. To the south of Leningrad the beginnings of a Russian line should be seen. It's distance from Moscow should be from eight to ten hexes, depending both on terrain and German pressure. Several things can almost be guaranteed at this point. First, it is here during October and November that the critical battle of the campaign will be fought. Will the "Typhoon" swamp the Russian lines before the Siberians arrive? The answer to that depends greatly upon the measures taken up to that point by the Stavka commander. Have the rail lines leading to this region been demolished as rapidly and completely as possible? Are some tank units available as a mobile reserve? How long will it take for mud weather to set in? And when are those damned Siberians going to arrive and deploy? In the south one would expect the situation to be more fluid given the more open terrain. The onset of mud in October should slow the German advance to a crawl and, all other things being equal, there is a better than average chance of Rostov being held at least until Spring. Again, however, it must be emphasized that the Russian must stay on the strategic defensive throughout the game unless some tactical opportunities should become available for very limited offensives. The Katyushas can be worked with tank unitsto counterattack German breakthroughs and the Siberians can be released as needed for the same purposes when they become available. These steps are necessary if the Russian hopes to retain Moscow. A more daring move might be the launching of a major air offensive during the end of October or beginning of November. The committment of the entire bombing force and many of the fighter regiments to the destruction of the German supply lines can yield major dividends even if only twentyfive percent of the raids score hits. The use of the remnants of the airborne infantry corps for the same purpose might seem uselessly sacrificial but the possibility of a paralyzed German foe attracts even the dullest of Russian commanders. For the Germans the months of October, November and December generally decide the outcome of the game. Can they (the Germans) get close enough to Moscow and Leningrad so that the onset of mud and snow has only a minimal effect? Have the Soviets been sufficiently weakened by constant offensive pressure? More than likely the German player will need to assemble his panzer, motorized and artillery units in the area of Smolensk for one last major push. (Code name: Typhoon). This should be supported by forward air units of JU87s, JU88s and fighters installed in new airfields constructed in turn before the assault. This air support is essential: the spectre of Wehrmacht units blasted into Valhalla by massive Russian air power should frighten even the most sanguine of players. To the south the German must assume the capture of Kiev by no later than August II. The choice of pushing on to Rostov or continuing north to take Moscow in flank can then be made, taking into consideration the extent of the Russian resistance. The priority target should be Moscow because, as indicated before, the German cannot win without its capture. The lack of German formations means that a sizeable portion of the line will be held by the Second and Fourth Rumanian armies, the Italian Corps and other odds and ends. It is necessary to thicken these qualitatively weak units with the seven divisions of the German Seventh Army, artillery, and anti-tank/anti- aircraft units. How this is done is a matter of preference but I've found that the German divisions do best positioned in the weakest points in the line while the allied units are ensconced in protected areas. The mobility of the anti-tank, allied motorized and panzer army reserve can be neatly employed to discourage or eliminate any Russian strikes in this portion of the line. It should be obvious by now that in the south the main offensive tool continues to be 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army. Equally obvious should be the fact that no mention has been made at all of the activity either on the Norwegian front or in the German rear areas. The area north of the A weather line undoubtedly will see some activity. The cost to the Germans of penetrating any kind of Russian defense (in supply factors, that is) is prohibitive and undoubtedly will limit the German effort to one attempt. The German forces in this area, 2 mountain divisions and 2Y2 infantry divisions, with a regiment of supporting artillery, probably can bring some pressure to bear and even possibly seize Murmansk. In any event, the German must guard the approaches to Petsamo and discourage any Russian ideas in this area. Finnish ski patrols will probably be very active in the center attempting to cut the main railway to Murmansk. Their pressure ought to force the hand of the Russian and compel him to assign at least a few units to patrol the line and block the secondary roads leading from Finland. The German needs to protect his rear areas, e.g., Warsaw, the rail lines and major air fields. This is best done with the nine security divisions, the unattached infantry battalions and in some cases the anti-aircraft units. In addition, although the number of construction engineer units seems impressive it will be necessary to scatter these along major supply routes to patch rail lines attacked by enemy parachutists and aircraft. The Russian must keep up the pressure even if it only slightly unbalances the German until a stabilized front can be established. Drang Nach Osten A Strategic Analysis Back to Campaign # 73 Table of Contents Back to Campaign List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1976 by Donald S. Lowry This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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