The strategic situation of Drang Nach Osten is defined by the section marked "Victory Conditions" in the rules and the "Order of Battle" charts. Four cities are the key to victory. Possession of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Rostov define the various levels of victory with the conquest of Petsamo by the Russian bearing a bonus for him. A glance at the mapboards reveals the tremendous strain these victory conditions place on both sides.

Stated in a different way, the German assault columns, tipped by mixed groups of armor, motorized infantry, artillery and combat engineers, must break through the Russian defensive zones, deal with at least two sizeable waves of reserves and finally break into four cities each of which possesses the defensive potential of a fortress. These tactical problems are confounded by a geographic situation which greatly widens the frontage which needs to be covered and lengthens the already precarious German supply lines.

In addition, these goals must be reached within a seventeen-turn time span and with weather conditions which vary from abysmal (mud) to horrific (snow). Attack lines are canalized by swamps and bodies of water, and the simple distance to the objectives from the start lines is a discouraging factor.

The other side, of course, can gain consolation from the difficulties outlined for the Germans above. Russian forces, however, are outnumbered badly and forced to deploy within seven hexes of the border. Less than ten percent of the Russian units can be consolidated into a reserve "front", but the rest must be committed in a more or less linear fashion to the defense of the entire European border. Significant also is the initial lack of any air power whatsoever, although this problem is solved within two turns. The Russians have the advantage of interior lines and a rail net which can rapidly move a substantial number of troops from one end of Russia to another. These conditions, plus varying terrain features and extensive reserves, can make for an interesting game if you draw the Russian side.

The name of the game for the Russian amounts to surviving the first devastating invasion turn, withdrawing slowly (while destroying as much of the rail net as possible) and accumulating reserves both for defense and possible Counterattack. Game experience indicates that this can be a highly problematic enterprise particularly when the Russian attempts to pursue an "historic" deployment.

Given the game mechanics it is impossible to completely prevent German breakthroughs against selected spots in the line. Therefore, on a tactical level the Russian player must, after the first turn, fight as flexible and as mobile a defense as possible. As in other games, the use of swamps, rivers and other protective terrain must be employed fully in the area of defense.

Let us examine the strategic and tactical positions of each side individually. For the sake of focusing on these problems clearly we will examine each in the context of the way the game unfolds initial deployment, opening moves, middle game and end game. Frequently DNO develops like a massive chess game. The following analysis respects this quality.

The Initial Deployment

The experienced wargamer should recognize immediately the inherent difficulties posed by the DNO mapboard, rule folder, and orders of battle. Let's look at them in a little detail:

The lengthy frontier: Russia gained several hundred miles of Polish territory from her treachery in 1939. The ironic thing is that ultimately this act backfired by extending substantially the front that she would have to defend and by diminishing the extent to which this region could be fortified. As a result the only fortified point on the entire frontier is the citadel of Brest which controls the major railroad routes through the Pripet marches.

Although the Russian player possesses fifteen fortification counters these may not be employed within ten squares of the frontier, reflecting the construction of the old Stalin Line along the pre-1939 borders. In addition, the Soviet player must guard the Russo-Finnish border south of the A-Weather Line to thwart a swift stroke taking Leningrad from the rear and Moscow from its relatively unprotected northern side.

Troop dispositions: Close to 950/'S of the Russian army is obliged to set up within seven hexes of the Soviet/Axis border. Their relatively low combat value definitely means that large numbers of troops-possibly as much as 20%-will be lost on the first turn irregardless.of how cleaverly the defense is established. Defense in depth backed by mobile reserves is curtailed by the initial lack of air power. There is really nothing that can be said. The Russian air reserves, when they finally come in turn 11, most probably will be decimated unless carefully husbanded for a strategic counter-stroke.

Terrain features: Several things strike the trained eye. The frontier on map five can be only lightly held by covering troops because of the ideal defensive terrain such as small lakes, swamps and woodland. The neck of the isthmus north of Leningrad must be heavily covered to prevent any sudden coup against the city. The border from the Baltic to south of the Pripet marshes offers a chance for infantry to survive behind the river lines and in the swamps.

Brest Litovsk can become a Russian Tobruk, a festering sore which can force the German to expend valuable time and resources to clean up. To the south the combination of rough terrain and river lines will slow up the invader. The area north of the Pripet marshes offers a succession of defensible, if somewhat longish, river lines. The marsh land immediately in front of Leningrad offers amazing advantages to the hard pressed Russian infantry in their attempt to stop the German Panzer drive towards the city. Nevertheless, the open areas immediately behind the rivers and the pocket formed in the Pripet Marsh/Kiev/Black Sea triangle offer enormous opportunities for German pincer operations.

Communications: The Russian player should enjoy the highly efficient rail net which can carry an unlimited number of units. This mobility has saved more than one harried Stavka commander.

The Russian Deployment

The initial comment I have to make is that you do not want to defend every hex side adjacent to the Axis-Soviet border. This was the order of battle and deployment by Stalin in 1941. He was extremely lucky-you may not be. To eliminate some of the element of luck let us divide the mapboard into its components to quickly assess each front's needs.

The primary Stavka concern is the defense of the frontiers on maps one and three. The Niemen River line should be strongly defended and troops from the reserve should fill in the gap west of Minsk where the river line bends away from the border. In all, this line consumes some twenty-five to thirty infantry divisions, ten or so motorized brigades, and about half of the available antitank regiments.

The latter should be placed on hexes covering the points where the rail lines cross the frontier. In addition, it is almost mandatory that a variety of armored pieces (about half the available line firepower) be in operational reserve, preferably on rail lines. This defensive net can be thickened by the allocation of the tank brigades in a direct infantry support role. (Read that last line: "Stack your tanks with your infantry!") Wherever possible, a second line, backstopping the first, should be developed whose overlapping ZOC's will slow up German advances. It is also a good practice to throw up a screen of infantry, perhaps some ten or so infantry brigades, to act as a partial breakwater before the Germans reach the main line of resistance.

Brest Litovsk should be firmly held by at least two good divisions of infantry with supporting NKVD and artillery units. I prefer to place a mixed group of infantry and cavalry on its right flank as far north as square LL44 and then bending back into the swamp.

Perhaps half the cavalry available and a half dozen infantry divisions and the same number of brigades can be spared for this task. These will be relatively safe as it will take the Germans considerable time to penetrate the swamp. On Brest's left flank at least seven divisions supported by some artillery and cavalry will be sufficient to slow the German advance.

South of the marsh lands the best defensive positions are offered by the Pru't River and the rough terrain east and south of Lwow. Delaying forces should be established in the dot city (Chernovtsy?) on 127 and in Lwow. The balance of the line infantry should be deployed evenly along the Prut River line between the USSR and Rumania and behind the dot city along the Dnestr River.

The balance of the Line armored formations should be disposed with an eye to chopping off the Parizer spearheads as they break into clear terrain. A small armored group of perhaps two Tank corps, three or four tank brigades and a similar number of motorized brigades should support the Prut line. The rest of the mobile units should take up supporting positions close to the covering infantry east of Lwow. They should be close enough to support but not so close as to be captured in a Panzer Army pincers.

The northern front should be protected with units drawn from Stavka reserve. An infantry group of two or three infantry divisions supported by three ski brigades arid an artillery regiment should be sufficient to hold Murmansk against all but the most crushing of German advances. Even if Murmansk falls its loss is not as crucial in this game as it would have been in real life.

Leningrad must be held at all costs. To this end it is necessary to form a thick defensive front on the isthmus and to protect the approaches north of Lake Ladoga. Without a deep front the good Finnish infantry corps (they can stack their divisions five high) can have the effect, if the Finnish war effort permits, of a steam roller.

North of Lake Ladoga good defensive terrain can permit a thinning out of infantry units. I'm comfortable using the infantry and cavalry brigades from Stavka reserve for this purpose. In clear terrain they ought to be supported by three or four line tank brigades.

The isthmus directly north of the city is the point of greatest concern. The lack of depth to this portion of the front precludes any kind of mobile defense and demands greater precautions when deploying than usual. All five garrison divisions need to be employed on the line adjacent to the border.

This should be thickened by adding perhaps another half dozen divisions, several NKVD brigades and whatever artillery that can be found. Behind this line, a switch position located on the very next row of hexes should be developed from the remnants of ski brigades, NKVD, and other odds and ends. Behind this line in a position three hexes from the border should be positioned the regiments of engineers, posted to quickly construct a fortified zone into which the other units can fall back.

The remaining Stavka reserves should be formed as a reserve front in the vicinity of Smolensk on the rail line to allow a quick response to the Axis assault, The parachute corps of nine brigades should be withdrawn to rear areas near potential airfields to increase the Russian players options later in the game. The one mountain division probably should be assigned to the Murmansk area where it can take advantage of its winterization.

The clever reader has by now seen the thrust of the strategy developed for the Russians. You must protect Leningrad first. If it falls any line you build will be up in the air lacking a firm anchor. To that end it is strongly advised that a ring of fortifications be erected south of Leningrad with seven of the initial fortification counters and the available engineering teams.

Likely spots for these field fortifications are 1-5, H-6, K-8, L-7 (all on map one) and J-35, J-34, J-33, and 1-32 (map two). Additional forts should be constructed forward of these positions as engineers become available.

Secondly, the Moscow area will undoubtedly attract a great deal of German attention. Loss of Moscow neatly severs the front in two and allows the German player the ability to defeat the Russian in detail. Protection of Leningrad and Moscow guarantees the Russian at least a draw. In addition, the possession of Moscow offers the Russian at least the chance of gaining a substantive or decisive victory. The withdrawal of Russian mobile forces should therefore be in the direction of Moscow where, more than likely, the climatic battle will be fought.

Kiev because of its proximity to the frontier cannot be defended successfully. At best covering forces can deny Kiev to the Germans for a few turns. If such a delaying action seems attractive the investment of several fortification counters initially, some engineers to strengthen the position, plus a few supply pieces to accommodate a siege, can be profitably made. Kiev can become a tough, expensive nut for the Wehrmacht to crack. If such a protected siege seems illadvised than the fortification counters not used at Leningrad should be distributed so as to support the Dneiper river line.

Rostov, because of its relative distance from the front and its proximity to east and south edge reserves, can be developed after the Axis commander has committed his forces to a definite iine of advance. The Russian player should always bear in mind that he can lose Rostov and Kiev and still not lose the war.

German Deployment

The objectives for the German assault are defined clearly by the rules. He must seize and hold three of the four target cities with strength undiminished by isolation, simply to gain the lowest level of victory. Achieving this requires a clear idea of the player's own goals and an accurate assessment of the means at hand. Which objectives seem most promising therefore? And, are they realistic?

My preference continues to be a variation on the Barbarossa theme. These goals can be quickly summarized as follows:

1. Quickly push a strong Army Group North in the direction of Leningrad, strongly supported by the Finnish Army and Luftwaffe formations. If this rush does not work prepare for a set piece assault, reinforcing your infantry formations particularly. A three-year-long siege is not acceptable in DNO.

2. Advance Army Group Center towards Moscow along the axis Minsk/Smolensk/Moscow.

3. Use Army Group South to sieze Kiev and subsequently threaten Moscow from the southwest.

4. Push a mobile group towards Rostov with an eye to capturing it if the opportunity presents itself.

The advantages offered to the Germans on the attack are many and varied. The German OKW commander should see clearly that the firepower and mobility of his Panzer and Motorized divisions are the key to his success. More than likely, it is they who will bear the responsibility for breaking through enemy lines and seizing distant objectives, And equally, it is they who will suffer the greatest losses holding shut encirclements while the trapped enemy formations and relief columns pound away mercilessly at them.

Moreover, the control of the air during the first two Axis turns is so overwhelming that the careful positioning of airfields and air "gruppen" is absolutely vital. The destruction of train marshalling yards and rail lines, and ground support for Wehrmacht attacks are the primary benefits offered by control of the air. It is a pleasure to watch your opponent cringe as you mercilessly destroy his air formations or interdict the escape route he had so carefully designed. I have found that initially an equal allocation of air power among the three German fronts is a solid if somewhat uncreative opening.

Interestingly enough, the troop distribution proposed for the original Barbarossa is quite suitable for achieving the objectives outlined above. Three armies should be directed onto the Leningrad axis. One command of about ten divisions should clear the Baltic coast. The main weight of the assault should fall on Panzergruppe I which should start some three hexes to the right of the Baltic coast on the Wehrmacht start line.

The first task of Panzergruppe I should be the capture of the city of Riga with its defending troops. Hopefully, Russian defensive forces will be pinned against the Baltic coast and destroyed by the following infantry. Panzergruppe I should consist of a minimum of three Panzer divisions plus supporting motorized and infantry units. On Panzergruppe's right flank should be another infantry army of about a dozen divisions. Not only must this force protect the Panzergruppe's right flank but obviously it will have responsibility for tying in with Army Group Center on their right.

Army Group Center bears the primary burden for breaking the back of the Russian Army. By dividing the ten Panzer divisions and five motorized units between the two groups represented by the Hq's with a movement ability of ten the German commander can begin setting the stage for a series of Kesselschlachts (pincer operations) directed at the gut of the Russian Army.

These infantry armies will possess some thirty-five infantry divisions between them, supporting artillery and other units. The two Panzer Groups should attack through holes punched in the Russian line by the infantry. Where exactly this occurs should be a function of how the Russian commander places his units.

Army Group South should be able to puncture a series of holes in the Russian positions between Brest and the Hungarian border. Generally, it is best to hit the citadel of Brest with an operational group of infantry closely supported by combat engineers, Flammpanzers, artillery and special railroad guns. Going into the line to the right of this operational group will be some twenty-five infantry divisions in the first echelon, four Panzer divisions, and two mountain divisions to clean up any resistance in the Carpathians.

The duty of the Hungarian, Rumanian, Italian and other allied divisions, as well as the 11th Army of seven infantry divisions, will be to act as an anvil upon which the Russian Army should be smashed by the encircling forces of 6th Army (12 divisions) and 1st Panzer Army of three Panzer divisions and four infantry divisions. The other infantry army, the 17th, with about nine free formations will have the responsibility of protecting the extended flank of Army Group South.

Tactically, the actual breakthroughs can be greatly facilitated by constructing special shock groups which will "crumble" the Soviet line and permit the mobile groups to pour through. Ideally, a good mix for these groups consists of two 7-6 infantry divisions, a pair of artillery regiments, two assault gun battalions and other odds and ends. For a particularly difficult assignment as many as three artillery regiments may be assigned.

Certain areas of the line should be singled out for this "shock treatment". Of course, the impact of the force used can be greatly enhanced by the use of railroad guns and ground attack by Luftwaffe units. The special rules on turn one allow the German player to improve his odds by one column; this and the ten "freebie" river attacks can punch a goodly number of holes in the Russian front-line defenses.

The mobile teams should consist of mobile combat engineers, anti-tank units, panzers and motorized units. If it is necessary to mix the mobile stuff with infantry or other non-motorized troops do so, but only with care.

On the right flank, contrary to historical commentary, the allied armies. can become positive assets if handled correctly. The Rumanian jaeger, mountain and cavalry units have definite potential as offensive instruments, particularly if properly supported by artillery and air strikes. The good, light divisions possessed by the Finns can spearhead crushing assaults on selected portions of the Russian line. In any event the weaker allied divisions should be withheld from any offensive operations lest they be mangled. Once they're chewed up they are irreplaceable. And they are excellent as garrison units and patrols for the communications and transport net.

Drang Nach Osten A Strategic Analysis

Overview and Deployment
The Opening
The Ending