Both armies were deployed on either side of a valley between 2 rows of dunes, running from the beach to the greenway. Maurits had agreed with his sub-commanders not to grasp the initiative but to await the Spanish attack. Albertus would have to take the ininiative since his army was without sufficient supplies and supply-lines to hold out much longer.

At 3.30PM both armies were so close that Vere ordered the musketeers of Maurits' Guard to open fire to tempt the Spaniards to attack. Albertus answered by sending the musketeers from the tercio's of Monroy and Villars forward, which took command of some hill­tops overloo-king the dune-valley, followed by about 500 pike & Shot which tried to cross this valley. On the beach Mendoza followed the same tactic. At the same time Albertus send a detachment of arquebusiers to a ridge between some dunes overlooking the greenway,with the same inten-tions as Vere had done before.

Meanwhile Maurits, who was to be found on the open south flank, ordered a cavalry charge by the Ist and 5th cavalry-squadron. They first had to cross some ditches and small dams before they reached terrain which allowed them to press the charge home. This charge was soon followed by a charge of the 2nd squadron. Both charges were successfull and lead to an initial breakthrough by the Dutch on the cavalry-flank, with several Spanish squadrons being routed and pursuited as far as Nieuwpoort and Oostende.

Meanwhile on the Spanish right wing the mutineer cavalry charged the van of the States' ar-my and threatened their position on the beach.This is the only time that the mutineer cavalry is mentioned as taking an active part in the battle. Francis Vere was wounded during this attack. As Vere's troops little by little pushed back the Spaniards, Albertus committed more troops of the bataille and took again the advantage over the English troops. There is also some mentioning as to Spanish cavalry supporting this attack, probably the Dukal Guard. During this fight Francis Vere was wounded for the second time and taken from the field. His brother Horatio took over command of the van and succeeded in repulsing the next attack by the Spanish bataille.

The mounted arquebusiers under Van Houte 'charged' the Spanish lancers. This attack was answered by the lancer-comp of Verdugo en Guevarra which charged the 2nd and 5th Dutch squadrons, causing severe disorder. Count Lodewijk van Nassau was amply saved from capture by a captain who recognized him by his orange plume. The Spanish cavalry charged home untill they came within sight of Maurits who had personally rallied 2 companies for a counter-attack, whereupon they withdrew. Up to then the cavalry force of neither side had managed to threaten the infantry flank of the enemy.

Time was now about 5.30PM. To relieve the pressure on his threatened van, Maurits send forward the 6th cavalry-squadron for a 4th charge, this time to threathen the Spanish bataille in it's flank, which was still further exposed by the dispersed Spanish cavalry. This had little to no effect and as Albertus had the remainder of his bataille join in the attack, Maurits was obliged to send his bataille under Solms forward too. Although these put up some heavy fire against the Spanish bataille, the latter forced both the exhausted English battalions the bataille still further back. The veteran Spanish foot, eager to demonstrate their supremacy, proved to be too strong and gained more and more terrain. The Frisian battalions were now ordered for-ward to support the English. On the beach the English battalion guarding the battery vainly attempted an attack on the Spanish battery, which was repulsed by the mutineers.

Meanwhile the tide had reached about it's highest level, just leaving a narrow stripe of the beach available. The van of the States' army was pushed back upon the artillery battery on the beach, while the bataille, also being pushed back, pressed the rearguard dangerously close uopn the train. The latter partly came under fire, which caused severe disorder. Horses with wagons running into the sea or against each other-, many of the personel being killed, the hospital-ship (a stranded ship in the harbour, were Francis Vere was also taken care of) getting overcrowded and many women and children of the followers crying in panic must have been an awfull sight. Maurits' greatest problem was to rally his cavalry, which after the successfull charges was spread all over the terrain and beyond. Some companies even didn't return before the battle was over. At this moment Albertus ordered his rearguard forward. Although no veterans, but mainly mercenaries and garrison-troops, they managed to push back the Dutch even further through shear numbers and enthusiasm. Maurits' train and artillery became more and more threatened. Meanwhile Horatio Vere, assisted by lieutenant-colonel Sir John Ogle, had managed to rally several hundred English foot.

This inspired one of the battalions of the French regiments in the bataille under colonel Dommerville to join the English. Together they advanced upon the Spanish mutineers and bataille who were crossing the dune-valley en masse now and headed towards the battery on the beach. As soon as they came within sight the battery, having loaden their guns with musket-balls, managed to hit them full with a bit of a lucky shot. Hereupon the Spaniards moved sidewards into the dunes to reappear again on the beach within short distance of the battery. Matters looked dramatical-ly serious now for the States' army.

Now time had come for Maurits to throw in his last reserve: the 7th cavalry-squadron under van Balen, comprising 2 English comp. At the moment that the Spaniards entered the beach again they were simultaneously attacked by HoratioVere and John Ogle through the dunes and across the beach in their flank by the cavalry comp of van Balen and Penbrook. The Spanish mutineers were thrown back into the dunes upon the bataille and took part of it with them in their retreat. During this struggle Zapena and El Villars were taken prisoner. The Spanish troops rallied upon the stubborn Irish foot of the rearguard who firmly held their ground.

At the same time Cecil's comp charged the mounted arquebusiers of the Dukal Guard, which had advanced a bit ahead on the greenway. These were easily routed and interpenetrated their own foot ranks. Cecil continued through the dunes and fell upon the left flank of the Irish. This even was too much for them and they were routed with heavy losses. Mendoza's muti-neer cavalry, still on the beach and unable to do much due to the terrain, withdrew from the field. Mendoza, unable to stop them tried to seek Albertus to assist him. On his way he was captured by the mounted arquebusiers of van Houten, which had crossed the dunes.

Time was about 6.30PM as the English and Frisian battalions rallied at the sight of the Spanish disorder and gathered courage for a last attack. This also inspired the Dutch bataille to resume their attack on the Spanish bataille. By the time the Spanish right wing collapsed and the Dukal Guard fled, Maurits had rallied most of his cavalry. The Spanish cavalry of Galeno had meanwhile for the greater part been dispersed. With heavy charges by the Dutch cavalry in the flank of the Spanish bataille, their last resistance was broken. Albertus could only be relieved with great difficulty and left the field, followed by the entire army. They fled into the direction of Leffinghe and from there to Oudenburg and Brugge.

It was nearly 7.00PM as Maurits could overlook the battlefield and make up the balance. Meanwhile his cavalry and part of the foot were still in pursuit of the enemy commanders, making it difficult to sent messages in time. Since the terrain sometimes screened enemy movements, reactions often came too late. All these factors led to a series of clashes and struggles from dune to dune, with frequently changing advantages.

Maurits has always been much praised for his victory, although 19th C literature acknowledes his failures too. Fact is that he had managed to keep a reasonable view on what happened on the battlefield and direct his troops to the right place at the right moment. It was wise not to leave part of the cavalry on the beach, thus creating a numerically superiority of cavalry on his right wing on the greenway. This compensated perhaps for their lack of battle­experience, since for many this was the first time they encountered enemy-cavalry face to face.

The commitment of his reserve is considered a master-stroke, but I think it was a normal decision for a competent general. Generally speaking I would say that he has compensated for the strategical mistakes of the foregoing days, by tactically handling his troops as good as possible under these difficult circumstances, both before and during the battle. Both his inspiring presence everywhere on the field and the drill of his smaller formations will have helped his army to withstand the pressure of the mighty power and fighting experience of the battle-hardened Spanish troops.

The Spaniards had the disadvantage of having forced-marched for many days already. On the battlefield they had the sun and wind right into their faces. Their best cavalry commander Velasco had been left behind at Oudenburg with a strategical reserve. Unlike Maurits, Alber­tus didn't mount his artillery on platforms to prevent them sinking away into the sand. One of the most serious mistakes was to place the mutineer cavalry on the beach which was commanded by the States'artillery and were they had amply room to deploy. Also he didn't have a real reserve for the final blow.

Epilogue

The battle was not a regular battle in its normal meaning. The terrain obstructed orderly troop movements and must have screened a large part of the battlefield to the supreme

The States-General at Oostende didn't allow an all-out pursuit of the enemy, probably since evening was falling, the men were over-tired and the escape route for the Spaniards to Leffinghe was still open. Also attention would be distracted from their original goal: Nieuwpoort and Duinkerke. Albertus fled over Leffinghe, Oudenburg and Brugge to Gent, where he arrived next day.

Losses were very heavy on both sides. Accounts on Spanish losses vary between 2.500 and 7.000. To my the most acceptable numbers are 3.000 dead, 800 wounded an 520 prisoners; a total of 4.320 losses or ±40% (see Cox). Of these only 120 were cavalry. Since 3.200 men were from the veteran tercio's and mutineers, this should have been a severe blow to the Spaniards. Moreover all the artillery and about 150 flags and standards were lost. Also 42 standards, that morning lost at Leffinghe, were recaptured.

On the Dutch side accounts vary between 2­3.000, while the only Spanish account (Carnero) mentions 6.000. Cox comes to a 1.950 dead and 800 wounded: a total of 2.750. One has to deduct about 750 casualties at Leffinghe, which leaves us with 2.000 (± 17%). Of these 250 were cavalry. The English had suffered badly, about 800 (30%) as did the Guard comp (35%).

The exploit of this victory was almost zero. The Spaniards had left behind their train at Lef­finghe on their flight to Brugge. They were allowed to bring it into safety next day to Ouden-burg. After 3 days rest Maurits marched back to Nieuwpoort to resume the siege.

Albertus, hardly hampered by the States' army manged to raise a new field army of 8.000 foot and another 5.000 troops to observe Oostende. Bad weather and the constant threath of the Spanish troops forced Maurits to raise the siege on July 18th.

It was August 1st as the first troops finally embarked for their return to the Netherlands.

Actually the mission had been military, politically and financially a complete failure, only leaving the victory at Nieuwpoort on July 2nd to be remembered for generations to come.

Bibliography

Most use has been made by Duyck, who as a financial secretary of the States accompanied the army on most campaigns between 1591 and 1602 and Cox, who made a thorough study of the logistical problems during the campaign with much attention for the troop dispositions.

Although most consulted works are non-­English I'll mention the most important ones:

Jan Orlers: 'Den Nassauschen Laurencrans' (Leiden 1610).
E. van Meeteren:'Belgische ofte Nederlantsche oorlogen ende Geschiedenissen' (Amsterdam 1663).
Journael van Anthonis Duck' (The Hague 1862-1866).
W. Dillingham:'The commentaries of Sir Francis Vere'. Cambridge 1657.
Groen van Prinsteren: 'Archives ou Correspondence inedite de la Maison d'Orange Nassau; deuxieme Serie, tome II I600-1625' Various letters (Utrecht 1858).
R. Fruin: 'De Slag by Nieuwpoort' (The Hague 1901). In the 3rd part of his Verspreide Geschriften (Collected Essays).
Charles Oman: 'A history of the art of warfare in the 16th century' (London 19..).
F. ten Raa and F de Bas: 'Het Staatsche Leger; deel II 1588-1609' (Breda 1918).
J.W Wijn: 'Het krijgswezen in de tijd van Prins Maurits' (Utrecht 1934).
Geoffrey Parker: 'The army of Flanders on the Spanish road' (Cambridge 1972/1990)
B.Cox: 'Vanden Tocht in Vlaenderen. De logistiek van Nieuwpoort 1600' (Zutphen 1986).

Good Generals Need Some Luck

Road to Nieuwpoort: 2nd July 1600
Map 1: The Road to Nieuwpoort
Jumbo Map 1: The Road to Nieuwpoort (slow: 185K)
Battle of Nieuwpoort: 2nd July 1600
Map 4: Battle (slow: 135K)
Jumbo Map 4: The Road to Nieuwpoort (extremely slow: 356K)
Order of Battle
Color Illustrations (very slow: 247K)
Wargaming the Battle