The French War in Indo-China is a subject I am especially interested in and I can't resist adding my two penneth to what Karim has written. For me, this will probably be 'this year's wargaming project.' After much vacillation I have decided to do it in 15mm, probably using Peter Pig figures (and maybe Old Glory?) and Quality Castings vehicles (if anyone from Quality Castings is reading this- thanks for the catalogues over the past two years-now that my finances are stabilising I'll place and order soon!). With regard to rules I'm tempted by Command Decision but will probably write my own (using a similar scale to CD).

Some of the Features of Dien Bien Phu Which have Caught My Eye Are:

Rules stressing the importance of morale are vital. Time again companies of French paras would counterattack Viet Minh (VM) battalions and throw them back through the elan of their assault. Any close assault rules you use should have relative morale as the crucial factor, not numbers or equipment. 'Citadel,' the boardgame covering the battle by GDW has a rather neat rule that whilst losses reduce the morale of most units, if the French elite para units take losses their morale goes up-reflecting not only 'that when the going gets tough the tough get going' but also that as the battle gets more intense these units shed their weaker members and consequently end by with a very high percentage of 'natural fighters'.

Perhaps unusually for 'modern era' games leaders should have morale as well as command benefits.

At the risk of sounding like a 'know it all' I would be tempted to tweak some of Karim's morale ratings. The elite French paras I'd be tempted to make morale 11 and non para French legion units morale 9. The BPVN had a somewhat shaky start in the battle but rapidly improved- perhaps the Veteran, Morale 9 (or better).

The greater flexibility and command control for the French at the tactical level should be emphasised (note tactical level- at the strategic level the VM clearly had the edge). The VM suffered from a lack of radios and low level unit initiative. Many times the VM would take a position and not only seem to be at a loss on how to exploit this but were also caught disorganised by immediate French counterattacks and consequently driven back. Perhaps this can be gamed by insisting on very rigid pre battle planning by the VM with little chance of changing these plans through initiative. With Command Decision I suggest limiting command stands to the battalion level.

Conversely the French were very flexible with hastily thrown together 'ad hoc' battlegroups and cross attached units etc. doing very well (but not always- there are examples when these went wrong with units failing to support each other etc.).

As an example of French tactical flexibility, note that during one counterattack Bigeard (French para commander) 'orchestrated' the operation with a battery of 8 radios. The VM tended to rely on flags, whistles etc. The French, with much greater experience in large-scale, set-piece battles could react rapidly; the VM had to pre plan everything.

Compounding the above problem for the VM was that their artillery was also inflexible. Preliminary barrages were both well planned (generally) and accurate but the batteries were unable to response to new threats or break up French counterattacks. Again some sort of rigid pre battle plan is required, maybe along WW1 lines. This was due not only to lack of radios and inexperienced command control but also due to the way the batteries were dug in. Individual guns were often emplaced individually and although this gave superb protection and concealment it further handicapped control. Also the VM artillery positions to maximise protection often had embrasures which offered little or not traverse, the guns effectively having to fire almost along fixed lines.

However, if the French do not immediately counterattack it will be very hard to shift the VM from it. Given time new defences will be prepared, fresh units moved in and land lines laid to help coordinate defensive fire (which in the meantime has been ranged in). Remember also that the French positions are completely overlooked by the VM from the surrounding hills- very little that the French do will remain unnoticed by the VM.

The M24 Chaffee is not regarded as a heavyweight in the tank world but they were enormously valuable at Dien Bien Phu, he presence of only 1 or 2 often making the difference between a counterattack succeeding or failing (they tended to be kept in reserve for this purpose). Their presence should increase the morale of attackers and decrease that of defenders. They also proved to be tough (certainly tougher than most wargames rules would make them), many surviving multiple hits before being disabled or knocked out. Disabled tanks were repaired and returned to the fray.

There seems to have been a feeling amongst the defenders that the Navy pilots pushed home their attacks in the face of heavy AA to greater effect than the airforce. Great lengths were gone to by the garrison to rescue pilots who came down between the lines (could make a good skirmish game).

Larger version of Map at right (88K).

Note how the role of Dien Bien Phu changed- originally intended to be a base for offensive operations, when these became impractical it was redesignated a defensive bastion which implies to me that the French High Command really was not sure on what they wanted. It would probably have been better to pull out of the area one the strength of the VM reaction was known- or at the very start of the operation decided it was to be a fortress and supplied the required equipment, engineers etc. The French bunker complexes were desperately improvised and suffered from a lack of sandbags and wood (when the rains came this was to have especially serious consequences). They were also not deep enough and there was not enough wire surrounding them.

There are also indications that for all its shortcomings as a defensive position Dien Bien Phu turned out to be a tougher nut to crack than Giap expected. During the course of the battle VM tactics changed from 'human wave' type assaults to a much more patient siege operation with massive numbers of trenches being dug up to and around French positions before assaults were launched. The French possibly came quite close to forcing the VM to break off the battle. This would not have won the war but it would have put a rather different complexion on the peace talks.

With regard to the French War in Indo-China it is easy to dismiss it as a 'poor man's Vietnam'. For me this is one of the attractions. The two sides are much more evenly matched on the battlefield, the French have an extremely colourful OOB and whilst in theory they can do most of the things the US tried later they have to do it with far less (men and equipment) and without the crushing technical and firepower superiority the Americans enjoyed later. The French can for example perform air mobile operations- but they have to do it with Dakotas and parachutes, not Hueys and airmobile infantry!

More Dien Bien Phu:

Dien Bien Phu (part 2)
The Editor Speaks about Dien Bien Phu
Dien Bien Phu Order of Battle
Dien Bien Phu VM Infantry Division Organization