If ever there was an unlikely group of would-be world conquerors, it was the Mongols. Originating from the lands in north-central Asia that are now called Mongolia, they were little more than a loose collection of ethnically-related nomadic tribes, more inclined to fight amongst themselves than join forces for any common cause. Then, in the early 13th century a young warlord named Temujin -known to posterity as Genghis Khan - united them by a combination of guile, force and charisma. His genius was in taking them from a rabble and transforming them into a force of nature: unstoppable, punishing and devastating; a force that relentlessly pursued their ruler's goal of making the world into one vast steppe, where "Mongol mothers can once again suckle free and happy children." In less than two generations they had spread from their tiny, insignificant homeland to trample all the land from Korea to Poland beneath the hooves of their cavalry, carving out the largest contiguous land empire in history. Until the modern era, no military force could compete with that of the Mongols in terms of effectiveness and certainly none came close in mobility. Their armies were well disciplined and utilized careful planning, Often they fought on several fronts at once, a difficult enough task in modern history and practically unheard of during the medieval period. The keys to the unprecedented string of Mongol victories were superiority in training, discipline, reconnaissance, mobility, and communications, each honed to a level unheard of in any other pre-twentieth century army. TRAINING All males between the ages of 15 to around 60 who were capable of bearing arms were eligible for military service. Trained from youth to be expert horsemen and archers, the rigors of daily nomadic living in the harsh climate of Mongolia prepared them to be warriors. When summoned they were expected to leave their flocks and homes, taking with them four or five changes of horses and travel to wherever the unit happened to be located. Wives and children were expected to look after the herds. Nomad horse archer armies were not new, and already possessed a long history of success. The key that allowed Genghis Khan to excel where others had failed - the essential element that separated the Mongols from their peers - was discipline. It was discipline that enabled him to overcome the assortment of tribal confederations and alliances which he faced before becoming the ruler of all Mongolia. While other armies would disintegrate in order to toot the dead and baggage of an enemy in flight, Genghis Khan ordered his armies to wait until victory was complete. Those who disobeyed were killed. This disciplined soldier was given a high rate of mobility. Each trooper had a string of three to five horses, enabling him to exchange mounts when one tired and provide replacements if one was slain. In sedentary armies, this simply was not possible. Horses were simply too expensive to maintain to allow each cavalryman to have more than one, especially the large horses necessary to carry an armored warrior. EQUIPMENT Mongol troops dressed and traveled very light and were considerably more lightly armored then the armies they faced, which enabled them to attain their high rate of mobility. Each man wore a silk undershirt, atop which he wore a tunic. Members of the heavy cavalry would also wear chain mail and a cuirass made of leather-covered iron scales. Each man carried a leather-covered wicker shield and a helmet of either leather or iron depending on his rank. Weapons consisted of two composite bows and sixty arrows. Light cavalry carried a small sword and two or three javelins while the heavy cavalry was equipped with a scimitar, a mace and a 4-meter (12 foot) lance. Soldiers also carried clothing, cook pots, dried meat, water and other smaller material. The saddlebag was made from a cow's stomach which, being waterproof and inflatable, could be used as a float when crossing rivers. The lightly-encumbered cavalry was thus able to consistently advance up to 100 miles per day. The principal Mongol weapon was the double-recurve composite bow, made of layers of sinew, horn, and wood. Each warrior had more than one, typically attached in a special quiver to their saddles on each horse in addition to quivers of arrows. The bow itself possessed an incredible amount of penetrating power, with pull weights of over one hundred pounds. The Mongols used a wide variety of arrows, many with specialized purposes, such as armor piercing, blunt stun arrows, and even whistling arrows for signaling purposes. In addition, the soldiers carried sabers, maces, axes, and sometimes a short spear with a hook at the bottom of the blade. Other supplies, such as rope, rations, files for sharpening arrows, etc., were also carried. This made the soldiers of the Mongol army self-sufficient. Able to function independently of supply lines, they were not hampered by a slow moving baggage train - a fact that contributed to their ability to make the rapid marches that characterized Mongol warfare. ORGANIZATION The organization of the Mongol army followed the old traditional decimal system of the steppe. The army was built upon a squad of ten (arban). Ten of these would then compose a company of a hundred (jaghun). The next unit was a regiment of a thousand (minggban). Most of the commanders listed in the contemporary sources were leaders of a mingghan. The equivalent of the modem division was a unit consisting of ten thousand (tumen). The organization was simple, but sensible. The system could also easily be applied to new conscripts from vassals or forcibly conscripted troops from among the conquered. DISCIPLINE The other key to Mongol organization has already been mentioned but its importance cannot be overstated. Discipline distinguished the Mongol armies from their contemporaries. Without discipline, the Mongols could not have perfected the system of steppe/horse archer warfare, which had existed for centuries. Nomads since the Scythians and Hsiung-nu had long based their armies and method of war on mobility and the bow. The Mongols, however, perfected it, allowing them to conquer the entire steppe land of Eurasia. No mean feat considering that nomadic horse archers from the steppes were a desired element in every army from China to Egypt. It was Genghis Kahn who made discipline an integral part of Mongol warfare and instituted rigorous training. The tactics that the Mongol army used, such a caracole technique in which the soldiers advanced, shot, then wheeled back in order for the next rank to fire, demanded unit integrity. Unit integrity was achieved through the battue, or hunt. During the battue, the army would form lines that often stretched for miles. These ranks would then begin to envelop an area, forcing the game into the ring. The Mongols would then tighten their ranks, so that the circle continued to shrink. The objective of this was to not allow any animal to escape. An incredibly high degree of organization, communication, and cooperation was necessary for this task. Without it, points of rendezvous could not be established, gaps would eventually appear in the ranks, and inevitably, confusion would result. Only a well-trained and disciplined army, with a high degree of unit integrity and command structure, could accomplish this task. COMMUNICATIONS Another key advantage the Mongols had was an extremely effective and reliable system of communications and coordination based on flags, torches and riders who carried messages over great distances, often changing horses in mid-gallop. Hence all Mongol units were able to remain in near constant contact with each other and, through their corps of couriers, under the control of a single commander even over thousands of miles. This level of integration of mobility and communication would not be equaled again until the combination of mechanized vehicles and radio communication in World War II. STRATEGY AND TACTICS Before invading a territory, the Mongols made extensive preparations in a quriltai. At this "council of war and state" key leaders would not only plan the upcoming war but also determine which generals would participate in it. Prior to and during the planning phase Mongol spies and scouts would have been accumulating intelligence on their opponent. Genghis Khan himself had stressed the importance of intelligence gathering. Before opening a campaign, he collected from merchants, travelers and spies exact information regarding conditions in the enemy country. Roads, bridges and other thoroughfares were kept in constant repair to ensure rapidity of movement and communication. Scouts were sent forward, sometimes as much as a thousand miles away, who sent back regular reports. Once the decision was made to go to war, leaders would call up the necessary units and prepare for the coming campaign. Although the planning of the campaign was a major component, the Mongol generals still maintained a high degree of independence. This enabled them to complete their objectives as they saw fit, as long as they adhered to the agreed to timetable. Because of this careful planning the Mongols were able to coordinate their movements and concentrate their forces at prearranged sites. The Mongols had a set method of invasion that varied only slightly from campaign to campaign. First the Mongol army would invade in several columns. Often it was a three-pronged attack, consisting of an "army of the center" and then two flanking forces. Flanking forces in some cases went into neighboring territories before rendezvousing dezvousing with the "army of the center." All of these columns were covered by a screen of scouts who constantly relayed information back to their mother column. Because of their pre-planned schedule as well as the scouts, the Mongols marched divided, but were able to fight united. Furthermore, because their forces marched in smaller concentrations, the Mongols were not impeded by lengthy columns stretching for miles. They used their mobility to spread terror to the effect that rarely were opponents ever really prepared to concentrate their forces when the enemy appeared. The use of a many-pronged invasion also fit into their preferred method of engaging the enemy. The Mongols preferred to deal with all field armies before moving deep into enemy territory. This was very practical. Reaching this goal was rarely difficult, as the enemy usually sought battle with the Mongols before the invaders destroyed an entire province. Furthermore, the use of columns, with screens of scouts gathering intelligence, enabled the Mongols to locate enemy armies much more rapidly than a single concentration would have. Since the Mongols could usually unite their forces before the enemy was cognizant of all of the different invasion forces, the Mongols were better able to conceal their troop strengths, and deliver a blow at times ad places of their choosing. In the event a Mongol force was cutoff or embattled it could be reinforced and relieved rapidly. On the battlefield the normal Mongol strategy was a direct rapid assault. Because their mobility and intelligence gathering systems were so much greater than their normally feudal opponents, the Mongols could usually concentrate quicker and overwhelm their foes. If this failed and they found themselves faced by an equal force, a strong enemy position, or by superior numbers, they would then utilize their superiority in maneuver and communications in order to bring the enemy on to more favorable ground. One favorite method was the feigned withdrawal, intended to lure an enemy holding a strong position into pursuing the Mongol force into a carefully prepared trap. Another tactic was to attempt to bypass or side-step the enemy position and catch an enemy in the open while they tried to reorient to the new Mongol position. Mongol commanders would also send portions of their force well past and around the enemy lines while the main body engaged the enemy army. At a signal from the commander these detached units would wheel and strike their opponents on the flank or in the rear. One recurring result of this combination of mobility and communication revealed by careful analysis of Mongol battles is that they were normally close to achieving their objectives long before the enemy had any clue what those objectives were. Since Mongol tactics usually focused on the enemy's field armies, strongholds and major cities were typically bypassed in the initial phases. At the same time, whenever possible, smaller fortresses or ones easily surprised were taken as they came along. Hammering at the smaller outposts and towns had several effects. First, it cut off the principal city and disrupted communications with other cities. Second, refugees from the smaller locales would flee to the last stronghold. The reports from these cities and the streaming hordes of refugees reduced the morale of the inhabitants and the garrison of the principle city, as well as straining food and water reserves by the sudden influx of refugees. What had seemed an impregnable fortress was being softened up. Once the field army was destroyed or scattered, the Mongols were then free to lay siege without interference. The smaller forts and towns could not harry the Mongols who either foraged or were out on other various missions during the siege. Most importantly, the numerous Mongol columns and raiding forces confused sallies from the different cities, since for cities to do so in any strength would leave them open to attack from another Mongol column. Finally, the capture of the outer strongholds and towns provided the Mongols with labor to either man the siege engines, or to act as human shields. It was also not uncommon for defeated troops to be recruited into the Mongol army. The most common method of preventing mutiny at a critical moment was to simply divide the new recruits into the already existing units. This prevented them from being a cohesive force, and it helped maintain unit integrity in the already existing formations. Similarly, as the Mongol army advanced, they impressed the young men from the country-side into labor gangs to transport supplies and keep open the highways The Mongols focused on destroying any hopes for a defeated opponent to rally, typically by pursuing the enemy leader until he dropped. Genghis Khan first carried this out in the wars of unification in Mongolia. In his first few encounters, he did not do this and it returned to haunt him. After that, it becomes a familiar tale. In Khwarazm, the ruler Muhammad was chased to the Caspian Sea with Jebe and Subotai in pursuit, while Genghis Khan himself pursued Jelal al-Din to the Indus and later sent more troops after him. In Europe, King Bela IV experienced the same harassment all the way to the Adriatic after the disaster at Mohi. By keeping him constantly on the move, the enemy leader was unable to serve as a rallying point for his armies. The scattered remnants would themselves have to keep moving to find him. In many reports, the escaping enemy leaders were only a few steps ahead of the Mongols. Pursuit offered an opportunity for the Mongols to acquire new intelligence on other lands, since the fleeing ruler would naturally head for territory outside of Mongol dominion. The pursuing forces could also wreak havoc in new territories as a warning and their presence made it advisable for local powers to keep their forces at home rather than going to help their neighbor. In addition to some destruction, the flying columns also spread fear. The grimmest feature of Mongol military policy was the deliberate use of terror to frighten its foes into submission. If a place surrendered without resistance, it was commonly spared; if the garrison refused to capitulate, it was then surrounded with a rampart and ditch built by the prisoner-slaves. Catapults bombarded the walls. When a breach was made, the prisoners were forced to fill in the moat and lead the assault, while the Mongols followed. When the city was captured, all the inhabitants were marched into an open space outside the walls and the town was given up to plunder. If the populace as a whole had manned the ramparts, every man, woman and child was put to the sword, and in at least one case even the cats and dogs were slaughtered. The policy, while savage, often meant the next towns along the way would surrender rather than resist MOBILITY The tactics used, whether in the field or during a siege, focused on two aspects: firepower and mobility. Nearly a century before Crecy, the Mongols had demonstrated on several occasions the advantages of concentrated archery firepower. In many engagements a withering hail of arrows broke a charge of armored knights. Concentrated firepower was also employed during siege operations. At the siege of Aleppo, Hulegu used twenty catapults against the Bab al-Iraq (Gate of Iraq) alone. In China, the Mongols constructed hundreds of siege engines to surpass the number which a defending city possessed. Mobility, which played a key role in so much of what the Mongols did, was vital for carrying out the caracole technique. By advancing, firing, wheeling, and retreating, the Mongol warriors were leaving themselves open to a possible counterattack -- success required disciplined unit integrity and mobility. Other tactics, such as encircling the enemy, required a high degree of mobility. Mobility also allowed the Mongols to withdraw and then reappear unexpectedly as necessary. Speed and dispersement also made it almost impossible for their opponents to accurately report on the movements of the Mongol forces. Mamluk and Mongol Battle of Ain Jalut 1260 The Sack of Baghdad 1258 2003: The New Hulegu (Saddam Hussein Speech) The Mamluks: Army, Organization, and Tactics The Mongols: Army, Organization, and Tactics War and Ramadan: Myth and Reality Chronology of Events Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 2 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.