US ARMED FORCES Following the revolution, the thirteen former colonies pared back the regular army to only 672 men and officers. Fearing a centralized armed force would be fatal to the new democracy, one that could be used to overthrow or intimidate the government, Congress relied upon states' militias to provide for the common' defense and protect its citizenry. The first test of whether this arrangement would work came in the Ohio territory. The US Army and militias grew from their English origins. Regular army officers at the time were generally experienced and some, like John Hamtramck and Josiah Harmar, were used to working with militias and frontier-style warfare. Both had proven battlefield experience and Hamtramck earlier led raids deep into enemy territory. Others like Arthur St. Clair and George Rogers Clark had mixed success on the battlefield and did not always endear themselves to the militias they commanded. State militia leaders were more problematic than their regular army counterparts. Some, like James Trotter and Richard Butler, were little more than racist thugs who were popular political leaders in their home state or territory. Trotter's raids in 1785 and 1786 from Kentucky were done against the expressed orders of the US government, and victimized peaceful clans of the Shawnee. His actions were a direct cause for the Shawnee to take to the warpath in 1790. Butler was particularly despised by the Native Americans and British alike. His death and mutilation was the subject of Indian lore and lurid woodcuts that illustrated contemporary accounts of the war. Simon Kenton, who first settled in Kentucky before moving north of the Ohio River, played a notable and successful role in the war during Wayne's campaign. Like Tecumseh, Kenton relied upon an extensive network of friendly natives to provide intelligence and guides. Recognizing that the coming war in the frontier was beyond the capabilities of the regular army, most of which was already deployed under General Harmar, Congress voted to increase its size and funding on April 30,'' 1790. The act doubled the Army's size to 1,216 officers and men, and allowed for three-year enlistments, up from the previous six-month terms. Congress also confirmed Governor St. Clair's ability to call out other states' militias, particularly from Virginia, to put down the Indian uprising. The shock of St. Clair's defeat was translated into the creation of a vastly larger US regular army. In March 1792 Congress authorized the creation of an army of over 5,000, putting this sizeable host under the command of General "Mad" Anthony Wayne. Wayne patterned the army he organized in Ohio the following year after those of he read about in Julius Caesar's Conquest of Gaul. The "Legion" was divided into 4 parts, or sub-legions, each a combined-arms force of scouts, militia, regular US Army infantry, cavalry as well as artillery. Like the Roman legions of old, the rankers were builders as well as fighters. At the end of each day's march a fortified encampment was built to guard against surprise attack. Roads along the line of march back to Cincinnati and along the Ohio River were also constructed, guarded by large stockaded forts placed at strategic intervals and portages. With a methodical campaign, not a quick and cheap raid, Wayne and the Legion forced the Shewanese to fight a type of war they could not win. The Legion's steady advance, that no amount of skirmishing or raids could deter, resulted in the destruction of countless villages, planting grounds, and storehouses. Unable to sustain the logistical effort to cut off the Legion, and only .with great difficulty able to match the size of the host opposing them, the Indian confederation despaired, and Wayne was able to grind down their resistance. When the Battle of Fallen Timbers was fought, it was against a foe that already saw much of their homelands destroyed, by a Shemanese host that seemed irresistible. THE WAY OF THE WARRIOR The Native Americans of the Ohio region were primarily hunters and subsistence farmers. Tactics and weaponry in war grew from this cultural base. Most nations were made up of extended family groupings or clans, led by sachems and chiefs. Medicine men, those who were adept at healing, hunting and prophecy, aided village elders in making decisions that affected the larger group. Merit and ability were almost exclusively the determinants for such status. Only during times of extreme crisis, as in time of war, would one chief (Mukajay) emerge or become appointed to speak for the entire nation. It is ironic that this grass-roots, pluralistic form of democratic rule would be so misunderstood or exploited by the United States at this time. The wilderness and sparsely populated (at least in America's eyes) frontier dictated the nature of much of the war's fighting. Small parties of warriors that conducted raids and ambushes were the most common tactics employed by the Indian alliance. These did much to spread a sense of terror and alarm throughout the region, but the effective coordination of these strikes into a coherent war-winning strategy was next to impossible for the alliance to achieve. Armed with bows, tomahawks (that were wickedly effective as either a thrown weapon or in hand-to-hand combat) and a variety of muskets as well as rifles, and fighting on territory with which they were intimately familiar, Algonquin warriors could be fearsome enemies to those who opposed them. The torture of captives by Native Americans was a common practice before the war broke out in 1790, but the savagery and cruelty` endured by those who fell into enemy hands grew in intensity with the conflict. Burnings at the stake, scalping, the mutilation and display of corpses, even cannibalism, became increasingly common on both sides as raids, reprisals and atrocities occurred. Fueled by the racism and religious intolerance by all parties, the dehumanization and genocidal nature of the Ohio conflict presaged those waged over a century later in two world wars. Most warriors exhibited fierce loyalty to their fellow clan members and nation. Bitter animosities among the nations, especially those held against the Iroquois, were not always overcome, even in the face of a common enemy the United States was eventually able to become. As homelands were overrun by enemy soldiers and settlers, and the realization that British intervention was not to be, the benefits of the way of the warpath decreased for many warriors with each passing month. Despite all of the war parties formed; the number of enemy scalps taken, or the coups counted against the foe, starving children, wives and elders dashed the hopes that this year's fighting would be the last. "The poor devils were almost starving to death before they got here" was how one US army officer wrote of the bands of surrendering warriors and family members at Greenville. [15] Like most citizen armies, the loss of one's home and family outweighed any promise of future victory for most warriors. That realization ultimately determined the end of war in Ohio. FURTHER READING Eckert, Allan W. The Frontiersman. Ashland, Kentucky: Jesse Stuart Foundation 2001. Eckert, Allan W. That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley. New York: Bantam Books, 1995. Jackson, Helen Hunt. A Century of Dishonor. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Knepper, George W Ohio and Its People. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989. McKee, Alexander. Minutes of Debates in Council on the Banks-of the Ottawa River (Commonly called the Miamia on the Lake), November 1791. Philadelphia, 1792. [Online publication] Columbus: Ohio Historical Society, Ohio Memory Project. http: //www.ohiomemory.org/ Nelson, Larry B. A Man of Distinction Among Them: Alexander McKee and the British-Indian Affairs Along the Ohio Country Frontier, 1754-1799. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1999. Palmer, William Pitt. Calendar of Virginia State Papers, Volume 4. New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1875, 1968. Sanders, Thomas E. and Walter W Peek. Literature of the American Indian. Beverly Hills, California: Glencoe Press, 1973. Sword, Wiley. President Washington's Indian War: the Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795. Norman: Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. Washington, George. The Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799. Prepared under the direction of the United States George Washington Bicentennial Commission and published by authority of Congress; John C. Fitzpatrick, editor. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1931-44. REFERENCES [1] Sword, Wiley. President Washington's Indian War: the Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795. Norman: Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985, p. 7. [2] Sanders, Thomas E. and Walter W Peek. Literature of the American Indian. Beverly Hills, California: Glencoe Press, 1973, p. 249. [3] Sword, pp. 81 and 83. [4] Washington, George. The Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, volume 8. Prepared under the direction of the United States George Washington Bicentennial Commission and published by authority of Congress; John C. Fitzpatrick, editor. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1931-44, p. 484. [5] Palmer, William Pitt. Calendar of Virginia State Papers, volume 4. New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1875, 1968, p. 157. [6] Washington, Writings of George Washington, volume 12, p. 22. [7] Sword, p. 201. [8] McKee, Alexander. Minutes of Debates in Council on the Banks of the Ottawa River (Commonly called the Miamia on the Lake), November 1791. Philadelphia, 1792. [Online publication] Columbus: Ohio Historical Society, Ohio Memory Project. http: //www.ohiomemory.org, p. 3. [9] Sword, p. 288. [10] Ibid., p. 326. [11] Jackson, Helen Hunt. A Century of Dishonor. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 338. [12] Sword, p. 319. [13] Ibid., p. 21. [14] Ibid., p. 317. [15] Ibid., p. 324. A Dark and Bloody Ground The Ohio Campaign 1790-1795 Introduction War in Ohio Wayne Takes Command Dramatis Personae US and Indian Forces Map of Battle of Fallen Timbers (very slow: 209K) Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 2 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.