In the fall of 1943, a vital bit of intelligence worked its way to the staff of 11 Group Headquarters at Uxbridge. Field Marshall Gerhard von Rundstedt, the German Commander in Chief, West, was to make a lengthy journey by train from the south of France to Paris. This information, deemed from a "secret and reliable source" came from an informant, likely working in the French railway. Armed with a detailed timetable, the planning staff, which included Wing Commanders James "Johnnie" Johnson and Pat "Jamie" Jameson, went to work. Von Rundstedt's train would be made up of sleepers, a restaurant car, and a flak wagon preceded by a pilot train. It would be traveling along a long and level stretch of railway southeast of Paris. He was due to make his trip one day in October, arriving in Paris shortly before nightfall. Johnson and Jameson decided that a long-range mission to intercept the train had a good chance of success. A flight of nimble fighters would be able to fly below enemy radar, take full advantage of cloud cover, avoid enemy air and anti-air defenses, then attack and destroy the train. In destroying the train, it was hoped that Von Rundstedt would be killed or wounded, and thereby put out of action. Naturally, von Rundstedt's loss would have a significant impact on the German effort in Hitler's Festung Europa and on preparations for the anticipated Allied invasion of western Europe. First, the planning staff had to decide which squadron to assign this difficult and important task. The distance to be flown precluded the use of Spitfires. Moreover, Spitfires, with just two 20 mm cannons and four .303-inch machine guns, were relatively lightly armed for the task of destroying the well-protected train. In addition, Spitfires weren't built to withstand heavy damage, as could be expected from the anti-aircraft artillery defenses onboard the train. In the RAF inventory at that time was the Hawker Typhoon. Armed with four hard-hitting 20 mm cannons, good speed on the deck, a tough airframe and a useful range supplemented by the use of auxiliary tanks, the Typhoon was an obvious choice. To carry out the mission, Wing Commander Jameson suggested 609 Squadron. Led by Squadron Leader Pat Thornton-Brown, 609 had already performed several aggressive and successful long-range missions over France. The outfit was ideally suited to the task. Thornton-Brown accepted the mission without hesitation, and planning began in earnest. Finally, on Saturday, October 16, 1943, a flight of 609 Squadron Typhoons took off at 1547. Von Rundstedt's train was scheduled to pull into Paris at 1759. With a little luck, the Typhoons pilots expected to disrupt von Rundstedt's schedule. His fate now lay in the hands of six RAF pilots and the meticulous and experienced planners of 11 Group. The cloudy October weather over England was promising for a mission of that nature. However, as the 609 flight made its way deeper inland, the weather began to improve. The cloud cover soon made way for clear and sunny conditions over France roughly 60 miles inland. Worse, near Bretigny, despite its attempts to avoid enemy radar detection and a German airfield, the low-flying flight was greeted by light flak. Soon after, Pilot Officer Charles Detal sighted and reported the presence of enemy aircraft aloft. Then all of a sudden, a Junkers Ju-88 was spotted at 1,000 feet. Thornton-Brown struggled to jettison his auxiliary tanks; nevertheless he was able to make three attacks on the Ju-88, finally setting one engine on fire; Flight Lieutenant "Smithy" Smith finished off the burning German bomber. By then, the sky was filled with aircraft in the throes of pursuit or escape. In the melee, Thornton-Brown and Flight-Lieutenant Johnny Baldwin shared in the destruction of another Ju-88. Flight-Lieutenant Smith and Detal also shot down an aircraft identified as a Messerschmitt Me-4 10 (Detal's first victory against the Luftwaffe). In the engagement, Thornton-Brown expended all of his ammunition; the others no doubt had used up much of their ammunition load. With the jettisoning of the tanks and the emergency maneuvering, the Typhoons were probably running low on fuel, as well. The clearing weather over France and the flight's fuel and ammunition state convinced Thornton-Brown to abort the mission. As it flew back to the RAF forward base at Lympe, the flight attacked targets of opportunity along the Seine. The flight landed at 1731., having had an eventful, if unsuccessful mission. No losses were sustained. Shortly afterward, von Rundstedt arrived safely in Paris, unaware that he had narrowly avoided the fate of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in another carefully planned interception just six months prior. ANALYSIS The planning was meticulous and the mission had a fair chance of success. However, several factors made the mission difficult. It was difficult to escape the attention of the Luftwaffe because the mission required flying over a populated land, which eased visual sighting of the Typhoons. Enemy radar systems were in place, operated by experienced personnel ready to call up interceptors. Cities and airfields were scattered around the countryside; to avoid sighting and anti-aircraft fire, the flight had to carefully work its way to the point of interception. Finally, the Luftwaffe controlled the air over France; even if enemy fighters did not engage the Typhoons, the amount of air traffic from liaison, bomber, reconnaissance, transport and training aircraft made an undetected outward-bound flight very unlikely. From the start, it seems that the von Rundstedt mission was more of an opportunistic attempt than a war-winning effort. Germany had many able and experienced officers to replace von Rundstedt. Erwin Rommel was one of them, and he ably implemented plans for the defense of Western Europe. Hence, although a strong effort was made, the loss of a flight of Typhoons was not apparently worth the slim chance the mission had for assassinating von Rundstedt. CONCLUSION These three missions, aimed at assassinating a military or political leader, laid the groundwork for similar missions today. Yet, they were accomplished with the technology of the day, which put men prominently in harm's way. Nowadays, these missions can be carried out with precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, or armed, unmanned aerial vehicles (flying drones), reducing the hazard to the crews having to perform them. Nevertheless, even with today's technology, miscues still occur with alarming regularity, resulting in failed missions, compromised safety, civilian deaths, or massive unintended destruction of property. For example, the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Salah Shehada, though successful, also caused many civilian deaths. The intelligence was accurate as far as it went, but did not predict the presence of civilians: right target, successful strike, unexpected additional casualties. The February 2002 attack in Afghanistan that killed a "tall" scrap-metal collector instead of Osama bin Laden shows that the weapon/tool worked perfectly but the mission was carried out with poor intelligence: right target, successful strike, wrong person. Thus, aerial assassinations today, using an array of technology undreamed of 60 years ago, share the same basic elements for success that those three pioneering World War II missions demanded: accurate intelligence, the right weapon, experienced personnel, and a little bit of luck. Pilots who participated in the missions: Yamamoto mission Captain Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr. 1st Lieutenant Besby F. Holmes 1st Lieutenant Rex T Barber 1st Lieutenant Raymond K. Hine (killed in action April 18, 1943) Flight 777-A mission (four pilots are listed out of the eight that participated) Oberleutnant Herbert Hintze Oberleutnant Albrecht Bellstedt (killed in action October 21, 1944) Leutnant Max Wittmer-Eigenbrot (killed in action August 8, 1943) Oberfeldwebel Hans Rakow Von Rundstedt mission Squadron Leader Pat Thornton-Brown (killed in action December 21, 1943) Flight Lieutenant L.E. Smith Flight Lieutenant Johnny Baldwin Flying Officer Lodewijk-Emmanuel Geerts Pilot Officer Charles Detal (killed in action March 23, 1944) Flight Sergeant Leon L. Henrion (missing in action January 29, 1944) The Pioneers of Aerial Assassination Three WWII Missions Introduction The Punctual Admiral: April 18, 1943 Dutch KLM 777-A's Last Flight: June 1, 1943 Target Von Rundstedt: October 16, 1943 Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 2 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.