After the loss of Guadalcanal to American forces in a campaign that bled white Japanese air and naval assets, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto decided to initiate Operation I-Go; it was designed to inflict heavy losses on the enemy to nudge the balance of power toward Japan's favor. Early April 1943 saw intensive Japanese attacks on Allied forces on Guadalcanal and New Guinea as part of that operation. Yamamoto decided then that a tour of frontline units would boost the morale of his depleted and exhausted personnel. On April 14, 1943, a coded Japanese message, essentially an itinerary of Yamamoto's planned tour, was relayed to Japanese forward bases. Four days later, Yamamoto, the commander in chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, the mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack, was dead. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the Yamamoto message was intercepted and decoded by Allied naval intelligence units. This information presented a great opportunity for United States forces to intercept and assassinate Yamamoto, thereby crippling the Japanese war effort. Navy brass debated on the merits of killing Yamamoto against the risk of losing experienced, sorely needed personnel or the risk of alerting the Japanese that their naval code had been compromised. With all in favor of assassinating Yamamoto, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Yamamoto's direct counterpart, gave the planners the "go ahead." Despite being initiated by the U.S. Navy, the mission fell to an air force unit because the Navy's fighters then available (the Chance Vought F4U Corsair and the Grumman F4F Wildcat) lacked the range to perform the 315-mile interception. Thus, it was decided that the 339th Fighter Squadron, a Lockheed P-38 Lightning unit based on Guadalcanal, should carry out the mission; even then, special 310-gallon fuel tanks had to be flown overnight to the airfield to allow the P-38s to fly the distance. The task of planning the actual interception fell to Major John W. Mitchell, commanding officer of the 339th. In the interests of maintaining secrecy, Mitchell was told of the mission on the afternoon of April 17, the day before Yamamoto's scheduled tour. Once the mission was revealed, there were two courses of action: an aerial interception of Yamamoto's aircraft, or a strafing attack of his submarine chaser as the Admiral traveled to Shortland Island. The naval officers present, headed by Admiral Marc Mitscher, favored a bombing and strafing attack on the sub chaser. Mitchell, however, reasoned that a strafing attack would require precious minutes to carry out; he also pointed out that there were Japanese fighter units very close by, and that his pilots would be forced to remain close to the deck (slang for "low to the ground" or "water" in this case -Ed.), where they'd be vulnerable to the Zeroes. In addition, there was always the chance that Yamamoto would survive the attack and wait to be picked up by a friendly vessel. To Admiral Mitscher's credit, he allowed Mitchell to decide the best course of action. The plan was on for an aerial interception. Despite the short amount of time for planning the interception, Mitchell carefully put together his flight route. Rejecting the plan of a Marine air staff officer, Mitchell plotted out the expected flight path ofYamamoto's plane, estimated its speed, decided where he had the best chance of intercepting Yamamoto, checked the Admiral's schedule, and worked out a meticulous flight plan. He planned for a "killer" section of four P-38s to take on the six escorting Zeroes, then attack Yamamoto's bomber; meanwhile, the rest of the squadron would fend off other Zeroes that were sure to answer distress signals from the Admiral's bomber crew. Many questions remained: would the Admiral be punctual? What flight path would he actually take? Would the weather hold? With so many variables, the odds were certainly against the success of the mission. On the morning of April 18 at 0725 hours, sixteen P-38s took off from Guadalcanal. A mishap immediately occurred; a flat tire during the takeoff run forced one of the pilots of the "killer" flight to abort, and with him, his wingman. The spare pilots, Lieutenant Besby Holmes and his wingman, Lieutenant Raymond Hine, took their place in the killer section, along with Captain Thomas Lanphier and Lieutenant Rex Barber. The pilots of 339th flew toward their target uneventfully, arriving at the point of interception at the southwest corner of Bougainville Island at 0934. It was a testimony to Mitchell's skill and planning that they arrived at precisely the correct point and just one minute ahead of schedule. Just then, one of the pilots called out, "Bogeys! Eleven o'clock high!". The hunt was on. Five miles away, the Japanese planes were right on schedule, descending from about 4,500 feet. However, there were two Mitsubishi G4M Betty bombers, not just the one as anticipated. For safety reasons, Yamamoto flew in one bomber while his staff officers, including his chief of staff Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, flew in the other. As the cover flight climbed hard to 18,000 feet, Mitchell gave the killer flight the go-ahead order. While Holmes struggled with his drop tank, with Hine dutifully covering his tail, Lanphier and Barber bore straight into the Japanese formation. The two Betty bombers dove hard to gain speed but the P-38s quickly caught up with them. Lanphier peeled off to meet the escorting Zeroes head-on. In the ensuing melee, Barber reported firing and scoring hits on a Betty bomber and watching it descend toward the jungle; he was not able to verify its crash. Lanphier, after first tangling with Zeroes, also reported firing a long burst at long range and at full deflection into a bomber; he reported scoring hits on the right engine and causing a fire that eventually ripped the right wing off. Meanwhile, Holmes rejoined the fight and spotted three Zeroes on the tail on a P-38 (Barber), which was itself gunning for another Betty bomber. Holmes and Hine picked up the chase and knocked the Zeroes down; Holmes continued after the Betty and reported scoring hits on it, too, watching it hit the sea. Their targets dispatched, the pilots of the killer flight made for home separately. Every pilot of the 339th, with the exception of Holmes's wingman, Lieutenant Hine, made it back safely. Hine was never seen again. ANALYSIS The Yamamoto mission owed its success to the dedication of many officers in the United States Army Air Force and Navy. Much of the credit for the successful execution of the mission is owed to Major Mitchell for his painstaking planning. Mitchell's planned flight path took the 339th far out to sea, then to the point of interception. The chance of visual detection by Japanese aircraft or seacraft was fairly remote, allowing the P-38s an uneventful outwardbound flight. Aided by a little luck and Yamamoto's compulsive punctuality, the interception occurred perfectly as planned. The only hitch was that there were two bombers instead of one. Both were shot down. However, credit for the actual downing of Yamamoto's bomber remains a contentious issue, although researchers believe Barber to have the strongest claim. Many factors were beyond the control of the planners but the operation was carried out to the best of the participants' knowledge, experience and expertise, all of which culminated in the death of Admiral Yamamoto and a major blow to the Japanese war effort. Postscript: Years after the war, during the investigations to determine who actually shot down Admiral Yamamoto, the sole surviving Zero pilot of the escorting flight, Kenji Yanagiya (Flight Petty Officer), reported shooting down a P-38, evidently Lt. Hine's. The Pioneers of Aerial Assassination Three WWII Missions Introduction The Punctual Admiral: April 18, 1943 Dutch KLM 777-A's Last Flight: June 1, 1943 Target Von Rundstedt: October 16, 1943 Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 2 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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