The 2nd Cavalry under Brigadier General Henry de Beauvoir de Lisle, with `D', `E' & `L' Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) arrived first. To give the infantry time to take up positions of advantage covering the deadly slope, he maneuvered for a flanking attack on the advancing Germans from the direction of Audregnies. De Lisle observed that six battalions (2 regiments) of German infantry and six batteries of field guns were moving forward toward the ridge and sunken road on which the British infantry was to deploy. The attackers were from IV Corps and were coming on in close order, obviously expecting little opposition, although the rest of the Corps artillery had been deployed in support.
Having worked 2nd Cavalry Brigade around to the German right Brigadier de Lisle ordered an attack. Senior officers who went forward on personal reconnaissance, galloped back to warn that the terrain was not suited for a cavalry charge. De Lisle would have none of it and ordered a charge to take place anyway. The facts of war demanded the Germans be stopped at once, regardless of cost. De Lisle reasoned correctly, that the enemy would not have any idea of terrain problems and the sight of the cavalry massing on the flanks of their infantry would create panic. It was harsh, but it was realistic.
The 9th Queens Own Lancers made a traditional type charge in column of squadrons. Although this was eventually stopped by barbed wire fences, garden allotments, broken ground and waste heaps, it nonetheless caused the panic in the German ranks de Lisle had sought and forced them to fall back. Captain Francis Octavus Grenfell, who was to win the Victoria Cross this day, later wrote of the fences and ground, "We simply galloped about like rabbits in front of a line of guns. Men and horses were falling in all directions. Most of one's time was spent in dodging the horses."
Captain Grenfell found himself senior surviving officer and took command of the Lancers. A railway spur provided some cover but just after taking command, he was twice severely wounded. Despite this he chose to carry on and we shall hear more of him later. They had drawn onto themselves the fire of nine German batteries. Casualties were heavy but the Lancers rallied and fell back to hold the left of the new British position. Two troops of the 4th Dragoon Guards had accompanied them, covering the left rear and they joined the Lancers in their temporary cover.
In the meantime, de Lisle had ordered Colonel Campbell of the 4th Dragoon Guards to launch a charge to capture a row of houses on the edge of the battlefield. From there, they could put down flanking fire on the German force. The action was taken partly to distract German fire from the charge by the 9th Lancers, but also to confuse the enemy as to British intentions. Despite the reservations of Campbell, who was alarmed by what had happened to the Lancers, it succeeded. They captured the position, however the fences and restricted ground had its effect. The Dragoon Guards were funneled into a narrow road. By the time the charge petered out, the regiment had left most of their strength scattered along the line of attack, but they had possession of the houses on the German flank. The survivors of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade were ordered to re-assemble behind a sugar factory and prepare for dismounted action. Valuable time had been gained but the Germans were now clearly deploying for a renewed attack.
All this activity gave time for the British 18 th Hussars to settle into position on the right of the new British position.
They were to be the least pressured unit present in the battle. The cavalry action also provided the precious time needed by the infantry. The meagre infantry force settled in and meagre it was. The very under-strength 1st Battalion of the Norfolks and the 1st Battalion of Cheshires were all that could be spared. They were to be supported by the 119th Battery RFA.
The sight of the massed German ranks was sobering, for not only did they already appear formidable from the British position, more and more could be seen coming into view. In the restricted landscape, it was as if they were marching out of a fog to appear suddenly close by at the foot of the murderous slope. Major Tom Bridges of the 4th Dragoon Guards took part. In his book Alarms and Excursions he describes how he had advanced expecting to find only German cavalry patrols to clear out of the way. Instead he came under heavy fire and was knocked unconscious when had his horse shot out from beneath him. When he recovered, he was in a small cottage being tended to by some Red Cross orderlies. Despite a nasty head wound and some temporary paralysis in his face, he was curious to know what was happening. With some help he made it to the side of the cottage and looked out. What he saw gives us an excellent picture of the German attack up the slope after they recovered from the surprise of the cavalry charge.
"I could scarcely believe my eyes! Marching through the corn in open order and perfect formation, with fixed bayonets glinting in the sun, were line upon line of gray-green German infantry. The nearest could not have been two hundred yards away."
Von Muck himself had a less clear picture, but was indeed searching for the British flank. As with most of the Prussian trained staff officers, he was obsessed with the idea of achieving an envelopment of the enemy and most of his deployments were aimed at pinning the main lines while searching for the elusive flank. His columns now attacking up the hill had no idea what strength opposed them. At first, it was thought that only patrols were present and Bavai had been set as the objective, with an arrival time of mid-afternoon. Although covering artillery had been deployed, this was only as a precaution and the main body advanced in full
march order just as described by Shephard in his air reconnaissance report and by Tom Bridges from much closer range.
The actions of the British cavalry in deploying to charge had thrown the leading elements into confusion. They were not to know that obstacles between them and the lancers would prevent contact. The wisest course had seemed to fall back and re-organize for a proper assault.
The commander of the Kaiser's First Army, General Von Muck, has gone down in history in less than favorable light, due, one might say, to bad press. His later mistake in turning too soon and exposing his flank toward a counter attack from Paris seems to have colored all writings about him. At the time of Mons and Elouges, he was in fine form and a somewhat formidable figure. Von Kluck had a habit of dashing about the battlefield in a Mercedes `Torpedo' staff car, driven by a trusted aide. He disdained the trappings of rank and usually appeared in a simple field uniform, without the decorations that adorned his contemporaries.
His dramatic appearance at the HQ of his command ers was accentuated by his habit of frequently carrying a pistol in one hand and a Mauser rifle in the other. He was known to bang the butt of the rifle forcefully on the floor when hammering home points to his subordinates.
Having assessed the situation, he was convinced that sufficient pressure must be put on the defense to push them back on Bavai. This was, however, to be just enough to force them to withdraw, but not enough to break them. His reasoning was that if they were the flank guard as was becoming apparent, it would be better to push them onto the rest of the BEF and persuade the whole to withdraw in the direction of Maubeuge. If he could persuade Sir John French along this course, the British would be trapped in the fortress town, where troops and artillery following behind Von Muck, could deal with them. This would free him to continue the race for Paris.
Once the infantry recovered from their initial shock, he launched the entire IV Corps at the position. Steady pressure was the plan, but Von Kluck had no idea so few British troops opposed him. Twenty-four battalions of German regular infantry were about to engage a force which, allowing for the reduced strength of the now dismounted British cavalry, could perhaps count on the equivalent to two full battalions.
At 12:45, the artillery commenced a furious bombardment. The Germans had not only the artillery of two divisions, but also the corps reserve artillery to assist them. Although they had cavalry attached at divisional level, these do not seem to have been committed. They were probably busy seeking the British flank and scouting as far behind them as possible as were the other cavalry of First Army. The infantry of the 7h and 8th Divisions, advanced across the open fields in open column attacks, the leading elements being successively mown down by the murderous fire of the BEF regulars and a pair of Maxim guns. Wave after wave kept coming until it was often difficult for the defenders to tell which was another attack and which was merely a line of dead heaped one upon the other.
German field artillery and howitzers tried to eliminate the annoying `L' battery 13pdrs but these had taken cover behind a railway embankment. The German gunners seemed to be always over or under as they sought the correct range. None the less, they made a huge effort, with several batteries engaging `L'. Tom Bridges remembered them firing as if on a practice range and according to the drill book. The 450 rounds of shrapnel fired by the 13pdrs of the RHA battery seemed a lot to veterans who had served in the Boer War, but was insignificant by later war standards.
Down by the sugar factory the situation for the rallied cavalry was becoming desperate. Large numbers of German infantry pressed forward and their supporting artillery fire was making it extremely difficult for the horse holders of the dismounted regiments. Consequently the cavalry were forced to mount up and retire before their horse lines were overwhelmed. Tom Bridges saw German infantry coming to the front of the house where he was sheltering with other wounded. To avoid capture he went out through a window on the opposite side and had the luck to find a horse, which although wounded, was strong enough to carry him away from immediate danger.
The 119th RFA were fighting against huge odds. Their 18pdrs disgorged shrapnel round after shrapnel round. However, the Germans could get to them more easily and plastered their positions with return fire. Gunner after gunner fell, until finally with the enemy infantry at 800 yards, it was decided the guns must be withdrawn. Limber horses were trotted forward and two guns got away before the Germans realized what was happening.
Now, however, they were alerted and the other four were threatened. The battery was commanded by Major Ernest Wright Alexander. He immediately sent a runner to the 9th Lancers who were falling back from the sugar factory rally point. Major Alexander dared not expose his other limber horses for fear they would become casualties and be unable to draw the guns to safety. He worked directly with his men as they pushed guns from their exposed position, into the cover where the horses waited.
Captain Grenfell, despite his earlier serious wounds, formed a working parry and rushed to the gunners' aid. The guns were standing in the open and were under direct fire from German artillery firing shrapnel, as well as infantry with rifles and machineguns. None the less, the combined efforts of the two groups saw all four guns manhandled into cover, limbered and safely withdrawn. Near the end of the exercise Alexander saw one of his gunners had been wounded and lay under intense fire. He dashed forward and dragged the man to safety. The saving of I l 9th Battery was a combined effort. RFA men and 9th Lancers had drawn strongly from British tradition going back to the days of Marlborough when the cry "save the guns" had echoed across battlefields in times of crisis.
Major Alexander was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) for his efforts in saving the guns and bringing the wounded man to safety. He later reached the rank of Major General and added the Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB), Companion of the Order of St.Michael and St. George (CMG), and Belgian Croix de Guerre to his other awards. His VC is now displayed at the Royal Artillery Museum at Greenwich in England. Captain Grenfell was also awarded the VC for his efforts earlier in the battle and bravely assisting the gunners, despite his two severe wounds. He was killed in action at Hooge, Belgium on May 24th 1915.
Orders were received about 2pm that the 3rd Division, for whom 5th Division were now providing cover, had withdrawn past the danger point and the flank guard from 5th Division could break off. Orders were sent for the tiny force to comply. The gallant `L' battery, still almost unscathed, did not receive the withdraw order. They continued to fire until they had used the last round carried in their limbers. At that point, it was useless to remain, so with remarkable coolness the guns were rolled into cover, the limbers and horses attached and the whole assembly withdrew in good order. Less than a dozen men of the battery had been wounded by shrapnel and none seriously. Fergusson now sent runners to all elements of his defending forces urging them to retire at once. With shells landing around his HQ and bullets smacking into walls, he withdrew 5th Division HQ under fire. From 2:30pm onward, sequentially the 4th Dragoon Guards retired, then the 9th Lancers and the other elements of 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The 18th Hussars also moved off, as did most of the Norfolks. The cavalry were able to re-assemble at Ruesnes, eight miles away and were ready to fight again next day.
However, the orders could not get through to the Cheshires and one isolated platoon of the Norfolks who had been placed further forward to cover the guns of 119th Battery. Many runners were sent, but none made it to them alive. In their exposed positions, the British infantry battled on. Round after round poured into the attackers, who were still coming in waves.
It was obvious to the Cheshires that supporting fire on their flanks was diminishing as was that of their artillery and they gradually fell back under the pressure of enemy attacks. At one point, taking advantage of the now exposed flanks of the Cheshires, the Germans moved a machinegun section to a track the British would have to withdraw across. As the retreating British infantry reached it, the Germans fired along the sunken track in perfect enfilade, bowling over men from the flank, who were already engaged to their front. The battalion reacted by pulling its own Maxim guns back and returning the fire. Then with the German gunners pinned, they launched a bayonet charge with a single section of ten men. Those Germans who ran scaped. The rest, even the wounded, were killed on the spot. Again, the line of retreat was open.
It could not go on forever. By 4pm the Germans had succeeded in getting around three sides of the remaining infantry and launched mass attacks against the dwindling force. Men of the Cheshires and the Norfolks fired off round after round, but still more Germans came on. British soldiers seized ammunition from the dead and wounded, but their numbers were shrinking. By 5pm, two thirds of their number were casualties. They had been forced from the leading edge of the slope and were holding the last line of defense, the sunken road between Elouges and Audregnies. Wounded who were unable to walk or fight had to be left behind and these were the first prisoners of the battle to fall into German hands.
At 6pm, the German leading elements had the British surrounded on all four sides and called on the survivors to surrender. They refused and continued to pour out a volume of fire that persuaded the attackers not to launch a final assault just yet. With close fire support from field batteries and machineguns, they managed to batter the defenders down to a mere 40 survivors of the original force. At 7pm, the last rounds of ammunition were fired. Rifle bolts were withdrawn and thrown away and the remaining Maxim gun disabled. Only then did those who were left respond to calls from the Germans and agreed to be taken prisoner. The gallant 40 were the last British soldiers on the field of Elouges who were still on their feet at the end of the action and many of them were wounded.
A few scattered remnants managed to escape. At the time of the bayonet charge against the flanking machineguns, many of the walking wounded had been told to make a break for the nearby Audregnies Wood. Of the 1,000 men of the Cheshires, only 200 soldiers and 2 officers answered roll call the following morning. Most of the survivors capable of fighting were from the battalion Reserve Company. They had been placed nearer to the Woods and consequently had seen less of the fighting. The isolated platoon of the Nor folks had been covering the retreat of 119th RFA and never received the order to retire.
Having stayed until the end, there were no survivors to tell the tale of their last moments as the attackers overwhelmed them. None were present at roll call next day. The battalion had lost 250 men out of the original 800 present.
Of the cavalry brigade, the 9th Lancers lost 250men and 300 horses. The 4th Dragoon Guards lost 225 men and a large number of horses. The 18th Hussars suffered only light casualties, having been less exposed to fire and direct assault than the rest. The men of 119th RFA had lost 30 of their number but recovered all of their guns. The seemingly invincible `L' battery retired with all its guns and not a single serious casualty. The ammunition they had expended was made up from the Army Train, but it would be two weeks before the Train could restock, as the dumps had to be destroyed or abandoned to the enemy. `L' battery would achieve more fame at Nery later in the campaign.
Tom Bridges, having had a narrow escape down near the sugar factory, made his way to a farmhouse where he sought help. He was cared for overnight by an old woman. German Uhlans (lance armed cavalry) scouted the farm during their mopping up operations but did not actually search the house and once they rode off, the exhausted major collapsed into a bed provided for him. Having had a night of sleep, his head injuries felt better and he was able to make his way back to British lines the day after the battle. He later became a Major General and just before WW2 published his story in Alarms and Excursions.
At midnight, weary to the bone, the British survivors reached their new positions near Bavai and collapsed into sleep. There would be no immediate pursuit. Some 5,000 German casualties littered the field at Elouges. The wounded would have to be gathered in, along with those of the British. Pitifully few prisoners were rounded up, but the battle area and the roads were clogged with debris. IV Corps was too busy sorting out the battlefield and counting their dead to continue pushing as far as Bavai. It would take them until the next day to be ready to move off again. After darkness had enveloped the battlefield, German buglers sounded "stand down". IV Corps and most of the rest of First Army tried to get some rest.
Battle of Elouges August 24th 1914
Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 2 no. 2
Back to Against the Odds List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2003 by LPS.
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com
* Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.