CONSEQUENCES General Varrenikov criticized the leadership of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Corps Commander. In his secret report to the Marshal of the USSR, General Sokolov, the following reasons were cited: All the forces were poorly or untrained for the operation, poor and erroneous intelligence of the area and enemy, unexpected events, leadership tolerated false situation reports and helicopter pilots were poorly oriented on the terrain of the landings. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense, responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to prepare for resumption of the operation. The failed attack had ended in fiasco, and now the Soviets were in damage control mode. A reinforcing regiment each from the DRA 11th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the DRA 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade arrived along with the DRA 203rd Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (special forces). The DRA 37th Commando Brigade arrived. Varrenikov authorized five Soviet battalions sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April. Soviet forward air controllers (in their Mi-4s) were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air Controllers. Soviet unit commanders were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders. From Kabul, orders were issued to arrest the helicopter regiment commander, but the commander had vanished. The helicopter pilots who landed the commandos in Pakistan said that the commander had ordered them to land there. The Chief of Staff, 40th Soviet Army, General-Major Yu. R Grekov, took command of the five Soviet battalions. General- Lieutenant V P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan) assumed overall coordination of all the forces. The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600 men. Varrenikov himself arrived at the battlefield to make sure no more fiascos occurred. THE SECOND ATTEMPT The renewed attack began on the morning of April 17. The DRA 25th Infantry division led the assault in the west and the DRA 14th Infantry Division led the assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen, a diversion was created. The eastern group began its attack at 0630 and the western group began at 1030. The DRA 25' Infantry Division was concentrated at Lezhi. Meanwhile, the Mujahideen had fortified the Dawri Gar mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes with accurate fire. Multiple prior Soviet/DRA attacks on the mountain had failed. When the artillery fire preparation began, the Mujahideen took shelter in caves and when the barrage ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions and repulsed the attack. To avoid a repeat, during the night of April 16th, troops silently positioned themselves near the summit and, at dawn, launched an attack on the Mujahideen without artillery preparation. The regiment captured the summit in a matter of minutes. The surprised Mujahideen fell back in disorder from the Lezhi area and into higher mountains. The DRA/Soviet force moved through the Manay Kandow pass. Simultaneously, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking attack from the Lezhi area that moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. As the DRA column neared, the Mujahideen HIH regiment withdrew without a fight! At the same time, leader Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. Rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani was dead. Panic took hold. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar, moving into surrounding mountains as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar. These rumors were untrue; he had suffered only minor wounds. Most of the stores in Zhawar were found in tact. The two T-55 tanks in the possession of the Mujahideen were moved out of their caves and fought the advancing column before being abandoned. LTC Kulenin, the adviser to the commander of the DRA 21't Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a T-55 round. The Soviet and DRA forces would finally enter Zhawar on April 19, 1986. One eyewitness account of the Soviet arrival follows from Colonel Kutsenkol Engineer Demolition: After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers. Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall. The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with powerful iron doors, which were painted in bright colors. There were 41 caves in all. All had electricity. More amazing material was to be found by Soviet troops: A hospital with new modern medical equipment made in the USA, nickel plated furniture, a library with English and Farsi books, a bakery, shelves of ammo and small arms, mines of all sorts from Italy, France, Germany, an operational T-34 tank, and a hotel with many rooms untouched by the Soviet bombs. The Afghan soldiers looted the base. The Soviet troops did not stop them. Even the six foot high brick facing wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25th Infantry Division at Khost! The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar. Their troops were quite nervous and leery of the Mujahideen. They knew the enemy would organize a counterattack. The Mujahideen had already moved MRLs up to the Pakistan border to fire on the communist forces. Nobody, including the Soviets, wanted to be trapped! Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time curtailed a thorough job of destroying the base. It is a strong testament to the ability of the Mujahideen to threaten their enemies' lines of communication. Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar. The Soviet high command had given him four hours to do so! The sappers; of the 45th Engineer Regiment, 40th Army went to work. Privately, he knew that it was an impossible task in the available time. Above each cave was a 90 foot thick layer of rock. There was no time to drill a one to two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, then cram that full of explosives to cause a collapse. So the sappers stacked 200 antitank mines in the caves and rigged them for simultaneous electric detonation. As the 45th attempted to do this, the combat soldiers were withdrawing! The sappers had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours, the command was given to the engineers to evacuate and head for Tani. The Mujahideen were hot on the Soviet heels. Anyone who fell behind would face a gruesome death. Kutsenko and his men hurriedly left as the Mujahideen MRLs fired with greater accuracy. The Soviet Nadir Cataclysm at Zhawar Afghanistan: April 1986 Assault and Plan Cataclysm and Into the Hornet's Nest Consequences and a Second Attempt The End at Zhawar Orders of Battle Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.