THE CATACLYSM AND NADIR Sometime around midnight on 2nd of April, the DRA began a two-hour artillery and aviation preparation of the target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter transport ships flew in to insert the initial assault group of the 38th Commando Brigade (60 men). The commandos landed without opposition, but the ground assault ran into heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending Dawri Gar mountain. Already, something had failed. The 7th and 14th Infantry divisions tried to link up. They could not break through the defenses. These divisions would try for three days, until their entire supply of ammunition was expended. By the 10th, these divisions pulled back to their start points. The 25th Infantry Division, located in the second echelon, covered the western flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear area. It did nothing the whole time (The DRA continued to fight for the possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for ten days following the air landing mess. The Mujahideen would attack the DRA LOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay Kandow checked their advance). The command post for the operation at Tani was in radio contact with the initial air assault group. The air assault group commander reported that the enemy firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern slope of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see the round?" The Commandoes replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about 15 kilometers from us!" For some odd reason, the CP thought nothing odd about this! The DRA then fired another illumination round five kilometers further away on the southern side of Dawri Gar mountain. The CP asked, "Do you see this round". The commandos replied, "Yes, we see it. It's about ten kilometers from us". It was finally clear to the CP that the commandos had landed some five kilometers inside Pakistan - far beyond the base at Zhawar! The Commandoes tried to withdraw but after an hour were surrounded and locked in deadly combat. Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her border. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense against helicopter gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not effective. Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take out attacking aircraft with the Blowpipe missiles and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountain and firing thirteen Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and his NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft. Mawlawi Haqani was in the Zadran area when he saw approximately 20 Mi8 helicopters flying over. He radioed the commanders at Zhawar to warn them. He thought they would land at Lezhi or Datakai. After his radio message, he saw another group of helicopters, including some Mi-24s gunships flying the same direction. These were escorted by SU-25 jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. The hornet's nest was stirred. The Mujahideen were caught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to tip them off and the helicopters landed the rest of the 38th Commando Brigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. The DRA/Soviets then committed the rest of the brigade to combat, not onto the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone, which was well-populated with Mujahideen, but onto the open areas around Zhawar itself This was a very bad move. INTO THE HORNET'S NEST The first lift was comprised of 15 helicopters, which landed at 0700 hours on the Spin Khawara plain. More lifts followed in rapid succession. Mi-24s gunships protected the convoy on the way in. Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border. Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed many helicopters while they were on the ground. RPGs, SA-7s and Blowpipes all took their toll. The Soviets had not expected this. Following the air assault, Soviet SU-25 jet aircraft bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defenses had no effect against them, but did take a severe toll on the Mi-8s. The Mujahideen, instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bomber aircraft, began assaulting the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and captured many of the DRA commandos. This was another totally unexpected event. Further, Mujahideen reinforcements moved from Miram. Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar and took the commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured 530 commandos from the 38th Brigade (Soviet sources indicate 312 landed and only 25 survived). Thus, the classic "A Bridge Too Far" scenario was repeated. This time, the DRA ground forces failed to reach the LZs and the commandoes became easy, stranded targets. Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with KAB 1500 precision guided missiles made runs on the caves. Soviet aircraft made numerous violations flying over Pakistani air space. The Zhawar caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, forcing the Soviet aircraft overfly Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with the smart weapons. Smart missiles were usually launched from 5-7,000 ft, up to 2 miles away. One cave was hit and the explosion killed 18 Mujahideen. Smart missiles hit another western cave, collapsing it and trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long and was used as the radio transmission bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just arrived from Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave. The jets easily evaded the defensive SA-7s. The Pakistanis sent in a small team armed with 13 Blowpipe SAMs. These were wireguided and required extensive training to be effective. The Pakistani team fired 13 missiles at the Soviet SU-25s. None hit their targets. Pakistani General Akhtar (who led the team) was now convinced the Blowpipe was too complicated of a weapon, and would soon replace it with the American Stinger. Other SU-25s dropped tons of bombs, blasting away the rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen nonetheless managed to escape. The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. One group of commandos on high ground held out for three days before they were finally overrun. The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one of the commando battalions managed to lead 24 of the commandos to the safety. This took eight days. Of the 32 helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight survived! The Soviet Nadir Cataclysm at Zhawar Afghanistan: April 1986 Assault and Plan Cataclysm and Into the Hornet's Nest Consequences and a Second Attempt The End at Zhawar Orders of Battle Back to Table of Contents -- Against the Odds vol. 1 no. 3 Back to Against the Odds List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by LPS. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com * Buy this back issue or subscribe to Against the Odds direct from LPS.