On 30 April/12 May 1802, a new infantry organization was introduced. Each jager regiment was reorganized into three battalions of four companies each. The regiment now consisted of one general (chef), 45 officers, 96 NCOs, 32 drummers and musicians, 1200 lagers and 121 noncombatant; the number of men was still less than in a musketeer regiment. The Leib-Gvardii (Life-Guard) Jager Battalion consisted of one chef, 17 officers, 36 NCOs, 14 drummers and musicians, 400 jagers, and 111 non­combatants. [26]

On the eve of the 1805 war, when Russia was allied to Austria, there were 23 line jager regiments and one Guard Jager battalion. [27]

Jagers were now given an additional three bullets more per man per year than earlier for the training in firing, making a total of nine bullets per man. [28] All NCOs and twelve men in each company were armed with rifles. [29] The jagers probably still used a modilied version of Kutuzov's 1786 instructions to the Bugskii Jager Corps as a drill manual. When in close order the jagers formed in two ranks. [30]

Fighting in woods, scrub, hills and villages was considered to be a jager's job. [31] General P.I.Bagration, in one of his reports to Kutuzov on the actions of his advance guard before Austerlitz, wrote that he needed one more regiment of jagers, because he did not have enough of them to keep all hills and woods, which were in front and at the right flank of his position. [32]

As noted previously, jagers were also to cover marching columns. At Austerlitz (20 November/2 December 1805), jager regiments marched at the head of the several columns, forming themselves in skirmish order when necessary. The Count de Langeron, a French emigre who joined the Russian service in 1790, commanded the 2nd Column of the allied army at Austerlitz. He wrote that, during the initial part of the march, he sent the 8th Jager Regiment, supported by the grenadier battalion of the Vyborgskii Musketeer Regiment, against French skirmishers who appeared at the right of his column. The 3rd battalion of the jager regiment deployed into skirmish order, but when the French skirmishers were driven off, the jagers and grenadiers took their place in the head of the column again. [33] By contrast, the lack of jagers in the 4th Column at Austerlitz was probably the reason why the Novgorodskii Musketeer Regiment, which marched in the head of this column, was surprised by the sudden appearance of the French so close to it.

Jagers not only drove off enemy skirmishers, but also engaged in combat with the main enemy forces in order to cover the other troops in the process of marching and forming battle lines, as well as attacking, capturing and holding villages. [34] Major-General Miller, chef of the 7th Jager Regiment, wrote in his report on the battle of Austerlitz that his regiment, at the head of the 3rd Column, was engaged in fighting with enemy skirmishers. It drove the enemy from the village and castle of Sokolnitz, took two enemy guns, pursued the enemy to the hills behind the village and held out there, covering the march of the column through the village. When enemy cavalry attempted to attack the head of the column exiting from the village, he and his regiment returned and drove the enemy away. [35]

Jagers could not be available everywhere, and from the very first engagements of the 1805 campaign there were many situations when musketeer or grenadier battalions had to push out a part of their men as skirmishers. On 3/15 October 1805, before the first engagement with the French, near Braunau, where his army assembled after a long approach march in separate columns, Kutuzov issued an order, which contained the following instruction: "a battalion, marching across a terrain covered with woods or in any other way, through a village or something like that, is to push out skirmishers, and to cover itself as necessary, without waiting for an order from its General." [36] In battle, as is confirmed in reports and memoirs, skirmishers from musketeer and grenadier battalions were usually sent to support the jagers, [37] to keep enemy skirmishers at bay if there were no jagers, [38] or to pursue the enemy in rough terrain. [39]

In general, in 1805 the sending of line infantrymen to skirmish is mentioned often enough to be deemed standard practice. The use of grenadiers to act as skirmishers was not a very good solution, as they were neither properly equipped nor trained to do the job. In his memoirs F.N. Glinka, an ADC to General M.A. Miloradovich in 1805, wrote: "At Krems [Durnstein, 30 October/1 1 November 1805], our grenadiers, with their great height and with large plumes, were sent to skirmish; the weak and small French shot them from behind the rocks, as they wished." [40]

Glinka also stated that the Russian infantrymen were not trained to take cover behind local obstacles. They even considered it shameful, marching directly at the enemy instead so he thought it would be necessary to train them properly. General Miloradovich in his report to Kutuzov on the combat of Krems wrote that even some officers commanding the skirmishers dashed forward, in spite of his instruction to keep in cover. As a result, they took very heavy casualties. [41] In general, therefore, whilst Russian foot skirmishers in 1805 were able to keep enemy skirmishers at bay, they probably took disproportionately more numerous casualties than the enemy.

It was also stated that the musket fire of the French, both in close or skirmish order, was significantly more rapid and accurate than that of the Russian infantry. [42] Several main causes for this were recognized: insufficient training in aimed fire, [43] the bad quality of muskets [44] (bad or too old barrels, straight musket-butts, muskets of different calibre in the same regiment etc), and the bad quality of powder (it was almost the same as in the artillery [45] were amongst those cited). As has been said, soldiers were given too few bullets per year for training in firing. Vigorous measures to improve these disadvantages were begun immediately after the campaign. A new curved shape to the musket-butt made it more convenient to aim at an intended target was introduced, [46] and from this time onwards, many orders and instructions were issued in which thorough training in aimed fire was strictly prescribed. In the Kostromskoi Musketeer Regiment raised in 1805, each recruit was given powder for a hundred shots and thirty bullets during his period of training. A wooden board 2.75 arshin (1.95 m) high and 1 arshin (0.71 m) wide was used as a target, with an earthen embankment behind it to make it easier to find the bullets for re-use. [47] Unfortunately, there was not much time to take all necessary measures. In 1806, Russia again engaged in war against France and started a new war against the Turks.

In 1806-07, as in the previous campaign, the jagers were usually sent to skirmish, if any of them were available. [48] The previous campaign had showed that there were not enough jagers, and it was therefore ordered that the number of men in each jager regiment was to be brought up to the strength of a musketeer regiment, but not all regiments received the increment before the start of the new campaign. [49] During the 1806-07 campaign, the lagers switched to the three-rank formation. [50]

The jagers were probably armed with better muskets, and did not have the variety of different calibre muskets as were frequently found in the infantry regiments. For example, at the end of 1807, all muskets in the 7th Jager Regiment were of the same calibre. [51] In 1806-07, the French skirmishers were in general still more effective than the Russian, especially in woods, because the Russians were much less experienced in this kind of combat, and it was admitted by the Russians themselves. [52]

Nevertheless, there were very good jager regiments. As an example, M.M.Petrov, an officer in the 1st Jager regiment in 1809-10, wrote in his memoirs that Ya.Ya.Davydovskii, chef of the regiment since 1802, trained his men in aimed fire by encouraging them to hunt in the wild forests of Karelia, where the regiment stayed before the war of 1806-07. [53] Davydovskii trained them to light in skirmish order according to instructions he had personally written, so in their first engagement with the French near Sochoczyn at the River Wkra (11/23 December 1806), the}, fought with skill using available cover, and prevented the French from crossing the river for a long time. [54] Unfortunately, Davydovskii was mortally wounded at Pultusk. The 3rd Jager Regiment was also considered a very well trained one; [55] General M.B. Barclay de Tolly commanded this regiment from 1797 to 1799, and was its chef from 1799 to 1814.

As it has been mentioned, some jager regiment commanders wrote then- own instructions and trained theirmen according to their own views. Other regiments were, however, still using Kutuzov's 1786 instruction to Bugskii Jager Corps, since in an article published in the Military Journal in 1810 the instruction was mentioned without any explanations, as though it was common knowledge. [56] Some information on the use of lagers in skirmish order can be found in memoirs of Ya.O.Otroshchenko, a captain in the 7th Jager Regiment in 1806-7. Once he had two companies under his command, he formed one company in skirmish order, and kept another one as a reserve in close order. [57] He also mentions that in skirmish order jagers operated in pairs. [58]

In battles, lagers were usually placed before the main line and at the flanks. For example, at the battle of Eylau (27 January/8 February 1807), Otroshchenlco, with his jagers, fought in skirmish order for almost the whole day at the right flank of the Russian army. [59] Jagers fought against enemy skirmishers, [60] ) and held important places such as villages, woods etc. [61] When occupying a wood, jagers formed themselves in skirmish order along its edge facing the enemy. [62] If the enemy held a wood, jagers attacked with bayonet and tried to drive the enemy out, as General N.N.Racwskii ordered the 20th Jager Regiment to do at Friedland during the fighting at the Sortlack Forest. The regiment was formed in skirmish order and supported by the Life-Guard Jager Regiment. [63] Otroshchenko also says that at Friedland the v attacked with the bayonet into the wood. [64] Jagers were often separated from their parent divisions and used in the advance and rear guards. Bagration and Barclay de Tolly were often in command of the rear guards during the campaign, and both praised the jagers many times for their bravery in their reports. Both generals were of jager regiments. [65]

Continuing the practice of 1805, in the 1806-07 campaign musketeer and grenadier battalions also often pushed out a part of then- men in skirmish order. There were still no official instructions on how this was to be done, so it was organised in several possible ways:

1) Sometirnes men from the third rank were used. This method is mentioned in a report of General M.L.Bulatov on the combat of Revolax (Finland, 15/27 April 1808), [66] as well as in the 1812 Instruction to Infantry Officers, where it is suggested that men from the third rank could be sent to pursue an enemy. [67] However, in a rescript of Tsar Alexander ( to the Military Minister dated 12/24 October 1810, this method was acknowledged as inappropriate. Unfortunately, there is no accompanying explanation for this, just a reference to its practice. [68]

2) On occasion a whole platoon or company was sent to skirrnish. [69] This method had an obvious disadvantage in that it broke up the internal structure of the battalion, making it impossible to form the battalion into column properly, or, more importantly, into square. Nevertheless, this method persisted well into 1812, and probably even later, as some memoirs show;

3) In some cases during the 1806/07 campaign a whole musketeer battalion or even an entire musketeer regiment was formed in skirmish order, as was the Pskovskii Musketeer Regiment at the combat of Mohrungen (13/15 January 1807) and in a rear-guard engagement a day before the battle of Eylau. [70]

4) According to the old tradition, an officer might call for volunteers to fulfil a difficult and dangerous task, and since the skirmishing was considered the case, it was done often. [71] This was probably the most frequently used method and it was used even in some jagerregiments, for example, in the 5th Jager Regiment at Czarnowro (11/23 December 1806). [72] This method had its advantages and disadvantages. Only those who really wished to act as skirmishers and to fight in an active way would be sent out to skirmish, while the more timid and reluctant men stayed in close order under their officer's eye.

The disadvantage was that the men and officers came from different companies and so they formed rather a disorderly group. Sometimes such groups of volunteers from various regiments were formed into a temporary battalion, as it was done in the detachment under command of Major-General N.M.Kamenskii sent to try to relieve Danzig when it was besieged by the French in 1807. [73]

An example of actions of such volunteers, although not a very typical one, can be found in the memoirs of VI. Timofeyev, a captain in the Vyborgskii Musketeer Regiment in 1807. At the battle of Eylau, the regiment (attached to Prussian General Lestocq's Corps) was ordered to attack the village of Kutschitten. Regimental commander Colonel Piller called for volunteers. Timofeyev was one of those who went forward, and he was the only officer in the whole group of volunteers. He writes: [74]

'When we approached Kutschitten, the French opened fire from behind a hedge covered with snow; seeing that our fire cannot make any harm to the enemy covered by the hedge and snow, I strictly forbade any firing and attacked with the bayonet without firing a shot, and the French, surprised by our resolution, dropped their muskets and cried for mercy. I cannot say how many of them were there, I had no time to pay any attention to that, because a column of French infantry marched towards me from the middle of the village. My volunteers were encouraged by the first success, and l. making the opportunitv presented pointed at the column threatening us, clashed at it with bayonet, confused it and put it to flight along the street, which crossed the village leading to the enemy side. It was necessary to use this lucky opportunity too, and so I with the volunteers pursued the column, which crowded together and was not able to move faster than us.'

They drove the French out of the village, captured four artillery pieces placed at the street (three of them appeared to be Russian ones), and continued to pursue the enemy to the end of the street without being able to see another large column of French infantry marching to the village. They had run since the beginning of the attack, otherwise, as Timofeyev says, the attack would not have been so successful, but, as a result of this, their own regiment was far behind and also out of sight.

Timofeyev continues his story: 'I onlv wanted to catch up the enemy column running from us and to force them to drop their muskets, as their skirmishers had done in the village, but this column, fleeing from our bayonets in greatest fear and disorder, met a column ... marching to its aid no more than 60 paces from the village, ran into it and disordered its head; but the rear platoons of it had already begun to deploy to the right and left, and two of them opened fire at us. That was a moment when 1 might have perished. There were up to a thousand of the French in both columns, if" not more, while I had just about 250 men, but ... it seems there were even less than that number-. The enemy, whose rear platoons were not disordered and had started to deploy, was able to rallv from the confusion and fear. 1 should have been destroyed. This was a resolute and very critical moment. Therefore, in order to not allow the enemy to discern the small numbers of our volunteers running along the street, and even more to take advantage of the disorder and fear of the enemy, I shouted 'ura' to the volunteers, dashed at the French with them, and produced even more fear and disorder in the enemy ranks. The enemy, dropping their weapons, cried for mercy. I forbade they be killed with bayonets, but ordered the muskets be taken from those who kept them and that the musket butts be broken. Men from the rear ranks of the [enemy] platoons started to run back to their own lines.'

The French acknowledged that, as a result of the attack of Russians and Prussians at Kutschitten, the 51st French Line Infantry Regiment and four companies of the 108th were almost wholly destroyed. [75] It can be seen from this example, that in some situations officers commanding skirmishers preferred to attack with the bayonet rather to start a firefight The obvious reason in this instance was that the French were in cover, while the Russians were in an open field.

Also during the 1806-07 campaign, dismounted Cossacks armed with muskets were sometimes used as foot skirmishers in advance- and rear-guard actions. [76]

The skirmish tactics were developed further during the Russo-Swedish war in 1808-09. The war was fought over Finland. Most "battles" of this war were more like large­scale skirmishes in the very rough terrain, where infantry fought with the support of only a few guns and with little or no cavalry. D.V. Davydov, later a famous partisan, wrote about some improvements in methods of skirmishing made by General Ya. P. Kulnev during this war. There were many inexperienced recruits among the troops and taking the advantage of broken terrain made control over the skirmishers difficult for the officers and experienced soldiers.

Some of the soldiers threw away their cartridges after the first few shots and ran away to the train with the excuse that they had used up their ammunition. "To stop this, Kulnev formed special groups consisting of a few men, whose only duty was to bring cartridges from the train to the skirmishers, and, keeping themselves behind the line of skirmishers (usually called "chain" in Russian documents), supply with ammunition any man who needed it. The same was done for the artillery. Davydov adds that Kulnev himself was vigilant in making sure that no skirmisher or artilleryman left his position under the pretext of lack of ammunition. Those who had fired off all their cartridges had to stay at their position until men from the special groups would bring them necessary ammunition. [77]

Davydov also writes that being with Kulnev's troops he witnessed for the first time a new method of reinforcing a chain of skirmishers. He explained that skirmishers were usually reinforced from the rear, making the chain confused and too dense, until eventually it turned into a disorderly mob in which men sometimes accidentally shoot one another. Kulnev placed reserves behind the flanks of the chain, so that if the chain was forced to retreat, the reserves could fire and attack the enemy's flanks. As a result, the chain was never too dense and, therefore, never changed into a crowd more harmful to itself than to the enemy.

Davydov further noted that, not fully understanding infantry maneuvers, he did not know whether this use of reserves was prescribed in any instructions to jagers, but that it extremely useful in the woods of Finland, especially at the engagement at Oravais (14/26 September 1808. M. Leontyev, an officer in the Mogilevskii Musketeer Regiment, writes that at Oravais they fought "in the bosom of the forest ... in thick skirmish chains. [78] In the 1812 Instruction to the Infantry Officer, this method was recommended as very useful in woods." [79]

Readers will wish to note Mat this article is extracted from a forthcoming book on the tactics of the Russian Army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.