Four Maneuvers

Additionally, jagers were trained to carry out four manoeuvres:

The first manoeuvre was to be used in sparse woods, rocky terrain, open villages, or large cemeteries, and was sometimes used to cover the march or deployment of an infantry column. On command, the even-numbered platoons would run 60 paces forward and form themselves in skirmish order in a single rank by. each man from the second rank taking position on the left of the man of the first rank of the same file. The chain would cover the whole front, with the skirmish line formed from the flank platoons covering the flanks and bent slightly back. The men in the skirmish line used any local obstacles to hide from the enemy. In the meantime, the odd-numbered platoons followed the skirmish line at a distance of 60 paces in close order line with intervals between the platoons.

Having passed through the wood or rough terrain, the skirmishers stopped. The platoons in close order then marched by files at the run through the skirmish line to form a close order line with platoon intervals in the open terrain, whereupon the skirmishers themselves formed in close order in the correct intervals, so that the whole battalion was formed in close order line.

If it became necessary to retreat, the even-numbered platoons formed themselves in skirmish order 60 paces behind the odd-numbered platoons. The odd-numbered platoons retreated by files at the run through the skirmish line, stopped 60 paces behind it to form a close order line with intervals to be ready to counterattack the enemy if he tried to pursue. On command the skirmish chain which was originally in the second rank ran 30 paces back, so forming the second skirmish line at a half-distance between the first position and the odd-numbered platoons. At the next command, the odd-numbered platoons formed themselves in skirmish order (thus forming the third skirmish line).

On the next signal, the front line ran through the second and at the third, the second line followed immediately after the first one had passed it, both stopping 60 paced behind the third skirmish line and forming in close order line with intervals. In this way, the odd-numbered platoons were in skirmish order and the even-numbered ones in close order. This leap-frogging was repeated until the jagers had passed through the wood or rough terrain, when the platoons in close order would stop in the open terrain 60 paces behind the wood, etc, the skirmishers ran through the intervals between them to form line 10 paces back from them, and so finally took their place in the formation. [10]

In 1788, Kutuzov abolished the double skirmish line in the first manoeuvre and ordered the retreat to be made in a single skirmish line. [11]

The second manoeuvre was to be used in very rough terrain or in thick woods where visibility was 60 paces or less. The even-numbered platoons ran forward, their first rank forming a skirmish line at a distance of 60 paces from the odd-numbered platoons, and their second rank forming another skirmish line at halve this distance, i.e. between the first rank of the even-numbered platoons and the still-formed odd-numbered platoons. Having located the enemy, the front skirmish line fired, whereupon the rear one ran forward through the first, stopped at a distance of 30 paces from it, waited until the first line had their muskets loaded, and then in its turn fired. This fire and manoeuvre continued until the jagers came out of the area of limited visibility.

If it were necessary to retreat over such terrain, the even­numbered platoons formed the two skirmish lines behind the odd-numbered platoons, the latter retreated through the skirmish lines, and then the skirmish lines retreated, passing through each other. [12]

The third manoeuvre was to be used in very heavy woods and marshes, where it was only possible to march in 'Indian file' along narrow paths. The man in the first rank at the right flank of each even-numbered platoon marched forward, the first rank of the platoon turned right and marched one by one to the right and then followed the right-flank man. When the first rank was formed in single file, the second rank of the platoon followed it in the same way. In this way, each even-numbered platoon formed a column of one-man width. Once the enemy was located, the first man fired and stepped aside of the path one pace to load his musket. The second man marched past the position by two paces, fired in his turn, and also stepped one pace to the right of the path, and so on. Once the even-numbered platoons arrived at a place where they were able to easily form a skirmish line, they did sot, and the odd-numbered platoons marched forward as quickly as possible. [13]

The fourth and final manoeuvre was used when it was necessary to march through a narrow pass or defile. The right half of the battalion turned to he left, the left one to the right, the platoons marched forward by files side by side, thus forming a column four files wide. If it was necessary to form line on the head of the column, the two leading platoons quarter-wheeled at a run and formed the central part, the other platoons running forward and forming themselves on the flanks file by file.

If it became necessary to form square from such a column, the platoons that were to form the front face of the square quarter-wheeled at the run to form the front face, whilst the platoons that were to form the sides ran obliquely to their places. The platoons that were to form the rear face of the square ran forward by files and then to the corners. [14]

In all these manoeuvres, Kutuzov wrote that the average interval between men in skirmish order was to be three paces. [15]

Essentially, the role of jagers was to fight in any terrain where line infantry and cavalry were unable to right, and to cover the march, deployment, and, if necessary, the retreat of all other troops. As an example, at the Finland Inspection manoeuvres in 1800 (9-10/20-21 August), lagers covered the deployment of musketeers and grenadiers from columns into lines, then retreated through the intervals of the infantry line to form the second line. Major or- General Michelson's (1 st) Jager Regiment then occupied a wood on the right flank, finally forming in skirmish order to cover the retreat of four battalions of line infantry in column. Another (Major-General Gvozdev's or 2nd) jager regiment supported an artillery battery that was placed in the rear to further cover the retreat. [16]

In 1799, Russian troops took part in war against France. One corps was sent to Italy, another one to Switzerland, where they were to cooperate with the Austrians. A third corps, with British troops, took part in an attempt to seize Holland from the hands of the French. The famous Russian field marshal, A.V. Suvorov, was appointed to command the Russian and Austrian troops in Italy.

On campaign, jagers were used to form advance- and rear guards, and to cover the march and deployment of the troops. Before the battle of Novi (4/15 August 1799), when the Russian troops were already formed in line of battle, a thick line of lagers was placed in front Gryazev, a captain in Rosenberg's (Moscow) Grenadier Regiment in 1799, wrote in his memoirs that the lagers lay in the fields of corn. [17]

In battle, if there were woods or rough terrain occupied by an enemy, jagers were usually sent there. [18]

They would also he used to pursue retreating enemy, as Bagration's (7th) Jager Regiment under command of Major-General Tchubarov did the day after the battle at the Trebbia River (7-8/18-19 June 1799), when, as Gryazev wrote, it advanced "in skirmish order, and acted in various ways according to the terrain and enemy movements." [19]

Before the Italian campaign in 1799, Suvorov considered the use of skirmishers from line regiments to be unnecessarv, and recommended that sixteen sharpshooters should be selected from ewery company instead. These sharpshooters were allowed to fire at will without waiting for the order from an officer, choosing targets of their own choice (enemy officers were recommended as primary targets). They were to remain part of their parent unit but they might be allowed to go forward from the formation if necessary, although not very far.

Suvorov paid a great deal of attention to the selection of the sharpshooters. He allowed them to wear a green branch in their headgear to distinguish them from the ordinary soldiers. Suvorov himself wore such a "badge", so the soldiers considered it a great honour and competed for the title of sharpshooter. [20] Suworov also ensured that skirmishers were used to cover the flanks.

In Italy, soldiers were sometimes detached from both the Musketeer and grenadier battalions and regiments to support the jagers, and to fight in skirmish order, even in rough terrain or in villages. The reason for this was that it was probably found that the jagers and selected sharpshooters alone were not sufficient to cope with the numerous French skirmishers. Grenadiers from the grenadier battalions were often sent to support the jagers, since both units were usually in the advance guard. [21]

Usually, the grenadiers formed a close order support to jagers, but were sometimes deployed in skirmish order. As an example, Captain Gryazev, with a few dozens of his grenadiers, fought in skirmish order alongside the jagers of Bagration's (7th) Regiment during the pursuit of French General Macdonald's troops after their, defeat at the Trebbia River. Gryazev even claims that he and his grenadiers forced the 17th French Line Demi-Brigade to surrender (the demi-brigade did indeed surrender, but this was due to the actions of the jagers rather than the grenadiers). In Switzerland, Gryazev was once sent to defend the village of Nafels with 200 men from his regiment. [22]

It was usual for a whole platoon or company to be detached, but sometimes volunteers were called for, following an old tradition to call on those soldiers who wanted to fulfil a difficult and dangerous task at their own risk. Not long before the battle of Novi at least one provisional battalion of volunteers taken from various musketeer regiments and grenadier battalions was formed. After the battle, it was disbanded and the men returned to their regiments, but such a battalion was formed again in Switzerland. An officer in this battalion described how the battalion was divided into six platoons and fought against the French foot skirmishers in the valley of Muttenthal (19/30 September 1799). Four platoons of the battalion were formed in skirmish order in two lines, opening fire when the enemy was at a range of 150 paces. When the French continued to advance, the signal to attack was given with a drumbeat, the Russian skirmishers charged with bayonet and drove the French skirmishers back to their main forces. The French reinforced their skirmishers, causing the Russian skirmishers to retreat to the flanks of the first line of their formed infantry, who in their turn charged with bayonet and forced the first French line back. The second French line counterattacked and the first Russian line was forced back, but the second Russian infantry line joined the fighting. Eventually the French were put to flight, and then the volunteers and Cossacks pursued the enemy. [23]

Captain Gcyazev tells a very similar story, though he was not aware of the existence of the provisional volunteer battalion, and wrote that a musketeer regiment was put before the main line and then retreated to the left flank of it. [24] Dismounted Cossacks armed with muskets were also sometimes used as foot skirmishers in Poland in 1794 and in Italy and Switzerland in 1799. [25]