At dawn on the (lay of the battle (27th) the weather was misty but as soon as it was light enough Reynier launched his attack. His objective was the only possible one, the dip in the Serra crossed by the San Antonio de Cantaro/Palheiros road, this being the lowest point in the Serra. The troops started off in regular forination, but due to the unevenness of the ground they quickly became less organised. It must have seemed to the British that the attack was being delivered by a number of small groups, moving diagonally up the slope.

Merle's division began moving up the steep slope some three quarters of a mile to the right of the San Antonio de Cantaro road. Its skirmishers came into contact with the light companies of the 7th, 88th and 45th Allied regiments, strung out along the front and they soon began to push the British line up the hill. The French regiments veered to their left thereby passing across the front of the 88th, directing their advance towards the unoccupied part of the crest between them, and the British troops placed immediately above the pass. The skirmishers left behind the eleven battalions forming this storming column.

Although the mist was dense, Picton, hearing the shooting, detached a wing of the 45th under Major Gwynne and two battalions of the 8th Portuguese to fill the unoccupied space. Because of the mist, he under-estimated the strength of the column. He also had to cope with Heudelet's vanguard along the high road where a column of four battalions, the 31st Uger, was pushing up the road, driving in Champlemond's skirmishers. As the mist began to lift, von Arentsebildt's guns opened up on the French, halting their advance.

The 31st Leger tried to hold its ground, aiming gallantly trying to right itself in the chaos, but they were swept even further to the right by the fire of the Anglo-Portuguese guns. Picton, whose area it was, sensing danger, left command of this sector to Mackinnon, and moved to his left where the firing was becoming heavier, emanating from a column of Merle's division who, once the mist had cleared, could be seen climbing the slope. Merle's people made good, albeit slow progress due, to the problems of the rocky, heather-covered, steep terrain.

They reached the crest before any British troops were there to meet them.

Wallace, a colonel in the 88th, one of Wellington's best, threw out three companies as skirmishers to cover his flanks. He ordered the wing of the 45th to fall in on his right and charged the disordered French mass diagonally across the plateau. At the same moment, the 8th Portuguese, further along the hilltop, opened a rolling fire against the enemy's front.

Meanwhile, Wellington, who had used the convent as an observation post, came up with two of Thompson's guns which fired upon the French flank and at the rear of a mass of soldiers who were still clambering up the hillside. At the same time, the light companies of the 45th and 88th, who had been driven to their right, were rallied by Picton in person and brought up to the plateau on the right of the Portuguese. They halted 60 yards from the leading French flank, opening up a rolling fire upon it. The four British battalions were facing eleven French ones.

But Wallace, was quick to see an advantage: the French were exhausted from their climb and in chaos, so he ordered the 88th to charge them before they had time to recover their breath.. His timing was flawless. The French were slow to appreciate the situation and had not recovered their wits enough to realise that they greatly outnumbered the defenders. Four of their battalions were sent rolling down the hill by Wallace's brave band. The firing was followed by a bayonet charge. As some of the French were descending, they collided with the 2nd Leger who had almost reached the skyline but who were struggling among the rocks which crowned the crest. Grattan describes the situation atmospherically

All was confusion and uproar, smoke, fire and bullets, French officers, soldiers, drummers and drums, knocked down in every direction; British, French and Portuguese mixed together, while in the midst of it all was to he seen Wallace, fighting like his ancestor of old and still calling to his soldiers to "press forward". He never slackened his fire while a Frenchman was within his reach, and followed them down the edge of the hill, where he formed his men in line, waiting for any order that he might receive, or any fresh body that might attack him. [11]

Picton was rightly, but uncharacteristically, fulsome in his tribute to this action. He wrote to Wellington that:

The Colonel of the 88th and Major Gwynne of the 45th are entitled to the whole of the credit and I can claim no credit whatever in the executive part of that brilliant exploit which your Lordship has so rightly and so justly extolled. [12]

The British troops followed the retreating enemy down the hillside until they came under fire from Reynier's artillery when they wer ordered back to their original positions.

The French were rattled. Reynier, seeing his right column rolling down the slope and the disintegration of the 31st under heavy Anglo-Portuguese fire ordered Foy's brigade to move up the hill to the right of the 31st. Foy assumed that this order was only to be implemented when it became clear that the first party's climb up the slopes had succeeded. Not so! Reynier cantered up to Foy, shouting :

Why don't you start on the climb? You could get the troops forward if you chose to do so, but don't choose to do so. [13]

So ordered, Foy and his brigade proceeded to climb the heights. He could see Merle's division retreating in disorder, pursued by Wallace. Foy's objective was the lowest hilltop to the right of the San Antonio pass. Eventually, the French faced Picton's division who were soon joined by the 9th Portuguese from Champlemond's brigade, with an unattached battalion of the Thomar Militia. This numerically inferior force was also joined by some of Leith's men. Despite Reynier's numerical superiority, he kept no reserves or flanking division to the south of the high road, so it was possible for Picton's hard-pressed troops to be reinforced almost immediately.

While the fog continued to hover over the crests, Leith ordered his brigades to the left while Hill detached some of his troops to occupy the heights from whence the 5th Division were being evacuated. By the time Foy had begun his attack, Leith had just reached the San Antonio pass, accompanied by Spry's Portuguese battalion, heading his column, followed by two battalions from the Lusitanian Legion, and Barnes's British Brigade. All these were accompanied by one of Dickson's batteries. He left his guns to Von Arenschildt, whose ammunition was running low and whose fire was beginning to slacken. Picton considered that he.was now strong enough to cope with the activity at the pass and suggested that he would be obliged if Leith would deal with the attack which was being made on the height on his immediate left. But Foy was now becoming dangerous. He managed to force his way to the summit despite the destructive fire, which eventually managed to drive them back: but despite this, the Thomar militia fled down the declivity and the 8th Portuguese fell back in disorder. Leith appeared in the nick of time with Barnes's three battalions, who came up the communication road behind the plateau. Leith described it thus:

A heavy fire of musketry was being kept up upon the heights, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. But when the rock forming the high part of the Serra became visible, the enemy appeared to be in full possession of it. A continued fire was being kept up from thence, and along the whole face of the Serra. [14]

Leith realised that time was more or less on his side as only the head of the French column had in fact reached the top. He deployed his leading battalion across the summit, while sending the 38th to go between the enemy and the reverse slope of the position. This move was none too successful, but Leith handled the 9th diagonally across the plateau to place it alongside the leading flanks of Foy's battalions. The 9th opened with a volley at 100 yards and then advanced, firing, in the face of very little return from the enemy who appeared disconcerted by the appearance of a new force parallel with its flank. At 20 yards from the enemy the 9th lowered its bayonets, preparing to charge; Leith riding in the van, waving his plumed hat. The enemy gave way.

Foy described the movement thus

My heroic column, much diminished during the ascent, soon reached the summit of the plateau, which was covered with hostile troops. Those on our left made a flanking movement and smashed up by their battalion volleys; meanwhile, those on our front, covered by some rocks, were murdering us with impunity. The head of the column fell back, despite my efforts. I could not get them to redeploy; disorder set in and the 17th and 20th raced downhill in headlong flight. [15]

Reynier had only one regiment in reserve after this, the 47th Line. He had completely lost two regiments, 2,000 men and more than half their officers. Picton's division had 427 killed and wounded and Leith's 160. Two senior officers had been hit - one of which was the Portuguese Brigadier Champlemond, and two majors, one from the 45th and one from the 88th. Because Wellington had a good communication road to his rear, he had great flexibility in moving troops from one section of the theatre to another. And the Allied troops had yet another time advantage which they exploited to perfection - that needed for the French to recover breath from the climb.

The battle on this side of the Serra was all but over. The situation was changing fast, further down the line where the other important action was on the British left and was as bloody as Reymer's attack although shorter in duration. Once Ney saw the 2nd Division massed on the crest of the plateau by the San Antonio pass he attacked, following his orders to the letter, with two divisions, one on either side of the Coimbra road, when he saw Merle's column massed on the edge of the plateau. He had three divisions under him, so he placed Loison on his right, Marchand on his left, keeping Mermet in reserve (behind the village of Moura). Marchand's and Loison's divisions were completely separated by a deep ravine. Marchand was to advance along the gentle slope which led up to the Bussaco convent. The first part of the approach was easy - up to the village of Sula through woods and orchards. But the upper part of the route was extremely steep, giving no cover whatsoever. It was, in fact, a glorified mule track.

Loison started just before Marchand with Simon's six battalions on the right, and Ferey's six on the left. Each group was preceded by skirmishers. During the easy stage of their climb they met the whole of Pack's 4th Cacadores on the hillside in front of his line battalions. Craufurd, commanding the Light Division, had thrown the 95th (700+ rifles) and the 3rd Cacadorcs (600 rifles) into enclosures in front of Sula. All that Loison could see was the 1st Division, far above him on the left on the highest plateau, with Cole further away in the direction of Paradas. Loison managed to evict the Cacadores and the Rifles from the lower slopes and then from the village of Sula.

The French then came up against heavy artillery fire from Ross's guns, trained on the exits from Sula, while Cleeves's German battery joined in from the head of the ravine, taking Ferey in the flank. Sula was an impossible place to stop, so Loison's people pressed forXvard using Ross's guns as their objective. Because the slope was much steeper nearer the top, the British and Portuguese rallied above Sula. The French managed to progress without problem up the easy slope. There being no track, Ferey's people drifted chaotical- ly to their left, close to the edge of the ravine which formed the boundary of Craufurd's position.

Lying in the hollow road which ran parallel to the head of the ravine, Craufurd had the 43rd on the left and the 52nd on the right, carrying a total of 1750 bayonets. He had had dur- ing this time been standing by the windmill (still there today, known as Craufurd's mill).

With impeccable timing, he waited until the two enemy columns had reached the last steep slope (just below where he was standing). As the French paused to take breath before climbing the final slope, he signalled to the concealed battalions crying, so legend has it, "Avenge the death of Sir John Moore." At once the crest became thick with rifles and the French received a tremendous volley. The heads of the advancing columns crumbled in a mass of dead and dying.

The French stood shocked. Then three companies of the 52nd were directed to deal with Simon's right flank while Lloyd and the 43rd did the same to the left. It was an impossible situation for the French who broke their columns and went hurtling down the hill. Some poor wretches lost their footing in the midst of this carnage, and rolled down to the bottom of the ravine. The Light Division pursued the seething mass as far as Sula when they came within range of the French guns. But one French battalion on Ferey's extreme left remained which was despatched by Coleman's Portuguese Brigade resulting in it too joining their defeated colleagues.

What was left of Loison's brigades reeled back to their original position under cover of one of Mermet's regiment which had been held in reserve. Some skirmishers bickered with Cranford's outposts so Wellington relieved the very tired members of the Light Division with Lowe's German Brigade and Campbell's 6th Cacadores. A few French managed to get into Sula but they were soon evicted by the 43rd.

Losses were as follows in this action were as follows: Loison lost 1200 men, his senior brigadier, Simon being wounded in the face and captured by an English private. [16]

The Cacadores and 95th had 119 casualties and the 43rd and 52nd had only three men killed, with two officers and 18 men wounded. McBean's Portuguese battalion lost one officer and 25 men. In total Loison's attack was repelled with the English loss of only 200 men.

These are the two main engagements of the Battle of Bussaco. In terms of casualties, a victory it certainly was. But most historians regarded it as a holding operation for the Allies en route for Torres Vedras. [17]

The day after the battle (on the 28th September) Montbrun's cavalry produced a good piece of reconnaissance. They discovered the Boialvo road (which did not exist on the Lopez maps) enabling the French to outflank the Allied armies. In a dispatch to the Emperor, however, which got captured by Wellington's men never seen by the Emperor, Massena dressed up the number of casualties describing them as negligible, and the operation as a victory because, he argued, having discovered the Boialvo road, he had managed to outflank the Allied armies. Although Napoleon received very few dispatches during the invasion of Portugal, he managed, through the indiscretions of British officers, to get a good deal of information about the progress of the campaign from English newspapers. He later told General Foy that he regarded the Bussaco operation as a failure.

Wellington was extremely annoyed about having been outflanked. Professor Horward blames him for incompetence, but it is clear from studying Professor Oman that the situation was as follows: Wellington knew of the existence of this road and had detailed Trant and his Portuguese militia to control this road. Trant did not arrive at the Boialvo road until the 28th September because his senior (Portuguese) officer had ordered him to take a circuitous route to Bussaco to avoid the French.

Reasons for the Reverse

There were many reasons for the French reverse at Bussaco. Massena made an initial error of judgment in the choice of route to Bussaeo for most of his party giving Wellington a time advantage. To be fair to Massena, the reason for this decision was the lack of knowledge of the terrain: the absence of guides, bad maps and 30 Portuguese non-French speaking collaborators. History has shown that he was unwise to ignore the advice of the majority of his senior commanders not to attack the allies in such a strong position. He used the Emperor's orders to take the course of action that he did to cover his real motive for attacking the heights, to assert his authority over his dissident colleagues.

Koch tells us that, due to the difficulties of the terrain, he was unable to find a satisfactory location for an observation post from where he could see the battlefield as a whole. Thus he had only reports from his officers as to how the battle was progressing on which to base his orders.

If Marbot is to be believed, to bring Mine Leberton with him meant that he had to set up his headquarters at Mortagoa to keep her safe and sound which meant that contact with his senior officers and troops was minimal; [18] Last but not least, Bussaco was the first experience he had of fighting against 'les anglais'. He greatly under-estimated their competence as he had not engaged them in an important battle previous to this point in the campaign. He also under-estimated the competence of the re-formed Portuguese army, disbanded by Junot at an earlier stage, but since trained and officered by Beresford and English officers.

The official French line, as seen through the columns of "Moniteur" the official French government newspaper, for public consumption, was that the battle was merely a skirmish, an Outpost affair.

The private view of many French officers was expressed by Colonel Noel. Not wishing to seem disloyal even some time after the battle, he wrote:

Only bold Massena and the enthusiastic French soldiery would have dared to undertake such an attack [19]

But shortly after that, he writes bitterly -

After the defeat of the 27th we did what we should have done at the beginning of this battle, that is to say we did a proper reconnaissance of the locality. Had this been done earlier, we would have discovered a road that woul have enabled us to turn the enemy's position. Our Portuguese officers appeared not to know of its existence: the countryside being deserted, there were no locals to put us in the picture, it took a belated exercise by our cavalry to discover it. How much unnecessary blood was spilt as a result of this omission. [20]

General Marbot, one of Massena's ADC's says much the same in his memoirs.

Wellington's View

In Wellington's view, the benefits of the Battle of Bussaco were:

The battle has had the best effects in inspiring confidence in the Portuguese troops both among our croaking officers, and the people of our country. It has likewise removed an impression which began to be very general, that we intended to fight no more but to retire to our ships; and it has given the Portuguese troops a taste for an amusement which they were not before accustomed, and which they would not have acquired had I not put them in a very strong position. [21]

Massena learned at least one lesson from Bussaco which stood him in good stead at Torres Vedras, and that was not to attack an enemy placed in a position similar to that of the English on the Bussaco heights but instead to tempt them to fight on more favourable ground.

The rest is history.

FOOTNOTES