Scott Bowden: (1997)
528pp Numerous illus. and maps £ 32.50

This the hefty first part of a trilogy about Napoleon's Imperial campaigns from 1805-7 under the general title of 'The Glory Years', frontloading this author's previous works on 1809 and later. Much of the marketing has surrounded Bowden's claim to have used archival sources from the three main participants to assemble the most detailed account of the campaign yet. In the Foreword, Colonel Elting rightly notes that it is "the historian's basic responsibility to present the whole story as completely, accurately and impartially as possible".

The presentation of this book leaves something to be desired. Whilst the many maps are welcome, some of the ground photos are rather dark and some relevant paintings, notably those by Kobell, (especially of the Elchingen bridge) have been overlooked in favour of familiar French commanders and kit, alongside some Allied illustrations done apparently by a 12 year old or Austrian cavalry from 1799 to 1850.

However, the text really lets the book down. The advent of the bicentennials ought to represent an opportunity to survey the Wars with the objectivity Elting calls for. The book opens with a lengthy discourse on the creation of one of the world's finest fighting machines, (although the accolade 'modern'would be disputed). It is valuable in that it explains how two years in an armed camp brought this about, based on a variety of French sources, both archival and noted secondary sources.

Unfortunately, the first signs of the rot are starting to set in. Everything is attributed to Napoleon! He didn't invent the Corps system nor skirmishing nor massed artillery - he simply improved existing ideas and practices, whilst running his regime to provide the necessary time and resources to drill large formations in working together. Why does Bowden then expand into irrelevancies (what has Vercingetorix got to do with it?) apparently designed to show how the French always advanced. No doubt Francophiles would lap this myth up, but others might point to the contrast with Rossbach and 1940.

The political side is the same - the Code Napoleon was no more his creation than UK laws are those of HM The Queen, who signs them and in whose name they are enacted. The rules within it (so marvellous the USA never adopted them) were designed to harness the resources of France and her satellites for Napoleon's wars of conquest. Then we are told this whole lot was designed to restore peace in Europe! Would Bowden write in such eulogistic terms about the mobile and efficient fighting force, with which he compares the Grande Armee at the end of the Ulm section - namely Hitler's Blitzkrieg army of 1938-41 - without considering what it was created for and the realities of the political-economic system underpinning it? Bowden has a number of axes to grind and we're off already.

Next we have three chapters on the Allies. I have read some nonsense recently about the Austrian army and government, (including in Bowden's 1809 book), usually based on a couple of pages from Rothenberg which haven't been understood by the author, but then padded with French and modern magazine material. However, this assessment of the Habsburg army is one of the worst yet. So hell bent is Bowden on showing the army was out of date that he lifts much of the Material from Duffy's Army of Maria Theresa, which only just touches on the start of the 1770s reforms, let alone the intervening 35 years. Although he gets the broad brush of Mack's belated changes roughly right, it is surrounded by nonsense about the army's prior organisation and then he puts in a recruitment district table from 1808! From that he later extrapolates that some regiments were fully Galician (not until 1808) and that this determined the formations of infantry units, including IR20, a Moravian unit which only ever had a supplementary district in Galicia (like all German units in 1805!).

We now reach the key problem with this book -- a certain lack of truthfulness about sourcing. In the earliest part of the Austrian section, there are footnotes from old books lifted from the works of Duffy and Rothenberg, a good example being n. 15, where the reference to Gallina's key work is copied straight from Rothenberg - in fact an English translation of the title of one essay from the book, (which details much of the reform processes). It is followed by a document citation, which is actually a Kriegsarchiv document relating to a reference in Rothenberg's previous note! In the bibliography, after an archive list lifted from Duffy, we find that prolific German author Derselbe - it means 'the same' or 'ditto' in a German author's bibliography. Curiously, having allegedly quoted from Angeli's essay 'Ulm and Austerlitz' (like Duffy and Willbold) partly in the Mitteilungen des Kriegsarchivs Vol. 3, he misses the eyewitness account of Austerlitz by Mahler in Vol. 6 of the same series, also footnoted in Rothenberg. Having quoted Schonhals at Ulm (like Rothenberg) he misses the same contemporary officer's view of Austerlitz (listed in Duffy).

Not being knowledgeable about Russian sources, I will only say that presumably they are more difficult than the Austrian and a number of Austerlitz quotes from alleged Russian sources bear a remarkable resemblance to Duffy's work. Using the work of Stein, a late 19th century German, doesn't qualify as archival, not least as it was recently republished. In the bibliography, there isn't even the customary thank you to the staff of the relevant archives in Russia, Austria and the UK.

Talking to UK and European Bonapartists, there is a willingness to discuss and exchange ideas. Coming from North America is a school of thought determined to prove Napoleon was virtually a saint and merely the victim of reactionary governments - quite how that squares with the idea that great characters of history shape events rather than get driven by them, is for such theorists to explain. This book's chapter on Britain and the Coalition is based on Napoleon's belief from at the latest 1800 through to his St. Helena memoirs that the British were the authors of all his misfortunes.

Apparently 1805 was a giant conspiracy orchestrated by Britain being beastly to those nice French. Such half-baked nonsense, ignoring the real issues involved and based on a lack of sound fact, seems to be rife in the USA as far up as the current President's wife. In this case, it is just a lot of ignorant rubbish about British and European history, which is not worthy of further analysis, except to note that a graduate from a Christian University ought to realise the misery inflicted by religious bigotry and nationalist distortion of history, most recently in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia.

Political memoirs are slanted and rarely admit to any errors on the part of the subject. In his Anglophobic diatribe, Bowden has completely overlooked the 1803 reorganisation of Germany, which was the foundation of French hegemeony in the area. Were the Continentals supposed to accept this? As for being "invited" into Switzerland, Stalin used this as a justification for his invasions and political interference. Before writing selective drivel, I would commend reading something like Blanning: Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (see AoN21) or an analysis of the resistance within France to conscription to feed the Grande Armee.

That's the background. The meat of this is the campaign narrative, which is certainly written in a lucid style (so is Sharpe). The text bowls along at a fair pace along with a combination of French archival material and mainly senior commanders' correspondence and memoirs. It would have been more illuminating if there had been more from the ordinary soldiers beyond Marbot and Coignet, especially given the unreliability of senior officers' recollections.

It hangs together well on the French side and is extensively supported by simple and clear maps, albeit they might have been larger in some cases, but any campaign history ought to take the time to give an overall shape to the opposition plans and actions, otherwise their units just seem to appear and move on an apparently random basis. Likewise the sourcing Bowden actually relies extensively on the recent works by Willbold and Egger, lifting their references to rarer sources. Indeed the extent to which he quotes Willbold's little 143pp book (still in print) for the Ulm campaign together with obscure chronicles from the area seems to go well beyond the scope of fair dealing and I hope Bowden will have the decency to send Willbold some of his royalties.

Nevertheless, in the heat of the two major battles Elchingen and Austerlitz - the Allied source notes, such as they are, almost vanish. Either Bowden doesn't want to reveal just how much he has copied from the recent authors or more likely, they contain material, which doesn't suit his version of events. In addition, he accepts the usual French claims of heroism and being outnumbered without question. Having discussed Mack's reforms, he seems now to forget that an Austrian battalion comprised four companies and a French nine, regularly discussing only the number of battalions involved. Pompously, Bowden then dismisses Willbold's French casualty figures as being way off beam because he uses Austrian sources - oh, so why does Bowden rely on French material not just for allied numbers, but what they got up to?

Relying largely on Duffy for the Allied side of Austerlitz, (notably for the Austrian Relation and Weyrother's documents), it is doubff ul whether Bowden even referred to Stutterheim's famous work. Aside from some of his quotes not being as in the 1985 Ken Trotman facsimile, the fighting at Tellnitz is revealing: The order in which the Grenzer units attacked the village is copied from Duffy, which is the opposite way round from Stutterheim. Then, the attack by the Austrian 4th Hussars is noted as from the Relation (Austrian printed account put out after most major battles), albeit lifted from Duffy, when Stutterheim, an eye- witness differs, a fact that goes unnoted.

Publishers cannot be expected to verify every assetion made by an author, but all of them would be well advised to follow Greenhill's example and at least get the book looked over by knowledgeable people to check the key claims, (assuming he survives the lynch mob, Herr Hofschr6er should be looking at the 1806 book). It was to be hoped that in the aftermath of the Hamilton- Williams fiasco that authors would be truthful with their claims to sourcing (there are always enthusiasts able to check them out). Authors like Bowden have a particular responsibility, given their following amongst younger enthusiasts, in whose minds myth becomes fact.

There is no shame in quoting from good recent works, where these are now out-of-print or in another language. However, it is something rather different to claim to have carried out original research by lifting the references in these better works.

In a severe case of pot and kettle, Bowden's Anglophobia becomes almost hysterical when he attacks British historians, notably Dr. Chandler, as Johnny-come-lately authors (who do you think you are, Bowden?) for supporting Soult's claims for recognition at Austerlitz. Relying on a French source singled out by Elting as unreliable, Bowden dismisses Soult as fraudulent and manipulative, British accolades allegedly being designed to make Wellington's victories over the Marshal more impressive. Why? Bowden could learn a lot from Dr. Chandler, whom I have always found to be objective about the Emperor and willing to listen to alternative views. The answer may be on p. 1066 of Campaigns of Napoleon - Soult urged the recall of Grouchy on the morning of 18th June 1815. Coupled with frequent references to Bowden's book on Waterloo (to be republished this year), are we next going to hear that Waterloo wasn't the fault of the Emperor, but his Chief of Staff?

The book concludes with 80pp of Orders of Battle essential for a campaign history, but what happened to an index, without which the usefulness of any reference book is compromised! The Austerlitz OB raises an interesting idea, worthy of further investigation, that in fact the Grande Armee outnumbered the Allies, whose strengths have previously been overstated, not taking account of their strategic consumption. The French OBs are well sourced and very detailed, but the Allied OBs, on which this assertion is based, are different. Throughout, all are allegedly deduced from the 1805 Feldakten in the Kriegarchiv and "numerous" Russian regimental histories. However, aside from a few units rounded to the nearest 50 at Sch6ngrabern, there are no Allied unit numbers, just overall totals, at all battles prior to Austerlitz, (Egger and Willbold are historical writers, not unduly concerned with OBs). At Austerlitz, this author specifically claims to have gone to archival and regimental sources.

The list of units is as in Duffy, but numbers are considerably lower. Most Austrian units are rounded to the nearest 50 with the ubiquitous general 1805 Feldakten reference. Similarly about half the Russian cavalry and all its Guard units (not previously engaged) are rounded to the nearest 100. So what of the rest of the Russians? Figures during the campaign are tabulated in Chapter VI up to the 27th November, the last being the basis of the Austerlitz OB, based on French archives and those "numerous" Russian regimental histories - only a few written in French are actually listed. Aside from the facts that regimental histories often list missing, some of whom later rejoin, and calculations based on losses can miss small groups of new reinforcements, surely at least some would give accurate numbers at a major battle like Austerlitz?

Many modern writers slavishly copy French accounts as the accurate truth even when impossible, notably Kellerman's at Marengo (cited twice in this book). In the absence of a single precise Allied archival reference and in keeping with Bowden's accounts of the major clashes, one is entitled to wonder whether these Russian figures actually arise from claims in the French archives about losses inflicted! (Evidence to the contrary would have included a breakdown of the calculations and sources for a few units). The Allied armies may well have been less than often stated, but not on the basis of this material. Looked at from another angle, if Bowden is right, how come the Grande Armee units close to their staging points, find them regularly outnumbered in Germany, but suddenly outnumber the Allies when hundreds of miles from their own depots? We end as we started - questioning the reliability of the material this author has in fact relied upon.

At the end of his account of Austerlitz, Duffy quotes Janetscek, a collection of local chronicles, describing the sufferings of local peasants and soldiers caused by the Emperor's battles. Also listed by Bowden, it seems that neither this nor Allied sources must get in the way of the glorification of Napoleon and the Grande Armee. "No detailed combat studies of these battles, incorporating the combination of archival documents in France, Austria and Russia has ever been attempted prior to Napoleon and Austerlitz" claims this author - it remains to be done and when it is, it must be objective.

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