Early in February I was woken by the news on my radio-alarm that Buckingham Palace was being increasingly annoyed by unfounded rumours and conspiracy theories. My immediate sleep-befuddled reaction was that Peter had now hacked off Brenda, but these fears were dismissed when the reporter went on to explain that it concerned an Egyptian shop-keeper and a traffic accident in Paris. So that was all right.

There can be few readers of this magazine who were unaware of the broad thrust of this long-awaited book. Peter has written several articles both here and elsewhere where he has either expanded on themes he only touches on in the book, or on related matters for which he could not find room. Areas covered have been as diverse as Siborne's History or the Anglo-Prussian communications network in Belgium in 1815. As Peter says in his Introduction, the 1815 Campaign in Belgium and France has interested Peter for some little time. Those readers who also buy Wargames Illustrated will have seen his 1994 series on the Battle of Ligny. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that this three-part series was a seminal work, exploring in brief some of themes that are expanded upon in the book.

I do not intend to comment on whether Peter has or has not done the necessary research over and above what are usually accepted as the standard works on the subject. He lists in detail the libraries, archives and private collections that he has used in the bibliography. Bringing some of these back into the light of day has done us all a great favour, and their addition to the historiography of the campaign is to be welcomed.

In the Introduction, Peter makes the statement: 'Every historian has an axe to grind and I am no exception. My contention is that the accepted view in the English-speaking world of this campaign and battle need challenging and revising. This work is the first comprehensive effort in the English language to explain the German perspective.' This in a nutshell, sums up the author's approach and on those grounds alone is why it is such a valuable addition to any Waterloo collection.

The book starts by looking at the political dimension and the Congress of Vienna. Looked at from the German dimension, and particularly the Prussian one, these deliberations often failed to acknowledge their requirements. If Prussia was now to be one of the European Great Powers, then she had to receive adequate recompense both for her past humiliations and for the sacrifices she had made in men and money in the 1813 - 14 campaigns. Castlereagh and then the Duke of Wellington were seen to be inimicable to these wishes, either by frustrating asterrirks to dismember smaller states or through their desire for a balance of power, although Peter regards the Duke as a most astute man.

Once Napoleon lands in France, the Allies began to react. As the two closest powers, Britain and Prussia started to form armies in Belgium either to defend against an attack or, when Russia and Austria had mobilised, to invade and overthrow the outlaw. In order to build up forces both governments tried to attract the smaller German states to join with them. Again, Prussia was in the humiliating position where most of the smaller states wanted to serve under British command because that way they would obtain a subsidy. Economically weak Prussia had difficulty supplying her own army let alone the ability to make any substantial contribution to these contingents. This chapter is particularly useful for readers who are interested in Confederation of the Rhine forces and what they did after they had left Russia.

The book really gets into its stride once the campaign opens. Peter provides almost a minute by minute account of march schedules and which unit was where and doing what. He has used the German regimental histories to good effect and gives an excellent feel for how the Prussian Army operated at Ligny. Wargamers in particular will find the small unit tactics which Peter describes useful in showing how the 1812 Regulations were used in practice. The situation maps for are generally clear, although only the overview has a scale. Quatre Bras is treated as an adjunct to Ligny (as indeed the Tirlemont agreement suggested it should be) but as it involved less German troops is not dealt with at the same length. The doings of the British units involved, whilst treated comprehensively, are not Peter's main theme. It is doubtful that readers who have the usual British sources on their bookshelves will gain any more information here.

I suspect that a large number of potential purchasers will be aware of Peter's accusation of Wellington misleading Blucher as to the position of the Anglo-Allied army, and that it would not be in a position to support him at Ligny. The 'why' is something that we could debate for a long time, and I do not want to do that here. Peter's evidence that he did mislead the Prussian General is impressive, culled from German archives and eyewitness accounts. It therefore sets the ground rules for those historians who want to argue the point - they cannot merely gainsay what Peter says, they will have to assemble their own archival proof. If Peter was preparing for a court case, he has at least produced a prima facie one.

Personally, I found the book to be very impressive, well written, with theories backed up with compelling evidence (one can see how Peter got his degree). Whether you agree with some of his points, or even if you are not particularly interested in the German States, it should be in your Waterloo library. I am looking forward to Peter's second volume.

More Book Reviews

1815 - The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, his German Allies and the Battle of Ligny and Quatre Bras
General de Brigade (Napoleonic rules)
The Glory Years 1805-7: Napoleon and Austerlitz 1805