(1986, reprinted regularly) (Arnold) 286pp - p/back £ 15.99

Our view of the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars tends to have a rather Anglo-French or personality-based slant. The political background, which drove all of Europe into 23 years of war quickly becomes obscured and even replaced by nationalist myth. The most notable of these is the idea that the Revolutionary Wars were a combined effort by the reactionary monarchist states against the fledgling French Republic.

The truth is rather more complex, and in this book from the Longman 'Origins of Wars' series Professor Blanning has expertly distilled the many threads of each nation's policies into a coherent whole picture. The first chapter looks at various theories about why wars start, which can be skipped over as it delves into many aspects of human personality, Clausewitzian theory, etc. only for the whole lot to be dismissed at the end of the book as being of little value in understanding why the Revolutionary Wars began. The main narrative is very clear, linking the personalities to the policies, which would otherwise be hard to follow.

The substantive chapters begin with an overview of the conflicts of the previous half-century notably Prussian and Russian expansionism compared with the strains in the AustroFrench alliance. Particular emphasis is placed on France's steady decline and the growing desire for national regeneration. Two chapters, dividing at the crucial Declaration of Pillnitz (27 August 1791 ) cover the Continental Powers' policies towards both France and each other, notably their primary concern with territorial expansion in Poland. They also look closely at internal events in France up to the start of the war in April 1792.

A further chapter covers British involvement as London became increasingly concerned about Revolutionary advances in the Low Countries during 1792-3. The author rightly postulates that the War of the Second Coalition was really the First Coalition War renewed after a brief pause for breath. This chapter is primarily used to discuss why France's traditional support for Turkey, (to counter-balance Austria), turned into Bonaparte's 1798 attempt to take Egypt, and how the Russians became involved in Central Europe.

Using reliable secondary material from the main European languages, the author deploys a clear line of argument to support his belief that the Revolutionaries and their opponents fundamentally misunderstood what was happening internally in the other's territory. They thus greatly underestimated their opponent's ability to fight.

The Revolutionaries needed war to survive their internal troubles, while the other Powers were more concerned with making territorial gains at the expense of a weakened France. France's internal problems were almost welcomed by the other Powers, who were not that interested in who was actually in control. France could quite probably have rejoined the community of nations as a Republic as the USA had so recently done.

This war which reshaped Europe and catapulted Napoleon to power in the Revolutionaries' place might never have happened and the old system of shifting alliances and conflicting interests would have continued.

This book is enjoyable, thought-provoking reading and should be read by all enthusiasts. As well as being extensively footnoted, there is a detailed list for Further Reading in all languages. Recommended.

More Book Reviews

The Longman Companion to the French Revolution
English and Welsh Infantry Regiments
Life in Napoleon's Army
The Adventures of John Wetherall
Female Tars
The Origins of French Revolutionary Wars
The Wars of Napoleon
Imperial Bayonets