In the summer of 1995, men dressed in threadbare uniforms of the French Revolutionary period had taken the Doria Palace by storm. Then, at bayonet point, the Austrian defenders of the 16th century town hall of Loano were hereded into the town square along with a good number of municipal employees, and for good measure, the mayor.

This colorful episode marks the beginning of the bi-centary celebration of the Battle of Loano, a little know victory but the first engraved on the Arc de Triumphe in Paris. Although not present at the battle, Napoleon gave strategic direction and planning for the series of battles that opened up the following year's campaign for Italy.

At the end of the 18th Century, each frontier of the Republic that had arisen from the Revolution constituted a front. The Italian frontier was no exception. Because of the nature of its geophysical terrain and the relatively little importance given to Piedmont as an adversary, the operations languished and the French Ministry of War considered them of secondary importance. By chance, at the beginning of 1794, the ambitious General Buonaparte was assigned as Artillery Inspector of the Army of Italy.

Insecurity

The assignment was ill-suited to produce battlefield laurels. Napoleon, in order to impose his own operational ideas, knew how to play on the insecurity that the political leadership had instilled in its generals. Dismissals, imprisonment and the guillotine were often the lot of unsuccessful commanders. He first gained the support of the political commissars Cristoforo Saliceti and Augustin Robespierre (the brother of Maximilien Robespierre).

Then he succeeded in persuading General Pierre Dumerbion, the Commander of the Armee d'Italie, to accept his scheme of a diversion on the strong positions of the Piedmontese in Saorgio, against which French attacks had failed for two years. In the meantime, the main effort would be developed on the coast in the direction of Savona. About two weeks later General Andre Massena reached Loano and, at the beginning of May 1794, he took the mountain passes which gave access to the Pianura padana, the plain of the River Po. Napoleon had wanted the campaign to continue, but his peremptory suggestions went against Minister Lazare Carnot's intentions.

Carnot was convinced that it was not worthwhile sacrificing forces on the Italian front which could affect the one on the Rhine. Buonaparte's view was that the war against Austria had to be won, but by forcing that country to withdraw from the Rhine in order to plug the gap in Italy.

Napoleon's viewpoint was one of grand strategy, ranging far and wide over broad horizons. In the meantime the General was sent to Genoa to occupy himself with less important administrative matters - a poor assignment for his ambitions. It was above all risky in that it coincided with the coup d'etat of 9 Thermidor - 27 July 1794. Buonaparte was imprisoned and had to find inexhaustible excuses to avoid the worst.

Waiting for clarification of Napoleon's personal affairs, the Armee d'Italie was champing at the bit. The General's worries were justified: Austria was beginning to worry about the Italian front and had decided to reinforce it. Not only this but Austria and Piedmont were collaborating, an arrangement that until then had meant little more than verbal co-operation.

During this pause in circumstances, whilst discussing strategy, a suggestion made by Napoleon was accepted. This was that to hold the front it would be necessary that Savona remained French. The Armee could then penetrate along the River Bormida in such a way as to divide the Piedmontese and the Austrians, thereby threatening to surround the latter.

Swift Campaign

Large Map 1 (64K)

A swift campaign which began on the 19 September was unexpectedly highly successful. By the 24th, however, General Dumerbion considered that his exhausted forces had to establish more secure positions by falling back a considerable distance and setting up a new front line.

The oscillations in the fortune of Napoleon corresponded closely with the operations on the Italian front. Involved in one of the periodic expulsions of supernumerary officials and then overwhelmed by the flaring up of his pride, only in the summer of 1795 did Napoleon return to the situation in Italy.

In fact, following the offensive taken by the Austrians on 29 June, General Francois Christophe Kellerman, the new Commander of the Armee d'Italie, had been driven back to Loano. The Bureau Topographique (more or less the French General Staff) recalled Buonaparte because of his accurate knowledge of the front.

He had just completed detailed reports on the subject when he found himself yet again in an awkward situation on the 15 September. The difficulties Buonaparte experienced in his career came to an end on 5 October -13 Vendemiare. This was the day he fired on those demonstrating in front of the Tuilleries. It was also the day of the French, who were about to attain a victory, advanced in Italy.

Italy First

Napoleon strongly advised the withdrawal of the troops from the Rhine and the Pyrenees in favour of the Italian front, in order to recover the lost positions and to finally divide the Austrian troops from those of Piedmont. Buonaparte's point of view was accepted, but put into practice over too long a period of time. Operations came to a standstill when serious conflicts arose between the rapacious Austrian Commander in Chief, General Baron De Wins, who was mainly involved in the plunder of Liguria, and his Piedmontese equivalent Lieutenantgeneral Baron Michelangelo Alessandro Marchini Colli. Colli was also supported by notables from Genoa, but even though the French were also affected by the delays, these proved advantageous in their case.

The lull in operations gave Kellerman the opportunity to reorganise his own troops now positioned on the Borghetto line. Based on a mountainous rampart, it started from Loano, and cut across the Maritime Alps to join in the defence of the River Tanaro. The rugged terrain of the Western Ligurian mountains heavily restricted the lines of communication whilst at the same time it proved effective as an excellent defence.

In addition the Piedmontese and Austrian troops, although well drilled, were disoriented because their training did not include mountain combat. It was too static and tied to defensive tactics.

The French were not affected by such limitations. Their demi- brigades (the term "regiment" was abolished during the Revolution because it had strong ties to traditional noble connections) had not been so strictly drilled and therefore were not particularly preoccupied by tactical principles. This was actually to their advantage since it rendered them more flexible than other detachments.

Courage

They were led on by the impetuous courage of their young officers, who were full of idealism for the Republic. The French armies travelled lightly with only their basic needs and consequently were not encumbered with excsssivs equipment and provisions. Admittedly, the men themselves were in great need of shoes, the chronic shortage of which characterised the campaigns of the Republican period. This the lack of shoes would affect their fighting and marching ability, not unlike the situation in the summer of 1795.

While the French were protected behind the line of the Borghetto, their adversaries organised defensive positions on the opposite bank. the Austrians positions ran from Borghetto situated one kilometre west of Loano) to the Scravaion. This is a pass cutting between the summit of the extremely sheer and rugged mountains, in particular those extending down to the coast.

The Piedmont troops were lined up from Scravaion to Garessio, following the Tanaro Valley on and on until the Tenda Pass. the Piedmontese were the only ones to maintain pressure on the French during the summer months.

These operations were for all practical purposes ineffective. They were organised by General De Wins, who for his part avoided exposing his command to the risk of an offensive. He was aware that Prussia and Spain were possibly in the process of abandoning the First Coalition, in which case the French could troops to the Italian front, as suggested by Napoleon. The Austrian Commander had no wish to provoke reinforcement of his adversary in the Castelvecchio area by attacking the French on the 19 September.

Weak Attack

The attack by Austrian General Count D'Argenteau's army corps was not a particularly strong one, but it resulted in failure as it was directed against the strongest point of the French line. Known as "Little Gibraltar", some soldiers were entrenched and some were defended by a redoubt consisting of a high dry-stone wall. A determined counterattack, however, allowed the French to conclusively overturn the situation in their favour within a few hours.

French reinforcements were in fact beginning to arrive. 6,000 men came from the Rhine and 10,000 from Spain, but the final addition to the Armee d'Italie was only 12,000 men - the difference being caused by strategic consumption. With them on 21 September arrived General Barthelemy Scherer who replaced Kellerman, transferred to Armee des Alpes.

The new commander suggested that it was not possible to carry out the plan that had been decided upon in August by the Committee of Public Safety, based upon Napoleon's first thoughts. He proposed an attack on the village of Ceva, intended to separate the two coalition armies, followed by the recapture of Vado, near the city of Savona. It was too ambitious an objective for the Armee d'Italie which, although having reached the strength of 33,000 men, was still outnumbered by the 30,000 Austrians and 12,000 Piedmontese.

Reshuffled Plan

Large Map 2 (slow: 115K)

The plan was therefore reshuffled by Scherer and Massena, although preserving the intention of dividing the Piedmontese from the Austrians. Now the main body of the French army would attack the troops of Colli at Garessio and Mount Spinarda, outflanking the Imperials in the Scravaion Pass which acted as the hinge between the two armies. At the same time the remainder of the Armee d'Italie would fix the Austrians with a demonstration between the pass and the coast.

The movements behind the French lines did not escape the Piedmontese commander. He took all the precautions he could, but both his plans and also those of Scherer were nullified by the abundant snowfall of the 15 November. The conditions of intense cold, coupled with inadequate clothing and equipment, made it impossible for the any units to remain on the harsh Ligurian mountains.

The French soldiers were shabbily dressed, but their Austrian colleagues suffered in equal measure since their clothes and equipment were worn-out by the long campaign too. The units, therefore, began to disperse and withdraw to the zone behind the front line. The French thought it would be easy to seize this opportunity to advance but, approaching the Austrian quarters, the resistance stiffened. General Charlet succeeded in occupying the important positions of Pian dei Prati abandoned by the Imperial troops.

The subsequent French attack began right from this area, in accordance with a new plan devised by General Massena. The manoeuvre was rather simple: fixing the flanks and breaking through the centre. The key of success depended on the element of surprise, the achievement of which was helped by the exchange of command between De Wins, who was disliked by both the Austrians and the Piedmontese, and General Baron Wallis, and also by the adverse weather conditions.

Bad Weather

The bad weather in particular made it extremely likely that the French units would withdraw to their billets and convinced the elderly Austrian commanders that operations would be resumed only in the following spring.

The Revolution had broken the rules traditionally followed by the armies and inclement weather had now become a part of the elements to be exploited in order to attain success. During the night of the 22 November, the Austrians descended from the summit and the ridge to make their way to the winter quarters prepared at the bottom of the valley. Without disturbance the 25,000 French soldiers completed their manoeuvres of approach to the enemy lines, now sparsely guarded by depleted detachments.

The Austrian-Piedmontese armies consisted of more than 44,000 men scattered between Savona and the Col di Tenda Pass. Although 19,000 Austrians were drawn up between the coast and the Castle of Rocca Barbena, there were few defenders in the zone where the French had attacked. In contrast, having been forewarned by their informers, the Piedmontese, arranged between Rocca Barbena and the valley of Tanaro, were ready for action, as demonstrated by the facts of the day of the 23rd.

For the whole day their sector held off the right flank of the French, commanded by General Philibert Serurier, which concluded with both adversaries still occupying their original positions.

The French attacks began early. One, conducted by General Miollis, was directed to the Valley of Tanaro, west of Garessio. The other, led by Serurier, was aimed at the San Bernardo Pass to cut the road to Rocca Barbena. By mid-morning the French found themselves in great difficulty in both directions, whilst the Piedmontese manoeuvred their units and cleverly exploited the hard terrain to fire incessantly upon the enemy with their muskets and cannons.

The fact that Serurier had already begun to withdraw at midday, without losing touch of the enemy, should not be taken as an indication that this attack of the future Marshal was a weak one. The task entrusted to him that day was carried out, namely to detain the Piedmont army in its proper positions. This prevented it from assisting the Imperial troops who were being subjected to greater pressures by Massena.

In fact Massena, who was in charge of more than 13,000 men, launched an attack before sunrise against the hinge between the Piedmontese line and that of the Austrians. On the left, Division General Amede Laharpe initiated two attacks. The one commanded by General St.Hilaire against the Scravaion Pass was stopped by Austrian and Piedmontese troops who were strongly entrenched within the pass.

The other column was directed instead to the Piedmontese positions in the upper valley of the Neva, a swift flowing mountain stream, with the intention of distracting the attention of the defenders. At the same time a strong contingent infiltrated, unseen, to outflank the defence line which united the Lingo and brie Schenasso mountains.

Position Taken

This position was taken at about 0700. The French General Pijion divided his forces instructing one column to outflank the Piedmontese who were engaged in a skirmish with the diversionary attack ordered b, Massena. The other column, meanwhile, converged on the Scravaion Pass reaching the rear of the Coalition units facing St.Hilaire.

At 10.00 the main part of the Piedmontese was driven back towards the North, the slopes of Mount Cianea. They were now cut-off from the troops of Austrian General D'Argenteau, in spite of the vigorous counter-attack led later by Baron Colli, who in the meantime succeeded in reorganising his own forces.

On the right of Massena, the fighting had a less favourable beginning. In fact at about 6.00, D'Argenteau, becoming aware of the movements the French troops led by General Charlet, immediately reinforced his own lines between the Saddle of the Alzabecchi and Rocca Barbena. The Austrians here demonstrated the quality of their own training and the orderly and precise fire of their line began to mow down the French columns.

When General Charlet was among the victims the revolutionary troops hesitated but, with immediately Massena took command of Charlet's troops and also commisted the reserve units of General Bizanet Desprte the Imperial troops solidly holding Rocca Barbena, they could not resist the blow when they were attacked by Massena and consequently began to withdraw.

In defence, the Austrians' commander of the sector, General Liptay, reorganised his troops in the valley near the centre of the village of Bardineto. Immediately, however, his positions appeared threatened by the convergence of the French vanguards. Laharpe's, led by General Pijion, descended from the Scravaion Pass and Massena's, under General Jean-Baptiste Cervoni, came from the Saddle of the Alzabecchi.

More Loano

Battle of Loano (I)
Battle of Loano (II)
Loano Order of Battle
Re-enactment Photos (extremely slow: 743K)