To compensate for the missed chance at Maastricht, De Saxe decided to lay siege to Bergen-op Zoom. A remarkable decision, since this town was thought to be an impregnable stronghold. Bergen-op-Zoom indeed had the reputation of being invincible. Before in 1581, 1584, 1588, 1594, 1605, 1622 and 1627 (during the 30 Years War),. great commanders like Parma and Spinola had failed to take this town. Prior to the War of Spanish Succession the great Dutch engineer Menno van Coehoorn had strengthened its defences and turned it into his masterpiece.

Although this article isn't meant to deal in depth with 18th century fortifications and siege-warfare, I think it makes for a change to deal a little bit more comprehensively with the siege of this town. Not in the least because siege-warfare formed an integral and important part of 18th C. stategies and this one was a fine example. Some even claim that it's duration saved the Republic from a further French invasion.

Where necessary I have added some illustrations. MAP IV shows the town with its fortifications.

Map of Siege of Bergen-op Zoom (200K)

The entire works now counted 16 bastions, most with double casemated batteries, covered by orillions in the angles of the flank. Between all bastions lay a ravelin with revetted walls and a strong casemated reduit, often protected by lunettes. The covered way had embattled escarp and counterscarp walls. In every place of arms there was a casemated lunet with a reduit. Everywhere beneath the covered way and the glacis, revetted mine-galleries had been constructed.

The western part of the town was protected both by inundations and additional works like the large bastioned fortress "Waterschans", guarding the Scheldt, the fortress " Slikfort" and the redoubt "Kijk in de Pot", both guarding the heavily retrenched camp facing south. The west-side ditches normally were wet.

The eastern part of the town was less protected. More attention was payed here at being able to cover every possible access with artileryor musket-fire. Besides, the dry ditches on the eastern front could be flooded with water from both the Scheldt and the surrounding inundations. In 1727 the northern side of the town had been connected with the fortified town Steenbergen by a continuing bastioned wall, intersected by the 3 strong fortresses Moermont, Pijnssen and Roovere, which had to protect some weak sections of the beforelying inundation. This was called the Lines of Steenbergen and also the `Key to Zeeland. See MAP V.

The result was a town almost impregnable and which in all circumstances could easily be supplied with replacements, weapons and victuals. MAP VI shows in more detail the parts of the defensive works which were relevant to the course of the siege.

At the start of the siege the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom counted 9 battalions and 2 squadrons, totalling some 5,000 effectives, commanded by the 57 year old Prince of Hessen-Philipsthall, an uncle of Prince William IV. The garrison was composed of the following troops: infantry battalions Oranje-Drenthe, Stolberg, Deutz, Lindmann, Schaumburg-Lippe, Leuwe, Burmania and probably 2 battalions of the regt. Waldeck; 1 sq. each of the cavalry rgts. Hop and Schagen. By the time that the French reached the town, the lines of Steenbergen were occupied by 10 battalions and 16 squadrons, totalling 7,000 effectives, under command of the Prince of SaksenHildburghausen.

Cumberland decided to position a reserve of 13 battalions (3 Austrian, 2 English, 5 Dutch and 2 Hessian) and 20 squadrons, totalling 9,000 men, at Oudenbosch between Steenbergen and Breda. Waldeck thought he got the overall command of the forces in and around Bergen-op-Zoom. However the newly appointed CaptainGeneral of the States army, Prince Willem IV, decided that the 87year old Swedish general Cronstrom should be given the command of all troops and strongholds between the rivers Scheldt and Meuse, from Lillo to Grave. At first Cronstrom refused because of his age and bad health. But after he was promised that his son, adjutant of Willem IV, together with 6 Swedish adjutants were to form his staff, he agreed. This caused Waldeck to retire immediately to his German estates. The reinforcements were led instead to Oudenbosch by general Schwarzenberg, while Cronstrom assumed command in Bergen-op-Zoom on July 14th.

Without too much detail I'll try to sketch as complete as possible the main events leading to the final surrender of the town.

After taking the village Zandvliet in front of Bergen-op-Zoom on July 9th, the French appeared in front of the town on July 12th. They had no up to date plan of the fortifications when they started the siege. They only possessed a 200 years old map of the town, showing 2 hornworks in their front which had been removed by Coehoorn long before.

With 2,400 labourers, protected by 10 grenadier companies and 5 battalions, they opened trenches during the night of July 14th at a distance of 200 metres opposite the bastions Coehoorn and Pucelle. Target of this attack were the lunettes Utrecht and Zeeland, which covered the ravelin Dedem. This ravelin was connected with the sally-port Fullenius by an embattled caponiere (see FIG B in MAP IV). This strong gate gave entrance through the town beneath the curtain-wall. Being badly informed, the French soon discovered that they had chosen the strongest front of the town for their attack. It was defended by 130 artillery-pieces in batteries and 28 mortars on the walls of the bastions and ravelin.

Despite several night-attacks by the garrison, the 2nd parallel was completed on July 18th. On July 20th the siege-fire was opened from the 2nd parallel with 40 siege-guns, 16 mortars and 2 howitzers. After 3 fruitless assaults on the redoubt 'Kijk in de Pot' the French opened siege- fire on this work too, starting July 23rd. Also assaults against the fortress Roovere in the Lines of Steenbergen were fruitless. In order to prevent replacements within the lines of defence from getting too much rest, siege-batteries of 8 and 4 pieces were aimed against the fortresses Roovere and Pijnssen.

On July 26th the French came within handgrenade-distance of the garrison. Despite rewards for good return-fire and the inspiring presence of representatives of the States-General within the besieged town, the defence and counter-attacks weren't effective enough.

Despite the fact that the garrison-artillery was understrength (reinforcements often consisting of sailors) and the equipment was in a bad condition and short of supplies, it performed remarkably well under the command of captain Verschuer. During the first 5 weeks of the siege the defenders spent 24,594 cannon-shot, 7,409 mortar bombs, 28,000 hand-grenades and 550,000 pounds of powder, against 50,000 cannon-shot and 3,078 mortar bombs of the French. They were able to cause 850 death and 4,230 wounded amongst the French in the trenches during this initial phase of the siege.

The threatened strongholds Coehoorn, Pucelle and Dedem and their surrounding outworks were constantly undermanned. Also the sorties were undertaken with too few men, resulting in not enough damage being inflicted and not demoralizing the besiegers enough. Twice a sortie was made with 100 men and only once with 800. On several occaisions, Hessen-Philipsthall requested reinforcements from within the lines of Steenbergen. The town could easily lodge and feed another 4,000 men, so that more effective sorties could be undertaken with forces of up to 3,000 men. However Cronstrom constantly refused to cooperate, partly because he was envious of Hessen-Philipsthall, who was a favourite amongst his men. However he also was afraid that the lines of Steenbergen might become understrength. Another point was that the garrison and its commanders had too much faith in the strength of the town. They even didn't think it necessary to create internal retrenchments and traverses.

As a result the French were able to complete their 3rd parallel on the 22nd and the 4th parallel on the 27th of July. On the night of August 5th the French were ready for the first assault. Targets were the covered way and the lunettes Zeeland and Utrecht in front of the works Coehoorn, Pucelle and Dedem. 3 Mines, which were placed beneath the place of arms in front of the 3 strongholds, blew up the top of the glacis. 10 Grenadier companies (500 men) came out of the 4th parallel, followed by 3 columns of labourers, each led by 2 engineers. Fire support was given from the troops in the parallels.

After bloody fights, the projecting places of arms in front of the bastions Coehoorn and Pucelle were occupied by the French and the one in front of the ravelin Dedem 2 nights later. In this manner the French were master of an important part of the covered way. However it would take another 6 weeks, before the town would surrender.

Meanwhile General Schwartzenberg had arrived at Oudenbosch with the reinforcements. When soon afterwards the Austrians sent another 4,000 strong detachment of hussars, croats and pandours under General Baroniay to support Schwarzenberg, Lowenthal intended to prevent their amalgamation. Hearing this, Schwartzenberg decided to attack the village Wouw (near Breda), where Lowenthal had his headquarters in the local castle.

The village was strengthened with several small redoubts and lesser field-works up to the inundations around Steenbergen.. Since the allied commanders again needed too much time to decide upon this plan of attack, Lowenthal was left enough time to take precautions. So he sent a detachment to support the garrison of Wouw and aligned it near the road from Huybergen to Breda. At dawn on August 10th an attack by 3 columns, totalling 2,000 men, was made at 3 redoubts which guarded the entrance to Wouw. However without support of the main force of about 20,000, this attack was doomed to fail. So after a 2-3 hours fight the attack was cancelled with a loss of about 100 men.

Afterwards it appeared that this plan of attack had been betrayed. Several hours later Schwartzenberg again deployed his main force on the nearby moor of Nispen, but seeing the French ready to counter-attack he cancelled the attack prematurely. A commission declared afterwards that with this decision most probably a definite chance to raise the siege had been lost. Without any delay all available troops within the lines should have been committed to the battle to force a raising of the siege by the French.

After several requests Prince William agreed to send another detachment to reinforce the troops around Steenbergen and Oudenbosch. Some 15 batallions, 7 squadrons and a batallion of Croats, totalling some 10,000 under the command of Genaral Chanclos arrived at Oudenbosch on August 30th, bringing the total force outside Bergen-op-Zoom to about 30,000. William was too afraid that the French could threaten both Bergen-op-Zoom and Maastricht at the same time and didn't dare to send stronger reinforcements.

The old and tired Cronstrom wasn't able to make optimal use of the total force he could dispose of, resulting in a command that was actually devided over 3 men: Hessen-Philippsthal commanding the troops within the town, Saksen-Hildburghausen those within the lines of Steenbergen and Chanclos those at Oudenbosch. This was doomed to fail.

After occupying the covered way the French continued with their plans, but ran up against the splendid works of Coehoorn. The lunettes they had to conquer could only be taken with mines, a labour during which the besieged had enough opportunity to answer with counter-mining and defensive fire. It would finally take 77 mines and 79 (Dutch) counter-mines before the defenders gave up.

On August 12th the French had completed the occupation of the covered way and succeeded with the lunet Zeeland. They entered it on August 15th. However, all seven lunettes were strengthened by Coehoorn with reduits and it was not until August 30th that the defenders were definitely cut off from this lunet. Next was the lunet Utrecht and because of the braveness of the defenders, it took even longer to take this one. It was not until September 13th and with several thousands of dead and wounded that both lunettes were in French hands.

The stubborn Cronstrom still refused to draw reinforcements from the lines of Steenbergen, despite urgent request from HessenPhilipsthall, who saw his garrison being reduced to 4,600 effectives, including 1,300 artillery-personel. The garrison now consisted of the following 10 battalions:

the Scots regiments Colyaer and Majoribanks, Waldeck (2),Loewe, Evertsen, Holstein-Gottorp, Saxen-Gotha, van Rechteren and Deutz. Strength ranging from 177 to 463 all ranks.

The only thing the town had no lack of were supplies of food, drink and tabacco. From all over Holland and Zeeland ships arrived in the well protected harbour with plenty of supplies. However this abundancy led to a decreasing discipline amongst the garrison.

Meanwhile on September 8th fire had been opened from 2 breachbatteries (8 pieces) against the left face of the Coehoorn bastion. After taking the lunet Utrecht 2 batteries (7 pieces) opened fire against the bastion Pucelle. Also I battery was positioned against the ravelin Dedem. After 6 fortnights of continuing fire, LOwenthal thought that the 4 breaches in both bastions were large enough to be assaulted by his men. He sent message to Hessen-Philipsthall who undertook no special precautions, trusting on the town's own strength.

The defenders thought, perhaps rightly, that the breaches in both the bastions wouldn't pose any real threat. To pose a real threat to the curtain-wall the French would have to take the ravelin Dedem. The breach there was such that it could be defended with 80 men protected by 4 artillery-pieces in good condition and an inward entrenchment which offered a strong enough refuge. Furthermore it was thought unwise to let water into the up to now dry ditch, because it had to be drawn from the inundated lines of Steenbergen and it was just the inundation that made these lines so particularly strong. A wet ditch also meant that the caponniere, which connected the ravelin Dedem with the curtain-wall, would be flooded.

So when the breach-batteries silenced on the night of September 16th the sleepy defenders didn't think that there was an immediate threat. The French could freely enter the ditch, kill the sentries, clear the mess around the breaches and fill in the cunette.

At 4 o'clock in the morning the French opened fire with all mortars and 3 assault columns commenced their attack. The head of the middle column split in 2 parts, each consisting of 50 volunteers and 1 grenadier company. Both rounded one flank of the ravelin and met at the gorge, where they occupied the gorge and the caponniere. 2 Other grenadier companies of the middle column assaulted the breach in the ravelin, followed by sappers, labourers and a line-battalion. The 80 men guarding the breach were all killed, while 2 grenadier companies from the regiments Thierry and Sturler, who were posted as reserve in the gorge, managed to retire along the caponniere through the sally-port Fullenius.

At the same time the left assault-column attacked the Coehoorn bastion and the right column the Pucelle bastion. Each column was headed by 6 grenadier companies, followed closely by 3 line battalions, then some sappers, artillerymen, pioneers and about 300 labourers. Each column was again closed by another 3 battalions. Each bastion was occupied by 86 men who, just like their companions in the ravelin Dedem, felt safe and didn't expect any assault at all.

The 4 narrow, but cleaned-up breaches were climbed by the grenadiers. The labourers and pioneers immediately commenced to entrench the gorges of the bastions, while the artillerymen started aiming the guns at the town. The narrow breaches should have allowed the defenders to hold up the attackers long enough until reinforcements from within arrived. However the confusion caused by the retreat of the 2 grenadier companies from the ravelin Dedem through the sally-port Fullenius, had caused this gateway to the town to stay opened. The Frenchmen, many of whom gathered in the ditch, noticed this and started pouring into the town along this easy way. Within an hour the French flags could be seen on the walls along the entire front of attack.

It was not before the French had occupied 3 bastions and 2 gates that the defenders were able to put any organized resistance. Most of the garrison were lodged in barracks at a considerable distance from the threatened areas. Fortunately the remainder of the Deutz regiment was just being mustered prior to its departure to Breda. Hessen-Philipsthall immediately directed them to Cronstrom's headquarters (the Markiezenhof), to assist the local 30 strong guard to save it from the first waves of French attackers. From there the French were repulsed to the market-square. Meanwhile Cronstrom left the town, while Hessen-Philipsthall directed the alarmed garrison troops to that side of the market square, from where the roads led to the Steenbergen-gate, the only safe escape-route. Twice the advancing French were repulsed as far back as the market. The harbour too was a seriously threatened area, defended with severe losses by the regiments Evertsen and Marjoribanks, which were finally forced to retreat.

As the French threatened to seize the Steenbergen-gate, HessenPhilipsthall commanded a general retreat along this way. Unfortunately the last platoon of the Waldeck regiment was cut off and annihilated. Only the regiment Rechteren had to be left behind, being cut off from the town in the outwork Kijk in de Pot. After an hour of desperate resistance they too had to give up and surrendered with 104 men all ranks out of the 311 one day before.

All in all some 1,270 men, including 75 officers, were made prisoner by Lowenthal who was very annoyed by the stiff resistance of such a small garrison. However there awaited him a rich booty: 240 guns from the town and 50 more from the fortresses within the lines of Steenbergen, a large amount of mortars, 12 ships that were anchored in the harbour, partly filled with supplies and a well-filled treasury. Nonetheless the French had payed a high price: according to French sources between 10 and 12,000 French had been killed during the entire siege-operation. Besides precious time had been lost. Dutch losses in the Bergen-op-Zoom were estimated at 6,000, including many civilians.

Once the allies had cleared the town and had withdrawn from the lines of Steenbergen, the town and fortresses were soon occupied by the French. Also the strongholds along the Scheldt fell into French hands soon afterwards. The fortress Frederik Hendrik on October 7th., followed by the town of Lillo on October 12th. and the Kruisschans one day later.

Soon afterwards the campaign came to an end and both sides retired in their winter-quarters. An Anglo-Dutch flotilla on the Scheldt managed to cut off Bergen-op-Zoom from Antwerp. As a result supplies for Bergen-op-Zoom had to come over land, were they often were a prey for the Austrian and States Army light troops and Frei-Korps.

Dutch Commitment War of Austrian Succession

Introduction and Preliminaries
1744: First Hostilities in Flanders
1745: Conquest of Flanders
1746: Further Conquests of Austrian Netherlands
Battle of Rocour: 11 October 1746
1747: Dutch Republic Threatened
Battle of Laffelt: 2 July 1747
Siege of Bergen-op Zoom
1748: Maastrict and the End of the War