Although detailed information on Laffelt isn't easy to trace, I've managed to draw a rather reliable map giving the main positions of both sides at the opening-phase of the battle (MAP III)

The Allied army, under overaal command of Cumberland, intended to take positions at the heights of Herderen. Again they were anticipated by De Saxe who seized the heights and took up positions between Tongeren and Montenaken, through the village Herderen. By commanding the Heights of Herderen, running across his entire front, he was able to deploy his troops unseen by the enemy. Again he had out-manoeuvred the allies. Leaving 10 battalions to guard his headquarters at Tongeren, he watched the battle from Herderen Heights, this time accompanied by the King in person. 

However the Allied army had occupied strong positions too, along a line stretching from the village Spauwen to Wylre. Just like at Rocour, the Allied position was marked by villages, forming projected strengthened spearpoints. The right wing was made up of the Austrians, with positions between the villages Spauwen and Rosmeer; Spauwen forming an almost impregnable fortress, situated at the ridge of a steep slope. The Dutch contingent formed the (weak) centre, resting on the villages Rosmeer and Hees. The left wing was made up of the British, Hanoverian and Hessian contingents with Laffelt as a key-position in their front, while the left flank was screened by the Austrian light troops at Wylre. The village of Laffelt had many natural defensive features like hedges, walls and orchards, that could turn the place into an almost unobtainable fortress. However the preparations of this were taken to hand too late and not yet finished when the battle started.

The terrain allowed only cavalry-deployment along the line Vlytingen-Laffelt, because the terrain was full with little streams, hedges and terrain-splits.

I have come to the following O.O.B. for the allies; the numbers between brackets (..) refer to MAP III:

OOB

Austrian contingent (under Batthyunyi)

infantry; regiments. Carl Lotharingen, Alt-KOnigsegg, AltArenberg, Neipperg, Los Rios, Waldeck, Wurmbrand, Botta, Damnitz, Salm, Browne, Gaisruck, Jung-Wolffenbuttel, Platz, Arberg, UjvAry, Haller, Bethlen, Bayreuth and JungArenberg (46 btns); (I)

cavalry ; dragoon-regiments. Althann, Lichtenstein, Batthydnyi, Styrum, Ligne, Wurttenberg and the cuirassier regiments. Hohenzollern, Diemar, Birkenfeld and Bentheim (53 sqds); (II)

Light troops under Tripps; (III) - infantry; Trenk-pandours, Carlstadt and Banalisten-grenzer and 4 free-companies;

cavalry; hussar regiments. Karolyi, GhilAnyi, Beleznay,Nadasty, Esterhazy, Kdlnoky, Jozsika and Carlstadter; 

Dutch contingent (under command of Waldeck)

Infantry; the Scottish regiments. Marjoribanks and Colyear, the German regt. Waldeck and the regt. Oranje-Friesland (4 btns); the free-corps Cornab6 and the Bavarian regiments. Leib and During (2 btns); (IV)

Cavalry ; Gardes to Paard, Birkenfeld, Lintelo, RechteOverijssel, Hessen-Philipsthall, Schack, Buys, Van Ginkel, Van Eck, Oranje-Friesland, Karabiniers, Nassau-la-Leck, Schagen and the dragoon regiments. Gardes Dragonders, Schlippenbach and Sachsen-Gotha (37 sq); and the Frangipani hussars. (V)

English/Hanoverian/Hessian contingent (under Cumberland)

infantry (VI); English: 1 btn. of the 1st and 3rd guards, the 3rd Foot (Howard-The Buffs), 4th(Barrell), 8th (Wolfe), 13th(Pulteney), 19th(Green Howards), 21st (Scots Fusiliers), 25th(Semphill), 32nd(Douglas), 33rd(Johnson), 36th(Flemming), 37th(Dejean), 48th(Conway) (14 btns);

Hanoverians: the regiments. Garde, Sommerfeld, Horn, Oberg, Borch, Klinkowstrom, Block, Druchtleben, Sporken, Hugo, Cheusses, Miinchov, Freudemann, Zastrow and Hau(3 (16 btns);

Hessians: regiments. Prinz Max, Prinz Georg, Ktinig, Isenburg, Garde and Baumbach.

Cavalry (Ligonier) (VII)

English: 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys) , 6th (Rothes' or Inniskilling) Dragoons, 4th Dragoons (Rich's) and 7th Dragoons (Queen's Regt) (12 sqds).

Hanoverian: the dragoon regiments. Pontpietin, Adelepsen, Wendt and the cavalry.regiments. Leib, Wrede, Hammerstein, Schultzen, Behr, Hardenberg and Montigny (24 sqds);

Hessian: regiments Leib, Prinz Max, Graffendorff and Isenburg;

Taking the Austrian battalion at an average of ±460 and the squadron of 100 (according to Austrian sources), this gives a total of a-bout 27,000 regular and 6,000 irregular Austrian troops. For the other contingents the average strength is estimated at 600/battalion and 100/squadron, giving a total of about 8,500 for the Dutch contingent, including 1,300 light troops and 26,000 for the English/Hanoverian/Hessian contingent. Total Allied forces thus might have been ±68,000.

Though lacking a detailed O.O.B. of the French, I've been able to trace their initial main positions which were as follows;letters between brackets (..) again refer to MAP III:

Right wing;

Corps D'Estrees (A);

infantry; Grenadiers Royaux (4 btns) and the free-corps Morliere and Grassins;

cavalry ; cavalry regiments. Royal, Broglie, Anjou and Barbancon (16 sqds) and the hussar regiments Lynden, Turpin, Polleretzky and Bercheny (18 sqds);

Corps Clermont-Prince (B);

infantry; regiments Monaco, Bonnac, La Fere, La Marche, Nice, Bourbon, Enghien, Segur and Vermandois (15 btns)

cavalry ; cavalryregiments Bretagne, Heudicourt, Conti and Rosen (18 sqds), Beauffremont-dragoons (5 sqds) and the hussar regiments Raugrave and Rosenberg (Freecorps)

Center (Clermont-Tonnerre)

infantry (Salieres); regiments Bettens, La Marck, Monin, Diesbach, Orleans, Chartres, La Tour du Pin, Royal la Marine, Roi, Montmorin, Bassigny, Royal Vaisseaux, Hainaut and the Irish Brigade (38 btns); (C)

cavalry ; regiments Cuirassiers, Egmont, Carabiniers, Roi, Clermont-Tonnerre, Royal-Cravattes, Bellefonds, RoyalRoussillon, Harcourt, Bourbon-Prince, Beauvilliers, RoyalPologne, Prince-Camille, Royal-Piemont, Bourbon-Busset, Conde, Noailles, Royal-Stranger, Saluces, Berry, Fiennes, Orleans and Brancas (98 sqds); (D)

Left wing (Senneterre) (E)

infantry; regiments Grenadiers-Royaux, Picardie, Champagne, Piemont, Touraine, Rochefort, Navarre, Auvergne, Rouergue, Cour au Chantre, Courten, Custines, Lorraine and Vexin (43 btns);

cavalry ; regiments Colonel-Gendral, Penthievre, Mestre-decamp Gdndral, Brionne, Royal-Allemand, Nassau and the Harcourt-dragoons (31 sqds);

artillery; batteries. Fontenay and Pumbecque (40 guns);

At Herderen-Heights (St.Germain) (F)

infantry; regiments Royal, Beauvoisis, Eu, Royal-Wallon, Rohan and Boufflers-Wallons (12 btns);

artillery; battery Gaudechart (50 guns);

Reserve

infantry; regiments Garde Francais and Garde Suisses (6 btns)

cavalry ; regiments Maison du Roi, Gendarmerie and Colonel-General-dragoons (26 sqds);

artillery; 20 guns.

This gives a total for the army of De Saxe of 118 battalions and 216 squadrons. Sources indicate an average for the battalion that had sunk to 500 because of the forced marches and of 100 for the squadron; this gives a grand total of about 80,000 + artillery.

Although not a battle in which the Dutch featured, I've decided to deal in some more detail with it, because it is one of only 3 largerscale battles in Flanders during the war and also because it is very interesting one.

De Saxe's plan of attack was to let D'Estrdes chase away the Austrian light troops under Tripps from the villages Montenaken and Wylre, as to expose the allied left wing. Then the definite French line of battle would be formed, with Clermont-Prince forming the right wing, with orders to take Laffelt, with flank-support of Sali6res and Clermont-Tonnerre.

Battle Start

At about 9.30 AM the battle started with D'Estrdes advancing upon Montenaken. The advance guard of hussars and the free-corps of Morliere and Grassins pushed back Tripps into Montenaken. Backed up by the cavalry of Clermont-Prince and a 10-gun battery the corps D'Estrdes carried Montenaken and could continue its advance upon Wylre.

At 10 AM Clermont-Prince advanced for the first time upon Laffelt. The Allies didn't dare to counter-attack since their left flank was now exposed. Instead Cumberland decided to strengthen his position by placing an English battery at the right and a 10-gun Hanoverian one on the left of Laffelt. Laffelt itself was occupied by 8 English batt. in 2 lines. Expecting the French to attack through Vlytingen the English Guard-troops were withdrawn from there and filled up the gap between the Hanoverian/Hessian line extending from Laffelt and Hees. Now the Allied front line was made up as shown on MAP III. Strange enough it was not until 10.30 AM that orders were sent to Batthyanyi for infantry-reinforcements and from Waldeck for cavalry support.

Clermont-Prince attacked Laffelt with 4 infantry brigades (16 btns) in column, suported by a 10-gun battery and cavalry support of Clermont-Tonnerre. At 10.45 they made their first attemp, but were repulsed with heavy losses by the English who had just taken their new positions behind earth walls.

At 11.30 orders went out to Batthyanyi to attack the Heights of Herderen, because Cumberland felt that the French were hesitating about what to do after the determined resistance at Laffelt. De Saxe didn't want to risk too much in a battle he actually hadn't longed for.

Batthyanyi was indecisive, because his contingent had taken ideal defensive positions, however these formed a very unsuitable base for offensive actions. He couldn't take the offensive without exposing other parts of the allied line. Besides, the terrain didn't lend itself to offensive actions. He asked advice and Cumberland sent him the Hanoverian general Zastrow to disscuss the situation.

It was already 1.00 PM and much precious time had been wasted 

The only action that resulted was to bring part of the Austrians forward between Grand-Spauwen and the north of Vlytingen, in which they succeeded, enabling Waldeck to advance with the Dutch upon Vlytingen. Furthermore the Austrians pushed forward a small battery against the Heights of Herderen, which was soon silenced by counter-fire. Unable to lure the French away from their position on the Heights, the Austrians remained further in a state of irresoluteness.

Waldeck meanwhile had tried to advance upon Vlytingen, but the leading freecorps of Cornabe was received with such murderous fire from Salieres infantry that Waldeck decided to line up with the Austrians, north of Vlytingen. His cavalry followed up, forming his 3rd and 4th line.

In the meantime Clermont-Prince had renewed his attack on Laffelt, but was again repulsed when Cumberland personally led a counter-attack with 4 Hanoverian battalions. A third attempt also failed. Being reinforced by the Irish Brigade, the Royal-Vaisseaux and a 10 heavy gun flanking battery, Clermont-Prince launched a 4th all-out attack on Laffelt at 1.30 PM. Again the advance was blocked by the staunch defence of the English infantry.

Cumberland was still convinced that he might be able to force the French from the field. Therefore he would need cavalry support however. To enable Ligonier to attack the cavalry of Clermont Prince Cumberland first wanted to secure his left flank. Therefore he ordered Tripps to launch an attack to regain Wylre and Montenaken. He also ordered the infantry to the right of Laffelt to line up with the Dutch and Austrians north of Vlytingen.

De Saxe, determined to carry the allied position at Laffelt, requested further reinforcements from the King; 4 brigades from the left wing. However delay in sending these troops urged him order 3 brigades from Salieres forward to support Clermont-Prince from the left.

Meanwhile Tripps had succeeded in regaining Wylre and to force back the French to Montenaken and beyond. De Saxe therefore reinforced his left wing cavalry with some brigades of ClermontTonnerre.

Making use of the hesitation with the Dutch and Austrians, De Saxe decided to try to create a gap between them and the al-lied left wing. This before reinforcements would come in from Batthyanyi and before the Dutch might overcome their irresoluteness and join in with the fighting around Laffelt.

De Saxe personally directed Salieres brigades in the right direction. In sight of this determined attack the English battery to the left of Laffelt limbered up and the infantry withdrew to their earlier positions between Hees and Laffelt. De Saxe seeing the Allied line becoming disordered, ordered his cavalry to charge in swarms. This action met with much success, causing much panic and casualties amongst the retreating English, Hanoverian and Hessian infantry. The reinforcements which were just coming in from Hees were forced to return. Finally the French cavalry was forced to retreat by some reformed Hanoverian battalions. However Waldeck had decided to retreat on Rosmeer, thus making De Saxes action a complete success. Batthyanyi had no other choice as to bring his left flank in line with Waldeck. He also sent another 6 battalions to reinforce Cumberland at Laffelt. Too late however, since Cumberland was forced to withdraw his right flank still further.

Had De Saxe been there, he certainly would have exploited the situation by ordering a massive cavalry-charge into the gap. Fortunately for the allies, De Saxe had moved to his right wing, where the threatened cavalry made his presence necessary. With Wylre and Montenaken regained by Tripps, Ligonier was in a position now to launch an attack on Clermont-Prince's cavalry. Fortunately for the French, his charge missed the right direction. The right flank got stuck in French infantry positions and in bad terrain, forcing him to cancel his attack, in a moment that the French right wing was wavering.

Cumberland, in command of his retreating infantry, met the retreating cavalry of Ligonier. Fearing that De Saxe would exploit the gap in the allied front line and defeat both wings seperately and having no room left to deploy his left wing, he saw no other way out but to order a complete withdrawl from the field. At about 3 PM this order was given.

It was due to a heroic action from Sir John Ligonier that the Allied centre and left could cross the Meuse by pontoon-bridges and shelter under the guns of Maastricht. With the dragoon regiments he man- aged to disorder the pursuing French cavalry, even capturing 5 French standards.

Just like at Rocoux it was again one Allied (Austrian) wing that was unable to have an active part at the battle, partly due to a bad choice of terrain and unco-ordinated command. Also the centre was hampered by bad terrain, bad conduct and was also out-manoeuvred by De Saxe.

The Allies had lost between 5 and 6,000 men, dead or wounded. In addition, the Allies had to abandon 16 cannon and 2,000 prisoners during the pursuit. The French estimated their losses at 8,700. Just like at Rocoux, historians tend to speak of just a 'half-battle' because a large part of the troops weren't involved directly in the action. Although the French had won the field, their victory wasn't such that they were able to resume the siege of Maastricht. The allied army had withdrawn behind the Meuse to cover Maastricht, however in such a fashion that De Saxe thougt it not wise to besiege Maastricht.

Dutch Commitment War of Austrian Succession

Introduction and Preliminaries
1744: First Hostilities in Flanders
1745: Conquest of Flanders
1746: Further Conquests of Austrian Netherlands
Battle of Rocour: 11 October 1746
1747: Dutch Republic Threatened
Battle of Laffelt: 2 July 1747
Siege of Bergen-op Zoom
1748: Maastrict and the End of the War