As the Hanoverian Army withdrew, the French advanced toward Hameln, their light troops bickering with Cumberland's covering forces. At this juncture d'Estrees and his subordinates must have been quite pleased with themselves and the direction the campaign had taken to date. Most of Germany west of the Weser was in their hands. The enemy had been handsomely outmaneuvered and his last line of defense breached without significant loss.

The Hanoverians seemed unwilling to risk a battle even now, though d'Estrees suspected that Hameln would not be given up without a fight. Nevertheless, the French commander did not fear battle because it appeared this French Army was just as solid as those under Marshal Maurice de Saxe which had beaten their enemies so often during the War of the Austrian Succession.

Due to his scouting reports, On 25 July d'Estrees remained under the impression that the enemy was still on the retreat. His orders for 25 July envisioned a continuing methodical advance toward Hameln by most of the army, while Lieutenant-General Francois Chevert, his right flank commander, moved ahead through the woods south of the village of Voremberg to attack the enemy rearguard as it withdrew (see tactical map). Broglie's detached corps on the left bank was ordered to cross the river at dawn to rejoin the main body for the final push on Hameln.

On the morning of 25 July the French commander climbed through the morning mist to high ground bordering the Weser from which he could observe Chevert's attack and the further withdrawal of the enemy. However, when the mist burned off it was not a retreating foe he beheld.

Instead, he saw spread out before him the entire Hanoverian army, about 35,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and twentyeight heavy guns, drawn up for battle in an imposing position stretching from Voremberg, far to the east, almost to the Weser (See Tactical Map). The Duke of Cumberland had been brought to bay.

The French Marshal resolved to attack immediately. General Chevert was already committed at Voremberg. He was ordered to press his attack. The balance of the army was ordered up. Unfortunately, much of it was still plodding in march column along narrow trails winding through the wooded, hilly country bordering the southern edge of the proposed battlefield. On the left, Broglie's men were still in the process of crossing the Weser, now a dangerous process dueto the proximity of the foe. By the time everyone was gotten together into battle order it was inappropriately late in the day to open a general engagement. Regretfully, The attack was postponed until the morrow.

Only Chevert's troops were engaged on the 25th. They ran into stiff resistance as they struggled unsuccessfully to evict the Hanoverians from Voremberg. Chevert's attack was called off once the decision was made to delay the battle, but not before he had gained important information indicating a major weakness in what appeared to be a strong enemy position.

The Hanoverian Deployment

Now let us examine the position selected by the Duke to resist the French advance. Cumberland anchored his right flank on the Fortress of Hameln and the extensive area of marshland south and east of the town The Haste Stream presents an imposing niilitary obstacle as it meanders southeast from this area of marsh and bog for about two miles to the village of Hastenbeck. Downstream from Hastenbeck the Haste represents a significant military obstacle because it is still bordered by marsh and is fordable at only one causeway.

East of the village the Haste is no longer an obstacle. So naturally strong was the portion of his line protected by the Haste Stream that the Duke felt comfortable holding its almost two mile length with just fifteen battalions. A four gun battery swept the causeway. Light troops protected the extreme right of the line and maintained communications with Hameln.

The town of Hastenbeck is located on a firm agricultural plain where the ground rises slightly to the north and east of the Haste Stream and its surrounding marshes. It sits in the middle of a sixhundred yards wide defile formed by the bog-lined Haste Stream to the west, and the wooded ridges to the east. It could easily have been converted into a defensive position of significance.

Instead Cumberland ordered Hastenbeck burned and deployed his center (thirteen battalions in two lines) on the plain north of the town. These troops extended the left of the Haste Stream defense line, but their line was somewhat refused to better cover the main line of retreat of the army through Afferde upon Hameln. An entrenched battery of nine heavy guns posted on high ground northeast of Hastenbeck swept the northern exits from the town (battery A on tactical map).

The bulk of the Hanoverian cavalry, 4,000 sabres, formed on the plain in rear of these infantry positions. It was, in fact, the only area on the entire battlefield suitable for massed mounted action.

To the north and east of Hastenbeck a string of wooded hills and ridges running generally southeast ascends gradually for several miles from the town of Afferde, then culminates in The Obensburg, an imposing hill rising about 200 metres above the plain, very steep on its westem and southern sides. The Duke posted his left along the southern spurs of this ridge complex. Seven battalions in two lines extended the infantry line eastward along a road which cut across the ridge and mountain to the village of Diedersen. Cumberland considered the Obensburg itself an impassable natural bulwark that would anchor his left and render it unassailable. Confident of this assessment, the Hanoverian general held the Obensberg with just three companies of Jaegers.

Voremberg, the village attacked by Chevert on the 25th, is located about 2000 yards east of Hastenbeck at the base of a spur running south from the Obensburg. For all practical purposes Voremberg marks the extreme left flank of the Hanoverian battleline.

Between and somewhat south of the two towns a little hill called the Schmiede Brinck pokes up from the cultivated plain, providing a covered approach to an enemy attacking from the south. To cover this approach, Cumberland established two entrenched batteries. The first, containing twelve heavy guns, was located on a spur about 800 yards east of Hastenbeck (battery B). It was to cover the eastern exits from Hastenbeck and the north slope of the Schmiede Brinck. Four grenadier battalions defended Us battery.

The second battery, of ten guns, was established on the high ground north of Voremberg to cover that village and to sweep the dead ground south of the Schniiede Brinck (battery Q. Three more grenadier battalions stood in support of these guns.

Finally, six squadrons and three battalions under Colonel Dashenhausen were posted in a defile between Afferde and Diedersen to cover the extreme left rear of the Hanoverian position.

The French Plan of Attack

The French battle plan for 26 July was based upon a severe flaw in Cumberland's dispositions. Contrary to the Duke's belief, the Obensburg was not impregnable. Chevert had discovered during his operations on 25 July that the eastern side of the Obensburg was practicable for attacking troops. By marching along a saddle ridge that connected the Obensburg with a hill farther to the east, the Bute Brinck , a stiff climb brings an attacker right into the rear of the left and left-center of the Hanoverian line.

Naturally, an assault on the Obensburg from the Bute Brinck became the keystone of the French attack plan. Chevert would lead this flanking force. During the early morning hours of the 26th he would march around the Hanoverian left in order to be in position to assault the Obensburg with four infantry brigades and supporting light artillery by 9:00 am.

A cannon shot from Chevert would announce the opening of his attack and serve as a signal for the numerous French heavy artillery(they had sixty-eight guns to the Hanoverians twenty-eight) to open fire along the entire front, with special attention given to the entrenched enemy heavy batteries. Once Chevert's assault was well under way and the artillery barrage had subdued the German guns, the balance of the French infantry would lunge forward in a frontal attack "en echelon." General d'Armentieres, on the right flank, would begin the frontal assault by attacking Voremberg with four brigades, supported by the Swiss brigade of Reding and four regiments of dismounted dragoons.

His attack was timed so as to assail Voremberg at the same time Chevert arrived on the Obensburg. Next, the rest of Lieutenant-General Contades' command would march over the Schmiede Brinck and attack Battery B. Lastly, General Broglie would assail Hastenbeck with most of his force. Approximately 7,000 French horse was in reserve south of the Haste Stream, or behind Broglie. A few infantry battalions were strung along the Haste Stream to discourage a crossing by the enemy in this sector

The Battle of Hastenbeck July 26, 1757

The Military Situation in Western Germany, 1757
Movements to Battle
Prelude to Battle
Battle of Hastenbeck Begins
Aftermath
Wargaming Hastenbeck