Battle of Hastenbeck
July 26, 1757

Movements to Battle

by Dean West



The major military barrier shielding Hanover from the west is the River Weser, a major tributary which is formed at Munden by the confluence of the Fulda and Werra rivers. From the junction of these streams the Weser flows generally north into the North Sea near the modern port of Bremenhaven. During the Seven Years' War the Weser was navigable throughout most of its length. Fortresses guarded the river at Bremen, Nienberg, Minden and Hameln.

Strategic movements of the French and Allied (black arrows) armies prior to the battle of Hastenbeck. The main component of the French army crossed the Weser at Hoxter. The map is from Savory's book His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany...

The Hanoverian army was concentrated on the right(east) bank of the river at Nienberg and Hameln. William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, was in command. Clear strategic thinking does not appear to have been Cumberland's strong suit. Instead of concentrating his efforts on detecting the French movements and strengthening the river defenses, and no doubt heartened by news of Frederick's victory at Prague, the Duke boldly advanced most of his army across the Weser to meet the French.

Regretably, he made no effort to reconnoiter the enemy and had little information as to their strength or relative disposition. Nevertheless, by 4 June the Duke was in position at Brackwede with perhaps 35,000 of his army, resolved to give battle.

The French did have the military acumen to scout the position of the Hanoverian army, which must not have been faultless, because D'Estrees was able to send large formations of light troops around both flanks to threaten Cumberland's line of retreat. These movements compelled the Hanoverians to retire hastily to the Weser.

Just in case you are picturing in your mind's eye two very well trained and disciplined armies of professional soldiers gracefully maneuvering in perfect order as they dance the minuet of Eighteenth Century warfare, Savory describes the Hanoverian retreat and the French pursuit as follows:

    "A hurried retirement requires very highly trained troops if it is to be carried out with any semblance of order Above all, the commander and his staff must have a sure grip. In this case both were lacking. Orders for the withdrawal did not reach all troops. The result was that rear units came back through others who had no orders to retire. In the night they fired on each other The French fired into both. By the time Bielefeld had been reached there was chaos, with the French on the heels of the Prussian rear-guard. Then, as the troops withdrew, the French fell to plundering. Bielefeld was worth sacking. It needs little imagination to picture the French officers trying, unheeded, to persuade their men to forsake their booty and to pursue."

On 16 June the Allied army arrived unceremoniously on the east side of the Weser and shook itself into order. Now the harried Duke was presented with the problem of preventing the far more numerous French from crossing the river. This would have been a nearly insurmountable task for a brilliant commander. It was an impossible one for Cumberland. He did have all the boats along the river collected so the enemy could not use them. He also made certain the fords were made difficult to cross by infesting the stream beds with pointy farm implements called harrows.

His six Prussian battalions garrisoned Minden, while the main army collected around Hameln. Small contingents garrisoned Nienberg and Bremen. Various detachments roamed up and down the river to warn of the appearance of the French.

In spite of these efforts, the French had no difficulty confounding Cumberland and gaining a bridgehead on the east bank. On the night of 7 July a strong French advance guard under Lieutenant-General d'Armentieres crossed the Weser at Blankenau, far to the south of the Hanoverian army. D'Armentieres then moved northward along the right bank of the river to a position covering the crossing of the main army, which proceeded uneventfully at Hoxter on 16 July. Lieutenant General Broglie meanwhile remained west of the river with a strong force, in order to protect the French line of communication to their base at Munster from any "maneuver sur la derriere" which a brilliant Hanoverian commander might have attempted.

At this point even I feel sorry for Cumberland. The French were across the river and advancing north in great strength. An anxious and rather unreasonable Frederick, smarting from his first good beating at Kolin, inopportunely ordered Cumberland's few Prussian battalions to march for the homeland, thus depriving the Duke of what at this critical juncture may have been his best infantry.

At the same time the Prussian monarch deluged Cumberland with uncomplimentary communiques exhorting him to take offensive action to relieve the pressure on his western flank. Picture the harried Hanoverian commander at his headquarters at Hameln. The wig is askew, the head throbbing from confusion and the stress of indecision. Nerves are frazzled by "Frederick fear". He pours over his sweat sprinkled maps, dividers in hand, struggling to form an action plan. All the time fond memories of happier days at Culloden rise unbidden from his subconscious.

The plan he came up with effectively divided his force in the face of the enemy. By 19 July about half his army had been sent south along the right bank of the Weser to oppose the French advance. The other half remained at Hameln. The Duke did not subsequently talk or write much about this campaign, so we cannot know whether he planned to attack the French while they were on the march, or just delay them by occupying and defending one of the defiles that lay along the enemy line of advance through Hanover.

All we know for certain is that he eventually bundled his advanced troops back to Hameln to join the main army, and occupied a position in the marshy, wooded, hilly country east of the town. It was on this ground that the battle of Hastenbeck would be fought.

The Battle of Hastenbeck July 26, 1757


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