The Seven Years War, known in North America as the French and Indian War, began in the New World in 1754 as a result of "French adventuring in the trans-Allegheny West," and the British response to these threatening machinations. [1]

Virginia was the first British colony to become enmeshed in what would soon become a world war, a geographic circumstance that quickly led to the involvement of North Carolina in the struggle with France, hereditary enemy of all Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic.

Far removed from the active military theaters during the conflict, and considerably poorer than other American provinces in the mid-eighteenth century, North Carolina's part in this imperial struggle was significantly less than the wealthier and more populated northern British mainland colonies, despite relatively cooperative relations between metropolitan officials and colonial assemblymen from 1754 to 1757. [2]

As a result of limited financial resources, negligible military assets and the absence of any significant external threats during the conflict, the assistance in terms of men, money and supplies granted to Great Britain by the Carolinians during the first half of the Seven Years War was modest, declined as the war progressed, and added very little to the success of British arms.

France and Great Britain were on a collision course in the early 1750s in the North American wilderness, driven by the desires of each power to control the Ohio River Valley. France was determined to join its strongholds in Canada with its Mississippi and Illinois posts, and to prevent encroachments of the numerous British speculators, hungry for land. The key to the French design was control of the strategic point of land at the site of modern Pittsburgh, the Forks of the Ohio, for whomever commanded the Ohio controlled the existence of New France as well. France had long considered the Ohio country its own "by right of discovery and occupations [3] and by 1753, had built several forts leading from Lake Erie toward the Forks of the Ohio, where they planned to build their largest fort. The French were not unopposed. Britain was determined to prevent French control of this strategic location in order to guarantee their own access to the rich lands across the Alleghenies, claimed by both Pennsylvania and Virginia. This effort was led by the powerful Virginia and London land speculators of the Ohio Company, while English traders penetrated further and further west of the Appalachians, underselling their French counterparts and threatening French relations with the Indians.

By the early 1750s, the French expelled these traders, and more worryingly, occupied the strategic Ohio River forks in April, 1753, with a force of several hundred colonial troops and Indian allies. Later in the year, they began construction of Fort Duquesne at the Forks, which was completed the following year. The French military presence on the Ohio was a peril Virginia and the British Empire could not afford to ignore [4]

Although several colonies had for years given warning to the King's officials in London of French activities in the Ohio country, Virginia's Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie had been the most persistent and forceful of colonial officials to alert London of this danger and to advocate active measures to thwart the enemy. In office since 1751, he was an ardent imperialist as well as a firm supporter of royal authority and a stockholder in the Ohio Company.

In August, 1753, he was authorized by the new southern secretary, the Earl of Holdernesse to counter French encroachments on the Ohio with force. Dinwiddie's plan was for a quick thrust to the Forks "to defeat the designs of the French," who were pressing their claim to the Ohio. He ordered the raising of two hundred men to proceed to the Forks of the Ohio and ordered the erection of a fort there. Finally, In January, Dinwiddie decided to augment his own forces by requesting soldiers and supplies from Virginia's neighbors. Only North Carolina, one of the poorest of Britain's colonies, answered his call. Response to this appeal for assistance was the genesis of North Carolina's military involvement in the Seven Years War, in which the colony played a modest and, as the war progressed, increasingly limited role "in what has been aptly termed the Great War for Empire." [5]

Dinwiddie directed his letter of January 29, 1754, asking for immediate aid from Virginia's southern neighbor to the President of the North Carolina Executive Council, Matthew Rowan, a wealthy Cape Fear planter and member of the colony's upper house for twenty years. In 1753, Rowan succeeded Nathaniel Rice who had become the acting chief executive of the colony upon the death of royal Governor Gabriel Johnston, in 1752. [6]

Virginia's plea for military aid was not the first inkling North Carolina had of the impending conflict. As early as the summer of 1753, the colonial office in London directed Rowan to gather intelligence of French intrusions on the Carolina frontier, and to "be in a condition to resist any hostile attempts that may be made upon any parts of his Majesty's Dominions within your government." The province was permitted to "repel force with force," though not to act as the aggressor. London also ordered Rowan to communicate and cooperate with all of the other American colonies "in case of any invasion," and further directed that he call the Assembly immediately for the purpose of securing supplies as needed for the mutual defense of the crown's possessions. [7]

Threatening activity in the colony's backcountry emphasized the prudence of the crown's warnings, for in June a party of French and Indians was detected and driven off "within less than two miles of the Rowan County Court House." In response to this startling enemy incursion, Rowan ordered the militia of Rowan, Orange and Anson counties "to be in redyness. [8]

Rowan received Dinwiddie's request for military support on February 18, 1754. Expecting this appeal from Virginia, Rowan had already called the Assembly to meet on February 19th, in Wilmington. In his opening speech to the House, he addressed the delegates:

"I have not the least doubt of your exciting yourselves to the utmost in the common cause on this occasion, a good and reasonable supply now, as it will be the most effectual, will be likewise the most saving to the several Provinces ... I have nothing to ask but what you will either be willing to do, or what your posterity will have reason to wish you had done." Despite Dinwiddie's concurrent pleas to Maryland and Pennsylvania, only poorer North Carolina saw fit to answer Virginia's plea for aid, though the lower house did not forget to remind Rowan of the "great Expence" this would require. "Being desirous of shewing their duty to his Majesty," the assembly voted to provide £22,000 in Public Bills of Credit to be issued immediately "as lawful Tender in all Payments whatsoever," £12,000 of which was "for raising and providing for a regiment of 750 effective men to be sent to the assistance of Virginia." This unit of provincials was to be a newly raised body of volunteers, not simply the calling up of county militia companies, though certainly militia members were expected to enlist. An additional £2,000 was earmarked to complete and repair Ft. Johnston at the mouth of the Cape Fear River, ordnance for which was still lacking, due to London's "uncertainty of the present condition of the fort."

The lower house also accorded £2,000 to construct a fort at Ocracoke Inlet on the Outer Banks. A further £1,000 of the paper currency was designated "to buy arms and ammunition for the poorer inhabitants of Rowan & Anson counties[,] being most exposed," while the bill included £5,000 "for other contingencies." These expenditures were to be met by a one-shilling poll tax and a "duty on wine, rum and all other spirituous liquors." [9]

Finally, an additional £18,000 of paper currency was authorized for use by the colony for various needs, though this final sum was not to be issued until "His Majesty's Pleasure is known." [10]

Rowan reluctantly consented to this £40,000 aid bill employing paper currency due to a chronic lack of specie in North Carolina. He felt obliged to explain his actions to the Board of Trade, which historically frowned on the issuance of unsecured paper bills in the colonies: "This I have been under a necessity of doing[,] otherways I cou'd not have got any supply." [11] He later advised the board that both houses of the legislature "were unanimous in not granting one shilling towards the expedition to the Ohio or to the fortifications" unless the aid was in the form of paper, which typically depreciated considerably. [12]

The lower house's authorization of £18,000 in additional notes may have been a measure to take advantage of military need to be able to issue paper money in their coin-strapped colony, especially since most of the bills were to be spent in North Carolina. "We have but very little silver and gold here," Rowan complained to the Board of Trade in June, which "has laid us under great difficulties." [13]

Perhaps the colony's "desire for soft money," according to one historian, "rather than an imperialistic spirit seems to have motivated her." [14]

Nevertheless, the willingness of specie-starved North Carolina to raise £40,000 and a large regiment to assist Virginia was remarkable, especially in light of the fact that no other colony assisted Virginia, and Dinwiddie was able to procure from his own "much divided" assembly only £10,000 and three hundred men for service on the Ohio. [15]

"Except for North Carolina," a grateful Dinwiddie wrote in May, "not one of the other colonies has granted any supplies." After voting the necessary finances for the new regiment and the colony's defense, on March 9th, the Assembly adjourned until June." [16]

While Dinwiddie urged the Carolinians to march to Virginia's aid with all dispatch, [17] the regiment was beset with tremendous difficulties. To lead the Carolina provincials, Rowan appointed Scottish-born Colonel James Inns to its command, a veteran of the Cartagena expedition in 1741 and the most experienced soldier in the colony. Though Dinwiddie described Inns as "an experience'd Officer" [18] of "Judgment and cool Conduct" and gave him overall command of the forces assembling in Virginia in June, Inns soon faced significant difficulties. [19]

The foremost challenge was supply. Rowan and Inns assumed that Old Dominion would supply the Carolinians with provisions while they served in Virginia; Dinwiddie, however, expected North Carolina to supply its own troops while on campaign and suggested that Rowan "depend on his Majesty's goodness for reimbursement. "

Instead, by June, Rowan was obliged to reduce the regiment's strength from seven hundred fifty to four hundred fifty men owing to the colony's inability to outfit the larger number of troops. [20]

While the regiment marched north, their condition rapidly deteriorated, as procuring supplies became exceedingly difficult. The colony's paper currency was also major problem. Due to a long-standing sectional controversy between the northern and southern sections of North Carolina over the scheme of representation in the Assembly, the northern counties had refused to send representatives to the colony's legislature since 1746. These counties refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new paper currency issued by the Assembly, of which they were not a part, and refused to circulate it; nor would they consent to pay any taxes to meet these unsecured bills. To further exacerbate Innes' problems obtaining provisions for his soldiers while on the march, the province's currency was not accepted in Virginia either. [21]

The regiment resorted to driving herds of cattle and hogs with them from North Carolina, to sell en route to the rendezvous point at Winchester in order to raise additional money as they proceeded. [22]

The North Carolina regiment was not an impressive contingent of soldiers, and by the time it reached Winchester, the unit virtually disintegrated. In fact, Inns men saw very little military action, and provided no support for Virginia. South Carolina Governor Glen described the regiment as "Neither disciplined nor Armed. Coll Inns the Gentleman who commands ... told me ... that what few arms they had were of different calibers-some wide bores, some small bores; but a great part had no arms at all." [23]

Dinwiddie wrote to Col. Inns, "I now wish we had none from your colony but yourself, for I foresee nothing but confusion among [the men.]" [24] The regiment was so destitute and disorderly while marching through Virginia that Inns apparently considered disbanding them while they marched, due to supply and payment difficulties [25] "Extravagance and bad management" [26] expended most of Inns' funds before he was able to push his men to Winchester, where no provisions or ammunition had been collected for them in advance. Dinwiddie complained that Innes' soldiers were allowed too much pay compared to Virginia's troops, and noted that North Carolina had "conducted their forces with great improvidence, allowing every private man 3s. per day while in Carolina, in short they have exhausted the whole money before they joined the other forces." [27]

In comparison, the Virginians were promised only eight pence, and Dinwiddie feared that this discrepancy would sow discord in the ranks. [28]

While Inns' provincials struggled onward toward Winchester, disaster befell the forces Virginia was able to marshal on the frontier. Compelled to abandon his effort to reach the Ohio, Virginia's commander, Lt. Colonel George Washington, surrendered his advanced post, Fort Necessity, to the French and their Indian allies on July 3rd, [29] and withdrew his forces to Wills Creek on the Potomac by July 9th The North Carolinians reached Winchester far too late to lend any assistance in this campaign, and saw no fighting [30] ;

Inns in fact remained in New Bern until the end of June. [31]

Though part of the regiment arrived at Winchester in late June or early July, Dinwiddie reported that as late as August 5th not all of Innes' men had yet arrived there. By then, the weary unit was reduced to less than three hundred fifty men, and was completely devoid of funds. Despite the hardships Innes' men endured to reach Virginia, Dinwiddie bluntly complained of the "monstrous delay" of the Carolinians, and blamed the "high pay ... allowed them" for the regiment's financial straits. "The misfortune attending our Expedition," he penned to Rowan on July 20th, referring to Washington's defeat, "is entirely owing to the delay of your forces," though he also blamed the tardiness of two long-delayed British independent companies. [32] Lacking pay for the officers and men, and with no support forthcoming from Virginia in either supplies or credit, Innes was forced to disband the Carolina provincials on August 11th and leave them to make it home as best they could. [33]