The Bourbon system for the defense of any important site rested on the garrisoning of regular troops, an adequate naval presence, and the erection of substantial fortresses to protect the chosen location. This doctrine had been successful in preventing the predations of adversaries and particular effort had been made to assure that Havana was well provided for. Before declaring war Carlos III had taken precautions to reinforce his American possessions, particularly at Havana. In February of 1761 the new Captain General for Cuba, Juan de Prado, arrived at Havana with explicit instructions from Carlos III to complete the construction of gaps in the defensive works and to anticipate British designs against the city. By June of 1761 the naval squadron there was increased by the arrival of 7 more ships of the line under the command of Admiral Gutierre de Hevia and 996 men of the Espana and Aragon regiments. This brought the total forces in the city to 2,400 regulars and 12 ships of the line with 6,300 seamen, gunners, and marines aboard.

Havana's harbor was considered the best in the West Indies and perhaps in the world. It was spacious enough to accommodate one hundred ships of the line. Its narrow entrance channel, about half a mile in length, led to three ample coves housing extensive shipyards that built first rate men of war. The entrance passage was strongly defended with cross fires from the fortress of Castillo de los Tres Reyes del Morro (El Morro) on one side and from the Castillo de San Salvador de la Punta (La Punta) on the other side. In addition a boom chain could be stretched between El Morro and La Punta to block the harbor entrance. The strategic location of the city had also justified the expense of constructing a wall that surrounded it by land for five kilometers, making it one of the few walled cities of the New World. Among these and other defensive works, El Morro was considered to be the cornerstone for the defense of the city. It towered over the harbor entrance and the city, was built on a rocky surface that prevented the construction of approaches by potential besiegers, and was garrisoned by 700 men serving 64 heavy caliber guns meant to decimate any attack by land or from the sea.

As soon as hostilities were declared, England acted swiftly to execute a plan to strike a blow against the center of Spanish power in the Caribbean by seizing Havana. The expedition was entrusted to the command of George Keppel, Third Earl of Albemarle, as commander in chief, and Vice-Admiral Sir George Pocock, as naval commander. It left Spithead, England on March 5, 1762 with 7 ships of the line and 4,365 men aboard 64 transports. They proceeded to a rendezvous in the Caribbean on April 25 with 8,461 men and 8 other ships of the line under Major-General the Hon. Robert Monckton and Rear Admiral George Rodney who had just captured the French island possession of Martinique. On May 23 they were also joined off the northwest corner of Saint Domingue (Haiti) by Sir James Douglas' squadron from Port Royal, Jamaica.

This combined force of 21 ships of the line, 24 lesser warships, and 168 other ships carrying approximately 14,000 seamen and marines and 12,826 regulars were also to be joined by four thousand regulars and American provincials sent from New York by Sir Jeffrey Amherst. Once assembled, the combined force was to sail along the North coast of Cuba to Havana and capture the city. Except for the failure to make the juncture with the North American contingent (which would only begin to arrive directly at Havana much later), this daring plan was carried out so flawlessly that by June 6 Havana was trembling at the sight of 213 ships on the horizon conveying an overwhelming force that was about to lay it under siege.

The plan for the capture of the city had originally been conceived by Admiral Sir Charles Knowles who, as governor of Jamaica during the 1750s, used an invitation to visit the city to acquaint himself with its defenses and to advance a proposal to attack it when the opportunity arose. Its central premise was the reduction of El Morro through a formal siege a la Vauban with trenches and approaches. It advocated that once El Morro was taken, the city would have to surrender because of the commanding position of the fortress over the city and the bay. Knowles' keen observations had failed to note, however, that El Morro was situated on a rocky promontory into which it was impossible to dig approach trenches and that it was surrounded on the land side by a gigantic ditch cut deep into the rock.

The arrival of the invasion force caused considerable consternation in the Spanish war council directing the defense of the city, led by Captain General Prado and Admiral Hevia. Although they were not surprised that the British had come, they had not anticipated facing a force of such magnitude. Because of this they decided to adopt a defensive posture meant to prolong the siege at all costs in the hope that they would be relieved or that the invaders would be wasted by yellow fever or dispersed by a storm during the upcoming hurricane season. Many of the controversial measures subsequently taken to resist the attack were meant to implement this strategy. Therefore, it was decided that the fleet would not sortie from the harbor to engage the Royal Navy. Its sailors, gunners and marines were diverted to man the fortresses.

The boom chain was stretched to close the harbor entrance, and the 3 men-of-war in the poorest condition were scuttled and sunk in the harbor entrance channel for good measure. All regular troops were concentrated in the city and used to man its walls and other defensive works. Comparable measures had worked before under relatively similar circumstances when an English force had been rejected at Cartagena, Colombia in 1741. That precedent was cited as "authorized doctrine" by the war council to justify the policies they had adopted.

Concurring in tactical objectives with their adversary, the war council agreed that El Morro would be the cornerstone of all defensive efforts and the site to which the priority of all human and material resources would be given. All the shot and powder and the best guns of the fleet were transferred to it and to La Punta. The disembarked naval gunners produced a cadre of about 600 trained artillerymen to man them. Admiral Hevia had prevailed on the war council to place the captains of his vessels in command of the key fortresses because their regular commanders were deemed old and lethargic. Naval captains were a natural choice because of their familiarity with gunnery and because they would not have been out of their element in a fortress under siege.

Save for the absence of a heaving deck beneath their feet they were used to functioning under circumstances of carnage where blood washed the decks and bodies lay about shattered by concussion and splinters. When the choice had to be made about who should command the centerpiece of the defense, Luis de Velasco was entrusted with the task. Although the reasons for this distinction are not recorded by any journal, the fact that he was chosen over all other captains speaks volumes of the estimation in which he was held by this time.

He assumed command of El Morro on June 8 and immediately set about taking inventory, organizing his defenses, and requisitioning supplies. He knew that he was racing against time before he came under fire. He would not be disappointed.

By June 12 the British had managed to drag their siege train from the landing area to the vicinity of El Morro to begin the erection of siege batteries. They were sited on an adjacent hill called La Cabana. Its position made it the Achilles heel of the entire Spanish defensive perimeter. The hill towered over the city and the bay's entrance channel and rose 22 1/2 feet higher than El Morro. In spite of its prominence it was totally undefended. The need to fortify La Cabana was well known to everyone. As early as 1589 the engineer that built El Morro remarked that "He who commands this hill, will command Havana." This was no closely guarded military secret either.

The March 1740 edition of The Gentleman's Magazine offered a map of the city [Contemporary Map of Havana (slow: 142K)] with a note about La Cabana suggesting: "...if possession be got of one of the hills to the East to attack the place by land ... it could not hold out for many days." Carlos III had even explicitly instructed Prado before he left to take command of Havana that the fortification of La Cabana was "...the most urgent task in all of Spain's domains, since if Havana is not secure, the American colonies will fall of their own weight, including even New Spain." The notoriety of the situation was to no avail. The Spanish had failed to fortify La Cabana for a litany of excuses and it would prove their undoing.

The task of building the actual siege works against El Morro fell upon the engineer Colonel Patrick Mackellar. This able and veteran officer was faced with the daunting challenge of digging approaches over a rocky surface that could not be excavated only to reach an impassable ditch at the foot of El Morro. His ingenious solution was to build breastworks across the surface instead of trenches and then, upon reaching the ditch, to mine under El Morro's bastion and use the resulting rubble to fill the ditch to form a runway for the assaulting troops to cross. This clever plan, however, would have to be carried out under constant fire from El Morro.

Luis de Velasco The Siege of Havana, 1762

Introduction and Background
War Between Spain and England
Plan of Defense and Offense
The Siege
Day of Reckoning
Illustration: Spanish Artillerists 1740 (slow: 76K)
Losses at El Morro: Day by Day 6/22-7/30 1762
Plan of El Morro (slow: 123K)
Contemporary Map of Havana (slow: 142K)

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