Battlefield Use Of Napoleonic Artillery

Selecting a Target

by Keith Webb, UK

So, having been placed at a particular site, how would a battery commander select a target from amongst those available? The relevant factors identified by Hughes’ analysis are as follows: 1. Visibility 2. Threat 3. Effectiveness Visibility Even though within the range of human eyesight and not obstructed by permanent terrain features, there were other factors which could temporarily prevent an enemy unit being visible: A. Smoke – the dense clouds of white smoke created by the battery itself, by adjacent infantry or other friendly batteries and also by the enemy guns, would swirl across the battery’s “line of sight” temporarily concealing some enemy units – strictly speaking they were then no longer available as a target although it is possible that the guns would simply continue to fire into the smoke (3) in the same direction and at the same range as their previous shot – and revealing others. B. Weather conditions – rain fall, snow fog or mist would reduce the range of human eyesight and often these weather conditions would be temporary, falling suddenly and then clearing again, so as to temporarily conceal or reveal targets. C. Friendly troops – the movement of friendly troops across the “line of sight” could temporarily conceal a target It was factors such as these, which created, as Hughes says, “fleeting opportunities for fire, (which) must be seized”. Threat Of the targets which could be seen at any moment, the size of the immediate threat each posed either to the battery itself, or to the troops it was meant to be supporting, would greatly influence the choice. The greater the threat, the more attractive would that target become. Consequently, a battery would give higher priority to enemy presenting such a threat – troops either actually firing upon it or its supports, or advancing toward them or capable of doing so shortly – than it would to enemy units threatening another part of the line. Effectiveness By effectiveness is meant the relative damage the battery could expect to inflict upon each of the available targets. The greater the damage that could be inflicted upon a target, the more attractive would that target be. The effectiveness of a battery’s fire upon a particular target would be determined by a number of factors: Range – a target had to be within range of the weapons and the available types of projectile each of which had their own limitations as to effective range. The greater the range, the less effect would there be on the target. Elevation – a target had to be within the weapon’s span of elevation, neither above its maximum elevation nor below its minimum. Size and compactness of the target – the battery was more likely to register a “hit” on a target that contained many enemies in a compact space than by “hitting” one in which there were few enemies to damage or where the individuals were well separated from each other. For this reason, close-formed infantry and cavalry units were far more attractive targets than enemy artillery batteries. The latter consisted of a number of small individual targets, widely separated (typically around 20 yards between the guns), through which the small (the largest being 4.25”) roundshot would generally pass without causing any damage. In such circumstances, it would take a long time before counter-battery fire had any effect. Nosworthy ([5] , p.395) cites a French account of the combat at Gross-Garten (1813) which describes 12 French guns firing at 15 enemy guns and how “after two hours nearly all of the enemy guns were silenced”. Consequently, counter-battery fire was prohibited by the training manuals of the day (Hughes [1] , p. 53) and by commanders in the field (Wellington at Waterloo – Hughes [1] , p.79) in order to make the most effective use of the available ammunition. This attitude is summoned up by the following maxim quoted by Nafziger ([6] ) “The primary target of the artillery is the enemy’s troops and not his artillery”. However, Hughes cites evidence (Talavera, Albuera, Waterloo) of the ineffectiveness of counter battery fire, concluding that “there seems little doubt that the guns could not be relied upon to put the enemy’s guns totally out of action” (Hughes [1] , p.91) although “gun detachments may have been withdrawn when their fire was not required, and the appearance of neutralisation may have been given”. The experience of Waterloo is cited where, according to Hughes, the allied artillery lost 15% of its strength to all arms on the day but was never neutralised (Hughes [2] , p.106). In conclusion, it is suggested that enemy batteries would be a very poor choice of target, usually only selected in the absence of any other, since the effect upon them would be so limited. Enfilade rather than frontal fire – as previously mentioned under Siting the Battery, a target presenting a flank would suffer more heavily than one fired upon from directly in front. Movement – a moving target was far more difficult to hit than a stationary one. Enemy units moving across the “line of sight” obviously were available as a target for a much shorter period of time than those moving along the “line of sight”. But even these created a difficulty since their range shortened or lengthened with every passing movement. Effect of Friendly Troops – the close approach of friendly troops toward a target would inevitably force the guns to cease fire for the fear of hitting their own troops rather than the enemy’s. Conclusion To obtain the full benefit of the artillery arm, a battery clearly needed to be positioned and its targets chosen, with care. If a wargame is to simulate this historical reality, the rules should encourage historically realistic behaviour and deter that which is unhistorical. To what extent the rules you game with result in artillery being used in the manner described above, or do those rules permit (even encourage) other, less historically realistic usage? References [1] Hughes, B.P. Artillery Tactics from Marlborough to Wellington. Anthony Bird Publications 1983 [2] Hughes, Major General B.P. Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield 1630 – 1850. Arms & Armour Press 1974 [3] Firepower Comes of Age. Copyright 1997 by The War Times Journal [4] Nosworthy, Brent. The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 – 1763. Hippocrene Books 1992 [5] Nosworthy, Brent. Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies. Constable 1995 [6] Nafziger, George. Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations. Greenhill Books 1996 Battlefield Use Of Napoleonic Artillery Where to Place and What to Fire At Command And Control Siting A Battery Selecting a Target Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire # 77 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com