Battlefield Use Of Napoleonic Artillery
Siting A Battery
by Keith Webb, UK
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Clearly, each battery ought to be sited where it would have the greatest effect on proceedings. Such an effect required a clear view and field of fire to the front of the battery – batteries had a natural tendency to fire directly to their front – such that an area of the battlefield containing the commander’s objectives to be assaulted or, in a defensive situation, across which the commander expected the enemy to advance, lay within range. Such a field of fire offered the battery the prospect of targets. The most important consideration when positioning a battery was undoubtedly, therefore, visibility. No enemy unit was available as a target unless it could be seen from the battery’s position – any enemy units that could not be seen could not be fired upon. Enemy units beyond the range of human eyesight, or otherwise hidden from view, could not be fired upon even if, technically, the weapons were capable of reaching that distance. Obstacles – such as higher ground; woods and forests; individual or groups of buildings; and friendly troops – along the “line of sight” would prevent an enemy unit being seen and therefore, being a target. Consequently, batteries needed to be sited well away from such obstacles. Nor should it be thought that a battery situated on ground higher than the obstacle itself could necessarily see troops sheltering behind that obstacle. All such obstacles create immediately behind them an area of “dead ground” into which it simply is not possible to see. The depth of this “dead ground” will vary depending upon the height of the obstacle, the height of the viewer and the distance that the viewer is from the obstacle. But it can be substantial and affords a military possibility of which, throughout history, many commanders have successfully taken advantage in order to conceal and protect their troops. The flat trajectory of the guns meant that it was impossible to fire over friendly troops – or other obstacles of such height – on the same level at ranges of less than about 800 yards. The fact that there had to be a clear line of
sight to a target meant that it really was impossible
to fire other than speculatively over such
obstacles anyway. Furthermore, because of
the detrimental effect on friendly troops – who
would be tormented by the noise and hurt with
the spillage of cartridges and shot that fell
short (Nafziger [6] , p.272) such that they tended
to cower, making their advance more difficult
and much slower as a result (Nosworthy [4] ,
p.315) – of the passage of shot over their
heads this was rarely done – even when the
guns were sited on higher ground (Nosworthy
5, p.381). The French advances at Talavera for
instance were not made directly beneath the
fire of the guns on the Cerro de Cascajal but
were made from either side of that hill.
Consequently, to be effective batteries
had to be deployed in front of, or on the flanks
of, the friendly troops they were supporting.
Nosworthy ([5] , p.386) observes that “batteries
were often pushed to ... positions between 60
and 150 metres in front of their supporting
formations in order to permit fire to continue
in support of friendly skirmishers’.
However, Nafziger ([6] , p.272) cites a number of maxims
from a Spanish manual for the best use of
artillery. One of these is that artillery should
not be posted in front of the infantry since this
increased the target for the enemy as well as
impeding the movement and breaking up the
order of one’s own troops.
A position on the flank afforded the additional
advantages of enfilading fire against
targets being attacked by or attacking the supporting
troops. This generally resulted in more
casualties inflicted per “hit” and the ability to
continue to fire upon the target for a longer
period as the distance between the supported
troops and the target diminished.
While common sense may suggest that
higher ground is always the best place from
which to fire, this was not the case at this time.
Roundshot, the principal ammunition used by
Napoleonic artillery, was most effective when
fired at a level trajectory about chest high and
bounced up on contact with the ground. If
fired from high ground onto lower ground, or
with the barrel elevated more than three or
four degrees (Nosworthy [5] , p.359) either of
which would cause the shot to fall with a steep
trajectory, the shot would hit the ground at
such an angle that it would bury itself in the
ground. At the very least the “bounce zone”
would be much shorter and the battery’s effectiveness
much reduced. Hence (Hughes [2] ,
p.61) the artillery manuals of the day frowned
upon the siting of guns on higher ground.
Hughes ([1] , p.72-72) argues that this was the
problem with the siting of the French artillery
at Talavera – the high trajectory of the shot from the batteries
located on a hill causing it to become buried into the ground.
This is another reason (lack of visibility being the first) why a battery could not fire with
any effect upon enemy units situated in the “dead ground” behind an obstacle –
the trajectory at which the roundshot would fall having cleared the obstacle would be so great as
to prevent any bounce or ricochet and rendering such fire ineffective. Another factor which worked against the
siting of guns on hills – particularly steep ones – was the limited barrel elevation available.
It was technically not possible to fire straight
down the hill because the barrel could not be
lowered to the necessary extent. Equally, since
there was a limit to the upward elevation, guns
could be ineffective firing steeply uphill –
Hughes ( [1] , p.64) quotes the ineffectiveness of
the French guns firing up the steep ridge at
Busaco and those of the British firing down.
A commander would, therefore, usually
look to site batteries on areas of flat, hard,
open ground, devoid of obstacles or irregularities.
Battlefield Use Of Napoleonic Artillery Where to Place and What to Fire At
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