Legion Franche Etrangere
1792-1795
The Raising of the ‘Légion Franche Etrangère’
by Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands
 |
Initiative for raising a Batavian legion came from the refugee Herman Willem Daendels. On 29 May 1792 he presented his plan to a few other refugees, among which was Balthasar Elias Abbema. Abbema had good contacts with Dumouriez, at that moment French minister of foreign affairs. On 13 June, he wrote a letter to Dumouriez, presenting him the proposal. Dumouriez supported the proposal enthusiastically and forwarded it to the Assemblée Nationale. The idea for raising a legion was not new. The Convention had already given permission for raising a Brabantine legion in Douai, and a legion from the Luik/Liège area in Givet, which would consist of refugees from Belgian Brabant and the area around Luik/Liège respectively. Still, initially there was some resistance against the creation of the legion. The Assemblée Legislative feared to provoke the Dutch Republic of the United Netherlands by raising the legion. But despite that the decision was made, although for the time being the name was changed in ‘Légion Batave de troupes légères’, a name that would be changed again later on! That the decision to raise the legion was taken relatively quickly is not very surprising. The revolutionaries in France were surrounded by numerous enemies, at home as well as foreign countries, among which were world powers. The standing army was much weakened by the departure of many émigrés, including whole battalions and regiments! It was numerically greatly reinforced by the influx of volunteers and later the levee en masse, but in practice quality of these reinforcements was low. The volunteers were undisciplined, many of them soon disappointed with soldiers life and with all the hardships and horror that came with it. Desertion was therefore high. The numerous volunteers deriving from mainly the Belgian territories had a much higher morale. Desertion was virtually non-existing, and most of them would not receive a nice treatment if they would go over to the enemy or fall into his hands. In the end, as already has been said, the Batavian legion would not receive the name ‘Bataafs Legioen’ officially, but ‘Légion franche étrangère’, the legion of ‘foreign volunteers’, so that it could be no provocation of the Dutch Republic. Although in practice it was commonly known as Légion batave or ‘Bataafs legioen’, a name even used in official documents! The capitulation for raising the Légion Franche étrangère, which was signed on 1 August 1792, stipulated among other things the following: There will be formed an administrative
council for the legion, which will consist
of Abbema, Van Boetzelaer, Huber, De
Kock, Van Hoey en De Witt. [4]
This council is responsible for admitting and assigning the commanders, officers, NCO’s and soldiers which will serve in the legion.
The legion will be in French service.
The legion will consist principally of four squadrons (each of two companies) jagers te paard ( ‘chasseurs à cheval’), four infantry battalions, a jager battalion, two artillery companies, and fifty
artificers.
A cavalry company consists of 62 men (officers included), a company of infantry. jagers and artillery consists of 100 men (officers included)
All officers receive an allowance for their equipment: 1,000 livres for a colonel; 500 livres for the six lieutenant-colonels, 300 livres for cavalry-captains; 250 livres for captains with the infantry.
The legion will initially be clothed with the expenses paid by the French state. [5]
Captains receive with the enlistment of men in their company the following allowance: for sergeants 120 livres; for corporals 100 livres, and for soldiers and drummers 80 livres per head.
[6]
All members of the legion will serve for a period of three years.
This all meant that the Légion franche étrangère would have the following paper strength:
It would take a while however before the
legion was really raised. For the time being,
the French Convention had its hands full with
the Duke of Brunswick, who was marching on
Paris with the Prussian army. Only after the
cannonade of Valmy (20 September 1792),
when the duke retreated en the French started
their careful advance, the raising of the legion
was taken up again.
The officers of the legion had to be
refugees from the Dutch Republic. The first
problem that had to be solved was finding a
suitable commander for the legion. Although
more or less founder of the legion, Herman
Willem Daendels was not eligible. Before
1787 he had been a civilian soldier, not one
out of profession. He had received no military
education and ample experience. In addition
he was to young (he was only 29).
Therefore, Daendels had to settle for the command of one of the infantry battalions, receiving the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In practice however he often pulled the strings, because of his influence
among the refugees and on the Bataafsch Comité Revolutionnair, and also because of his nature and the way he acted. Next choice for commanding the legion was Colonel Sternbach, former commander of one of the regiments fighting on the side of the patriots in 1787. Sternbach, who lived in Maastricht after his dismissal, turned down the offer. He already much regretted his choice for the patriots in 1787, and was busy making overtures with the Stadtholder again. [7]
Finally Colonel J.C. Mascheck was proposed, who accepted the assignment. Of the field officers there were only two not being a soldier by profession: Daendels and Gelderman.
The following officers were assigned, known names of men which we will meet again in the future: [8]
. As it turned out it was difficult to bring the
legion up to strength. Despite the huge amount of
refugees in France, initially only about three hundred
of them that applied were also suitable for
service. Almost immediately and despite the intentions,
soldiers that were not of Dutch origin
were also accepted, especially Belgians. This way
the legion could grow in size steadily; from 400 to
600 at its formal raining on 1 October 1792.
Soldiers with military experience came in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd infantry battalion. The 4th battalion, that of Daendels, existed almost completely of emigrated Dutch civilians, and as such were nothing
more then some kind of volunteer civilian soldiers. They were sometimes, to distinguish them from the other battalions consisting of soldiers by profession, indicated as Garde Nationale soldée.
Therefore I doubt if the battalion has participated in any real fighting. In any case, the battalion is not listed in the official order of battle of the Armée de Hollande of 1 March 1793, during Dumouriez’ invasion of the Dutch Republic. [9]
This did not prevents its commander Daendels to distinguish himself in several combats. As a result, he soon acquired another command in the French army, and a higher rank.
[10]
After the occupation of the Belgian territories by the French recruitment gave better results. At that moment, there was actively recruited in the conquered territories: on 21 November 1792 Daendels wrote to Dumont-Pigalle [11] that the next day four captains, four lieutenants and for 2nd lieutenants would disperse between Sluis and Maastricht, to recruit infantry for the legion. [12]
It was clear by now that the proposed strength had been calculated very optimistically. This had undoubtedly been necessary at that time, to induce the French to support raising the legion. The problem solved itself in December 1792, when it became clear that an attack on the Dutch Republic was imminent. In a letter to Dumont-Pigalle writes J.F.R. van Hooff (joint founder of the Bataafsch Comité Revolutionnair) on 20 December 1792: “The legion is [since 15 December 1792] finally complete, the recruits are arriving in huge numbers: we receive even sixty of them each day! Among them are
many deserters”. [13]
These deserters were of course a great gain for the legion, because they were already trained, able to pass their knowledge to the less trained and inexperienced legionnaires. So many men came forward that it became impossible to absorb them all into the legion. In addition, it seems that about four hundred refugees in Grevelingen suddenly became interested in voluntary enlistment in the legion. There was even talking about the creation of an additional regiment. [14]
In reality however it would not come to that. Most volunteers turned out to be unfit for service. On 27 December the legion was two thousand men strong. Of these however only three hundred
were Dutch. The bulk of them were
Swiss, dismissed from French service, and
Belgians. During its presence in Breda and
Geertruidenberg in February and March 1793
the legion counted 2,450 men and 28 guns: [15]
every battalion had four field guns at its disposal
(battalion guns, that usually followed
the movement of the battalion to which it
belongs; 3-pdr, 4-pdr or 6-pdr cannon). Beside
these, the legion possessed two reserve batteries
of six 12-pdr cannon each.
It was not unusual in the French revolutionary armies to possess so many guns. These had to remedy the lack of firepower of the untrained infantry. But even according to French standards, the amount of guns belonging to the legion was extraordinary high: 1 gun for every 88 men! The legion existed until 1 November 1793. On that date, the famous amalgame took place in the French army. In a nutshell this mend that demi-brigades were formed by combining one battalion of the French standing army with two volunteer battalions. For the Légion franche étrangère this meant that the four infantry battalions and the jager battalion were combined into the 30me Demi-brigade, with as Chef de brigade the commander of the 1st infantry battalion of the legion, Bonhomme. The jagers te paard became part of the 13me Régiment Chasseurs à Cheval .
Legion Franche Etrangere 1792-1795
|