The Siege of San Sebastian
July 10th - August 13th 1813
Breaching the Walls and Failure
by Leon Parté, UK
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The fire from the breaching-batteries was continued without intermission, and effected great damage; the stone embrasures were destroyed, the guns dismounted, the walls shaken severely. The garrison, however, met the bombardment bravely, and laboured hard to repair damages or neutralise them. On the 22nd a breach, which appeared to be practicable, was formed. The Storming of San Sebastion, August 31st, 1813. Engraving after W. Heath. Editor’s Collection. On the 23rd a second breach was commenced beyond the first. Our shells ignited some houses in the town, and a general conflagration was imminent, but it came to nothing beyond delaying the British attack, which had been fixed for the 24th. Everything was ready for the last act in the siege. The storming party, 2,000 strong, was composed of General Hay's brigade of the 5th Division, for the first breach, while another battalion attacked the second. All of the stormers were to assemble in the foremost trench. The signal for the advance was to be the explosion of a mine on the left flank, designed by a young officer of engineers, Lieutenant Reid. On the 21st, while digging at a parallel, he had come upon a pipe four feet by three wide, which was actually the aqueduct conveying the water into the town. Reid had entered the mouth of this narrow opening and followed the passage right up to the counterscarp of the horn-work, where he was stopped by a closed door. Returning to report, it was decided to form a mine at the end of the drain. The postponement was unfortunate; the tide would have served well at daylight on the 24th; it was then at the lowest ebb and the wide strand would have given ample space for the advancing columns. The troops assembled before daylight. The Royal Scots, under Major Frazer, intended to assail the great breach, supported by the 9th (Norfolk) Regiment and the 38th (South Staffordshire) Regiment, whose goal was the lesser breach beyond. About 5 a.m. the column filed out of the trench on the signal given by the exploding mine. There were 300 yards of the open to cover. The British batteries on the sand-hills, which fired upon their own men, had not heard the signal. The advance was very arduous, the ground most difficult, much narrowed between the wall and the waters and very slippery from the receding tide, which left the rocks covered with seaweed and here and there deep pools. Moreover, sharpshooters, who kept up an effective fire, lined the fortifications on the flanks. The first to reach the breach were Major Frazer of the Royal Scots and Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Harry) Jones, of the Engineers; a few men closely followed, but in disorder, straggling and out of breath. On the far side down below was the yawning breach, filled with smoke and flames of the burning houses beyond. By this time a small handful of the most intrepid had gathered round their leaders, but quite two-thirds of the main column had turned aside on their road to the breach, and were engaged in a musketry battle with the enemy on the rampart. Failure of the Attack The rear of the storming party was thus already in confusion, and the van would not advance. Frazer now was killed, so was Machel with the ladders; Jones was wounded and taken prisoner; the rest of the leading assailants were either slain or dispersed. The Colonels of the 38th and 9th, Greville and Cameron, and Captain Archimbeau, of the Royals, strove hard to encourage and urge on their men; but all were dispirited and in inextricable confusion. And now a hail of shot and shell fell upon them from the whole of the enemy's artillery, while continuous musketry fire, with showers of grape and hand-grenades, hit the struggling mass, which could neither advance nor retire, causing the most frightful slaughter. According to the French account, at this last supreme moment, when defeat was unmistakable, “ the bravest English rushed upon the French bayonets to find an honourable death; the rest sought safety in flight, still decimated by the furious fire, so that few escaped alive.” The attack had proved a failure, costly in valuable lives, of officers out of all proportion to men. Many reasons and some excuses were offered for the disaster; the most plausible were that the attack had been badly planned and feebly executed. Jones, in his Sieges of Spain, says : “The efforts in the breach were certainly neither very obstinate nor very persevering,” and he was an eyewitness . “No general or staff-officer went out of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of regimental officers failed.” The Siege Suspended Lord Wellington went at once to San Sebastian and wished to renew the attack. But the besiegers were short of ammunition, which was daily expected from England, and he thought it better to await its arrival. Then momentous events followed elsewhere. Soult advanced and began the serious movements that produced the first set of the battles of the Pyrenees, and Wellington was peremptorily called away from San Sebastian. The siege was suspended for several weeks and converted into a blockade. Now the French, elated at their respite, were constantly alert, and being reinforced made many sallies. At the same time, under Rey’s energetic impulse, the damaged defences were repaired and strengthened, the magazines were refilled, and guns were remounted in the batteries. The Siege of San Sebastian July 10th - August 13th 1813
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Breaching the Walls