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[1] My thanks (as so often) go to Philip Haythornthwaite for providing information. Much of this paragraph is based on Dörnberg's notice in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie , Band 5 (Leipzig, 1877), the Cambridge Modern History, ix (1909), pp.293, 336-7, 356-7, 411-3, and J Gill's With the Eagles to Glory (1992), pp.424-9. The accounts in D Chandler, Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars (1979), p123, and D Hamilton-Williams, Waterloo, New Perspectives (1993), p.83 need correction.
[2] The tergiversations of the King of Prussia over the years, and Metternich's notorious denial ('on my word of honour as a German count') in his interview with Napoleon at Dresden on 26 June 1813 that Austria had allied itself against France - the treaty between Austria, Prussia and Russia had already been negotiated and was ratified at Reichenbach (70 miles from Dresden) on 27 June - show that lesser men had bad examples to follow.
[3] Julius von Pflugk-Harttung (1848-1919) was originally a medieval historian, held university posts in Switzerland and Germany, was well known to Lord Acton and so was one of the scholars participating in the great Cambridge Modern History. His Waterloo studies were regarded in England as among the best German contributions on that vexed subject. Others had used the document, e.g. Gen von Ollech, Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 (1876) and H Delbrück, Das Leben des . . .Gneisnau , vol iv (1880). Peter Hofschröer's 1815, the Waterloo Campaign, 2 vols, (1998- 9) [hereafter Hofschröer, with volume number], provides an English translation of some paragraphs of Pflugk-Harttung's text.
[4] I wish to thank Joanna Legg of the Western Front Association, who is currently translating German unit war diaries 1914-18, for kindly helping with translation from the German.
[5] See note 10 below.
[6] The Duke's First Orders at 5 p.m. on 15 June, had instructed Dörnberg's brigade to march 'this night' 13 miles south to Vilvorde, but that would still have left it north of Brussels (Wellington Despatches [WD], xii, 472, and with slight verbal differences in 1852 ed viii, 142). The 10 p.m. 'After Orders' (WD 1852 ed, viii 142) stated that it was to follow the 5th Division from Brussels. Dörnberg's words here indicate that further orders moving it to Quatre Bras had been issued by 4 a.m. at latest. We shall have to refer repeatedly to these two editions of the orders as the discussion develops.
[7] As Wellington had surveyed the position in 1814 it seems that he was methodically checking all his bearings on the old adage that time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted. It is, however, a further instance of his concern about the possibility of a French direct thrust at Brussels or Ghent, a concern which resulted in his orders for the defence of the Braine l'Alleud and Hal sectors on the 18th.
[8] Dörnberg's statement is of interest for two reasons. First, his recollection of 'Enghien' shows how generally accurate his memory was. The 15 June 10 p.m. 'After orders' did indeed specify that the cavalry should continue to Enghien (see WD, 1838, xii, 474; 1852, viii, 142), but at that hour Dörnberg was still on the road from Mons, so he must have heard the information on the 16th; the Duke's orders were not collected and published until years after this account was written, so Dörnberg's account and WD are quite independent and yet agree on the point. Secondly, his claim that the Duke sent a message to Lord Uxbridge is supported by Lord Greenock, who had been AQMG at Uxbridge's HQ at Ninove. In 1842 Greenock wrote that during the period 16-18 June orders to their force 'were either communicated verbally or contained in private notes addressed to the Marquess of Anglesey [Lord Uxbridge]' and that just after Uxbridge and his staff had passed Braine-le-Comte distant firing was heard 'and I rather think Lord Anglesea [sic] received some communication reporting what was going on at Quatre Bras' as orders to move as quickly as possible to Quatre Bras were then issued and Uxbridge 'galloped to Nivelles and thence to Quatre Bras' (Greenock to Gurwood, 14 and 19 Sept 1842: Southampton Univ, WP 8/3/7 and 11). Braine is over 20 miles from Ninove and 14 from Quatre Bras, and as Greenock also said that Uxbridge only reached Ninove from Brussels 'after daybreak' on the 16th, and Uxbridge himself said that he reached Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 p.m. (Siborne, Waterloo Letters [1891], No. 4, p.4), these times fit the times in Dörnberg's account. Although his recollection is not entirely clear Müffling's Passages from My Life (1853, and reprinted as Memoirs, 1997, a translation of his Aus meinem Leben, 1851, but written 1844) appears to say that he knew before the meeting at Brye that the reserve cavalry were to concentrate at 'Nivelles' and not Enghien (pp.234-5 in the German and p.235 in the English editions).
[9] Pflugk-Harttung noted that Ollech, p.127 had cited the short (approx 150 word) passage in para 5 ('The Duke said to General Gneisnau' down to 'and shall act accordingly') , which was repeated by Delbrück; Ollech also referred to Dörnberg's final reference to Gneisnau's opinion and the Duke's answer at Quatre Bras (para 8). Mr Hofschröer's extracts (1815, i, pp. 140, 224-5, 234, 236) comprise paragraphs 1, 4 and 5.
[10] It is not so easy to accept Dörnberg's belief in the certainty of his Intelligence as far back as 'eight days' before the outbreak of fighting (para 2). Some of his Intelligence was good but some must have been misinformation deliberately fed to him by enemy sources, as a couple of instances taken from his reports will show: on 6 June he sent Wellington a report that Buonaparte was leaving Paris that day (wrong) and would launch a false attack on the Prussians and a real one on the English army (Well Supplementary
Desp [WSD], x, 424), and on 8 June he reported news that the Young Guard was supposed to be at Valenciennes and the Old Guard marching to Maubeuge, both towns menacing the Duke's sector and not Blücher's, and thus supporting the earlier misinformation. Likewise while he is quite correct
about information coming from a source close to General Comte Bertrand (para 2), it came on the evening of 10 June and from the British officer Colonel Dillon, uncle to the Comtesse (Dörnberg's report of 11 June, WSD, x, 454).
[11] I have discussed the Netherlands letters and timetable for 15 June in more detail in my article 'Towards a Better Chronology for the Waterloo Campaign', War in History, vii (4), November 2000.
[12] Wellington to Orange, 9 a.m, 8 May 1815, WD (1838), xii, 363; (1852 ed), viii, 59.
[13] WSD, x, 480.
[14] Behr's letter is in WSD, x, 481, with extract in Hofschröer, i, 196; Chassé's and Paravicini's messages are in F De Bas & J T'Serclaes de Wommersom, La Campagne de 1815 (1908), i 393-94 [DBTS], (English translations of them are in Hofschröer, i, 199); Wellington's First Orders are untimed in the 1838 edition of WD but are timed '5 p.m.' in the 1852 edition, viii, 142. For the English text of Hügel's letter (the German is in A Pfister, Aus Dem Lager der Verbündeten 1814 und1815 [1897], p.366), see my article 'At What Time on 15 June 1815 did Wellington Learn of the Attack on the Prussians?' in War in History, vi (1), January 1999, p.112 where he states that when Müffling rushed to the Prince of Orange and the Duke at 5.45 p.m. with his first Prussian news of an attack, the Prince was in a position to tell Müffling of heavy firing in the Prussian sector. He can only have learnt this from the reports sent with Lord March.
[15] Müffling's various claims are in his Passages, pp.228-30. He claimed (1844) to have received news of the attack on Charleroi at 3 p.m. from a Prussian officer and to have gone immediately to Wellington, but Hügel shows that it was only at 5.45 p.m. that Müffling received the news and went to Wellington. And if the news really reached him in mid afternoon, why did he wait four hours before informing his own C-in-C at 7 p.m. that 'the news has just arrived that Lieut-General von Ziethen has been attacked' (Delbrück, iv, p.365 fn., and Hofschröer, i, 212)?
[16] See note 6 for source references to the '5 p.m.' First Orders and the 10 p.m. After Orders. The texts in the editions of 1838 and 1852 differ because the later edition was revised and enlarged with additional material and incorporated originals written by different staff officers. For instance the 10 p.m. orders to the 5th Division quoted in my text are in the 1852 edition but not in 1838. However the 10 p.m. orders to the 3rd Division in the 1838 edition state it is to 'continue' its movement on Nivelles whereas the later
edition merely has 'to move'. Thus the 1852 version appears to show Wellington more active in moving the 5th Division as compared with the 1838 text, but less active as regards the 3rd. Anyone arguing that the later edition exaggerates the activity in Wellington's forces would have to explain why the 3rd Division's orders are less 'forward' there.
[17] Ziethen to Blücher, 15 June, 8.15 am: 'I have informed the Duke of Wellington of the situation, and requested him to concentrate around Nivelles [bei Nivelles zu konzentrieren] . . .': Lettow Vorbeck, Napoleons Untergang (Berlin, 1904), p.253, and Hofschröer, i, 193 . Pflugk-Harttung long ago pointed out that Ziethen himself named 'Nivelles' and not 'Quatre Bras': Vorgeschichte, esp at p.58. Note also Müffling to Blücher, 15 June, 7 p.m.: 'The news has just arrived that Lieut-General von Ziethen has been attacked . . . the Prince of Orange is to report to him [Wellington] if enemy columns are marching on Nivelles. . . If the enemy should not have attacked Nivelles, the Duke will be in the region of Nivelles with his whole force in the morning': see sources in note 15.
[18] 'Braine-le-Comte, 10.30 p.m. [?10 p.m.], 15 June. Monseigneur, Captain Baron de Gagern has this instant arrived from Nivelles with the news that the enemy has already pushed as far as Quatre Bras. I have taken on myself the responsibility of telling General Perponcher [2nd Netherlands Division, HQ Nivelles] to support his 2nd Brigade [at Quatre Bras] with the 1st [until then at Nivelles] and to evacuate the hospital and administrative units towards Brussels. I have sent an officer to Nivelles and to Fayt to ascertain the state of affairs at the first-named place and then to warn Generals Chassé and Collaert so that in case of need they join and support [Perponcher's] 2nd Division'. Constant's letter is quoted in his Journal, and timed '10.30 p.m. (?10 p.m.)' in DBTS, i, 409-10 and '10 p.m.' in Jacques Logie's edition in
Mélanges Historiques: Napoléon, Wellington, Waterloo, Braine l'Alleud (Waterloo, 1970), pp.123-51, at p.132. Logie's and DBTS's texts differ slightly in places.
[19] The Prussian Major von Brünneck recorded the Prince of Orange informing him that '17 englische Bataillone sind von Brüssel aus zur Unterstützung des Punktes von Quatre Bras in Marsche gesetzt worden': report of his 6.30 a.m. meeting with the Prince at Quatre Bras in Lettow Vorbeck, p.298, English trans in Hofschröer, i, 224-5. 'Englische . . . von Brüssel' obviously means 'the Brussels Reserve under British command'. By 3.15 p.m. Wellington's force at Quatre Bras totalled 18,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. In
addition to the 2nd Netherlands Division which covered the Nivelles-Quatre Bras sector, Picton's 5th Division brought 8 British and 4 Hanoverian battalions, and the 4th Hanoverian Brigade of the British 6th Division brought 4 battalions, while the Brunswick Corps brought 8 battalions. This makes a total of 24 battalions under British command, not counting the Netherlanders.
[20] That units well back in the column were allowed a much-needed hour's rest for a meal suggests that certain units would still have been resting while the head of column was moving again, but I think the reconciliation of times from such reports as have so far been published cannot be totally satisfactory.
[21] The Duke has been criticised for not forcing the pace, but it was against his standard practice. Peninsular veterans knew that the Duke insisted on a 21/2 m.p.h. pace, with space between units, with hourly pauses and the use of shade for rest breaks; that the high-camber chaussée limited the width of column; that a 13 mile march to Mont St Jean, with a further march (perhaps a forced one) to reach a battlefield and then full-scale and energetic fighting, required that 'over-marching' should be avoided at this stage. On
the road to Paris in late June the Duke warned Müffling that 'it would not do' for British troops to try to match the Prussian daily distances (later British observers noted the German tendency to 'over-march' in pre-1914 manoeuvres). The best short account known to me of Wellington's marching practice is that by S Petty in Wellington Studies 1, ed C M Woolgar (Southampton, 1996), pp.146-52, which I think conclusive.
[22] Of recent studies, Mr Hamilton-Williams, Waterloo, New Perspectives, pp.178-9 does not use Dörnberg's para 3 very accurately and adds some notions of his own as to what apparently he believes was passing through Dörnberg's mind. Mr Hofschröer, in 1815 vol i, for some unexplained reason totally omits and ignores Dörnberg's para 3 and its additional notes.
[23] English translations of most of the accounts can be found in Hofschröer, i, 233-7. Quotations from Clausewitz, Grolman (Damitz), Müffling, Nostitz, Reiche, Thurn und Taxis come from those pages, save only where I quote phrases not found, I think, in Hofschröer in which case I give source and page references. But Reiche says little to the point, and Pflugk-Harttung (Vorgeschichte, p.168 fn) concludes that Nostitz was not actually present. After this article was prepared for publication there has appeared Mr Gary Cousins' incisive analysis of the Brye meeting and Gneisnau's role in it: First Empire, No 71. I thank him for some further information, which has enabled me to make last-minute updates or amendments in places.
[24] In despite of all other accounts, Nostitz, writing in 1864 when he was 77, claimed that the meeting lasted two hours and that at 3 p.m. Blücher then had time to ride back alongside the Duke for part of the way. But the battle of Ligny had begun by 2.30 p.m. at latest. He is probably safer on less specific matters, but many of his remarks suggest that hindsight assisted his account.
[25] There is no indication that the three Corps commanders, Ziethen, Pirch and Thielemann were present. Reiche, COS of I Corps had been on the intended battlefield from the night of 15/16 June; II Corps arrived in mid-morning and its COS, Aster, is not recorded as being at the meeting. III Corps did not reach the field until the start of the afternoon and its COS, Clausewitz, writes of Wellington's departure from Brye 'it is said [sic] that his parting words were' etc, which plainly shows that Clausewitz was not there.
[26] There is a private conversation between the Duke and Lady De Ros (which she recorded in the 1830s or 40s, printed in Sir H Maxwell's Wellington (1900), ii, 19) and another with Hardinge (which Lord Mahon recorded, 26 Oct 1837, printed in Stanhope's Conversations with Wellington, 'World Classics' ed, 108). Both are essentially about the Duke's opinion of the Prussian dispositions - which had been carefully selected by the Prussian high command and for which, naturally, they were entirely responsible - and do not touch on the major questions discussed at Brye.
[27] It is worth recalling that at Frasnes at 10.30 a.m. the Duke had written to Blücher: '. . . Je ne vois pas beaucoup de L'Ennemie en avant de vous [sic] . . . Rien n'a paru du côté de Binch; ni sur notre [sic] droite' (Ollech, facsimile at p.124: accents added).
[28] Müffling's statement is in his, Passages, p.230 (also in Hofschröer, i, 233). The sequence of orders, replies, mishaps, etc, concerning IV Corps is given in in Hofschröer, i, 187, 189-90, 221, 234, where it is admitted that 'it is unlikely' that the Duke was informed prior to the Brye meeting of IV Corps' absence. Even III Corps was only just reaching the field around midday; Clausewitz says that it had received Gneisnau's orders of 11.30 p.m., 14 June, only at 9 a.m. on the 15th at Ciney, then had to assemble into divisions,
and then march 32 miles to Sombreffe, arriving several hours before battle commenced (On War, Book V, chap 13, pp.328-9 in the Howard and Paret translation).
[29] Nostitz's 'Tagebuch', a diary cum memoir, in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, Band 1, heft 6 (Berlin, 1885), p.18. Although he uses other quotations from pages 17 and 18 of Nostitz, Mr Hofschröer has overlooked this passage which bears strongly on the decision to fight at Ligny.
[30] A phrase omitted from Mr Hofschröer's translation of para 5 (i, 236).
[31] There is a very powerful and convincing analysis of these accounts by Mr Neil Carey, First Empire, 43, Nov/Dec 1998, p.33. His detailed arguments demonstrate quite conclusively that a force reaching Quatre Bras from 2.45 p.m. onwards could have begun to reach Brye from 4.30 p.m. onwards and would have influenced French operations around St Amand well before that. His reasoning has never been controverted.
[32] Discussion of this remark must be held over to a subsequent article, but readers will at once notice that it implies awareness of Wellington's 'Frasnes letter' to Blücher, not published until 1876.
[33] Although Wellington was indeed attacked, could he have ignored Ney and marched to Sombreffe? Does not the answer show how unreasonable the Prussian complaints are?
[34] My italics. These italicised words are in Pflugk-Harttung's appendix p.293 and also are quoted in his text, p.163. They are omitted from Mr Hofschröer's translation of para 5 (1815, i, 236).
[35] Somerset says that the Duke expected a sizeable force to be at Quatre Bras about 2 p.m. and so 'told Blücher that he would give him all the support in his power', adds that the Duke 'galloped back to Quatre Bras which he reached about half-past two. He looked attentively with his spy-glass and observing the movements of the French towards Frasne [sic] told the Prince of Orange that he would be attacked directly', that attack materialising 'in a few minutes': Somerset's account, in E Owen (ed), The Waterloo Papers (1997), p.9.
[36] If Wellington at the time had thought Dörnberg's reports in any way inadequate or deficient would he have evinced the quite conversational attitude and equable spirit towards him which Dörnberg records?. Mrs Arbuthnot, who knew and understood Wellington as well as anyone in his inner circle, after remarking on his good nature, added that 'when he thinks he has been ill-used he certainly does not easily forgive' (Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot [1950], vol i, p. 282, 21 January 1824); and there are numerous instances of the Duke's lasting resentment or coldness towards officers whom he blamed for mistakes. Had Wellington thought Dörnberg in any way remiss I am certain that someone, at some time, would have heard him say so and have recorded it - and nobody ever did.
Conversations with the Duke of Wellington Dörnberg’s Account of the Start of the Waterloo Campaign
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