by John Hussey, UK
For many years a copy of Dörnberg's MS was held in a file in the Berlin War Archives, presumed destroyed in the Second World War. The Prussian historian General von Ollech used a small extract in 1876, and was followed in this by Hans Delbrück in 1880, but it was Julius von Pflugk-Harttung who printed by far the longest extract in his Vorgeschicte der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance: Wellington (Berlin 1903), Appendix III, pp.291-3, covering events up to the start of the battle of Quatre Bras on 16 June. Pflugk-Harttung published further Dörnberg material dealing with 18 June in his later work Belle Alliance (1915). [3]
Dörnberg penned his account before 1835, though how long before is not known. Prudence should therefore rank it somewhat below truly contemporary evidence such as Sir Augustus Frazer's daily letters home, but along-side the first-hand testimony of many officers in Colburn's United Services Journal or in the files of correspondence kept by Captain Siborne and eventually published in Waterloo
Letters. Dörnberg added some supplementary remarks when two Prussian commentaries on the campaign by Clausewitz and Damitz were published in 1835 and 1837 respectively.
Although Gurwood's twelfth or Waterloo volume of the Wellington Despatches [WD] appeared in 1838 and provided new material on the events of June 1815 together with some of the Duke's correspondence and opinions in the weeks before the campaign, Dörnberg found nothing in WD to cause him to write any further comments on his MS; nor apparently did Siborne's History of 1844 and 1848 lead him to write anything.
The next major contribution bearing on Dörnberg's conduct was Müffling's Memoir Aus meinem Leben, but this was not published until 1851, the year after Dörnberg's death. The greatest addition to Dörnberg's story came only with the publication of the invaluable Wellington Supplementary Despatches [WSD], vol x, in 1863, which set out clearly his dedication in gathering Intelligence. I have retained the paragraph breaks of Dörnberg's MS as printed by Pflugk-Harttung, but for ease of reference have numbered the paragraphs. I have also made some of his long clauses into separate sentences.
[4]
(1) Through my travellers as well as the crowd of French people arriving almost daily, I was very well informed of the movements of the French Army, its concentration at Beaumont and Bonaparte's arrival there.
(2) About eight days before the outbreak of hostilities a French officer came from the office of General Bertrand. He declared that in 8 to 10 days' time the war would begin and that Bonaparte's intention was to throw himself between the Prussian and English Armies. By order, my reports to the Duke of Wellington were sent first to the Prince of Orange, who had his headquarters at Braine-le-Comte on the road to Brussels.
On 14 June Sir Henry Clinton, whose headquarters were at Ath, came to see me to find out what I knew. I disclosed to him the report of the [French] Army having assembled and that Bonaparte had joined it. When he had examined everything, he said, 'Yes, now I believe it - but the Duke, who is always very well informed, does not believe it' ['Ja, jetzt glaube ich es - aber der Herzog, das doch immer
sehr gut unterrichtet ist, glaubt es nicht']. This made the well-known story about the high-ranking Lady extremely credible to me; that Fouché had sent her - indeed to the Duke himself - as he had promised, with the news that hostilities would be starting with immediate effect. But he had had her arrested at the French frontier again in order to cover himself. [5]
(3) Early on the 15th, when I heard that the Prussian outposts had been attacked and I had sent the message [die Meldung] to Brussels, [Dörnberg's additional note: That this report is said to have been first received by the Duke of Wellington at midnight, as claimed by Major von Damitz in his book [published in 1837], I cannot explain in any other way than that the Prince of Orange held it up for so long
[ihn so lange aufgehalten habe]; since I have only just found out from this book about the delayed arrival of the message, I have also not been able to start any investigation into the matter.]
I rode towards Binche [about 11 English miles away] and saw that the Prussians were withdrawing. Towards evening I rode away from Mons as I was under orders to remain there only until the outbreak of hostilities, so as not to allow myself to be encircled there. I rode to Brussels [35 miles], where I arrived the next day between 4 and 5 in the morning. I went straight to the Duke, whom I found in bed. He sprang up at once and said to me that there would most probably be a battle that day at Quatre Bras, and he ordered me to ride immediately to Waterloo and instruct General Picton to march his Division to Quatre Bras forthwith [Er sprang sogleich aus, sagte mir, dass wir uns wahrscheinlich den Tag bei Quatre-Bras schlagen würden, und befahl mir, gleich nach Waterloo zu reiten und dem General
Picton den Befehl zu bringen, sogleich mit seiner Division nach Quatre-Bras zu marschieren].
[Dörnberg's additional note: It is therefore a mistake if Clausewitz [in his posthumously published commentary of 1835] believes that the Duke had first despatched this order from Bry[e] [after 1 p.m. on the 16th]; moreover, when we arrived at Quatre Bras from Bry[e], we found Picton's Division was already under fire.] My brigade, which was quartered at Malines [18 miles north of Wellington's Reserve in Brussels], had already received the order to march there [habe schon den Befehl, auch dahin zu marschieren]. [6]
So I rode to Waterloo [11 miles south, beyond the forest of Soignies] and hardly was the Division on the march than the Duke himself arrived [und kaum hatte sich die Division in Marsch gesetzt, als der Herzog auch schon selbst ankam].
(4) At Mont St Jean [2 miles south of Waterloo, where the road forks to Nivelles and to Quatre Bras] he halted for a while, enquiring where the various roads led.
[7]
Arriving at Quatre Bras [about 8 miles from Mont St Jean] we found the Netherlands troops under the Prince of Orange skirmishing with the French towards Frasnes [2 miles further south], with the occasional cannon-shot falling among them. Here the Duke wrote another order to Lord Uxbridge that the cavalry, which was assembled around Enghien, should immediately come to Quatre Bras [a distance of over 20 miles]. [8]
A patrol of Prussian hussars arrived, informing the Duke that Marshal Blücher was at Sombreffe [some 6 miles from Quatre Bras]. He said to me that he wanted to ride there and that I should accompany him. Along with several of the Duke's staff [Adjutanten] General von Müffling rode with us.
(5) We found Marshal Blücher at the mill of Bry [about a mile short of Sombreffe] . Having spoken a few words the Duke said to General von Gneisnau, 'Will you give me your opinion as to what you wish me to do?' ['Sagen Sie mir doch Ihre Meinung, was Sie wünchen, dass ich thun soll?']. Gneisnau took the map in his hand and said, 'If you can push aside what opposition stands before you at Quatre Bras and press forward quickly [i.e. southwards, down the main Brussels-Gosselies-Charleroi road], that would achieve the greatest result [das grösste Resultat hervorbringen] in that you would then come upon the rear of the French Army.
However, as there are only narrow roads in that direction it would be safest if you could pin down the forces standing in front of you and then move leftwards [i.e. eastwards] with the rest of your Army, so coming up on our right wing and taking the French Army in the left flank'. The Duke replied, 'The reasoning is sound. I will see what is against me and how much of my Army has come up, and shall act accordingly' ['Das Raisonnement ist richtig, ich werde sehen, was gegen mich steht und wie viel von meiner Armee angekommen ist, um demgemäss zu handeln.'] - without saying anything to indicate either one way or the other what his decision was and without giving any promise [-ohne irgend etwas zu sagen, dass er sich für das eine oder das andere entschiede, oder ohne
irgend ein Versprechen zu geben.].
(6) As we rode away, the brave Blücher accompanied us for a short distance and as he left us the Duke said to me [here Dörnberg quotes the Duke in English:] 'What a fine fellow he is!'
(7) From the high ground where we were we could distinctly see the enemy columns advancing [against the Prussians] and also Bonaparte with his entourage. During the [5 mile] ride back we could hear the gunfire at Quatre Bras growing louder.
(8) When we arrived there the French cannon-fire was quite intense but there did not appear to be many troops, and while Gneisnau's suggestion 'to overthrow whatever stood in our way and to press into the enemy army's rear' was still in my mind, I said to the Duke that I did not believe that the French were very strong since it seemed to me that they wanted rather to make noise than actually to attack us. The Duke answered [here Dörnberg quotes him in English:], 'It may be so, but I don't believe it'. And promptly thereupon he was proved right, because there then began a serious attack.
[9]
Conversations with the Duke of Wellington Dörnbergs Account of the Start of the Waterloo Campaign
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