by Cole H. KeKelis, USA
Now that the broader military significance of Gibraltar has been examined, there must follow an analysis of the more indirect, strategic elements of those military contributions. The Rock served many vital roles during those years of crisis. It was an observation post, a base for maritime interceptions, a center for naval correspondence, a victualling yard and a repair station. Each of these strategic functions of Gibraltar contributed in its own way to the demise of Napoleon. First of all, Gibraltar was a good observation post. It was poised at the gates of the Mediterranean and therefore was naturally suited to the role of look-out base. One of the lieutenant-governors during the Napoleonic Period, Charles O’Hara, built a 200-foot tall tower from which he hoped to be able to see Cadiz harbour. [26]
From Gibraltar it was possible to keep accurate tabs on what was passing through the Straits into or out of the Mediterranean. Admiral Jervis, made Earl of St. Vincent after his victory in the cape in 1796, took up residence on Gibraltar as First Sea Lord in 1800, for it was “the natural centre for collecting naval intelligence.”
[27]
With regard to Gibraltar’s function as a look-out base in 1805, G.T. Garratt has written that “Without Gibraltar as a base Collingwood could never have remained to watch Villeneauve during the last fatal three weeks...” before Trafalgar. [28]
Those based at Gibraltar could certainly see who and what was passing through the Straits, but intercepting those vessels was another matter. The harbour at Gibraltar is notorious for its high winds and it is, therefore, difficult for any ships docked at Gibraltar to move out of the bay quickly enough to intercept passing ships. It is not impossible, however, and such maritime interceptions did occur frequently enough to plague Napoleon and his allies. Another function of Gibraltar was that of a “post office” for naval correspondence. [29]
It was, as always, ideally situated in the centre of British operations in and around the Mediterra-nean, and so most correspondence was sent to Gibraltar before being passed on to Lisbon or
some other larger port. It is no surprise then that it was the Gibraltar Chronicle that first printed the news of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. [30]
Indeed, naval correspondence is vital in war-time, and ship-to-shore or shore-to-ship com-munication is essential in order to keep things moving properly. Without Gibraltar, British communications could have been severely disadvantaged during the Napoleonic Wars.
As a victualling and repair yard there is no doubt that Gibraltar was foremost among British possessions. In 1795, Nelson wrote that, “We cannot get another mast this side of Gibraltar.”
[31]
True, there was no better place to put in for quick repairs. On more than one occasion, Gibraltar served as a “pit stop” for damaged ships which, once repaired, returned to battle in order to gain victory over their tired foes. Remember Saumarez’s victory over the Real Carlos and company in 1801. Before he launched his pursuit of the Spanish fleet, he had attacked a smaller fleet bottled up at Cadiz. Saumarez had been repelled and, putting back to Gibraltar, was able to get the quick repairs he needed in order to attack again.
Nelson stopped off at Gibraltar for repairs and supplies before joining Jervis for the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1796. On May 5, 1796, Nelson wrote to his wife that “I expect to be two days at Gibraltar to water and victual ...” [32]
A certain Captain Frederick Hoffman, who served in the Royal Navy from 1793 to 1814, wrote that “We occasionally ran into Gibraltar for refreshments and stores.”
[33]
The following extract from the journal of Purser, commanding officer of HMS Victory in 1796, demonstrates just how much was available to British vessels at Gibraltar:
Literally “tons” of food and supplies for the HMS Victory from Gibraltar, one of Britain’s chief victualling yards in the Napoleonic Period. [34]
Thomas Huskisson, who served in the Royal Navy from 1800 to 1808, wrote in his autobiography about various injuries to his ship and others. For instance, “when the mainmast was found to be badly sprung,” Huskisson’s vessel was “obliged to repair to Gibraltar.” [35]
Then later, “We again went to Gibraltar ... for a new main yard, the old one being badly sprung,” and after repairs, “we rejoined the squadron off Cadiz.” After the Battle of Trafalgar, Huskisson remembered that ships went on to Gibraltar; “Our time at Gibraltar was employed in repairing damages sustained in the action, such as securing mainmast and rudder sufficiently to take the ship home.”
G.T. Garratt has written that “Gibraltar was also the only outlying base capable of vicutalling and refitting men-of-war, and of supplying British privateers.”
[36]
Without Gibraltar, British vessels might have had to have put back to Lisbon and depart from the Mediterranean altogether in order to be resupplied or repaired. There are many examples in which
Gibraltar’s accessibility and convenience resulted in great victories over Napoleon, most notably at Trafalgar. The great American naval historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, has written that Gibraltar, “Being the great British naval station of the Mediterranean ... was centrally placed to receive information ... and especially to hasten ... the work of supply and repair upon which the efficiency of a fleet primarily depends.” [37]
Gibraltar thus served Britain admirably as a port for communication, supply and repair during the Napoleonic Wars and as such contributed greatly to the defeat of Napoleon by keeping the British navy alert, supplied and in good order. With the additional advantage of Gibraltar as observation post, these ships could be kept abreast of maritime movements of enemy forces. There is then the question of Gibraltar as the essential element required for British domination of the Mediterranean. In 1782, Charles James Fox made a speech before the House of Commons regarding the position of Gibraltar:
Fox states quite strongly that Gibraltar is essential to Britain with regard to policing the Mediterranean. [38] Without Gibraltar, Britain could never count on a presence in the Mediterranean strong enough to guarantee European recognition of British naval supremacy. Thus we see another key role played by Gibraltar. With Gibraltar, the British did not have to rely upon any friendly continental ports. The Rock became a base from which to police the Mediterranean, and during the Napoleonic Period, Gibraltar allowed the British to police the seas at ease. Now that the military operations in which Gibraltar played a part have been outlined and the basic strategic advantages making involvement in such operations have been analysed, we must turn to the final category of Gibraltarian contribution to the demise of Napoleon, that of economic advantages. Economic advantages of Gibraltar fall into three categories: smuggling, trade, and supplies for privateers and insurgent forces.
Smuggling
Gibraltar was always the site for the odd dodgy deal. “Between 1793 and 1801, British exports and imports rose by 30 per cent, and Gibraltar, as the port in Europe where fewer questions were asked than anywhere else about the provenance or destination of goods landed there ... benefited more than proportionately.” [39]
Thus we see that as a base for illicit trade Gibraltar served Britain admirably during the early Napoleonic Period. During the Peninsular War, Gibraltar smuggled goods into French Spain in order to support the guerillas. But it was in breeches of the famous Continental System of Napoleon that Gibraltar was to shine out above all others as the best place to breech Bonaparte’s block on British goods.
The Continental System was initiated by Napoleon in 1806. It was a systematic attempt to destroy Britain by crippling her economic system. Napoleon ordered that no continental European port should permit trade with British vessels. The British countered this with their own Orders in Council, which declared that no ship could trade with Europe that did not first stop off at Britain, and then Britain issued the order to blockade all of Europe. These wars of paper blockades crippled French as well as British economies. Businesses all over were severely damaged by these actions, and Napoleon suffered on the public opinion front as French businessmen found themselves sinking below water under the weight of the Continental System.
Gibraltar played a key role during those years of the Continental System. So many vessels had to be committed to fulfil the European blockades that the Gibraltar dockyard was extended.
A new victualling yard was constructed. New businesses sprang up all over the Rock in order to fill the demands made by all the British blockade ships, as well as those of the privateers and smugglers who made their way to Gibraltar in order to breech the Continental System. “Few questions were asked about the ownership, origin, or destination of cargoes put up for quick sale from ships brought into Gibraltar and declared lawful prizes by the Admiralty Court ...” [40]
Thus we see that Gibraltar was the port where many ships seized during the economic wars of the Continental System were brought for disposal and sale. Privateers and anti-French smugglers thrived in the Mediterranean thanks to Gibraltar. During the Peninsular War, guerillas were similarly supplied and as has already been demonstrated, Gibral-tar businesses contributed to the war effort by loaning money to insurgent forces, interest-free. With the loss of the Americas, Britain had to look eastward for trade possibilities.
Thus, Gibraltar assumed a new importance as first port on the route to the Suez overland route to India. Illicit trade was not only commonplace on the Rock but also provided Britain with sturdy trade routes eastward and a strong position for trade in the Mediterranean and therefore in southern Europe. Sound trade routes could not help but give Britain inherent advantages over Napoleon’s France.
Also, in the Parliamentary Papers of John Robinson it is seen that, during the reign of King George III, revenues taken from Gibraltar were used to fund “secret and special services.”
[41]
Some of these secret services (most likely in the form of foreign intelligence and espionage) could well have been to the detriment of Napoleon.
This exercise has analyzed the importance of Gibraltar in bringing about the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte. Doubtless, the Rock contributed greatly to Bonaparte’s demise, but how did contemporary individuals regard Gibraltar? Did it appear to contemporaries to be a valuable and deadly foe to Napoleon?
Prominent American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan held the Rock in high esteem. Mahan regarded it as “the great British naval station of the Mediterranean.”
[42]
“What a lion in the path was Gibraltar to the French...” declared Mahan. [43]
American traveler of the late nineteenth century, Dr. Henry M. Field, described Gibraltar as “a lion couchant--a true British lion, not unlike those in Trafalgar Square in London, only that the bronze is
changed to stone, and the figure carved out of a mountain ... every feature bearing the character of kingly majesty and power. That is Gibraltar!” [44]
The opinions of such prominent naval officers of the period as Admirals Jervis and Nelson have already been stated. Both men regarded Gibraltar as both essential and extremely useful. We have also seen the opinion of Charles Fox, who held that Gibraltar was the only thing maintaining British supremacy in the naval sphere. The author of a contemporary tribute to British naval officers, written in 1806, holds that Gibraltar’s “value as a naval station has long been too well understood, to require any observation on that head.” [45]
Thomas Huskisson of the Royal Navy referred more than once to the “safety” of Gibraltar in his autobiography. [46]
We have seen how Gibraltar contributed to the demise of Napoleon. Now let us hear how Napoleon himself regarded the Rock. While exiled to St. Helena, the former Emperor was asked by a certain Admiral Cockburn which, in Napoleon’s opinion, was the “strongest place in the world.” [47]
Napoleon named seven places, and among them was Gibraltar. Cockburn then told Napoleon that the British thought Bonaparte was planning to attack Gibraltar during the Peninsular War, to which Napoleon responded:
Napoleon, who in a breath previous recognized Gibraltar as one of the strongest places in the world, went on to downplay the importance of the Rock.
Regarding Napoleon’s statements in reference to Gibraltar, we know for a fact that in 1808, Napoleon took personal command of forces destined to to “bear our triumphant Eagles to the Pillars of Hercules ...” [48]
Can this be a man who feels it is “injudicious” to ruin the position of Gibraltar? Napoleon was bound for Gibraltar in 1808 but was sidetracked by Moore and then was forced to lead his armies in Austria. And what of Soult’s furious, frustrated campaigns in Andalusia throughout the Peninsular War? Poor old Soult was ordered by Napoleon to subjugate Andalusia, but he could not on account of the contributions of Gibraltar, as we have seen.
Napoleon said that Gibraltar is “of no value” to Britain. This exercise has fairly dealt the death blow to that assertion of the fallen emperor. It has proven that the Rock most definitely “protects” trade routes and maritime activities and that it “intercepts” naval traffic through the Straits. That it is an object of “national pride” is clearly true. Did not the British troops marching to the defence of Gibraltar
during the Spanish siege in 1726 embark “cheerfully with loud huzzahs at going off”? [49]
Jack Russell has commented that “Gibraltar came to represent” Britain’s “pride and her power,” that Gibraltar “became synonymous in the English language with invincibility, grit, courage, and endurance.” [50]
T.H. McGuffie has called Gibraltar “an incomparable fortress.” [51]
McGuffie described Gibraltar as “Formidable in aspect ... a natural stronghold.” In 1782, John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, referred to Gibraltar as “that important fortress,” for
which it “was judged advisable to sacrifice many material objects” in order that Gibraltar not be taken from Britain. [52] British pride is demonstrated in the 1884 volume, Gibraltar and Its Sieges, in which the author claims that Gibraltar is a name that will “stir the heart of every Englishman, so long as patriotism is recognized as a virtue,--so long as England’s sons continue to cherish England’s honour.” [53]
During the Peninsular War, when Napoleon might have attacked Gibraltar, the Rock was causing anything but “great umbrage” to the Spanish people. The Spaniards as we have seen, flocked to the guns of Gibraltar in times of trouble and received gladly the supplies given them by the British from the Rock. It would most certainly not have been “injudicious” to have captured Gibraltar. But we must remember that these are the memoirs of a defeated dictator who truly had not the capacity to ever take Gibraltar after his fleets were destroyed at Trafalgar.
Before closing, we should look at some of the inherent disadvantages of British possession of Gibraltar in order to balance this exercise. Spanish resentment of British occupation has always been high. Relations with that country have been historically crippled because of the Rock. The anchorages of Gibraltar are poor, and the harbour is windy and difficult to escape with ease. The notorious, periodic yellow fever outbreaks that have plagued the peninsula were disastrous at times, and the discipline of the Gibraltar garrison has been a question best left ignored, for they have traditionally been a drunken, uncoordinated lot.
Despite the disadvantages of holding Gibraltar, the British have reaped far more benefits from the Rock than can be measured in comparison with what might have been achieved had relations with Spain been better. Gibraltar is a strong fortress. The British have held it since 1704 and will probably never relinquish the Rock. It has served them admirably throughout the three centuries of their occupation. Most authors of the subject agree that Gibraltar has always been among the finest possessions of the British Empire. Others, like George Hills, regard Gibraltar as “better than nothing,”
[54]
But this study has shown that the Rock of Gibraltar, Old ‘Gib.,’ has been of inestimable value to Britain. From 1789 to 1815, the Rock undermined the position of France, and Gibraltar contributed significantly to the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte. That much having been proven, it may safely be said that this study has broadened the understanding of the Napoleonic Era in that Gibraltar has been
duly recognized as the hub of British military and naval action against Bonaparte.
The Rock Against Napoleon The Importance of Gibraltar to the Napoleonic Wars
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