Battle of Vimeiro
21 August 1808
Junot and Wellesley
by Miguel Freire, Portugal
 |
General Jean Andoche Junot
Current photo of the monument to the Battle in the Vimeiro village square. It was this sang-froid under fire that impressed Napoleon and made him assign Junot as his Aide in Italy. In this office he was seriously injured in the head, and this might have caused some mental disturbs. He accompanied Napoleon to the Egypt where he took part in many victories. The Royal Navy arrested him when returning to France in October of 1799. He is set free later on and returns to France. In 1801 is Général de Division. In 1805 is ambassador in Portugal. He leads the army that invades Portugal in 1807 but he does not manage to seize the Royal Family. After defeat at Vimeiro and the Cintra Convention he returns to France. Latter returns to Spain and afterwards to Portugal where he participates in the Buçaco fight. In 1812 he took part in the invasion of Russia. In 1813, after returning to France, he began to show signs of a deep madness that led him to suicide by throwing himself of a window in July of that year. He died without having achieved his much-desired post of Marechal. Junot’s Command I – There were not many things, if any existed, that Junot has done well. Is option of attacking the British seems us wise, for the idea was to attack them before they could receive reinforcements from other British units or more Portuguese. Though Junot had the initiative he did not know how to seize it. Not knowing of the British reinforcement by the Ackland’s and Anstruther's brigades, his calculations always favoured him. II – Junot had a clear advantage, his cavalry was fairly more than the one from the British. It was this branch that Junot did not know how to use, and we dare to say it could have been decisive to the victory. The fact remains that apart from not having a clear personal perspective of the “front line”, the minimum one can demand from a commander, [12] Junot also did not gave clear instructions to his cavalry in order to identify the weak points of the British position. In the current doctrinal terminology the operations could have been a “recce-pull”, that is, the cavalry units would first make the weak points recognition of the enemy position and would then inform the main body, which was marching a bit behind these, about where to make the main effort. Needless to say that the French cavalry
needed not to be very professional to realize that the British had no cavalry watching and that the timely alert of the enemy approach would be given by the advanced outposts of the infantry units themselves. III – The option of a frontal attack (as the main effort) and an envelopment (as the supporting attack) does not seem bad at all, but when the force is divided in almost equal parts by the two attacks, there are no conditions left to apply the main effort (with great chances of succeed). Only the presence of the Generals commanders of divisions at Vimeiro would give the idea that there was the main effort. On the other hand, by assigning to the supporting attack two brigades of different divisions and without a single commander, as well as separated among them in time and space, could
seriously compromise an assault that should be coordinated.
He is considered one of the best British Generals ever. His history in the Peninsula War period melts itself with the British army involvement history in the Peninsula. He was born in 1769 and was educated in a French military academy. When he was assigned to Portugal he was 39 years old and was Lieutenant General. He had a distinguish career behind him in several operational theatres not only in India as well as in Europe.
Having been criticized by his defensive nature in battles, the truth is that in Portugal, during the year of 1808 he beat Delaborde in the Roliça fight, on the offensive, and defeated, in Vimeiro, on a dynamic defensive operation Junot. Hewas vindicated by the inquiring commission on the Cintra Convention affair. After General Moore’s death in Coruña, he was appointed commander of the forces stationed in the Peninsula and will fight the French until 1814 already in French territory. In Portugal, among other things we owe him the Torres lines that were a “wall” that kept Massena from conquering Lisbon.
Wellesley’s Command
I - Since he disembarked in Portugal, Wellesley knew for sure that the offensive élan, along with initiative, had to be by his side. As we have seen before, that did not happen only because Sir Harry Burrard did not allow. The Vimeiro fight is not a defensive operation by Wellesley, it is a protection operation to cover disembarkation and the dispositions were meant to carry out that mission. We do not think it would matter if another disposition had been better. What is important is the quick analysis of Wellesley about the uselessness of his disposition and the extraordinary capacity to change it timely to intervene, with success, in the fight.
The decision was up to Wellesley, but we must not forget his brigade commanders’ initiative, on their own decision they showed mental agility to guess the enemy’s moves and acted accordingly. What happened with Ackland’s and Anstruther's units to stand Kellermann is a happy example of what is demanding in current armies: the commander has to be clear in his intent explaining carefully the mission’s purpose to his subordinate commanders, in the absence of orders and before changes in the fight, they are to act in order to fulfil the mission’s purpose. II - Smart use of the terrain and line formation. The organisation of the British infantry units in line, opposite from the column formation by the French ones turned out to be the key element not only in Vimeiro but as well as in other peninsular fights. To make it simple the matter can be summarized like this; the column is essentially an offensive formation whose main characteristic is velocity, the enormous moral effect to who is inside of the formation and the terrifying effect to who sees its approach. However it lacks firepower. On the other hand, the line formation is essentially a defensive formation and its value rests on the
fire ability. The line extension itself allows the ends to make fire to the flanks of a column, that is a deadly combination. On a normal situation the normal weapon ratio firing in a line is 900 against 200 in a column. The right combination between the line formation and the adequate use of terrain allows even more this type of formation. By keeping from the enemies sight, on the reverse slope, the main lines, and bringing forward a mere line of skirmishers we invite the enemy to charge from a distance, but when they approach and realise the truth it is too late to withdraw. The mass fire is then devastating.
As mentioned in the Roliça article (FE69), the Portuguese army was far from being a reliable and dependable ally in hard fought engagements. [13]
At both Roliça and Vimeiro the Portuguese infantry did not actually engage the enemy, only the cavalry did so. If at Roliça there were doubts about the Portuguese cavalry's commitment, they were confirmed at Vimeiro. Here, all reports indicate that the majority of the Portuguese cavalry avoided charging Kellermann's grenadiers, and even withdrew. General Beresford with his organisational and disciplinary capabilities, together with a cadre of British officers, and the progressive determination and courage of the Portuguese soldiers, would make the Portuguese army rise as a reliable military force as soon as 1810.
With the Cintra Convention the French had to leave Portugal, thus achieving a conclusion to operations in Portugal. To that end, Roliça and Vimeiro had been enough, along with the persuading power of many reinforcements already approaching the Portuguese coast. If it is for sure that the Cintra Convention spared the French effectives and their equipment, the truth is that the same happened with the British. It also allowed further British troops to make the Portuguese beaches in safety. After reading the Convention articles, one wonders who actually won the battle.
[14]
A positive aspect of the Cintra Convention, looking to this campaign as a whole, is that the end-state to Portugal was achieved without having the need to destroy the enemy army (and subsequent
partial destruction of the Anglo-Portuguese army) but by the lack of will from the French to fight, or at least from their Generals.
So, why not take them back by sea to France?
[1] César, Victoriano, Military History Studies, Typ of the Cooperativa Militar, Lisbon, 1903, p. 109
Battle of Vimeiro 21 August 1808
|
When the revolutionary wars began, Junot was a law student. Already as a volunteer he was injured in 1792 and 1793. It is in Toulon, as sergeant, that he captures Napoleon attention. Under fire, he wrote a note from the lips of Napoleon, and they were being so closely fired at that the sand was all over the paper, and Junot shall have said: “well, shall have no need of sand” (one assumes to blot the ink).