Battle of Stockach
25 March 1799
Part 2

Comments on the Battle

by Roland Kessinger, Germany

Jourdan is usually criticised on two points:

Stockach around 1800

First, he split his forces in close proximity to the Austrians to launch a tactical “maneuvre sur les derrieres” into the Austrian rear, when with hindsight, it would have been better to keep Soult and St. Cyr together to attack the Austrians through the Graue Wald. However, Jourdan believed that the Archduke had significantly fewer troops than in reality.

The second criticism is more damaging: It seems that Jourdan did not direct the battle from a central point, joining Soult’s advance during the late afternoon. Throughout the whole battle, he seemed to be unaware of events on his right wing (Souham and Ferino), so he was never in control of the battle. Reports from the right would have soon demonstrated to him that the Austrians were stronger than expected.

St. Cyr’s march into the Austrian rear was a complete failure and the Archduke was unconcerned by the attempt to attack his army from the rear. Jourdan ought to have sent the 3rd Division and Soult from Liptingen towards Stockach, thereby probably halting the Austrian counterattack. Once again, the key factor here was that Jourdan underestimated the strength of Charles’ forces, so his battle plan was wrong right from the start. Numbers probably dictated that Charles would probably win anyway.

Nevertheless, the Archduke has also been criticised. The key point usually raised is that he did not concentrate his attack with superior forces, but allow Jourdan to attack him first. The outcome of the battle was not impressive for Charles – the Austrians had ultimately defeated the French, but at a cost nearly 60% more losses. However, it is necessary to consider the situation at the start of the battle - Charles must have known that he enjoyed a large margin of superiority and his situation was not that different from Ostrach, albeit only a small part of his own force had been engaged there, and Jourdan had withdrawn quickly. It is thus rather ironic that Clausewitz chose to criticise Charles for “lacking enterprise and the hunger for victory”, maintaining that while Charles often displayed good tactical judgement, he had a false conception of strategy, “He takes the means for the end-aim and the end-aim for the means” alleging that Charles focused on “the occupation of certain points and areas, but these cannot ever be anything but a means of the enemy”.

Clausewitz had fundamentally failed to understand the strategy Charles was pursuing, which was based on the conquest of the vital sector, Switzerland. The Archduke only ever intended to force Jourdan back over the Rhine, before he executed his own move into central Switzerland from the north and right into Massena’s “derriere”, a key component of which was trying to keep initial losses to a minimum. It was never Charles’ intention to “destroy” Jourdan’s weak force (many French troops were in the Rhine fortresses) as this would have diverted him from his primary objective, but Jourdan certainly had to be driven from Germany as the precondition.

Until 23rd March, the French seemed to be doing precisely this, but on the 24th, they appeared to halt, which must have come as something of a surprise to Charles. The position Jourdan chose – a semi-circle from Singen through Engen to Tuttlingen – was no defensive position, so Charles first needed to find out what was going on and.took two measures: First, he ordered a reconnaissance in force from Aach towards Engen where the French army was concentrated, adding Reserve Division units to the Advance-Guard, as was often Austrian practice. Secondly, he reinforced GM Merveldt and ordered him to push St. Cyr over the Danube to separate his division from the rest of the French army. It is clear from these measures that Charles must have quite reasonably thought that Jourdan knew about his numerical inferiority and would take up his retreat again after a few clashes. The usual criticism that he did not mount an attack with the whole army would only be accurate, if Charles had wanted to “destroy” Jourdan and believed that his opponent would remain in his position, but clearly he was not contemplating either. Nevertheless, Charles was completely surprised by the massive French attack, which was an option he had not considered.

As a result, he had left a gap of several kilometres between his right wing and his advance guard under GM Merveldt. It was precisely Merveldt, who took the brunt of the French assault, (luckily for Jourdan, who probably did not know it was the Austrians’ weakest point) and the commander of the right wing, FZM Wallis, could not send reinforcements towards Liptingen in time. The possibility of Jourdan attacking would have seemed unreasonable to Charles who knew his own superior-ity, but the initial strike had come against his most exposed sector. In the face of this concentrated assault, Charles kept his head and shifted his reserves to the critical position, using his Grenadiers to fill the gaps on his right and decide the battle, supported by the superior Austrian heavy cavalry. Although numbered as one of his great victories, Stockach was largely decided by numbers, but it was one entirely in line with his strategy: Jourdan had to withdraw to France and Charles could advance into Switzerland.

Austrian Command and Control

The French Army organisation during the battle was very static. Nearly all the troops stayed with their divisions and all officers commanded the same units throughout, the only exception being 8e DB sent back from the 3rd Division to help Soult. On the other hand and contrary to the received wisdom, the Austrian command structure was much more dynamic. Early in the morning, 11. Latour Light Dragoons were ordered to move from the Reserve to a specific point with the Advance-Guard and was placed under the direction of FML Nauendorf, commander of the Advance-Guard. IR2 was likewise moved in the early morning from Kollowrat’s Reserve to the Advance-Guard, where it came under the orders of GM Gyulai.

On the other side of the battlefield, FML Alex Württemberg’s cavalry brigade was spilt – four squadrons of 11. Kurassier reinforced the infantry of FML Baillet-Latour and the rest, including Württemburg himself, went to the opposite wing as there was no need for any more cavalry in that terrain.

The biggest changes occurred on the Austrian right wing, which was under heavy pressure. As early as March 24th, GM Kempf’s brigade was transferred from FML Petrasch to GM Merveldt and during that night, the Archduke recalled GM Kempf with IR1 and exchanged them for IR 42 from FML Furstenberg’s Division. After the French had broken GM Merveldt’s advance guard, FML Furstenberg organised the counter attack with Petrasch’s IR1 and IR31, while Petrasch himself was ordered to form a defensive line with IRs 49 and 21, the former unit being originally in his Division and the latter under Furstenberg.

When FML Furstenberg was killed, GM Stipsitz and FML Anhalt-Köthen could quickly take command of his Division. It is thus clear that the Austrian command was much more flexible than the French, the Austrians rear-ranging their troops and commanders as necessary. Consequently, they were able to react specifically as the battle unfolded. Although this might have caused confusion, there is no sign of it in the battle or reports.

Aftermath

After the severe fighting, Jourdan knew that with no reserves left and the Archduke having a significant reserve, he would have to retreat. This did not stop him writing a report to Paris of his “great victory”, news of which appeared a few days later in “Le Moniteur”. Anxious that FML Sztaray’s force, marching from Ulm to Sigmaringen, might get behind them, St. Cyr and Vandamme crossed the Danube near Sigmaringen on March 26th. However, it was soon clear that only some weak cavalry patrols were east of Sigmaringen, so they could continue their retreat towards Rottweil and the Black Forest without further danger.

Soult’s advance guard Division, still near Liptingen, the retreat would be more difficult as they were still in contact with large Austrian forces. Around 4 a.m. on March 26th outposts of 25e Legere came under attack around Liptingen and Mortier ordered a retreat towards Tuttlingen, 25e Legere reforming behind Liptingen and forming Soult’s rearguard with 5e Hussars. There was also a brief exchange of artillery fire around Liptingen as the Division marched along the Liptingen-Tuttlingen road through the defile and the forest towards Tuttlingen, where the Division crossed the Danube. From there, Soult continued his retreat towards Rottweil.

On March 27th, there was a small clash between 6. Coburg Light Dragoons under GM O’Reilly and the rearguard under Mortier near Tuttlingen, but Charles did not press any pursuit in this sector. Overnight on 25/26th March, French communications fell apart. Jourdan had been unaware of events on his right during the battle, but on the following day, the commanders in that sector were unaware of the defeat of the left wing and renewed their attack. Souham’s 2nd Division attacked Nenzingen at 6 a.m. on March 26th with Decaen’s brigade. Thirty minutes later, Souham was ordered to retreat towards Geisingen on the Danube, which he had to execute with GM Kienmayer’s brigade pursuing him. There was a clash between 6e Hussars and 10. Meszaros Hussars, before around noon, 2nd Division took a position near Engen to cover Ferino’s left, which was still in contact with the Austrians near Wahlwies.

At 3 a.m. on March 27th, 2nd Division continued its retreat and moved in columns towards Geisingen, having sustained 8 dead and 9 wounded during the 26th. Finally, Ferino’s 1st Division had attacked Wahlwies again at 5 a.m. on the 26th, as their commander believed rightly that it was the key weakpoint in the Austrian left wing, but he was again repulsed by FML Reuss with IR29. By noon, the French left brigade under Jacopin was defending the Rossberg between Wahlwies and Steisslingen, while the right brigade under Tharreau pushed back an Austrian attack column, before attempting to attack the extreme Austrian left, although it was unable to push back the Austrian troops guarding the Radolfzell-Stahringen road.

In his advanced position, Ferino had been left exposed by the retreat of the rest of the French army,so at 8 p.m., he started to move westwards, led by 102e DB from Jacopin’s brigade at the head of the column. The 1st division marched via Singen and Hilzingen to Loffingen, where it arrived shortly before midnight on March 27th, while at the same time, Ruby’s brigade (originally part of Massena’s army), marched to Constance where it crossed the Rhine back to Switzerland. Charles only sent some light troops to pursue the French, aloowing Jourdan time to reorganise his army. On March 28th, the 1st Division was near Neustadt covering the Höllental towards Freiburg/Breisach, while the rest of the French army prepared to retreat through the Kinzig valley towards Strassbourg.

The French army was demoralised and inevitably, several senior officers began to blame each other for the defeat. On April 2nd, Souham resigned his command which passed to Decaen, and on the following day, Jourdan left his army and returned to France, leaving his former chief of staff, Ernouf, to lead the beaten Army of the Danube back over the Rhine, a crossing at Strasbourg and Breisach, which was largely complete by April 5th. This rapid withdrawal was not due to Austrian pressure – on the contrary, the defeats in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol led Vienna to order Charles to withdraw his army eastwards. However, as he started and some units were already back on the northern shore of Lake Constance, further news arrived of FML Paul von Kray’s victories in NE Italy arrived and Charles was permitted to remain in position. In fact, Ernouf had pulled back quickly as everyone realised that Switzerland would be the next Austrian strategic target.

The remnants of the Army of the Danube were sent immediately to Switzerland, where they joined Massena and were posted along the upper Rhine between Lake Constance and Basle. Much to French surprise, the attack did not materialise. Charles was ready to move and pressed for an attack into Switzerland, but after lengthy arguments with Vienna, which led to a spell of illness for the Archduke, the Emperor wrote on 4th May: “(You) are to abandon, for reasons of which you are well aware, all enterprises, which might entangle you in Switzerland”.

It was only after the episode of the Rastatt murders, that Charles decided he had to act at the end of May and cross the Rhine into Switzerland. It was already too late sa Massena had withdrawn to Zurich and Charles couold not drop into the French rear. Instead after a frontal attack on the Zurichberg Charles was able to push back Massena behind the Limmat River in the First Battle of Zurich (3rd - 6th June), before the fighting faded away over the summer. Later, the Russians under General Korsakov would take over the Swiss sector near Zurich and Charles marched north to defeat the French once more at Mannheim on 18th September. A few days later, Massena destroyed the Russians in the Second Battle of Zurich (25th - 26th September), his victory nullifying the effects of Charles’ own successes at both Stockach and Mannheim.

Over the winter of 1799/1800, new personalities appeared on the scene. In France, Napoleon Bonaparte seized political power in a coup d’etat, FZM Kray replaced an unwell Charles in March 1800 in Germany. The Archduke could only watch from the sidelines as the War of the Second Coalition ended with a French victory in 1801.

Battle of Stockach: Part 2 25 March 1799

More Battle of Stockach: Part 1 25 March 1799

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