Battle of Stockach
25 March 1799
Part 1

March 25th First Clashes

by Roland Kessinger, Germany

First Clashes in the South

Early in the morning of March 25th, around 5 a.m., the French troops started their attack. Approximately one hour earlier, around 4 a.m., the Austrians on the other side had already prepared to march off from their camps. Near Lake Constance, Ruby’s brigade encountered Oberstlt. Wiedersberg’s troops and as the day progressed, Ruby was able to push the Austrian advance guard back near Espasingen, (close to the main body). This village was guarded by IR22 Lacy, who had been reinforced in the early hours by four squadrons of 11. Ansbach Kurassier despatched by FML Alexander Württemberg. With his other regiment (2. Franz Herzog von Modena) Württemburg was to cover the Austrian rear northwest of Stockach The Austrian force around Espansingen did not suffer any casualties that day, so Ruby cannot have nearby hills and probably advanced no further than Stahringen.

In contrast, Ferino with 1 st Division was more aggressive. His right brigade under Tharreau moved from Singen to attack GM Schwarzenberg near Friedingen, but this Austrian brigade had been reinforced by IR3 Erzherzog Karl and withdstood the initial French pressure until Schwarzenberg realised that the left brigade of Ferino’s division had already reached the small village of Wiechs near Steisslingen on his right. A further French advance here would cut Schwarzenberg off from the main Austrian army.

French skirmishers were already in a forest behind a hill, where the Austrian commander had positioned his light artillery. When he realised the danger, Schwarzenberg had already received the order to send the three battalions of IR3 back to the main body, as the whole army had come under attack during the morning, so around noon, Schwarzenberg opted for a general withdrawal, but it was difficult as his rearguard troops remained constantly engaged with the French, the 2. Motschlitz Uhlans taking the brunt of the significant losses. The main response was effective canister fire from its artillery, enabling GM Schwarzenberg to withdraw his light troops along the Steisslingen-Stockach road through the defile near Orsingen to Nenzingen by 3 p.m.

In the north, Ferino’s left brigade under Jacopin had attacked the Austrians from Muhlhausen. His brigade (mainly 102e DB) crossed the Aach stream near Volkertshausen and encountered 1st Battalion IR2 Erzherzog Ferdinand in a forest between Langenstein Castle and Wiechs. This Austrian battalion had been sent forward from its position near Eigeltingen to support the advance of FML Nauendorf’s advance guard troops near Aach and to clear the forest southwest of Langenstein Castle of French troops, but instead found most of its men were captured by the 102e. In all, IR2 641 men, of which 413 were captured. Only one company guarding the battalion guns and some stragglers fought their way through to Aach.

When GM Schwarzenberg reached Nenzingen, he reformed his men on the flat ground in front of the village and an indecisive cannonade followed until Ferino decided to attack the forest along the Stockach-Aach road. However, it took three French assaults until the Austrians were evicted from the forest and they were still able to reform behind Nenzingen around 3 p.m..

The Nenzingen-Wahlwies-Espasingen Area

In the meantime, the new commander of the Austrian left wing, FML Staader, had reorganised his troops. After the Grenadiers (originally in the Reserve) had been sent to the right wing, the Nellenburg hill was garrisoned with a battalion IR7 C. Schroder and a battalion of 12. Deutsch-Banater Grenzer with their battalion guns from FML Baillet Latour’s Division. The two other battalions of IR7 and 12. Kinsky Light Dragoons (from the Reserve) were sent behind a small hill, so that they could easily reach either the Nellenburg Hill or the so-called Zollbrucke - a strategically important bridge over the Stockacher Aach River.

Additional battalion guns were moved on to the Nellenburg Hill. These troops were reinforced with the Rubinitz Light Battalion (GM Schwqarzenberg) and the Radivojevich Light Battalion (GM Paicek), who were to defend the Zollbrucke. GM Schwarzenberg’s cavalry was held in reserve and didn’t see any action for the rest of the day.

The other key position on the Austrian left wing was Wahlwies, defended by FML Reuss’ Division. IR 29 O. Wallis and two companies (one division) of IR3 Erzherzog Karl were around the village, probably supported by the remainder of IR 3, although theyw ould take no further part in the battle. The Grenzer Scharfschutzen (Sharpshooters) also reinforced the positions around Wahlwies. Staader’s wing was anchored by Oberstlt. Wiedersberg’s detachment near Espasingen, (IR42 Erbach, four squadrons 11. Ansbach Kurassier and 1 company of Tyrolean Jaeger) with therest around the village. FML Mels-Colloredo’s cavalry Division was held in reserve behind the infantry, but the broken ground between the Nellenburg hill and Espasingen prevented its employment in the subsequent fighting.

This excellent defensive position guarded by the Austrian left that afternoon would be a hard target for Ferino, whose Division now faced the Austrian left in a line running from Nenzingen to Wahlwies. Under Jourdan’s plan, Ferino would be joined by Souoham’s 2 nd Division at Nenzingen before advancing on Stockach, but Souham never arrived, leaving Ferino inactive until late afternoon.

The French commander had too few troops to assault the Austrian positions on the Nellenburg Hill -- just a small cavalry moved through Nenzingen around 4 p.m., but was stopped by the fire of Austrian artillery under Oberst Schuhag on the hill. FML Staader would not ahev to face any more French attacks. Neither FML Baillet-Latour’s division nor 12. Kinsky Light Dragoons defending the Nellenburg Hill suffered any losses.

The fighting around Wahlwies was more ferocious. With no sign of Souham, Ferino concentrated his men in an attack on this village around 4 p.m., the French troops started to attack Wahlwies. They reached the Stockacher Aach stream, which flowed through the middle of the village and there was a prolonged action and street fighting at thepoint of the bayonet until 9.30 p.m., but IR29 O. Wallis and two companies of IR3 Erzherzog Karl together with the Grenzer Scharfschuetzen were able to stop the French from crossing the river.

Eventually, Ferino’s troops had to withdraw, overwhelmed by the superior weight of Austrian musketry and artillery. The many dead from both sides were buried in the Wahlwies cemetery and around the village during the following days. While the fighting raged around Wahlwies, Tharreau sent some units off to the right in an attempt to outflank the Austrian position and reach the Radolfzell-Stockach road, but the move failed. These attacks were the last mounted by the 1 st Division on March 25 th . Halted at all points, the Division had to camp in the open field in front of the marsh around Wiechs after the battle along a line between Steisslingen and Orsingen, while the Austrians held their positions were able to hold their positions along the chain of hills between the Nellenburg hill, Wahlwies and Espasingen.

Ferino had done well, pushing back the Austrian advance guard under GM Schwarzenberg with significant losses, although only 2. Uhlans lost more that 100 men (mentioned in a private letter by Oberstlt. Liechtenstein, its commander, of March 27 th ). Albeit many must have been briefly "missing" as only 48 dead, wounded and prisoners feature in the official report. Furthermore, it was Ferino’s troops, who captured most of 1st battalion of IR2.

Once GM Schwarzenberg’s advance guard had joined the Line infantry units between the Nellenburg Hill and Espasingen, Ferino could do little without Souham, who had been halted by FML Nauendorf between Aach and Eigeltingen, and his late attacks had little chance against the numerically superior Austrians, although the French comamnder’s efforts had pinned down some of Charles’ best troops. Two regiments on the Austrian left wing (IR7 C. Schroeder, IR 22 Lacy) saw no action, while Austrian right was embroiled in fierce fighting all day.

However, the distances were such that these troops could not have been shifted to the right and facing superior numbers, Ferino could not abandon his own position. His initial weak attacks on Nenzingen with cavalry were followed by a concentration of his men that afternoon around Wahlwies. He heard nothing from Souham, who could not get beyond Aach and so, Ferino could only probe for the weak point, which he had identified at Wahlwies. Even here, Ferino knew there were more Austrians to his right, so he had to despatch troops further to the southeast, weakening his main force still further.

Souham against Nauendorf

At 2 a.m., the right brigade of GB Decaen had formed up and marched east of Engen. The 83e DB had already had spent the night in the Wasserburger Tal (Wasserburg Valley), when it was joined by the rest of its brigade (2e DB) and the combined force then prepared to attack Aach, which was held by a weak detachment of the Austrian advance guard.

Two companies of 2e DB were marching along the higher ground on the left (northern) side of the Engen-Aach road while one company was moving forward along the hills on the right side. The rest of the battalion followed the road with the other battalion of 2e DB forming the second line. In the early morning, Decaen stormed the Aach position – there were two separate communities at that time (Nowadays united into one large town) -- Aach town on top of a steep hill overlooking the important Stockach-Engen road; Aach village was in the valley along the Aach River.

The French had the town and later, 2nd Battalion of 2e DB moved down to the village. From there, it marched along the road to Stockach for several some kilometres, but could not push further east, as in the interim, GM Gyulai had been reinforced with IR3 Erzherzog Karl from the Reserve -- originally, it had been sent to FML Nauendorf’s advance-guard to reinforce the planned reconnaissance from Aach towards Engen, but that had been halted by Souham’s attack.

Initially, the Austrians had been surprised by this move - Charles was on his way from his headquarter at Stockach to Aach when he was informed about the general French attack. However, as the initial shock faded, the Austrians filled the gaps from their Reserve. IR2 was pushed forward, losing most of its 1st Battalion (as mentioned above). At the same time the 2nd battalion of IR 2 was sent from Eigeltingen along the main road towards Aach to reinforce the Austrian light troops and IR 12 Manfredini in that area. Once they arrived, GM Gyulai could mount his counterattack on the two Aach settlements and drove the French back west to a small wood forest and some vineyards, around which both sides halted.

Approximately two hours after the Austrians had regained Aach, GD Souham gave the order for his own counterattack around 10 a.m. An hour later, Charles who was still near Aach was informed that his right wing near Liptingen had been completely shattered, exposing his army to being outflanked from the north. The Archduke immediately ordered all his advance units to fall back on the main line of the army.

In the south, GM Schwarzenberg had to retreat to Nenzingen and Wahlwies, while FML Nauendorf was to send most of his troops (GM Gyulai and GM Kienmayer) from the Aach area through the Espebachtal (Valley of the Espebach) to reinforce the army right wing near Mahlspuren. The remainder of Nauendorf’s troops (IR 2 and the 11. Latour Light Dragoons from the Reserve) were to protect this movement by blocking the defile, through which the Stockach-Engen road ran from Aach village towards Eigeltingen. If they were not able to hold their position, these Austrian troops were to go back to the main army near the Nellenburg hill.

Charles’ order for a slow retreat coincided with Souham’s renewed assault on Aach. Towards noon, some companies of the 83e DB were moving forward to storm the hills either side of Aach town. While Goullus attacked Aach town from the north, Decaen was to outflank the Austrians from the south with 6 other companies (probably 7e DB), two light guns and a squadron of 1er Dragoons. He followed a small track though the forest from Muhlhausen to Aach village, but before he could engage the Austrians, they had begun their retreat.

The 6e Dragoons of Goullus’ brigade, which were already at Aach town on top of the hill didn’t move down into the village, allowing the Austrians to escape. Lacking enough cavalry for a pursuit, some of Goullus’ units appear to have followed Nauendorf’s men towards Mahlspuren from the north side of Aach, but half-heartedly. Gyulai and Kienmayer were able to reach their new position near Raithaslach and Mahlspuren in the afternoon without any disruption. IR12 Manfredini in particular had been heavily engaged there in fighting between the Austrian right and French troops marching in from the Liptingen-Neuhausen area.

GB Decaen made a more determined pursuit, but Souham’s Division was not going to achieve its objective of joining Ferino at Nenzingen as it was halted in a series of clashes around Langenstein Castle between Aach and Eigeltingen by an Austrian force primarily composed of two battalions of IR 2 and 11. Latour Light Dragoons. Early that morning, the 11. Dragoons had been sent from near Schweingruben on the Stockach-Liptingen road to the area around of Wiechs, where in accordance with an order of the 24th, they were to reinforce the advance guard. However, en route during the morning, they realised that the French ha d beaten them to it.

As they approached Wiechs, GM Hessen-Homburg (the brigade commander, but with just 11. Dragoons and two guns) saw a large French force and decided to return to a hill in the forest near Langenstein Castle.

When the first French troops (presumably 7e DB) marching from Aach reached Langenstein Castle, they were met by a hail of musketry and canister. Fighting mostly on foot, the Dragoons captured 1 officer and 30 men from 7e DB and halted the French with extra support from two Jäger companies, despite the French being reinforced with 1er Dragoons, until the last Austrian troops had passed through the defile.

Together with 11. Dragoons, the two remaining battalions of IR 2, who were on their way from Aach to the Nellenburg hill, formed the rearguard as the Austrians withdrew through the defile. At Langenstein Castle, 11. Latour Light Dragoons were also covering the left flank of GM Schwarzenberg’s column as it fell back from Steisslingen through Orsingen to the main army at Nenzingen, (which they reached around 3 p.m). Around 3 p.m., GM Hessen-Homburg was ordered by FML Nauendorf to return to the Nellenburg hill, although there would be no more fighting around here. Throughout the day, 11. Latour Light Dragoons lost 4 dead, 14 wounded and 6 prisoners.

After the Austrian dragoons had retreated, GB Decaen continued his advance to Eigeltingen, so that he was in line with Ferino’s 1 st Division, but he could go no further. Ahead of him were strong Austrian cavalry units along the Eigeltingen-Stockach road. Souham despatched two horse guns to 1er Dragoons on the left of Eigeltingen, but nothing serious was attempted. 1er Dragoons seemed to have pushed a little bit further towards the Zollbrucke, until halted by Austrian artillery under Oberst Schuhag.

During the night both sides stayed in their position between Eigeltingen and Nenzingen. The right brigade of the 2nd division was positioned towards Nenzingen in front of Eigeltingen and the left brigade behind the village. During the night, Decaen contacted GD Ferino, who had his headquarters in the hills west of Orsingen. Ferino responded that he was not able to achieve anything against the Austrian position in front of Stockach. He was especially concerned about his right wing as the Austrians seemed to be planning to break through Bodman along the Stahringen-Radolfzell road, although he had sent GB Tharreau to forestall this move. In this sector of the battlefield, losses had been severe on both sides: 2e DB lost 230 dead and wounded plus 89 prisoners.

Despite these heavy losses, the few French troops had never constituted a threat to the Austrians in the Aach-Eigeltingen area, despite the initial success of the early morning, as Austrian reinforcements had halted any further advance. The battle would be decided on the Austrian right in the north -- after the initial withdrawal, Charles had reinforced his right, while those left in this sector could contain the French and halt Souham’s advance, leaving Ferino isolated at Stockach.

It is widely believed that broken ground favoured French tactics, but around Aach, it is clear the Austrians were a match for them, where numbers were similar. Dragoons were also fighting on foot (as they would also do at Turbigo in Italy in the following year), so that is not an exclusively French tactic.

Although the conjunction of the French 1st and 2nd Division had been prevented and a southern outflanking move halted, the French move in the north would be far more successful. .

The Destruction of Merveldt’s Troops

During the early morning, Jourdan had sent forward the advance guard and Reserve Divisions from their camps towards Emmingen ob Eck. The advance guard under Soult set off at around 2 a.m. from north of Engen, while the Reserve moved off a little later around 3 a.m. from the hills near Immendingen to advance through Hattingen towards Emmingen ob Eck.

The Austrian commander, GM Merveldt, was not aware of these movements, as the French troops in front of him - St. Cyr -- had remained inactive in the forest near the Liptingen-Tuttlingen road. During the night, Merveldt had received orders to attack St. Cyr’s right around Liptingen, garrisoned with just a weak French outpost, driving on through there westwards to the dominating Wittoh hill and the open ground to its northwest. The effect would then be to separate St. Cyr from the rest of the French army, forcing St. Cyr to retreat.

Once close to Emmingen, GM Merveldt could use his cavalry, as in frontal assault along the Liptingen-Stockach road into the forest and the defile, his cavalry would be unuseable. Around 3 a.m., Merveldt ordered Oberstlt. Westenroth to attack Emmingen with two companies Wurmser Freikorps and a half-squadron of 1. Merveldt Uhlans to cover the Austrian deployment out of the forest between Liptingen and Emmingen. Around 5 a.m., Westenroth evicted the French from Emmingen and Merveldt sent 3 more squadrons of 1. Uhlans under Major Brochovzky forward to reinforce Westenroth in the open ground around the village.

The 1. Majors-Division (5th/6th sqdns) of this regiment would follow. At the same time, GM Merveldt asked GM Kempf to move IR1 Kaiser from the forest between Liptingen and Emmingen towards the latter village, as further reinforcement in the shape of IR42 Erbach had not arrived from the main body. Kempf agreed, as he ahd not yet received the order to send IR1 back to the main body.

Merveldt’s plan was now to occupy the Wittoh hill with IR1 until IR42 arrived, when GM Merveldt would advance further west. While IR1 advanced towards Emmingen, 1st Battalion 13. Wallach-Illyrian Grenzer was ordered to take position at a gorge north of the Liptingen-Emmingen road and to advance to the western edge of the forest to cover IR1’s advance The last two squadrons of 1. Uhlans were also sent by Merveldt to Emmingen, replaced on the Liptingen-Tuttlingen road by 3 squadrons of 1. Kaiser Hussars. The remainder of the Wurmser Freikorps (9 companioes) were also sent to garrison Emmingen.

Returning to Emmingen, Mervldt realised that the French had pre-empted him and two French cavalry regiments were already on the open ground west of Emmingen while 3 battalions (presumably 25e legere) appeared near the Wittoh hill. GM Merveldt immediately ordered four squadrons of 1. Uhlans to attack and they pushed the French back to the Wittoh hill, but the Austrians could now see the whole French left wing heading for them.

It was obvious to Merveldt that he could not take on these superior forces and so, he ordered a general retreat of the advance guard back on the position of the main army near Mahlspuren. GM Kempf was directed to send IR1 back through the forest to Liptingen where it would take up a defensive position with IR 42, which had now arrived at Liptingen, and then fall back on Stockach. IR 31 Benjowsky would cover the right flank, while Merveldt formed the rear guard with his cavalry (1. Merveldt Uhlans, 1. Kaiser Hussars) and light troops (Wallach-Illyrian battalion, Wurmser Freikorps) to halt the French around Liptingen for as long as possible.

Then, a mixed force would go to Schwandorf to cover the Austrian right, while the remainder of the rear guard would cover the retreat towards Stockach. Unfortunately for Merveldt, events did not go to plan. The first French troops (25e legere) had driven the Wurmser Freikorps companies out of Emmingen. At the same time, Chef d’escadron Luis Michel Sahuc of 1er Chasseurs a Cheval with his 3 squadrons attacked the Austrian uhlans, inflicting more than 30 losses, while Sahuc was wounded by a lance, his place in command being taken by Chef d’escadron Dubois-Crance. The scattered Austrian Freikorps soldiers encountered IR1 in the forest between Emmingen and Liptingen and a general panic seems to have taken hold amongst the Austrian infantry as IR 1 came tumbling out of the forest in total disorder.

Meanwhile, General de Brigade Mortier had advanced with 25e legere south of the forest and broke through to Liptingen, while 53e and 67e DB under GB Laval advanced in 4 columns along the Emmingen-Liptingen road.

Nevertheless, the Austrian cavalry had been ordered to help to reform the infantry east of Liptingen on the road towards Stockach behind IR 42, but when these infantry saw the muddled mob of IR 1 and Wurmser Freikorps, they panicked too and the cavalry could do nothing. At the same time, 1st battalion 13. Wallach-Illyrian Grenzer Regiment emerged from the forest between Emmingen and Liptingen in good order, but by the time it reached Liptingen, its officers could no longer keep it together.

Only the cavalry seem to have covered the retreat in good order. When the French advance guard infantry had reached Liptingen, it was to wait for the cavalry and artillery following through the forest, but this allowed the Austrians time to reform.

At that same time, General de Division Vandamme had commenced his attack on GM Merveldt’s right near Neuhausen ob Eck. 1er legere had advanced from Fridingen on the Danube during the early morning along the road to Neuhausen ob Eck, so there were now two French columns under GB Soult on the left and GD Vandamme on the right converging on GM Merveldt’s troops. In the centre of the French force, St. Cyr had been inactive with his 3 rd Division throughout the early morning to give a false impression to the Austrian outposts, while Soult and Vandamme reached their position.

After GM Merveldt had sent nearly his entire infantry towards Emmingen, there was only IR31 along the Tuttlingen-Liptingen road and some light troops on the outposts facing St. Cyr. With the two columns up, St. Cyr could advance too. His left brigade under GB Walther (108e DB and 2e Dragoons) moved forward along the Tuttlingen-Liptingen road, but emerging from the forest northwest of Liptingen, it ran into a hail of canister fire, which quickly dismounted Walther’s guns. In response, the French commander sent forward his 2nd Dragoons, who clashed with Austrian cavalry and, as the pressure from the other two columns increased, the Austrians fell back. IR 31 was now the only infantry regiment that had not lost its cohesion and its Oberst (Colonel) was ordered to withdraw from his position northwest of Liptingen towards Neuhaus, a single house at the Liptingen-Stockach road.

Archduke Charles went up with the Grenadiers to see the situation on the right wing. As they emerged from the forest, they are said to have refused to advance further if Charles went with them and came under enemy fire.

The 2nd battalion was positioned south of the main road on the small Homburg hill, just southwest of Neuhaus together with three squadrons of 1. Kaiser Hussars and their Cavalry Artillery battery, but they immediately came under attack from 25e legere. The other battalion (1st) of IR 31 took up a position on the edge of the large "Graue Wald" forest north of the road near Neuhaus, where it easily drove off some skirmishers. Nevertheless, the pressure on the Austrian rear guard increased. The remaining hussars and uhlans had to stand under a hail of canister and howitzer fire in front of Neuhaus, but held their order as they covered the retreat. 1st battalion of IR 31 was then attacked in the front and rear by Vandamme’s 1er legere north of Neuhaus, who captured most of them after a lengthy struggle.

From here, French skirmishers could threaten the flank and rear of the Austrian cavalry near Neuhaus. French skirmishers also picked off many gunners from the Cavalry artillery battery, forcing it to abandon its position on the Homburg hill and escape along the main Liptingen-Stockach road, although the two 7-pounder howitzers were captured, one having become bogged down in a swamp near Schwandorf.

Once they had lost the artillery support around 9 a.m., the Austrian cavalry, still under artillery fire itself and with skirmishers in its rear, could no longer hold its lines. As the skirmishers reached Neuhaus, GM Merveldt ordered a general retreat by his cavalry. A small detachment under Oberst Keglevich (presumably 1. Kaiser Hussars) was ordered to Schwandorf and then to follow the main road towards Messkirch.

The rest followed the infantry along the Liptingen-Stockach road. Although GM Merveldt and GM Kempf’s brigades had effectively disintegrated and fled towards Stockach, the French only followed at some distance, allowing GM Merveldt time to ride to Oberst Keglevich, who was now in position between Schwandorf and Krumbach, to observe the French column marching in that direction. GM Merveldt ordered Keglevich to retreat towards Messkirch, if he had to withdraw as the Oberst would subsequently do. GM Merveldt had suffered heavily that morning as both his flanks were struck by French columns.under Soult and Vandamme.

However, most of his troops never came into close contact with the enemy, aside from the rearguard cavalry. Many of the losses probably occurred around Emmingen ob Eck, when the Austrian troops panicked at the sight of the advancing French and a general muddle took hold as the Wurmser Freikorps became mixed with IR1 and the panic spread to IR 42 and the battalion of 13. Wallach-Illyrian Grenzer.

There is a report by the priest of Liptingen saying that there were many Austrian soldiers running through the village and throwing away their guns. Merveldt faced the prospect of his entire command disintegrating, but he was not the only one to get into trouble that day.

Jourdan’s Crucial Decision

After the advance-guard of the Austrian right had been scattered by his three Divisions, Jourdan made a crucial decision. Believing he had destroyed the entire Austrian right and that Charles had already sent reinforcements to the Tyrol, the French commander now took the view that unlike at Ostrach, the Archduke had no significant reserves.

So, Jourdan fatally split his forces: Soult would continue to pursue Merveldt along the Liptingen-Stockach main road; Vandamme would take 1er legere and 3 squadrons (presumably Chasseurs a Cheval and H hussars) alongside Soult’s left and head towards Schwandorf, Muhlingen and Krumbach to get into the Austrian rear. St Cyr’s troops which had not been heavily engaged so far (especially Legrand’s brigade, which was not involved in any fighting) were now given the longest line of march to cut the Austrian line of retreat by marching through Messkirch towards Pfullendorf.

The Reserve cavalry under GD d’Hautpoul remained on the open ground near Liptingen.

Around 10 a.m., Jourdan confirmed his orders to Soult, Vandamme and St. Cyr to continue their advances, but it was a fatal mistake. While St. Cyr would be far away from the battlefield with his fresh troops, Soult and Vandamme would have to face the entire Austrian right and part of its Reserve for the rest of the day. The outcome was only going to go one way.

More Battle of Stockach: Part 1 25 March 1799

Battle of Stockach: Part 2 25 March 1799

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #67
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2002 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com