Action at Sochocin
24 December 1806
The Action
by Robert Goetz, USA
 |
Colonel Sicard, aide de camp to Augereau, had conducted a reconnaissance in force of Sochocin on the morning of 23 December. Sicard’s force consisted of two battalions of infantry (one from 16th Légère and one from 14th Ligne) and 100 chasseurs from Milhaud’s brigade, along with two 4-pounders. At the approach of the French the Russian cavalry outposts withdrew to the bridgehead, alerting the force on the right bank. French reports give the strength of the Russian force on the right bank as about 300 men (perhaps as much as one battalion), a squadron of cavalry (hussars or Cossacks) and two guns. The remainder of the Russian force on the left bank went unnoticed by the French. The approach of Sicard’s party provoked an ex-change of fire in which four voltigeurs of 16th Légère were wounded and a handful of Russians also fell. Sicard, having determined that the Russians were present in force at Sochocin, withdrew and returned to Plonsk after pressing close enough to the bridge to determine that it had been recently rebuilt and was intact. Russian accounts claimed to have repulsed the French attempt to force a crossing, but this seems an exaggeration as the French were only conducting a reconnaissance. The report of the French activity at Sochocin combined with the French reconnaissance at Kolozab prompted Barclay to order all forces to the left bank and both bridges dismantled. Davydovskii used the woods, hills and hollows on the left bank to his best advantage, deploying a battalion (perhaps two) of jäger in open order along the river bank and positioning the remainder of his force out of site behind a patch of woods. The following morning around 4:00 AM, Heudelet’s division, with Durosnel’s cavalry brigade attached, had advanced from its position southwest of Plonsk to Plonsk itself. By 8:00 AM, Heudelet had begun his march on Sochocin, arriving in the vicinity of Sochocin around 11:00 AM. Amey with the three battalions of 7th Légère pressed on to the river while Sarrut remained in reserve with the five battalions of the 24th and 63rd Ligne. Observing the strength of the Russian position and the difficult approach to the bridge, Heudelet first attempted to find an alternative crossing. Heudelet’s scouts were unable to locate a nearby ford, however, and the general detached a party of infantry and cavalry under the command of Chef d’Escadron Massy to press further downstream in search of a crossing. Having failed to locate a means to turn the Russian position at the bridge, Heudelet sent a party forward to attempt to repair the bridge, but it was driven off by enemy fire. By around 12:30 PM, Heudelet decided to try forcing the bridge. Selecting the bravest officer of his staff, Commandant Martin, Heudelet assembled the carabineers of 7th légère to form a storming party, accompanied by a party of engineers who were to repair the bridge. A half battery was advanced to support Martin’s force and two battalions of 7th Légère were advanced to the banks of the river on either side of the bridge to provide fire support. A single 8-pounder loaded with grapeshot was assigned to the storming party to sweep away any Russian attempt to approach the far side of the bridge. Heudelet ordered the force to repair the bridge at all costs. Martin’s party dutifully advanced to the near end of the bridge and was met by a withering crossfire from the opposite bank. In the first few minutes under fire, Commandant Martin, the captain of engineers, the artillery officer commanding the 8-pounder and 20 carabineers were killed or wounded and the remnants of the force withdrew in disorder. The firing on both sides of the river remained intense. Davydovskii, in the process of writing a report to Barclay, took a bullet in the leg and later received an apparently superficial wound in the head. By around 1:30 PM Davydovskii received word of the French crossing at Kolozab and Barclay’s withdrawal. With this news came the order to withdraw on Nowemiasto, presumably after holding his position as long as he could safely do so. Ershov, his three battalions in the woods covering Davydovskii’s left, began falling back towards Sochocin shortly after 1:30, having lost contact with Barclay. Heudelet had received word of the French crossing at Kolozab at about the same time as Davydovskii. With the seizure of the bridge at Kolozab, Augereau ordered Desjardin’s first brigade (Lapisse) in pursuit of Barclay towards Nowemiasto while the second brigade (Lefranc) crossed the river and turned north to clear the Russian forces from Sochocin. Augereau sent orders for Sarrut’s brigade to cross at Kolozab behind Lefranc. Around the same time Massy reported that he had succeeded in getting two companies of infantry across the river at Gromadzyn, presumably as Ershov’s men withdrew to the north. Heudelet sent Sarrut off to Kolozab while Amey remained opposite Sochocin to maintain pressure on Davydovskii. With Amey’s forces reduced to firing futilely across the river, the focus of the action shifted to the woods south of Sochocin where Ershov’s Tenguinsk musketeers were deployed to cover Davydovskii’s left. The details of Ershov’s deployment are unclear, but it seems he positioned skirmishers in woods near the northern edge with the remainder of the regiment formed up just beyond the woods. Lefranc, advancing north through the woods with Colonel Habert’s 105th Ligne in the lead, made contact with the Russian infantry around 3:00 PM, and intense skirmishing broke out. The French pressed the Russian skirmishers back out of the woods and ran directly into the main body of Tenguinsk musketeers. Habert formed his regiment and advanced against Ershov, but the French faltered under the fire of the Russians. Seizing the moment, Ershov ordered a counterattack that drove the French back into the woods in disorder. Habert’s men reformed under cover of the woods and managed to hold firm against the Russian advance. By around 3:30 PM the 44th Ligne had joined Habert’s 105th and Lefranc made a second attempt to dislodge Ershov’s men. The second French attack made better progress and forced the Russians to give ground. The numbers now favoring the French, Ershov and Davydovskii determined that the time had come to withdraw. As the sun set, Ershov and Davydovskii withdrew towards Nowemiasto, joining Barclay there and then marching on Strzegoczin where Kamenskii had ordered the concentration of the Russian forces. Lefranc pursued the Russians a short distance until darkness forced him to break off the pursuit. With the withdrawal of Davydovskii’s forces, the remaining French forces opposite Sochocin were able to conduct their repairs of the bridge and cross to the left bank. Durosnel’s cavalry, 7th Légère and Lefranc’s brigade bivouacked near Sochocin while Sarrut’s brigade seems to have bivouacked near Kolozab having followed Lefranc’s regiments across the Wkra at that point. ConclusionsThe action at Sochocin differs from the actions at Kolozab and Borkowo in that the crossing of the Wkra at that point was essentially unsuccessful. The Russian forces at Sochocin were only forced to withdraw after the seizure of the position at Kolozab exposed their left flank. The success of the Russians in holding this position is due to the natural strength of the position, particularly the location
of the bridge, and the absence of any fords by which the position could be turned. Under the circumstances, the attempt to repair the bridge under fire does not seem to have been well thought out, but rather an act of frustration and desperation for lack of more positive action to take. Martin’s doomed attempt resulted only in unnecessary loss of life, and is similar in that regard to Colonel Savary’s storming of the bridge at Kolozab on the same day. Baron Marcellis de Marbot, then a colonel and Aide-de-Camp to Augereau, harshly condemns Heudelet’s attempt to storm the bridge, declaring that “I have always felt disgusted by this contempt of human life, which at times leads generals to sacrifice their men to their desire of seeing themselves mentioned in dispatches.” [3]
Commandant Lechatier is also severely critical of Heudelet in his history of the campaign, although unlike Marbot he is equally critical of Savary. However, in defense of Heudelet it should be pointed out that his orders were to take the bridge. There were few options open to him beyond a direct assault and the extent of the Russian forces opposed to him was largely concealed from view. Further, he did not know the situation at Kolozab until after the attempt had been made, a point that Marbot, with the benefit of hindsight, overlooks. The French losses were considerable given small force engaged and the short duration of the fighting. Heudelet reported 33 dead and 229 wounded, apparently all from 7th Légère and the artillery. These casualty figures are slightly more than those of 1st Division, which had suffered 33 dead and 223 wounded with all four regiments engaged at either Kolozab or Sochocin.
For the Russians, there is little to criticize. Davydovskii made the most of the position, concealing his troops skillfully and beating off all attempts to cross the river. In maintaining the position, he was ably assisted by Ershov who conducted a capable rearguard action against Lefranc, safeguarding Davydovskii’s flank until near dusk. Russian casualties are not stated, although they included Davydovskii himself, but were certainly much lighter than those incurred by 7th Légère and probably no heavier proportionally than those suffered by Lefranc’s battalions. The overall strategic significance of the action for the Russians, however, was bad. With the bridge at Sochocin in French hands, the main road from Plonsk to Ciechanow was now open, exposing the Russian right to a flanking movement by the French as Napoleon had envisioned.
[1] Mikhailovskii-Danielevskii states that the Russian troops were deploying on the 22nd of December (10th of December old style). The two battalions of 3rd Jäger, the Tenguinsk Musketeers, and Isoum Hussars had been in position since at least 18 December according to Plotho.
Action at Sochocin 24 December 1806
|