A Belle Alliance
The Battle About Books
About the Battle
Key To Understanding
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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I think the key to understanding the establishment coolness towards Siborne Sr.’s model, and faith in the Despatch, lies not with its portrayal of, and "rigid adherence to historical truth", but with the fact that the establishment - like Wellington and his troops - was so emphatically adamant that it was Wellington’s victory. It is difficult to summarise the lengthy description in Siborne Sr.’s "History" of the final phase of the battle, but, as if Wellington’s repulse of the final French attack was not glorious enough, the general advance set in motion a domino effect which caused the rest of the French army, even that not directly in its path, to collapse as well. After the general advance was brought to a halt, Wellington surveyed "the retreating line of his vanquished foe", and his exhausted troops made their bivouacs, and the "comparatively fresh" Prussians took up the pursuit to make his victory "secure beyond a doubt" ("History", p.382). According to Siborne Sr.’s account this was a "physical overthrow and moral annihilation unexampled in the history of modern warfare" ("History", p.386). Siborne Sr. says: "It is undeniably true that the blow which decided the victory was that given by Wellington, when, after having completely defeated the grand attack, by the French imperial guard, he instantly followed up that defeat by boldly attacking and penetrating the centre of the enemy’s lines, and sustaining this movement by the general advance of his whole army..." ("History", p.396-397) and rolling up the main French army. As for the Prussians, on the extreme left the Prussians joined the general advance, against part of D’Erlon’s corps; between the extreme left and Plancenoit, the Prussians attacked the French again; and at Plancenoit, the Prussians began a 3rd assault at about the time the general advance started, and finally succeeded in taking the village, after nearly 4 hours of combat in which for most of the time they comfortably outnumbered the French. On all of these fronts, resistance –- even at Plancenoit where it was greatest -- was diminished and eventually collapsed, because the French troops involved could see that the rest of the main French army was already falling back under the impact of the general advance by Wellington’s line, and themselves joined the rout. There is little doubt that Ziethen, Pirch and Bülow’s Prussians are given a significant but essentially supporting role in this triumph: Bülow especially "…contributed most materially to the general and fatal panic which seized upon the whole of the French army" ("History", pp. 396-397). And to re-emphasise that Siborne Sr. also clearly regarded the Despatch as "high authority", "History" quotes from the Despatch, directly and approvingly, the passage quoted earlier : "I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army…", in his summary of the Prussian contribution ("History", pp. 395-400). Later, he says "…both armies admirably and honourably performed the parts respectively assigned to them -- the one, holding its defensive position with unparalleled bravery, and unmitigated perseverance, until the moment when its chief, having defeated the last desperate attempt of his opponent to force his line, leads it on to victory; the other, operating a powerful diversion, by which the effect of that advance is made still more decisive, and rendering the victory complete by a harassing and vigorous pursuit -- and thus was consummated the tactical solution of the plan which had been, with so much skill and foresight, strategically preconcerted by the Allied commanders" ("History", p.397). Shortly after describing the fault in the original version of the model, Siborne Sr. reiterates that the general advance of Wellington’s army, "…it should be remembered, was made by his Grace to follow up a victory he had already secured, and, in conjunction with the Prussian attack, to render the overthrow of the enemy complete in every respect" ("History", p.399). But the establishment line was that the credit and glory of the victory on the 18th June belonged to Wellington and his army (especially the British portion), and it was cool towards the depiction of the climax of the battle at all. For if Siborne Sr. was to place Prussian troops on his model in proportion to the numbers and space occupied at that time, it would show them making up nearly half of the Allied troops present: well above the Prussian share of
man-hours engaged there, of which Wellington’s troops had supplied most (by the end of the day about 5/6, of which British 1/3, Germans in Wellington’s army about 1/2 - figures based upon strengths and timings in [9]). ("History" deals separately
with the battle of Wavre, in which Prussians - outnumbered by over 2 to 1 - fought "long and successfully" ("History", p.416) against effectively the right wing of the French army under Grouchy.
The Despatch, in the section about the 18th June, gives roughly about 1/3 of its space to the Prussian operations or contribution -- coincidentally, roughly their share of allied
man-hours, taking both Wavre and Waterloo on 18th and 19 th June).
Even that "truth" may have been too much, if it was felt that it would still present a misleading picture, understating the crushing nature of the victory gained by Wellington, out of proportion even to the "true" proportions represented by the proposed model. The nature and extent of the victory, achieved by Wellington in the eyes of the establishment, could not be
adequately represented qualitatively, even if the model truthfully represented the quantitative situation at the time chosen for depiction: the quantitative "truth" was at least two steps removed from the qualitative position, the "official line" based upon the impression conveyed by the Despatch (and as said earlier, there is no real inconsistency between the Despatch and Siborne Sr.’s "History"), reflected in the memoirs of participants, and in the minds of the public.
If this was the established belief, then for its holders, even to correct the model for
the distortion admitted to by Siborne Sr. in "History" was not enough. It might be thought that the solution would be to move the time depicted by the model forward, to some time after the general advance, because if it was done in accordance with Siborne Sr.’s researches, as described in "History", it would then depict Wellington’s troops in possession of even more of the battlefield after their advance. The problem is, that it would also have shown the Prussians in even greater numbers, and occupying even more space, even to the point
of linking up with Wellington on ground formerly occupied by the French army. In
other words, it might have undermined even more the established view that the battle was
won decisively by Wellington. This speculation may be borne out by the fact that
in 1834 it was suggested (Gordon to FitzRoy Somerset, BL., Add. MS 34703, fol. 192,
quoted in [2]) that Siborne Sr. should perhaps
show dispositions at the start of the battle, and inform the public of subsequent events
by some other means consistent with Wellington’s Despatch, (and as it happened later with "History").
I think Clausewitz made some observations about the inevitable interplay between war and politics...and for sure there is no such thing as an honest politician except in a fantasy world. Undoubtedly some of the establishment coolness came from the general British attitude towards Prussia: but even a balanced reader of the history of the period might not be surprised if the British government and establishment mistrusted Prussia; or that what happened in the years 1814-15 (even by Mr. Hofschröer’s own account) only confirmed that opinion; and
subsequently the rivalry between Britain and Prussia (and later the British and German
Empires) had only grown. The idea of Waterloo as a British victory no doubt helped the reputation of Britain and its Empire as it developed in the nineteenth century. My focus here has not been the German victory argument, but there is a respectable body of literature in English and German which would suggest that that too may be a product of another "myth-making industry that is still running today" [2a] -- a "Prusso-German" one, which was born as the German Empire took shape in the later nineteenth century. It suggests that "German-ness" at the time of the Napoleonic Wars was little more than a cultural - and largely a linguistic - concept.
If so, to draw the German victory conclusion, merely by counting the participants who spoke German, makes no more sense than saying that it was a "trousered" or a "brown-haired" victory. To be fair, the claim is diluted in Mr. Hofschröer’s book of the title, and perhaps anything less eye-catching would have generated less publicity and sales.
I am not saying that the descriptions in Siborne Sr.’s "History" (and Siborne Jr.’s "Letters" - both essential reading for anyone interested in the campaign and the era), or the portrayal of his model, of the final phase of this battle, are wrong or right, true or false. But it is interesting, if Siborne Sr.’s was "an honest historian", and "an
honourable man" [2]; if he had "conducted correspondence with the Prussian General Staff", and if he had made "every effort to write a balanced History", which was to the satisfaction of the Prussian General Staff, that he should still come down so heavily in favour of the view that it was a decisive victory for Wellington, and describe that victory in terms so in accordance, in overall tone if not in detail, with Wellington’s Despatch, which was also the "official line" taken by the British establishment, many members of which were also participants in the battle and correspondents in Siborne Sr.’s research.
Perhaps "Peer Pressure" was merely a taster, and Mr. Hofschröer will soon publish
more evidence to support his case that Wellington played a personal and vindictive
role in this controversy. I will read it with interest, but for me, and in itself "Peer
Pressure!" provides no compelling evidence to support the contention of an orchestrated
campaign of denigration to discredit Siborne Sr., whether this alleged campaign is dated
to 1830 or 1836. Siborne Sr.’s straits seem to have been self-inflicted. Whatever one
may think of the motives behind the British government’s withdrawal from the project,
its position was clear.
In December 1833 -- after it was cancelled, yet Siborne Sr. had
continued the work and to incur expenses -- he was given a choice - have the expenses
to date paid and terminate the project, or continue at his own expense - and by 1834
he had decided to go it alone. He was given opportunities to take on board the
establishment’s discomfort, but ignored them. It is possible that this was the
motivation behind the personal (and perhaps "off-the-record") meeting with Wellington,
suggested in 1836 - to bring Siborne Sr. on board with the "official line" and with their
qualitative misgivings about his quantitatively accurate model - but again he turned it down. How the government and establishment was supposed to interpret these signals is open to speculation. Yet by 1837 he wrote to FitzRoy Somerset, and in 1841 to Hardinge, to say that while his model was still based on "rigid adherence to historical truth", (Siborne Sr. to Hardinge, BL., Add. MS 34706, fols. 238, 239, quoted in [2]) even that was malleable in the heat of money, and again asked for funds.
In another context (when subjected to an attempted blackmail) Wellington is supposed to have said "Publish and be damned". (Exasperation with the controversy, not personal malice towards
Siborne Sr., was surely behind the merely indiscrete comment attributed to Wellington when asked his opinion of the business). In effect that was what the government said: for by 1841, it had simply done nothing and walked away, and the model, now in the public domain for 3 years, had turned out to be merely a curious novelty. Yet Siborne Sr.’s "History" - first published in 1844 -- long after the controversy emerged -- betrays no bitterness against or disappointment with Wellington, his supposed persecutor, or with several of his supposed willing henchmen (Hardinge, Somerset, etc.), the establishment or the government.
At about this time, Siborne Sr. began work on a "New Model", depicting the charge of the Household and Union brigades - surprising, given his experience with the first model, unless
perhaps [2b] it was financed by the man who led that charge.
A Belle Alliance The Battle About Books About the Battle
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