Battle of Vera 1813
"Please God,
I Will Keep the Bridge"
Plans
by Rifleman Moore
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The modern village of Vera (seen centre-left) from the hermitage of La Rhune. In the foreground is the later attack route of Kempt’s Brigade, Light Division attack of early October, 1813.
When he received the message from D’Erlon at Maya asking for support in the face of what D’Erlon saw was a serious Allied advance, Marshal Soult saw the danger also of a thrust breaking through at the Pass there and ordered Foy’s Division from Urrugne on the lower Bidassoa to speedily support the troops of D’Erlon at Maya Pass, with Clausel being ordered to retreat by the early evening in reply to a second message sent to Soult before 2pm that the Allied troops before him were slowly retreating as they obviously knew more Allied troops in his rear were marching west and north-west from Santa Barbara and Eschellar to cut Clausel off. Soult at Behobie read both Clausel’s and D’Erlons morning messages with the distant but loud accompaniment of the Allied siege guns at San Sebastian heralding from 8am that day the final storming of the fortress ; there was no time for Soult to prevent either of the French ‘surprise’ attacks going in to save a fortress that would be already lost by the time they could reach it - but he could stop these attacks going too far into the jaws of the trap prepared by Wellington. Back at Vera, the troops in the two Brigades of the Light Division commanded by Von Alten glared down from the hills at the Frenchmen now occupying Vera. General Skerrett had temporary command of Vandeleur’s Brigade (comprising the 1/52nd Light Infantry, the 2/95th Rifles, 3rd Portuguese Cacadores and the 17th Portuguese Line infantry). Skerrett had inherited Vandeleurs Brigade-Major, a impetuous and fiery young officer of the 95th named Harry Smith. Smith had earlier watched fuming at the isolated picket of the 95th being forced to retire into and through Vera under fire from the French voltigeurs supported by company columns and artillery as Skerrett sent forward no support. Smith had attempted during the early morning fighting to persuade Skerrett that the 2/95th could be moved up and could hold the village if timely supported by the 1/52nd. Skerrett had made no reply, but had suddenly ridden over to watch the 2/95th at a point nearest the village where the French artillery firing was coming in fast and furious, soon to be joined by a now furious Harry Smith. Smith pointed out to Skerrett that the French company charge had tumbled the 2/95th out of their last footholds in the village and would soon capture the bridge. Once again, Skerrett did not reply. The French moved up along the river bank and reached the bridge - Smith once again pointed out to Skerrett that the French were now seriously overstretched, disorganised and under fire from the 95th, also looking up a little in awe at the faces of the redcoats of the 52nd Foot glaring down at them from the hills. Skerrett mumbled an almost inaudible approval of Smith’s observations which Smith took the opportunity to identify as a verbal order. Smith turned his horse, galloped over to Colonel John Colbourne of the 52nd Foot and ordered him on behalf of Skerrett to advance, much to Colbourne’s delight. The French vanguard quickly gave up the bridge and fell back through the village before the advance of the 52nd and 95th. The troops of both sides fell to collecting their wounded in the truce around Vera but at 4pm a terrific gale and rainstorm blew in from the sea, blowing over several trees and drowning all sound in a terrific downpour lasting several hours, forcing the troops of the Light Division advance to take cover in the village houses. By the evening, the storm had abated but rain still fell heavily. Harry Smith realised that the French were now in a dangerous situation. The three French Divisions that had crossed the river were stuck in the mountains in bad weather facing the enemy with a second enemy in force coming up fast behind them. The level of the Bidassoa was steadily rising, making the fords on the ‘south’ side of the great gorge impassable and the only way back to France being over the bridge at Vera. Smith reported these facts to General Skerrett, eagerly adding a provisional plan to fortify the houses at the bridge, fill them with the riflemen of the 2/95th and hold the 52nd in close support nearby ; they could easily hold the bridge and cut the entire French force off completely, forcing it to surrender or be surrounded and face annihilation. To Smith’s astonishment, Skerrett laughed at him and ordered a complete withdrawal of his entire Brigade a mile away back onto the Santa Barbera heights, leaving only a picket of thirty men on duty at the bridge to prevent any messages to and from the divided French forces crossing. Smith in vain remonstrated, finally writing the order down in his day-book, showing it to Skerrett before asking him once again to confirm it before the rest of the staff, which Skerrett - now in an angry mood matching Smith’s own - grunted the affirmative. Smith turned and left, angrily shouting over his shoulder that they would all soon live to regret it … Smith mounted his horse and galloped over in the wet gloom to the bivouac of the 2/95th Rifles. Dismounting, he shouted for his brother, Tom, then acting Adjutant and asked him for a picket of thirty men for the bridge. Every officer in the Light Division now knew the tactical situation and came over hearing the argument between the Smith brothers to add their opinion to that of Tom’s to the disbelief of Skerrett’s orders. Harry Smith’s mood did not brook this advice - he turned away from the debate and shouted for Captain Daniel Cadoux, named as the company commander whose turn it was for picket duty. Cadoux also added his concerns to his fellow officers’, stating that as it was his company who had that morning been tumbled unsupported out of Vera with the loss of twenty riflemen, the duty was a hard one for his remaining men. Smith’s mood softened as he saw Cadoux’s concerns for his men -- he remembered how he had once felt nothing but animosity towards Cadoux, thinking him a dreamy-eyed outsider to the ‘light bobs’, a ‘dandy-fied fop’ with his attitude to his turnout and the large emerald signet ring he habitually wore - but realising when he saw Cadoux under fire at Vittoria his impression was wholly incorrect. Smith agreed with Cadoux that the entire company should go, around fifty soldiers, and also agreed he would immediately send up the rest of the 2/95th if any firing was heard at the bridge during darkness. Cadoux offered Smith his hand and smiling, said to Smith “Please God, I will keep the bridge.” More Battle of Vera 1813 Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #62 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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Clausel had ordered the French Division then before Vera to remain there to cover the fords and not to cross the river ; a small force from there would attack the village itself and try to take the bridge.