Eylau: A Russian View

Battle of Eylau

by Patrick E. Wilson, UK

The French began their attack about 2.00 p.m., the Grand-Duke of Berg hesitated to commit his cavalry because of the casualties he had sustained at Hof. Instead Soult advanced against Bagration’s position with three infantry brigades, one on the left of the Landsberg Road and two to the right. Those on the right advanced through the woods to turn Bagration's left, the left Brigade (18th and 46th Ligne) advanced upon the Tenknitten See under heavy artillery fire and when they reached the edge of that lake, Bagration's first line charged with the bayonet. The 46th Ligne regiment managed to retire in order despite the fury of the attacks but the 18th Ligne regiment, attacked with the bayonet and then charged by the St. Petersburg Dragoons, was completely overthrown losing its eagle to the victorious Dragoons.

Soult was only able to redeem the situation by placing his artillery between Grunhofchen and Scheweken and blasting the Russians as they attempted to exploit their success. Meanwhile Soult’s two brigades on the right, had by this time got through the wood and Bagration could see that his position on the Tenknitten was turned. This was just as well as Soult had now brought his other two divisions up to attack the Russian centre, whilst Marechal Pierre Augereau was moving his 7th Corps d’Armée upon the village of Tenknitten to turn Bagration’s right. Bagration’s rearguard though now fell back upon General Essen’s 8th Division, whose resistance gained time for them to get away to their allotted places within the main army beyond Preussisch-Eylau.

Once again though Soult’s right turned the Russian left near the Waschkeiten See, Vivier’s brigade though did not suffer the fate of Ferrey’s and quickly over powered the 25 squadrons of cavalry facing it. Essen now had no option but to retire. This he successfully did through the intervals of Barclay de Tolly’s troops, who had been ordered to hold Preussisch-Eylau. The French now held the whole of plateau above the town and had already suffered considerable casualties, one of the hills over which Soult had advanced was found three weeks later to be still strewn with his dead. [7]

Here the combat should have ended but Soult’s troops, perhaps anxious to secure Preussisch-Eylau for shelter from the cold, continued their advance and collided with Barclay de Tolly’s men in gardens and houses of the town. The conflict was bitter and little quarter was given on either side as the French fought their way to the centre of Preussisch-Eylau and cannon engaged cannon at point blank range.

Little by little the French, superior street fighters, gained the upper hand and drove Barclay de Tolly’s men back and General Vivier’s men eventually stormed the church after a murderous hand to hand fight. It was about this time that Barclay de Tolly’s hand was shattered by a random shot and he was forced to retire from the fight. The order had been given to evacuate the place, when suddenly General Somow’s 4th Division arrived with orders to storm the town. Bagration, on foot, led the counterattack in three columns and despite fierce French resistance the town was quickly cleared by 6.00 p.m. by these fresh and resolute troops who bayoneted every exhausted Frenchman in their path. But then Bagration withdrew the division back to its position within the main Russian army and the Russians once more evacuated Preussisch-Eylau.

The French quietly reoccupying what was left of the town by 7.00 p.m. Soult in his report blamed one of his own regiments, the 24th Ligne, for precipitating this undesirable attack, but once commenced and the impetuous given, it had been impossible to stop and had forced the French commanders, against their better judgement, to storm the place.

The night that followed, for the Russians at least on the bare hills north east of Preussisch-Eylau, was one of utmost suffering as the temperature plunged to 2 Fahrenheit. This was to some extent made worse by Benningsen, who ordered that no fires were to be lit so as not to give away his position to the French. But as at least one writer has pointed out, the French already knew where his army was and Benningsen could have allowed his troops the pleasure of spending, what would be for many, their last night beside a warm fire. [8]

The French used what cover and comforts they could get their hands on, thus many enjoyed a more sheltered night then their Russian foes.

Benningsen deployed his army for the coming battle between Schloditten and Klein Sausgarten, with an outpost under.General Bagavout at Serpallen. The main part of his army he deployed as follows. The 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 8th Divisions formed the front line, their regiments deploying two battalions in line and a third in support. Three large artillery batteries were assembled to the front of these divisions, on the right wing 60 guns (including the three Prussian heavy batteries of Major Huguenin) were deployed. In the centre, 70 heavy guns were deployed opposite the town of Preussisch-Eylau and on the left wing another 40 heavy guns were deployed. On the right and left wings of Benningsen’s army a substantial amount of cavalry were deployed, the right wing opposite General Lasalle’s light cavalry was particularly strong. In reserve behind the front line were the 4th, 7th and 14th Divisions, which were drawn up in dense columns. Also in reserve with these troops were 28 squadrons of cavalry and 50 horse artillery guns. Finally at Serpallen, General Bagavout had a week outpost of two Hussar and two Jäger regiments. General Tuchkov commanded the right wing, General Baron Sacken the centre, General Ostermann-Tolstoi the left wing, General Dokhtorov the reserve and General Gallitzin the cavalry. Initially though the 4th Division, (did it receive its orders?) remained opposite Preussisch-Eylau in front of Benningsen’s main line, where it had retired after the fight for the town and only moved to it’s allotted position during the morning of the battle.

The French had deployed as follows; two of Soult’s divisions (Leval and Legrand) stood either side of Preussisch-Eylau, to Soult’s left General Lasalle commanded the cavalry brigades of Colbert, Guyot and Durosnel. On Soult’s right, between Preussisch-Eylau and Rothenen, Marechal Pierre Augereau deployed his two divisions one behind the other (Desjardins then Heudelet). On Augereau’s right, in front of Rothenen, stood Soult’s 3rd division under General St. Hilaire, to that general’s right was General Comte Milhaud’s Dragoon division. Immediately behind these troops, massed on the frozen lakes, stood the Cuirassier division of General Comte d’Hautpoul, the Dragoon divisions of General Klien and Grouchy and then the French Imperial Guard, both horse and foot under Marechal Jean-Baptiste Bessieres. Marechal’s Davout and Ney were as yet absent from the battlefield but Napoleon expected them to appear during the course of the day and turn the flanks of Benningsen’s army. Had he in mind a new “Cannae” that would result in Benningsen’s destruction?

The 8th February 1807 broke with heavy snow laden clouds and a freezing wind, the clouds discharged their snowy contents from time to time into the faces of the shivering soldiers and at times it grew so dark that the Russians could not make out Preussisch-Eylau. The freezing wind made it hard for soldiers to hear the word of command, and Marechal Davout was to note that the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau had all the characteristics of a night attack. Almost immediately with the breaking of dawn the Russian artillery opened fire, at first on the right, where the Prussian batteries of Major Huguenin particularly distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire, against Marechal Soult’s Corps d’Armée and the town of Preussisch-Eylau. Pretty soon though the cannonade became general along the whole Russian line and the French artillery were not slow in responding to the challenge, and being slightly better protected by the environments of Preussisch-Eylau suffered less in the exchange of fire. Not so their infantry though, who suffered terribly from the fire and this fact led directly to the first act of the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau.

In an effort to alleviate the pressure on his Corps d’Armée, Soult ordered his left hand division (Legrand’s) forward against General Tuchkov’s positions but it did not produce the effect that Soult envisaged. General Tuchkov met Soult’s division with two infantry regiments whilst at the same time launching two of his Dragoon regiment’s into the division’s flank. This resulted in Soult’s division being driven almost pell-mell back to their original position, luckily for Soult, the light cavalry under General Lasalle held firm and even repulsed a heavy assault by Dragoons later in the day. This, according to Charles Parquin who was present, occurred around 2.00 p.m. and involved an exchange of carbine fire between his brigade (7th and 20th Chasseurs of General Durosnel) and Russian Dragoons because the snow was just too deep to charge in. There were heavy losses on both sides, the 20th Chasseurs losing over a hundred men. [9]

However, Soult’s repulse was to have an even greater impact upon the cause of the battle because it influenced Napoleon’s decision making. Seeing Soult’s repulse Napoleon concluded that the Russians intended to advance against Preussisch-Eylau from their right wing, so to ease the pressure upon that sector of his army he decided to advance with the centre right of his forces. This he knew to be premature as Marechal Davout’s Corps d’Armée was not yet upon the field but he felt that he had to do something to aid the hard pressed Soult. With this in mind Marechal Augereau's and General St. Hilaire's divisions were ordered to attack the Russian left. Once again the result was not what had been intended, if anything it had a worse outcome then Soult’s.

It was at this moment that a terrible snowstorm burst upon the field of battle, in an instant you could not see two feet in front of you. The snow blew right into the faces of Augereau’s infantry divisions and instead of marching to the attack the Russian left as ordered, they veered towards the Russian centre where their central battery of 70 heavy guns was busy pounding Preussisch-Eylau.

What happened next is perhaps best described by an eyewitness, Denis Davidov, a Russian cavalry officer:

“Augereau’s Corps lost it’s bearing, lost contact with St. Hilaire's division and all the cavalry, and suddenly appeared, much to their surprise in front of our central battery just as the weather cleared. Seventy cannons belched total hell and a hail of grapeshot started to ring against the rifle barrels and hammer at the live mass of flesh and bone.

In an instant the Moscow Grenadier and the Shlusselburg infantry together with General Somow rushed upon them with lowered bayonets. The French wavered, but recovering met bayonet with bayonet and stood their ground.

There took place an engagement the likes of which had never been seen before. Over 20,000 men from both sides were plunging a three faceted blade into each other. Crowds fell. I was personal witness of this Homeric slaughter and I must say truly that over the course of the 16 campaigns in my service record and through the epoch of all Napoleonic campaigns, justly referred to as the legend of our century. I have never seen the likes of it! For about half an hour you didn’t hear a cannon or a rifle shot neither in the midst nor around this spot; you could only hear some inexpressible roar of thousands of brave soldiers in hand to hand struggle, mixing and cutting each other up.

Mounds of dead bodies were piled over each other by the hundreds, so that this whole segment of the battle resembled a high parapet of a suddenly erected fortification. Finally, our side got the upper hand! Augereau’s Corps was toppled and hotly pursued by our infantry and Prince Golitsyn who had galloped with the central cavalry to support the foot soldiers. The pitch of their fervour reached improbable heights; one of our battalions in the heat of pursuit went way over the enemy position and appeared at the church a hundred steps away from Napoleon himself, which is.mentioned by all Frenchmen in their war dairies of that time. [10]

The rout of Augereau’s Corps d’Armée was really a disaster for Napoleon, his right under Soult was repulsed, his left under Davout was not yet upon the field of battle in any significant force and only truly heroic measures could redeem the situation. The only force Napoleon had immediately available were eighty or so squadrons of the Cavalry Reserve under the Grand Duke of Berg and those of the Imperial Guard under Bessieres. Without hesitation though Napoleon coolly ordered the Grand Duke of Berg to charge the Russian army’s centre. Superbly mounted, in a gorgeous uniform and surrounded by a staff second only to himself in colour, Murat now demonstrated to the world why he was the greatest cavalry leader of his day.

Placing himself at the head of Grouchy’s Dragoon division, he lead more then eighty squadrons (10,700 men) against the Russian centre in what has gone down.in history as the greatest cavalry charge ever. Murat’s squadrons at first engaged Prince Galitzin’s cavalry, who had wrought so much havoc amongst Augereau’s battalions, and drove them pell-mell back upon their infantry. Such was the fury of the charge that his squadrons literally rode over the first line of Russian infantry and sabred many of the gunners who had done so much harm to Augereau’s Corps. Murat’s Cuirassier squadrons under d’Hautpoul broke through the second line of Russian infantry as well but the intrepid Russians formed up again behind the French cavalry and barred their retreat as the Russian cavalry now returned to attack the now exhausted French cavalry.

Fortunately help was at hand in the shape Bessieres and his Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, who now smashed into the Russian lines and like d’Hautpoul’s Cuirassiers before them broke through both Russian lines. Released, the Grand Duke of Berg’s cavalry fought their way back to French lines having thoroughly disrupted and cut up Benningsen’s centre. Murat though had silenced his critics and what is more important saved Napoleon’s centre. His charge had so shook Benningsen’s nerve that he almost certainly let slip a genuine chance to defeat Napoleon before Davout arrived to save him. Denis Davidov certainly thought so and lamented that Benningsen had not taken full advantage of Augereau’s rout and the Grand Duke of Berg’s mauling by falling upon St. Hilaire and destroying him too. [11]

Maréchal Louis Davout 1770 - 1823 who almost brought Napoleon victory at Preussisch-Eylau

A lull now descended over the battlefield, only the artillery of both sides kept up a severe cannonade whilst both sides awaited reinforcement. Indeed it was not until three hours later that Davout’s attack began in earnest at 2.00 p.m. General Bagavout at Serpallen bore the brunt of Davout’s first onslaught and despite a valiant defence, aided by the arrival of General Kamenskoi’s 14th Division from Benningsen’s reserve, was forced to yield to a combined attack from General Comte Friant and General Baron Marulaz. Bagavout and Kamenskoi then fell back to a position between the Kreegeberg heights, on which stood General Ostermann-Tolstoi's 2nd Division, and the village of Klein Sausqarten which they occupied.

Davout now ordered the divisions of St. Hilaire and Morand to attack the Russian 2nd Division on the Kreegeberg whilst Friant and Marulaz assaulted and took Klein Sausgarten. General Gudin, Davout’s final reserve would support the latter’s attack when he arrived. This attack was more difficult from the beginning, the divisions of St. Hilaire and Morand suffered severe casualties from Ostermann-Tolstoi's artillery and his local counterattacks. Indeed, so severe were the casualties inflicted on Morand’s 13th Legere that it had to be replaced in the firing line by a battalion of the 17th Ligne. [12]

Finally, St. Hilaire and Morand gained the upper hand and captured the Kreegeberg, overrunning 18 Russian guns in a spectacular counterattack of their own. Though they did not have to wait long for a Russian response, General Korff at the head of 20 squadrons pounced on a battalion of 10th Legere and drove it back upon Serpallen. Here Korff caused great disorder until the Klien’s Dragoons, who had moved up from behind St. Hilaire, intervened to drive him off. The storming of the Kreegeberg however secured for the French the key to the Russian Left.

Friant’s assault on Klein Sausgarten had also met with difficulties, his leading brigade under General Lochet at first took Klein Sausgarten easily but were soon evicted as Bagavout and Kamenskoi bought their full weight of numbers to bear. Lochet then found himself outside the village and fighting amongst the stockades of the area until Friant could bring his artillery to bear and force his way back into the village of Klein Sausgarten. This time Friant succeeded and firmly established himself there but Lochet was killed in the fighting. Bagavout and Kamenskoi though may have been forced to relinquish their hold on Klein Sausgarten because of Ostermann-Tolstoi’s withdrawal from the Kreegeberg as that movement had exposed their flank. Davout though quickly took advantage of the gains his Generals had made and placed artillery on the Kreegeberg to rake the entire Russian line then facing Preussisch-Eylau. This it did with particularly good effect as Denis Davidov recounts:

“ . . . The whole field of Battle from Kutschitten to Schmoditten was covered with scattered soldiers: they were stretched towards the Konigsberg highway under the protection of those comrades in arms who had not lost spirit or order and were shedding their blood on every step of ground they fought for. The crossfire of the ever-increasing enemy batteries plowed and blew up everything that was to be seen on the battlefield. Pieces of rifles, chunks of gun carriages, headgear, helmets were flying all over, everything was cracking and falling apart”. [13]

Whilst Davout’s artillery inflicted this damage on the Russian front line, Friant and Gudin advanced on Anklappen, the birch wood and then Atschitten. The fighting here was still intense as Bagavout and Kamenskoi continued to fight back, the first attack on Anklappen was forced back when General Ermolov brought up three horse batteries to support Bagavout and Kamenskoi. Ermolov’s artillery practically blasted Friant’s leading regiment out of Anklappen and set fire to all the buildings, the French attack on the birch wood though succeeded at the first attempt and Bagavout and Kamenskoi were forced back upon Kutschitten. A second attempt on Anklappen, this time by two regiments, succeeded despite the seriousness of the resistance encountered and the Russian left suddenly found itself in a very precarious position. Especially after the French troops that had taken the birch wood followed that success up with the capture of Kutschitten too! The road to Konigsberg was now open to the French and it appeared that the Russians had lost the battle. Davout appeared to have done it again! The Russian left was at right angles to the rest of their army, Ostermann-Tolstoi, Bagavout and Kamenskoi held on as best they could with their battered commands and Ermolov’s artillery still attempted to stall Davout’s continued advance. It seemed that nothing short of a miracle could save Benningsen’s army. And, believe it or not that was exactly what occurred.

When Benningsen decided to fight at Preussisch-Eylau he had ordered General Anton L’Estocq and his Prussian Corps to his assistance. This Corps had been on Benningsen’s right for most of the retreat and combats already related above but had been endeavouring to rejoin Benningsen. This had not been easy as it had to sacrifice a number of rearguards as it retired and on the day of the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau, it had been involved in a series of running combats with Marechal Michel Ney’s 6th Corps d’Armée. But eventually L’Estocq broke free of Ney’s Corps and arrived on the battlefield at around 5.00 pm. Light was already beginning to fade when L’Estocq received the order to go to the rescue of the Russian left. During L’Estocq’s march it became apparent to him that his Prussians had an opportunity to outflank Davout and this was quickly formed into a plan of attack. With the Russian Wyburg infantry regiment and the Prussian von Ruchel infantry regiment leading, L’Estocq stormed Kutschitten and annihilated its defenders, taking the eagle of 51st Ligne regiment and recapturing some Russian artillery.

L’Estocq then led his triumphant and victorious troops against the birch wood, where they engaged the French 12th Ligne regiment in a firefight that lasted a full half-hour before driving them out bayonet point. To L’Estocq’s right the Russian left, re-galvanised by L’Estocq’s presence, successfully stormed Anklappen. L’Estocq eventually found himself checked by Davout’s artillery on the Kreegeberg but joined by Ermolov’s artillery and the remnants of Bagavout’s and Kamenskoi’s commands, who had just retaken Anklappen, he prepared to assault Klein Sausgarten. However the assault did not take place, the Russian left was too exhausted and there was insufficient light reminding for any further offensive action, though Ermolov’s and L’Estocq’s artillery continued to fire at the enemy well into the night. Indeed, such was the French concern about their right that Davout himself came up and rallied his Corps with the cry: “The brave will die covered with glory, and only cowards will make acquaintance with the wastes of Siberia.” [14]

Fortunately for the French the Russians were exhausted and though they retained much of their position of that morning were without food and low on ammunition. The battle had decimated their ranks; Ostermann-Tolstoi's 2nd Division numbered only 2,170 men that night. Benningsen knew he had lost heavily, stating 12,000 killed and 7,900 wounded in his report. What he did not know was that the French had lost much more and that their morale was shaken. Cries of “Vive la paix!” replaced the more usual “Vive L'Empereur!” that night. Calling a council of war that night, Benningsen told his assembled generals that he had no course but to retire on Konigsberg as he had neither food nor sufficient ammunition for the army. His generals, particularly Knorring, Ostermann-Tolstoi, Steinheil and the Prussian L’Estocq, urged him to hold on, indeed to attack in the morning. But Benningsen was firm and an hour later he led his army away from the battlefield towards Konigsberg.

The French did not molest the retreat, they were too exhausted to attempt any pursuit. L’Estocq’s Corps remained in position until 2.00 am then retired on Friedland via Domnau. Again the French did not pursue.

Indeed it was only on the 9th February that Murat followed with his cavalry and that was at a respectable distance. If he did try to close up with his cavalry they were invariably cut up, the French pursuit could in no way be compared to the pursuit of the Prussian army the October before. Eventually though it was the French who retreated all the way back to the Passage River, leaving behind many wounded, cannon and wrecked villages. Napoleon’s plan to destroy Benningsen’s army in one great battle had come to nothing. As had Benningsen’s plan to catch Bernadotte’s Corps d’Armée in its cantonments before help could arrive and destroy it. Ney’s unauthorised advance had saved Bernadotte. But Benningsen’s actions had stung the Grande Armée into life and the resulting chase and Battle had wrought havoc not only amongst Benningsen’s divisions but had also severely dented the reputation of the French army.

I would argue that Benningsen’s Russians and Prussians had come out of the contest on top and that Preussisch-Eylau was a worthy sister to Benningsen’s victory at Pultusk that December. It could have been a great victory had Benningsen not hesitated after the repulse of the Grand Duke of Berg’s great cavalry attack. However, the result still did great honour to the Russian Army and its ally Prussia.

References

[1] Wilson, Sir Robert, Campaigns In Poland 18061807 (Worley Publications: Felling, 1995 reprint of 1810 edition)., pp.236-237.
[2] Petre, F.Loraine, Napoleon’s Campaign In Poland 180607 (Greenhill books: London, 1989 reprint of 1907 edition)., p.143.
[3] Wilson, Op.cit.,p02.
[4] Ibid., pp.9394
[5] Petre, Op.Cit.,p.159.
[6] Freiherr von der Goltz, Colmar, Jene to Eylau: The disgrace and the Redemption of the Old Prussian Army (Pallas Armata: Tunbridge, 1995 reprint of 1913 edition).,pp.234-237.
[7] Wilson, Op.Cit.,p06.
[8] Freiherr von der Goltz, Op.Cit.,p.257.
[9] Jones, B.T.(Ed), Napoleons Army: The Military Memories of Charles Parquin (Greenhill books: London, 1987 reprint of 1969 edition).,p.53.
[10] Troubetzkoy, Gergory, The Battle of Eylau (from Denis Davidoff’s Memoirs), a 1997 article published in Napoleonic Scholarship, The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society.,pp.44-45.
[11] Troubetzkoy, Op.Cit.,p.45.
[12] Petre, Op.Cit.,p.190.
[13] Troubetzkoy, Op.Cit.,p.46.
[14] Freiherr von der Goltz, Op.Cit.,p.297.

Sources and further Reading

Chandler, David G., The Campaigns of Napoleon (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1987 reprint of 1966 edition).
Esposito, Vincent J., & Elting, John R., A Military History and Altas of the Napoleonic Wars (Arms & Armour: London, 1980 reprint of 1964 edition).
Freiherr von der Goltz, Colmar, Jena to Eylau: The disgrace and the Redemption of the Old Prussian Army (Pallas Armata: Tunbridge, 1995 reprint of 1913 edition)
Jones, B.T., Napoleon’s Army: The Military Memories of Charles Parquin (Greenhill books: London, 1987 reprint of 1969 edition).
Petre, F. Loraine, Napoleon’s Campaign In Poland 1806 - 07 (Greenhill books: London 1989 reprint of 1907).
Troubetzkoy, Gregory, The Battle of Eylau (from Denis Davidov’s memoirs) a 1997 article published in Napoleonic Scholarship, the Journal of the International Napoleonic Society.
Wilson, Sir Robert, Campaigns in Poland 1806 - 1807 (Worley Publications: Felling, 1995 reprint of 1810 edition).

Eylau: A Russian View by Patrick E. Wilson, UK


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