The Battle of Magnano
5th April 1799
A Forgotten Austrian Victory
of 200 Years Ago
by Mag. Herbert Zima, Austria
(Translation Bernhard Voykowitsch, Austria
assisted by Neil Clifford, UK)
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The Battle of 5th AprilThe French were able carry out the planned movements having only to contend with poor roads, soft from the pouring spring rains, but without interference from the Austrians. In the evening of 2nd April their army was concentrated to the west of the Adige between Verona and Legnago. Kray had perceived the intentions of the French commander. He decided to keep the concentration of his army at Verona ready for an attack on the French when they were crossing to the northern side of the Adige. This decision of an optimum concentration of force combined with the intention of attacking the opponent during a river crossing deserve full appreciation and is reminiscent of the future strategy of the Austrian Suedarmee in 1866. The Austrian divisions of Kaim, Mercandin and Zoph (the latter of which had only lately arrived) encamped in front of Verona between Tomba and Santa Lucia while Frelich's division remained in Verona. St.Julien was observing Peschiera while Klenau watched the Po. On the 2nd of April the Austrians successfully surprised Villafranca. A patrol consisting of a division of the 5th Hussars, a half squadron of Karacsay dragoons, some Levenehr dragoons and one company of IR Gyulai under the command of Major Fulda took 29 French officers and 500 men prisoners and captured 2 guns and 9 ammunition vehicles. Still more important was that by this dashing cavalry coup the Austrians also captured written orders from Schérer that instructed the French pontoon train to march to Isola Rizza. This dispelled the remaining doubts of the Austrian command about French intentions. On the 3rd of April the Austrians carried out reconnaissance tasks. On the 4th they wanted to attack but the attack was postponed by a day to make sure that the troops could complete their preparations. For a number of reasons Schérer altered his plan again; the activity of the Austrians, their advance to the southern bank of the Adige, the surprise attack on Villafranca and their intense reconnoitring, probably also the reports of his engineer officers that it was impossible to build a pontoon bridge at Albaredo. Schérer decided to concentrate his army more to the left on the 4th April and to attack on the 5th. The French commander was badly informed as to the whereabouts of the Austrian army. Schérer thought that the Imperial army was in the hilly terrain of Sommacampagna. Kray who was also ill-informed about the changed enemy intentions had ordered the attack to take place on the 5th. A battle was now unavoidable. The French Army of Italy totalled approximately 41,000 men in 46 battalions and 60 squadrons. Its left wing in the west was made up of 3 divisions totalling 20,000 men which advanced on two roads; Serurier marched from Vigasio through Isolaita and Povegliano to Villafranca while Hatry and Montrichard under Moreau moved through Castel d'Azzano to Dossobuono and Sommacampagna. On the right wing in the east, Victor and Grenier with 14,000 men advanced from Mazzagatta and Villafontana by way of San Giovanni and Pozzo to Verona. In the centre Delmas with 7,000 men acted as a reserve and advanced from Isola della Scala through Buttapietra and Ca di David. During the battle Schérer was with this division. FML Kray's intention was to cut the French off from the Mincio and Mantua. The Austrian order of advance was as follows: Ist Column FML Mercandin (in the east from Verona to Pozzo):
1 coy of Jaegers 6 squadrons Levenehr dragoons IInd Column FML Kaim (by Ca David, Magnano and Buttapietra against the enemy centre)
1 coy of Jaegers 2 squadrons Karacsay dragoons IIIrd Column FML Zoph (in the west by Dossobuono and Castel d'Azzano against the enemy left)
1 coy of Jaegers 2 squadrons Karacsay dragoons IVth Column GM Marquis Lusignan instead of ill FML Frelich (reserve behind lInd Column)
1 coy of Jaegers 6 squadrons Lobkowitz dragoons Artillery Reserve FML Hohenzollern's Column
GM Gottesheim's brigade (to Villafranca):
GM St. Julien's brigade (to Alpo):
GM Doeller's brigade (to Isolaita):
Schusteckh's detachment (from Albaredo to the right side of the Adige)
Verona garrison - and Oberst Szénássy's detachment (on the right bank of the Adige until San Giovanni)
The French disposition had grave flaws; the frontage of the line of battle from San Giovanni to Villafranca measured 16 kms. During the advance the divisions would spread apart. There was no real reserve as Delmas immediately had to close the gap opening up in the centre. The frontage of the Austrian line of battle decreased during the advance. The columns of Lusignan and Szenassy were extracted to provide sufficient reserves. The French broke camp already at 6 o'clock while the Austrians were still preparing breakfast; they only began their advance at 10 o'clock. The battlefield was the typical cultivated landscape of northern Italy; fields bordered by ditches, stone walls, and rows of trees. Often vines hung between these trees. Roads usually had very broad ditches. Dispersed villages and single farms were typical. The terrain south of Castel d'Azzano, Magnano and Pozzo was intersected by numerous streams, canals and drains whose banks were covered with trees and brush. View was restricted so that any advance had to proceed slowly.
In a letter to Melas dated 20th April 1799, Kray attributed the defeat of his left wing to the incompetence and rashness of Quartermaster-General Chasteler: ". . . especially in the battle of the 5th of this (month) where I had sent him to the left wing of our army and where he forced FML Mercandin into a precipitate attack by which the latter's division was thrown into disaster and wholesome rout and flight which I could hardly redress by a hazardous new attack of Frelich's division and thereby gain the decisive victory..." In this letter Kray went so far to say that had he remained commander-in-chief he would have demanded the removal of Chasteler. Melas reported this to the Court War Council yet the matter fizzled out because Suvorov developed a special relationship for Chasteler with whom he got on so well. In the meantime the Austrian IInd Column had executed its march through Ca di David and Magnano without encountering any enemy. The French division of Montrichard, that formerly had stood at Magnano according to Schérer's new plan, had moved behind Hatry's division and then followed it to Castel d'Azzano. Delmas' division moved from Sanguinetto and despite marching all through the night had still had not arrived in Buttapietra . Thus only in front of Buttapietra did FML Kaim encounter the French advance guard. He chased it away and then occupied the village. Moreau who was marching with Hatry's and Montrichard's divisions to the north-west against Castel d'Azzano heard the sound of combat in his rear and detached Montrichard's rearmost brigade to support Delmas. With the remaining three brigades he continued his march. FML Kaim could not hold against the reinforced division of Delmas and had to abandon Buttapietra and take up a new position to the north of the village. The IIIrd Austrian column under FML Zoph which advanced from Dossobuona to Castel d'Azzano bumped into Moreau's division to the north of this village and the held its ground against the latter's three brigades. Gottesheim's brigade (from Hohenzollem's column) advanced to Villafranca, St. Julien's to Alpo which he occupied and Döller through Povegliano to lsolalta. Serurier's division had marched from Bovolone by way of Vigasio in the direction of Villafranca. When it passed Isolalta combat ensued. This village lies at some distance from the Tartaro stream that runs between dams; a bridge crossed the Tartaro between these dams. GM Doeller deployed 2 battalions of IR Giulay behind the north dam and fired at the French column. He moved the Banat Grenz battalion to Vigasio in order to cut off the retreat of the seemingly surrounded French. One squadron of Karacsay dragoons attacked Isolaita and captured 6 pieces of artillery and some ammunition carts. When the dragoons tried to bring back their booty to their own lines the infantrymen of IR Giulay mistook them for French cavalry and abandoned their own position. In the meantime Serurier had restored order within his troops, turned them to the left and attacked the bridge and the dam. The French captured these objectives but then were stopped by the dragoons. The Banat Grenz battalion in Vigasio had to surrender. Clearly, in the early afternoon, the situation was anything but rosy for the Austrians: The defeated 1st Column was in flight with Victor's and Grenier's divisions hard on its heels. The IInd Column struggled to retake Buttapietra and bloody attacks of IRs 26 and 48 and of grenadier battalions Weber and Fiquelmont (whose commander was killed here) failed to break through. The IIIrd Column with much effort held Scudo d'Orlando against Moreau. GM St. Julien remained in Alpo, GM Döller had to withdraw his defeated brigade to Dossobuono, while Gottesheim found no enemy in Villafranca and held there, observing into the direction of Mantua. In this miserable situation (the crisis point of the battle) FML Kray grasped the initiative and succeeded to turn the scales by the use of his reserves. Chasteler sent Szenassy's detachment to Tomba in order to support 1st Column's infantry so that it could reform from its disorder. The new Hussar-Regiment 7 attacked for the first time in its career in order to help its comrades of the 1st Column. This was not enough, FML Kray who was with his reserves north of Ca di David (with Major Radetzky near him) ordered the Marquess Lusignan with his three infantry regiments of Reisky, Nadasdy and Thurn and the Lobkowitz dragoons to turn left and to push into the flank of Grenier and Victor. Field Artillery commander GM Roos advanced two batteries of the artillery reserve to enfilade the enemy. The attack of the Austrian reserves hit Grenier's division. The Lobkowitz dragoons attacked into the gap between Grenier and Victor. Against Victor, Szenassyl's detachment and the 1st Column advanced. The French held San Giovanni but in the end the village was stormed from the north and from the west. From the north by IR Thurn and the IIIrd battalion of Jellacic under the personal leadership Quartermaster General Chasteler, from the west and the south-west by IRs Nadasdy and Reisky under GM Lattermann. The French fled to the south where they tried to reform in Valese behind a large lake. Due to the close pursuit of the Austrians they had to withdraw to Isola della Scala. When darkness fell the Austrian stopped the pursuit having reached the Menago canal. With the right wing of the French army defeated, Kray turned to the centre and ordered Kaim to be reinforced by 2 grenadier battalions (Korherr and Paar) from the reserve. Now Delmas had to withdraw to Buttapietra. The Austrians didn't storm the village in order to avoid further losses and because the French situation there was already untenable due to the defeat of the French right wing. Thus the situation in the centre was stabilised. Then Kray lead two battalions (grenadier battalion Pers, IInd Battalion Mittrovsky) and a handful of cavalry (half a squadron of Lobkowitz dragoons) under Colonel Sommariva to the right wing from where he had received worrying reports. The march was to the "sound of the guns" which could be heard from north of Castel d'Azzano. In the afternoon FML Zoph had had to abandon Scudo d'Orlando (a farm north of Castel d'Azzano) and withdrew in the direction of Verona. One battalion of IR Klebek and a half squadron of Karaczay dragoons still stood into the direction of Magnano to keep contact with Kaim. Kray ordered Colonel Zach, who had gone ahead, to turn this battalion into Moreau's right flank. Moreau had followed the retreating Austrians only with Hatry's division and had left Partouneaux' brigade behind to secure communications with Delmas. Kray now lead his battalions against the flank of Partouneaux' brigade. Moreau didn't leave his brigade commander in the lurch and sent him 3 battalions of Hatry's division under Solignac. The Lobkowitz dragoons made a brilliant attack on the French but a counter attack by the 9e Chasseurs restored the balance. An interesting situation had developed on this wing. FML Zoph was at the height of Dossobuona in the process of retreating to Verona. Moreau with a part of his command was following. Alpo was occupied by the Austrians, Partouneaux was at Scudo d'Orlando facing east against the troops that had come with Kray. Serurier finally managed to occupy Villafranca which Gottesheim had abandoned upon orders from Hohenzollem. Now the fighting turned into a cannonade until darkness fell. During the night the French withdrew everywhere; Moreau to Vigasio, Delmas to lsola della Scala, Serurier to Mozzecane. The retreat was continued on the next day and the Austrians occupied Valleggio on the Mincio, Villafranca, lsolalta and Isola della Scala. Austrian losses were considerable: 780 dead, 3,049 wounded and 1,899 prisoners, altogether 5,728 men. The French lost at least as many dead and wounded but in addition 4,500 prisoners, 7 flags, 18 artillery pieces and 40 ammunition vehicles. The Austrians lost FML Mercandin and GM Kovachevich dead and GM Roos wounded. On the French side GB Pigeon and GB Rynkiewicz were killed. On 7th April the French withdrew behind the Mincio. Later they would retire behind the Oglio. Schérer asked to be replaced; this was granted and he left the army on 27th April. On his suggestion, Moreau who had lead his troops such expertly at Magnano became his successor. The Austrians halted along the Mincio; the army encamped at Villafranca and no forceful pursuit followed. The reason for this must be found in the fact that Kray wanted to await the arrival of the designated commanders in chief. In fact Melas arrived only on the 10th April, Suvorov on the 14th and the first column of Russian troops of 11,000 men on the 18th. SummaryThe Austrian victory of Magnano which today has fallen into obscurity must be attributed to the energy and the offensive spirit of FML Kray whose achievements have not so far found due appreciation. Yet victory would not have been possible had the Austrians soldiers not fought extraordinarily well and shown themselves equal to the French. The high losses among the Austrian generals prove that Austrian leaders were ready to lead from the front disregarding their own personal safety. By comparison, the leadership of the French Army of Italy did not live up to expectations. Napoleon rightly criticised Schérer and maintained that Schérer should have taken a defensive position behind the Mincio, or in a camp south of Mantua, and awaited reinforcements. This course of action however would have been against the express orders of the Directory. The encounter battle of Magnano and the combats preceding it are remarkable for several reasons: They show that Austrians still, after several defeats, were capable of achieving a clear and decisive victory against French revolutionary armies. The Austrian victory was achieved although the Russians had not arrived yet. Austrian commander in chief FML Kray was only the oldest divisional commander (by accident because the designated commanders in chief Melas and Suvorov still hadn't arrived at the army). He showed himself to be the equal of the challenge. The Austrian victory of Magnano once more defeats the often repeated prejudice in military history whereby the young generals of the revolutionary armies continually defeated the weak and senile generals on the allied side. At 64 years old, Kray showed himself equal to 52 year old Schérer and 38 year old Moreau. The terrain where the fighting took place had been, and would be again in the future, the ground for many battles of the Austrian army. In 1796, 1797, 1800, 1805, 1809, 1814, 1848, 1859 and 1866 Austrian soldiers fought and spilt their blood there. The fighting has a lot of tension and drama. On 26th March at Pastrengo the fortunes of war smiled on Schérer. In one move - the crossing of the Adige - he could have decided the whole operation. Yet he obviously lacked the necessary daring, the moral fortitude and the necessary tactical foresight. On the other hand, on 5th April Kray understood that he must use his wisely kept reserves to secure victory for an Austrian army that had already almost been defeated. Finally let us hear what Kray himself had to say as we have the rare opportunity to have in the Kriegsarchiv the letters he wrote to his brother. These contain a great deal of personal insights and comments in which their author spoke plainly. He writes from Padua 20th March 1799 before the first combats: "I have already sent three orderlies to the new commander-in-chief as well as the Court War Council asking for instructions but have not received any to this date. Thus I will have to act as circumstances dictate. The new commander-in-chief left Graz on the 18th of this month and plans to arrive here travelling by short stages in his own coach which therefore can take long time. This means that I could be easily confronted with a battle which I will to try to win ..." After his victory from Verona he writes on 9th April: ". . . God has kept me lucky and I believe that I have done and shown enough for an temporary commander. I'm eager to know how it will be seen at Vienna. Hopefully all my enemies are humiliated and ashamed for having treated me so badly up until now. ... Yesterday the new commander-in-chief General Melas finally has arrived here and I have handed over command today. I am very much delighted to have ended my command in such an honourable way. By this I have saved the honour of the unlucky Army of Italy." Until 1918 there was a lasting monument to commemorate the victor of Magnano. From 1888 the Hungarian Infantry-Regiment No. 67, the successors of the Gradiskaner Grenzer, with its recruiting district in Eperjes in Upper Hungary (today Slovakia) bore the name of "FZM Paul Freiherr Kray de Krajova at Topolya". More Magnano
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As the opposing armies did not know anything about each other's dispositions, they approached on the same roads; the Austrians from north to south, the French in the opposite direction. Therefore at 11 o'clock Austrian Ist Column bumped into the French divisions of Victor and Grenier near Pozzo. The Austrians marched with the company of Jaegers at their head, then IR 28 and then IR 24. The rear was made up by the Levenehr dragoons. IR 28 had not fully deployed before it was overrun. The brigade commander GM Mittrowksy deployed IR 24 and ordered its advance under the command of Oberst Weidenfeld. The attack was executed with determination; bands playing. Outflanked on both wings this regiment was driven back too, losing many prisoners and 2 guns. When the French cavalry began to pursue the Austrian infantry FML Mercandin put himself at the head of the Levenehr dragoons and attacked the French cavalrymen. This was in vain; the Austrian dragoons were forced to retreat with Mercandin mortally wounded.
The remnants of the defeated Austrian column flooded back to Tomba pursued by the victorious French.