by John Cook, UK
In Dispatches FE19 Garry Wills asked a number of questions resulting from my articles on drill and tactics in FE 16 and 17, some of which I hope I have been able to deal with satisfactorily in subsequent articles. There remains the question of wheeling with a moving pivot which I can answer very simply. It was neither a Napoleonic innovation nor unique to the French.
Until the appearance of Brent Nosworthy's and George Nafziger's books [1], George Jeffrey's [1], mentioned by Garry, was the most recent examination of Napoleonic drill and tactics. The inference of George Jeffrey's study is that the French Règlement 1791 was in some way so different from all those that went before it, that it gave the French infantry a massive tactical advantage. I do not agree with this analysis.
Although the Règlement 1791 does display some differences from its peers, the fact of the matter is that as far drill was concerned its basic principles were as Prussian in essence as all the others. Indeed, although every regulation of the period exhibits variations on the numerous essential themes, the drill they contain is all founded on late 18th century Prussian practice and experimentation. The tactical doctrine of the respective protagonists, however, was something else entirely. It was, as I have said before, the way in which the tool was used that marked French practice as different, not the tool itself.
The differences in the Règlement 1791, particularly the notorious colonne d'attaque, have, in my view, been seized upon by some modern analysts in an attempt to explain the sometimes tactical superiority of the French infantry. However, the only advantage bestowed by a column formed by divisions on the centre, such as the colonne d'attaque and Prussian Angriffs-colonne, is speed of conversion into line because both wings are able to deploy to the left and right simultaneously, thus reducing the furthest distance any sub-unit (section through company to division) has to march. It is, therefore, merely a development of perpendicular deployment, the purpose of which is faster conversion into the familiar old linear order. The disadvantages of the colonne d'attaque were explained in my article in FE17 and for those reasons it probably saw less use than Napoleonic mythology would have us believe.
This seems, to me, to be a very reasonable analysis and after having examined more than a dozen Napoleonic infantry regulations it is my conclusion that the alleged intrinsic superiority of the Règlement 1791 is another modern Napoleonic legend, the subject of so much repeated fable, rather like the supposed superiority of British musketry, the point that it was the tactical circumstances in which it was used that made it different being constantly missed.
In the case of wheeling the basic mechanics differed hardly at all from regulation to regulation and the only limiting factor was the frontage involved.
Forming by files overcame this to a degree but at unit level one also finds that the battalion, and its sub-units, wheel by their component parts. What follows is a brief examination of elementary wheeling manoeuvres at sub-unit level and the application of wheeling in various methods of changing direction and position at unit (battalion) level. Where possible, illustrations have been taken from contemporary regulations; the quality of some is poor but I felt that they were far more interesting than my sketches could possibly be. In this context I'd like to take this opportunity to thank George Nafziger for his kindness in providing me with the illustrations from the Austrian Exercier-Reglement 1807 and a copy of Smirke's Review of a Battalion of Infantry, both of which have added considerably to this article and my understanding of some otherwise obscure texts.
To return to the subject under discussion, the ability to wheel was second only in importance to the ability of the soldier to place one foot after the other. At the lowest level it was necessary if individual ranks and sub-units were to carry out movements as part of unit conversions from one formation to another, and at the other so that the unit could change position or its direction of march. There were three distinct methods of changing direction available to the Napoleonic soldier and it seems appropriate to start there.
In this manoeuvre the man on the pivot flank did not move, except to turn on the spot towards the new direction, whilst the wheeling flank described an arc, individuals shortening their pace the closer they were to the pivot flank.
Wheel Continued
[1] Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies and A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare respectively.
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