One Wheel On My Wagon ...

Changes of Direction and Position
Part 1

by John Cook, UK


In Dispatches FE19 Garry Wills asked a number of questions resulting from my articles on drill and tactics in FE 16 and 17, some of which I hope I have been able to deal with satisfactorily in subsequent articles. There remains the question of wheeling with a moving pivot which I can answer very simply. It was neither a Napoleonic innovation nor unique to the French.

Until the appearance of Brent Nosworthy's and George Nafziger's books [1], George Jeffrey's [1], mentioned by Garry, was the most recent examination of Napoleonic drill and tactics. The inference of George Jeffrey's study is that the French Règlement 1791 was in some way so different from all those that went before it, that it gave the French infantry a massive tactical advantage. I do not agree with this analysis.

Although the Règlement 1791 does display some differences from its peers, the fact of the matter is that as far drill was concerned its basic principles were as Prussian in essence as all the others. Indeed, although every regulation of the period exhibits variations on the numerous essential themes, the drill they contain is all founded on late 18th century Prussian practice and experimentation. The tactical doctrine of the respective protagonists, however, was something else entirely. It was, as I have said before, the way in which the tool was used that marked French practice as different, not the tool itself.

The differences in the Règlement 1791, particularly the notorious colonne d'attaque, have, in my view, been seized upon by some modern analysts in an attempt to explain the sometimes tactical superiority of the French infantry. However, the only advantage bestowed by a column formed by divisions on the centre, such as the colonne d'attaque and Prussian Angriffs-colonne, is speed of conversion into line because both wings are able to deploy to the left and right simultaneously, thus reducing the furthest distance any sub-unit (section through company to division) has to march. It is, therefore, merely a development of perpendicular deployment, the purpose of which is faster conversion into the familiar old linear order. The disadvantages of the colonne d'attaque were explained in my article in FE17 and for those reasons it probably saw less use than Napoleonic mythology would have us believe.

    "I feel that the words of Pelet, Chambray, and Colin above show that columns of attack (columns on the middle) saw little or no use by the French, at least from 1805, on the basis of both theoretical considerations and practical ones, and that this was especially the case in multi-battalion columns of Divisions and Brigades as a whole, and in rapidly developing fights." [3]

This seems, to me, to be a very reasonable analysis and after having examined more than a dozen Napoleonic infantry regulations it is my conclusion that the alleged intrinsic superiority of the Règlement 1791 is another modern Napoleonic legend, the subject of so much repeated fable, rather like the supposed superiority of British musketry, the point that it was the tactical circumstances in which it was used that made it different being constantly missed. In the case of wheeling the basic mechanics differed hardly at all from regulation to regulation and the only limiting factor was the frontage involved.

Forming by files overcame this to a degree but at unit level one also finds that the battalion, and its sub-units, wheel by their component parts. What follows is a brief examination of elementary wheeling manoeuvres at sub-unit level and the application of wheeling in various methods of changing direction and position at unit (battalion) level. Where possible, illustrations have been taken from contemporary regulations; the quality of some is poor but I felt that they were far more interesting than my sketches could possibly be. In this context I'd like to take this opportunity to thank George Nafziger for his kindness in providing me with the illustrations from the Austrian Exercier-Reglement 1807 and a copy of Smirke's Review of a Battalion of Infantry, both of which have added considerably to this article and my understanding of some otherwise obscure texts.

To return to the subject under discussion, the ability to wheel was second only in importance to the ability of the soldier to place one foot after the other. At the lowest level it was necessary if individual ranks and sub-units were to carry out movements as part of unit conversions from one formation to another, and at the other so that the unit could change position or its direction of march. There were three distinct methods of changing direction available to the Napoleonic soldier and it seems appropriate to start there.

  1. The wheel with a stationary pivot.

    In this manoeuvre the man on the pivot flank did not move, except to turn on the spot towards the new direction, whilst the wheeling flank described an arc, individuals shortening their pace the closer they were to the pivot flank.

  2. The wheel with a moving pivot.
    In this case the pivot flank and wheeling flank both move, describing concentric arcs. Again, however, because the pivot described a smaller arc, the individuals shortened their pace as described above.

  3. Forming by files.
    Here the pivot flank moves separately from the rest of the manoeuvring sub-unit which changes direction by a march of files onto the new alignment. Forming is the British term for this manoeuvre which is used to describe it in the Rules and Regulations 1792. It remains in the repertoire today. It is sometimes called wheeling with a moving pivot but, although it is true that the pivot does move, strictly speaking this is not correct terminology. [4]

Wheel Continued

Footnotes

[1] Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies and A Guide to Napoleonic Warfare respectively.
[2] Jeffrey, George. Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. Brockton, MA, 1982. This is still a worthwhile primer although it compares the Règlement 1791 with the so called 'Prussian system' which is a somewhat generalised overview of mid-18th Century methods and does not take account of developments during the latter part of the 18th Century and, more importantly, ignores all reforms that took place during the Napoleonic period.
[3] John E. Koontz. "French Battalion Columns by Divisions." Empires, Eagles and Lions No86. March 1985. p23. Drawn principally from primary sources quoted in Colin, this article shows that the structure of the colonne d'attaque made formation directly from colonne par peletons impossible and that, for this reason, it probably saw comparatively little use.
[4] George Jeffrey and George Nafziger refer to forming as wheeling with a moving and floating pivot respectively.


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