The campaign of 1814 appears to be one of the least popular and well known of all Napoleon's campaigns. Yet the mere ten weeks that it lasted have been hailed as one of Napoleon's most outstanding martial achievements. Although it ultimately ended in defeat and abdication he showed much of his old verve and energy in leading a small army composed of half trained conscripts and grizzled old veterans to a series of dazzling victories before being finally overwhelmed. Despite the large numbers in the Allied armies many of the en-gagements had only 20,000 to 30,000 men on each side and there-fore lend themselves rather better to the wargames table than many of Napoleon's better known battles. They also offer the French tabletop general the chance to field a small army with a high proportion of Guard units, and the Allied general a host of nations to be represented; Russians, Austrians, Prussians, Wurtembugers and Bavarians. BACKGROUND After the catastrophic defeat at Leipzig in October 1813 the French army straggled back to its own borders. Luckily for Napoleon the Allies failed to follow up their advantage and it was not until early in January 1814 that they had crossed the Rhine into France. The borders were thinly protected by Napoleon's Marshals with the ragged remains of the Grand Army of 1813. Napoleon was in Paris securing his political position and energetically calling new conscripts to the Eagles. The Allied invasion was something of a military promenade as the 60,000 Frenchmen spread across the whole front could do little to stop Blucher's Silesian Army and Schwarzenberg's Bohemian Army, totalling 250,000. Eventually Napoleon was forced to make a move and so on the 26th January 1814 he arrived in Chalons at the head of the Imperial Guard. The following campaign did not start well for Napoleon. Firstly, at the Battle of Brienne on the 29th January he failed to stop Blucher joining Schwarzenberg. Then, after failing to take any positive action after that battle he was attacked and beaten at La Rothiere just three days later. The Allies failed to follow up their victory and splitting up once more into two armies set off on different roads towards Paris, believing Napoleon to be beaten and unable to resist. Napoleon was able to take advantage of the Allies overconfidence and, spotting that Blucher had allowed the various corps of his army to become dangerously spread out, struck at him first. With lightning speed Napoleon pounced on Blucher's isolated corps: At Champaubert he surprised Olsufiew's corps of 4,000 infantry and 24 guns and totally destroyed it on the 10th February. Olsufiew himself was captured and only 1,600 men and 15 guns escaped. The Emperor stood in the midst of Blucher's widely separated corps. He now headed west to Montmirail where, on the 11th February he defeated the Russian General Sacken's corps of about 18,000 men and 90 guns, despite the proximity of the Prussian corps of Yorck whose presence allowed Sacken to escape total collapse. Following up this victory Napoleon led a ruthless pursuit North until Sacken and Yorck scrambled across the River Marne at Chateau Thierry and destroyed the bridge behind them. Back to Blucher Napoleon now turned his attention to Blucher himself who was gradually pushing back the weak corps under Marmont that he had left to contain him whilst dealing with Olusfiew and Sacken. Blucher attacked Marmont on the 14th February at Vauchamps and was surprised to find that Napoleon was arriving with most of his army. Blucher was disastrously defeated and pushed back beyond Etoges. In the four days fighting at Champaubert, Montmirail and Vauchamps, Blucher's army of 56,000 men had lost over 16,000 men and 47 guns. Napoleon's loss had only been about 4000. With Blucher in disarray Napoleon was now forced to turn his attention to Schwarzenberg in the south. During February Schwarzenberg's massive army of 200,000 had only managed a painfully slow advance against the meagre 39,000 strong commands of Victor and Oudinot. However, by the time Napoleon arrived the Austrians under Bianchi had reached as far as Fontainbleu, just 30 miles from Paris itself. Leaving Mortier and Marmont to mask Blucher, Napoleon marched south with all his remaining troops. News of Blucher's mauling had thrown Schwarzenberg's headquarters into a panic. As soon as it was confirmed that Napoleon was on his way south plans were immediately drawn up for a withdrawal, despite the fact that Schwarzenberg's forces outnumbered what Napoleon could hope to put in the field by at least 2 to 1. As the withdrawal began the rearguards were attacked by Napoleon: On the 17th February Pahlen was attacked at Mormant by Gerard and badly beaten with the loss of 2,000 men and 10 guns. At Nangis, Wrede's Bavarian advanced guard was driven in with heavy loss. Napoleon followed these minor successes with an assault on Monte-reau where the Wurtemberg corps, under their Crown Prince, consisting of about 8,500 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 26 guns, attempted to stem Napoleon's advance. It was a foolhardy attempt in the face of Napoleon's 30,000 men and 70 guns and the outcome was entirely predictable; the Crown Prince lost nearly 5,000 men, 3,400 of them being prisoners, and 15 guns. Before this battle was over Schwarzenberg had issued orders for a general retreat on Troyes where he could concentrate his isolated corps. As Napoleon lost contact with Schwarzenberg's troops due to their precipitous retreat, news was coming in that Blucher had reorganised and reinforced the Silesian Army and was once more contemplating an advance on Paris. As Schwarzenberg continued his retreat across the Seine on the 24th February Napoleon gave orders for the second pursuit of Blucher. Napoleon had left Marmont and Mortier with only 10,000 men and they were quite unable to make much impression on Blucher whose recent reinforcement had brought him up to 53,000 men. As the most implacable of Napoleon's enemies Blucher had fully recovered from his fright earlier in the month and was intent on crushing Marmont and Mortier and marching on Paris. Napoleon marched north with about 35,000 men, planning to crush Blucher between himself and his two marshals. Inevitably Blucher was able to push Marmont and Mortier back with little problem until they crossed the Marne. Here they were able to make a stand between the 28th February and the 1st March giving Blucher a bloody nose as he tried to outflank them. It was around the 1st of March that Blucher first started receiving reports that Napoleon was marching on his rear. Perhaps recalling events in the middle of February Blucher immediately retired north to avoid Napoleon's trap and to join up with Bulow and Winzingerode who were moving towards him with another 47,000 men. The sudden surrender of Soissons and it's important bridge over the Aisne to Blucher denied Napoleon the opportunity for a decisive battle with him whilst the odds were almost even. However, the fortuitous deliverance of that bridge to Blucher allowed him to escape an unwanted battle and meet up with his considerable reinforcements. As Blucher continued his march north towards Laon, Napoleon, without a bridging train, was struggling to secure a crossing over Aisne. This he achieved at Berry-au-Bac once Nansouty and Pac had driven away the Cossacks who were guarding the bridge. THE BATTLE OF CRAONNE Both Blucher and Napoleon were heading for Laon. As Napoleon's troops advanced from Berry-au-Bac more and more contacts were made with Russian detachments. On the 6th Mar Meunier was forced to storm the Abbey of Vauclerc and two battalions of the Old Guard drove the enemy from Chevreux and Craonne. However they were unable to take the small plateau above these villages. Meunier co-operated by attacking from Vaulcerc to Heurtebise; the battle for the latter became quite fierce and the farm changed hands several times before remaining in the hands of the Rus-sians. The small plateau was evacuated by the 13th and 14th Jaeger Regiments who had fought valiantly against the Old Guard battalions. As night fell on the 6th Mar Napoleon realised he would have to deal with the force on the Chemin des Dames feature, estimated as 20,000 strong, before continuing his advance to Loan. Blucher decided to hold Chemin des Dames with a strong force commanded by Woronzow and supported by Sacken, whilst Winzingerode with 10,000 or 12,000 cavalry (5,500 of his own, all of Langerons's cavalry and Yorck's reserve cavalry) would execute a wide flanking march and fall on Napoleon's northern flank and rear as he attacked Waronzow from the east. Winzingerode was to be followed by the infantry of Yorck, Kleist and Langeron to support his attack. GROUND The Chemin des Dames, upon which the battle was to be fought, is an unusual feature: It is a long plateau of varying width which stretches from Corbeny in the east to the far side of Soissons in the west. In the east it's steep sides rise to nearly 500 feet above the surrounding plain. At this end is a salient which is known as the small plateau of Craonne. It is joined to the main plateau by a thin neck of high ground which is only 150 yds wide, on which stands the large farm of Hurtebise. One main road runs along the plateau from end to end and this leads past the farm which is slightly below the level of the plateaus on either side of the neck. On the north the high ground of the plateau falls steeply down to the valley of the Lette River, and to the south towards the valley of Foulon. Blucher believed that an attack could only be launched from the narrow neck and so felt that Woronzow's troops could be sufficient to hold the plateau whilst Winzingerode executed the decisive turning movement to the north to attack the French flank and rear. THE FORCES The French army of 1814 was only a shadow of its former, glorious self. Divisions and corps were now only the strengths of regi-ments and brigades. Some battalions started the campaign less than a hundred strong and many others quickly dipped below that as the bad weather, hard marching and battle casualties took their toll. By the time of Craonne this strategic consumption gives the modern researcher some idea of the rigours of soldiers during the Napoleonic campaign Meunier's Young Guard Division was made up of the 1st to 4th Regiments of Voltigeurs and was just over 4,000 strong on the 25th January 1814. At Craonne on the 7th March it mustered just 1,000. Although Napoleon received a constant steam of reinforcements they were bearly trained or equipped and could not keep pace with the losses that his army suffered. Only the Old Guard was able to maintain it's strength and effectiveness throughout the campaign, making incredible marches in time to make decisive contributions on the battlefield. This quick turnover, the numerous reorganisations that Napoleon was forced to complete and the disarray of the administrative system makes detailed study of the composition and strengths of the French army an intriguing but frustrating task. Consequently, I have only been able to break the French forces at Craonne down by division and approximate strength. The Russian order of battle is far batter documented and there-fore more detailed. Of course they too suffered from considerable strategic consumption although their supply system was more effective and administration better organised. On the morning of the 7th March, at about 8 o'clock, Napoleon rode up to the small plateau in order to examine the Russian position. On the main plateau Woronzow had formed his forces in three lines of battalion columns; the first line, 14 battalions strong, stretched across the road opposite the farm of Heurtebise, and 1,200 yards from it, with the left on the edge of the plateau. The second line was composed of seven battalions, and the third of nine. They were drawn up 500 yards and 1,000 yards respectively in the rear of the first line. The farm of Heurtebise was occupied by 800 men with two squadrons of the Pavogradsky Hussars in support. On the right of the first line was the rest of the Hussars and four regiments of Cossacks. Two miles or so behind the third line were Sacken's 4,000 cavalry under the command of Wassilchikow. 36 guns commanded the neck between the two woods of Marion and de Quatre Heures with twelve more supporting them to the south. On the left were eighteen guns covering the Lette valley, and a reserve of twenty more were posted between the second and third lines. THE BATTLE The battle opened at 0900 on the 7th Mar with a large but fairly ineffective artillery duel. The French guns had unlimbed 2,500 yards away from the Russian lines and it was this range rather than anything else which kept casualties on both sides to a minimum. At this time Napoleon was still waiting for many of his troops to come up from Berry-au-Bac. Immediately available he had Ney's two tiny divisions of the Young Guard (together only 2,100 strong) and P. Boyer's brigade of Spanish veterans (1,900 strong), Boyer de Rebeval's Young Guard Division of Victor's Corps, Friant's Old Guard Division and the Guard Cavalry divisions of Exelmans and Colbert; in total about 18,400 men. Napoleon's plan was to fix Woronzow by developing an attack against his centre and once this was achieved to attack both flanks; Ney from the north and Nansouty, with the 1st and 2nd Divisions of Guard cavalry, from the south. Unfortunately for Napoleon he was once more let down by Ney's impetuosity. No sooner had Napoleon's artillery on the plateau opened fire then he launched his own divisions into the attack with no artillery preparation or support as his own guns had not yet come up. P Boyer's brigade was thrown against the village of Ailles and Meunier's division against the heights to the south east of it with predictable results. Heavy casualties were inflicted by the Russian guns on the edge of the plateau to which Ney had no reply. By 10 o'clock and despite their terrible casualties, Meunier's men had fought their way to the edge of the plateau but were incapable of advancing further. A Russian counter attack immediately threw them off again and they reformed at the bottom of the slope. Meanwhile on Napoleon's left flank the 1st and 2nd divisions of Guard Cavalry under Nansouty had started their march against the Russian right which was guarded by the Pavogradsky Hussar Regiment and 4 regiments of Cossacks. Moving via Vasogne on the narrow, slippery tracks that led up to the plateau this was a slow and easily observable manoeuvre. Despite their valiant attacks, Ney's troops were taking heavy casualties and his guns had still not arrived. To give him some support Napoleon sent Boyer de Rebeval's Division of the Young Guard into action as soon as they arrived on the battlefield some time before 11 o'clock. The only other troops he had available prior to their arrival was Friant's 1st Division of the Old Guard and it was far too early in the day to commit these incomparable troops. Boyer de Rebeval's Young Guardsmen attacked past Heurte-bise and came into line on Ney's left flank, thus relieving the pressure on Meunier's battered troops. This manoeuvre also had the effect of cutting off the Russian garrison of Heurtebise and, the farm being well ablaze, the remains of the 800 man garrison struggled back to the Russian lines. By 11.30 Ney's artillery had finally got into position and in conjunction with 4 batteries deployed by Napoleon on Boyer de Rebeval's left now that Heurtebise had been evacuated, the French were finally able to return some of the heavy Russian artillery fire. Ney was now able to launch a more co-ordinated attack and once more his troops battled their way onto the edge of the plateau. Boyer de Rebeval's troops fought their way into Marion wood and pushed the Russians out, but the artillery fire was so heavy that they could not advance further. The Russian guns were sweeping the battlefield causing terrible losses whilst many of the French guns, with only inexperienced and half trained crews, were getting the worst of the counter battery fire. By 12 o'clock, although the Russian left had partially pulled back the fighting seemed to have reached a stalemate. Meanwhile, on the French left, Nansouty's troopers had climbed the more gentle southern slopes and formed up on the plateau. By 11.30 they had charged Benkendorf's cavalry covering the Russian right and defeated it, including two infantry battalions sent to it's aid which were driven back on Paissy. They were only saved from total destruction by the fire of a reserve battery which held Nansouty's men in check. Back on the right and centre, Ney's and Victor's assault had ground to a halt in the face of withering artillery fire. Due to the ground the French guns were in no position to help or had already been effectively suppressed. At this critical time Victor himself was wounded as the French troops maintained a mere toe hold on the edge of the plateau in the face of terrible casualties. Critical Point The battle had reached a critical point and Napoleon had only Friant's Grumblers and Sparre's recently arrived brigade of dragoons. This brigade, consisting of the 5th and 12th Dragoon Regiments were made up of hardened Spanish veterans. At 1pm they were ordered to charge the guns which were causing Ney's troops such terrible casualties. The dragoons, led by Grouchy, charged from behind Marion Wood, sabred the gunners and captured 12 pieces. It was now Woronzow's turn to make a critical decision : Although his centre was still firm both flanks were now being driven in and his centre was therefore in danger of being cut off. Two infantry regiments were ordered to charge the dragoons with the bayonet and drive them back. Their horses blown and with no sup-port the dragoons were forced to give up the guns they had re-cently captured. They drew back and formed up again in front of Boyer de Rebeval's troops. The Russians were quick to bring the guns back into action and were soon reaping a terrible harvest once more. As the French dragoons stood under a terrible fire of grape and ball both Grouchy and Sparre were wounded almost simultaneously. Leaderless and with mounting casualties the dragoons were at-tacked by an infantry brigade from Woronzow's second line. The dragoons turned and fled; in an instant they gathered up Ney's and Boyer de Rebeval's troops and the whole went tumbling down into the Thette valley where order was gradually restored. On the Russian right things were also going wrong for the French The Russian cavalry reformed behind the artillery that had saved them from total destruction and with it's fire support were able to counter attack Nansouty and throw him back to the edge of the plateau. The pendulum had swung once more against the French but at last Napoleon had more troops arriving. The first available was La Farriere's 3rd Guard Cavalry Division. At 1.45pm this was thrown against the centre of the Russian line and although it was thrown back it's sacrifice had brought Napoleon the time he required to bring up Charpentier's Young Guard Division of Victor's corps. As this division advanced to the south of Heurtebise Ney's troops once more bravely struggled up the northern slopes. At 2.00pm they had once more established themselves on the plateau. As the French regained momentum so Nansouty was once more able to advance against the Russian right. Napoleon realised that the resistance was finally beginning to weaken. Both Boyer de Rebev-al's and the Guard artillery was now able to deploy between Marion and Quatre Heures Woods and put extra pressure on the Russian front line. Under cover of this fire the French were finally able to form a continuous line across the Chemin de Dames and therefore exert pressure across the whole front. Although Napoleon was unaware of it, the apparent weakening of Russian resolve co-incided with Sacken's third order to Woronzow to retire. Woronzow was unwilling to follow these orders as he felt to withdraw in the face of increasing French pressure could lead to diaster. He believed that he was holding his own and could do so until darkness when the withdrawal could be conducted in safety. At 2.30, as the Russians contemplated withdrawal, Napoleon deployed his reserve artillery to join the guns already deployed across the far side of the plateau's neck just beyond Heurtebise. Now 88 guns were in position and it was the Russian's turn to face concentrated artillery fire. Charpentier's left, in contact with Nansouty's right, began to force in the right of the Russian infantry. However, having forced the Russian cavalry back, Nansouty was forced to retire once more by artillery fire. On the right P Boyer's brigade had finally forced the Russians out of Ailles and the remains of Meunier's and Rebeval's troops were advancing from the area of Marion Wood. Russian Retreat Finally, in the centre, Curial, Friant and the 3rd division of Guard cavalry advanced through Drouot's guns along the Chemin des Dames. The Russians now began their withdrawal; an orderly affair conducted in square. Many of the Russians were furious at being ordered to evacuate a position they had paid dearly to defend and one regiment actually charged the French guns rather than with-draw. However, they narrowly evaded being captured and were forced to follow their comrades. As the retreat continued the Russians were constantly harassed by the French cavalry and twice they set up gun lines to slow the French and give themselves time to regroup. Sacken's 4,000 cavalry were also sent forward to counter the French cavalry who outflanked these temporary holding positions but these too were eventually thrown back. At Chevregny the Russians reached fresh allied troops who had not been engaged and could not be followed. The French pursuit there-fore ended between 7 and 8pm. Throughout the battle the Russians had anxiously awaited news of Winzingerode's flanking march. This supposedly decisive manoeuvre had turned to farce. Firstly, the forces allocated to this move were widely spread and to allow them to concentrate and rest Winzingerode deferred the start until the morning. When he did start he took the longer route along appalling tracks that some-times reduced the column to single file and the attempt was aborted. Russian commentators declare that should this manoeuvre have been completed in time Napoleon would have been decisively defeated. However, the French authors point to the uncommitted troops that Napoleon had following up and suggest that these would have been perfectly sufficient to have held Winzingerode in check. Certainly, Blucher's plan for a turning movement was good in conception but badly executed. Craonne was but a pyrrhic victory for Napoleon, who was only able to make real headway against Woronzow once the latter had been ordered three times to retire. Mikhailofsky-Danielefsky, an ADC to the Emperor Alexander describes the battle as a great Russian feat of arms which was only tainted by the need to withdraw in daylight. French commentators admit that the Russians fought bravely but point out that Napoleon attacked an immensely strong position with numbers that were actually inferior to the Russians until the latter part of the battle as more troops came up. Certainly the Russians lost no cannon or colour and inflicted at least 5,500 casualties. The Russians themselves lost 6000, including 3 generals killed. These were very high casualties in relation to the numbers engaged. By being forced to attack Woronzow, Napoleon's plan to anticipate Blucher, or cut off part of his army at Laon, had been disrupted. In the event Napoleon had to follow Blucher's troops to that place. He convinced himself that his victory had forced Blucher into a disordered retreat which would force him to withdraw beyond Laon before he could restore some order to his defeated army. In fact Woronzow was able to conduct an orderly withdrawal to Laon where Blucher had formed up the whole of his army, now over 100,000 strong. Napoleon, suffering from this fatal delusion now led his exhausted 40,000 men into a trap he was lucky to escape. RUSSIAN ORDER OF BATTLE 3rd Infantry Corps - Count Woronzow Division - Maj. Gen. Laptiew Brigade Rudinger Neust Regt 1 Bn 2nd Jaegers 1 Bn 44th Jaegers 2 Bns Brigade Rosen Lithuanian Regt 1 Bn Podolie Regt 1 Bn Pretrowsk Regt 1 Bn Division - Maj. Gen. Wuitsch Brigade Swarikin Schwirwansk Regt 2 Bns Butirsk Regt 2 Bns 19th Jaegers 2 Bns Brigade Laharpe Navaginsk Regt 2 Bns Tula Reg 2 Bns Combined Grenadiers 3 Bns Brigade Krasowski Ufimsk Regt 2 Bns 13th Jaegers 2 Bns 14th Jaegers 2 Bns Brigade Selivanov Ochotsk Regt 1 Bn Kamschatcka Regt 1 Bn Division - Maj. Gen. Stzawitzki Brigade Levandowski Odessa Regt 1 Bn Wilna Regt 1 Bn Brigade Alexejew Terraspol Regt 1 Bn Simbirsk Regt 1 Bn Brigade Kollogribow 49th Jaegers 1 Bn 50th Jaegers 1 Bn Total : 34 Bns, 13,000 men. 72 Guns Corps detached from Army of Poland - Gen. Stroganow Brigade Sanders Smolensk Regt 1 Bn Narva Regt 1 Bn Brigade Schwetschin Alexopol Regt 2 Bns New Ingrie Regt 1 Bn Brigade Prince Glebow 6th Jaegers 1 Bn 41st Jaegers 1 Bn Brigade Scheltuchin Pensa Reg 1 Bn Saratow Regt 2 Bns Total : 10 Bns. 5,000 men. 24 Guns Cavalry Brigade Benkendorf Pavografski Hussars 9 Sqns 3rd Sisoeva Cossacks 2 Sqns Girowa Cossacks 2 Sqns 18th Grekow Cossacks 2 Sqns ? Cossacks 2 Sqns Total - 17 Sqns - 2000 men SACKEN'S CAVALRY In support. Lt Gen Wassiltschikow HUSSARS DIVISION. LT GEN LANDSKOY Brigade Prince Wadbolski Aschtirsk Hussars 4 Sqns Marienpol Hussars 4 Sqns Brigade Kaslowski White Russian Hussars 4 Sqns Alexander Hussars 4 Sqns DRAGOON DIVISION. MAJ GEN PANTSCHULIDZEW Brigade Uschakow Courland Dragoons 3 Sqns Smolensk Dragoons 3 Sqns Brigade Umanez Twer Dragoons 3 Sqns Kimburn Dragoons 3 Sqns COSSACK DIVISION. GEN KARPOW 2nd Karpow 2 Sqns Sementschenko 2 Sqns Lukowkin 2 Sqns Kutainikow iv 2 Sqns Grekow 2 Sqns St Peterberg Volunteers 2 Sqns 4th Ukraine 2 Sqns 2nd Kalmuks Total - 44 Sqns. 4000 men FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE Commander in Chief: Emperor Napoleon Ney's Corps 1st Voltigeur Division YG (Meunier) 1,000 2nd Voltigeur Division YG (Curial) 1,100 P. Boyer's Brigade 1,900 Victor's Corps 1st Provisional Division YG (Charpentier) 5,400 2nd Provisional Division YG (Boyer de Rebeval) 4,000 From Mortier's Corps 3rd Provisional Division YG (Poret de Morvan) 4,800 2nd Old Guard Division (Christiani) 2,400 Under Napoleon's direct command 1st Division Old Guard (Friant) 6,000 Total Inf : 27,200 CAVALRY Nansouty 1st Guard Cavalry Division (Colbert) 900 2nd Guard Cavalry Division (Exelmans) 1,500 Grouchy From Roussel d'Urbal's Dragoon Division Sparre's Dragoon Brigade (5th and 12th Regts) 1,000 From Mortier: 3rd Guard Cavalry Division (La Ferriere) 1,500 Total Cav : 4,900 ARTILLERY A total of 102 guns More 1814 Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814 Napoleon's Letters to Marie-Louise Campaign 1814 Large Map (slow: 103K) Campaign 1814 Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 308K) Battle of Craonne Large Map (slow: 119K) Battle of Craonne Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 541K) Related Battle of La Rothiere (FE#43) Battle of Montmirail (FE#36) Battle of Craonne (FE#34) Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #19 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by First Empire. 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