In the spring of 1815, months before the blood and thunder of Waterloo brought the Napoleonic era to a close, a brief campaign in central Italy heralded the demise of Marshal
Joachim Murat's Kingdom of Naples. Seen by some as the first glimmering of the Italian independence struggle and by others as the last act of a confused and desperate man, this war
opened with Murat launching a bold offensive into northern Italy and ended two months later with a complete victory for his opponent, Feldmarschalleutnant (FML) Friedrich Freiherr von
Bianchi commanding the Austrian 'Army of Naples'.
The principal engagement of the campaign, and hence the Neapolitan army's last major battle, was fought at Tolentino on 2 and 3 May. Given Colin Allen's fine series of pieces on Murat's army, it seems an appropriate moment to examine this obscure engagement.
A Hasty, Hopeful Expedition
The Italian campaign of 1815 grew out of Murat's desire to unite all of Italy under his own sceptre and his belief that a bold stroke against the Austrian forces in the northern half of the peninsula would inspire the people of Italy to throw off Habsburg domination. Doubtless pushed by Machiavellian spouse, Caroline Bonaparte, Murat had renounced his emperor during the calamitous days of 1813-14. He thus retained his throne as the Allied powers shipped Napoleon off to Elba and demolished the old Kingdom of Italy, retaking some lands and dividing the remainder between the Pope and a clutch of exiled dukes and princes.
Upon Napoleon's return to France, however, Murat again heard the sounds of glory in the distance and rediscovered the bonds of loyalty that still tied him to his old master. On 15 March, against the advice of his ministers and queen, he decided to take up the sword against Austria and began making preparations for a strike north as the 'liberator of Italy'. In doing so, he managed to irritate Napoleon, incite Allied retaliation and seal his own doom.
Political and strategic considerations aside, Murat should have been deterred by the state of his army. In addition to manpower shortages that left most regiments understrength, many of the soldiers in the ranks of the Neapolitan Arrny in 1815 were new recruits, inexperienced, poorly trained and ill-equipped. Artillery was in short supply, the existing equipment deficient and the draft horses 'in a deplorable state' according to one officer. The cavalry horses too were mostly young and inadequately trained (although the 1st Regiment seems to have been an exception). Moreover, morale and discipline, never the strong points of Neapolitan units, were generally poor to execrable.
Raised by the forced enrolment of prisoners, deserters, draft evaders, and other malcontents, many regiments thus began to melt away as soon as the campaign opened and proved fragile entities on the battlefield. These problems were especially acute in the newer regiments, particularly the 9th Line, 10th Line and 4th Light. As Murat's chief of engineers recalled, the army was 'a numerous troop, with little discipline, disorganised in its administration, scarcely armed, richly dressed, courageous, presumptuous'. Easily enthused in moments of victory, it would quickly slide into disorder, indiscipline and disintegration in times of crisis.
Good leadership could have ameliorated or corrected some of these faults, but the calibre of officer in Murat's army was generally low and many of his generals - most notably his chief of staff, Armand Millet de Villeneuve - were notoriously indolent and incapable. Jealous rivalries hindered cooperation and few had any great faith in their comrades, their king or their cause.
The Habsburg forces presented a very different picture. Besides being better equipped, trained and provisioned, most of the Austrian units in Italy had much more combat experience than their foes.
Leadership, at least at the junior levels was also generally superior. Scattered all over the peninsula in small garrisons, they would be unable to act offensively for several weeks, but reinforcements were en route and the senior commander in Italy, General der Kavallerie Johann Graf Frimont von Palota, had instructions to attack as soon as possible.
His broad directions outlined two specific objectives. First, his mission was to destroy the Neapolitan Army and thereby eliminate the threat to Austrian forces operating on France's Alpine frontier. Second, he should not waste time chasing Murat deep into southern Italy, but should endeavour to engage the Neapolitans as far north as possible (that is, near the Po River).
No Plan
In contrast, Murat appears to have had no plan of campaign whatsoever. Departing his capital on 17 March, he rode northeast to Ancona where his line cavalry division and two line infantry divisions had been stationed since the end of the previous year's hostilities and where Lieutenant General (LTG) Giuseppe Lechi's 3rd Division was slowly assembling. Here he dithered and consulted while the well-informed Austrians gathered their forces.
Finally, on 27 March, after a confused counsel of war, King Joachim decided to launch his offensive and the next morning his brightly uniformed, fragile army, about 40,000 strong, marched north toward the Po valley. In the meantime, poorly coordinated with the actions of the main army, the two small Guard divisions had crossed the border into the Papal territories on the 22nd. Murat's vague concept appears to have been that these two forces would unite at Bologna, but as the campaign opened, they were separated by the daunting heights of the Apennines and vulnerable to defeat in detail. The 4th Division and a variety of militia
units remained behind to guard the kingdom.
For a week, Murat's men made good progress. Offering occasional resistance, the dispersed Austrian detachments fell back and the king marched up the coast, turning inland at Rimini to make a triumphal entry into Bologna on 1 April.
Wasted Days
Instead of pushing on to the weakly-guarded Po, however, he wasted three days in issuing proclamations and vainly attempting to rally Italian volunteers to his flag. He only resumed the advance on the 4th, pushing back an Austrian rear guard, but losing over 300 deserters from the engaged division (LTG Michele Carascosa's 1st). His entrance into Modena was poorly received and his recruiting agents met with little success; indeed, in some cases they were chased and harassed by local citizens. Murat began to lose confidence in himself and his schemes.
Still he persisted. Leaving Carascosa near Carpi, he took the 2nd Division northeast (Lechi formed a link between the other two divisions), encircling the citadel of Ferrara on the 6th and finally reaching the banks of the Po on 7 April. The same day, on the other side of the mountains, Generals Pignatelli-Strongoli and Livron brought their Guard troops into Florence on the heels of the retreating Austrians.
Halt
At the Po, the Neapolitan advance came to a halt. Hoping to use the river line as a flank shield for a march on Milan, Murat spent another day (8 April) trying to reduce an Austrian bridgehead north of Ferrara but was unable to dislodge the defenders. Murat now lost his nerve and the initiative.
On the 10th, an Austrian reconnaissance in force struck General Guglielmo Pepe's brigade at Carpi and two days later a foray from the bridgehead pressed the blockading Neapolitan force back. The next morning, however, when the Austrian attack was renewed in concert with a sally from the citadel in Ferrara, the Habsburg troops found the enemy's lines deserted. Having ordered the Guard to join the main army, Murat had skillfully slipped out during the night and begun the long retreat that would lead to Tolentino and the downfall of his kingdom.
Retreat and Pursuit
Several days passed before the Austrians could launch a full pursuit, but by the 16th Frimont had united most of his force in Bologna and was prepared to advance. Given the generally weak state of the Neapolitan Army and the need for a speedy end to the campaign, Frimont adopted the risky strategy of dividing his main body into two columns.
The eastern force, approximately 15,500 men commanded by Generalmajor (GM) Graf Adam Neipperg, was to push down the coast, keeping close contact with Murat and delaying the Neapolitan retreat, while the energetic Bianchi with 12,000 men slipped over the Apennines and hurried south toward Foligno.
With luck, these two forces would catch and crush Murat somewhere near Ancona. Simultaneously, GM Laval Graf Nugent would depart Pistoia and move on Rome via Florence with a small third column (3,300). Encountering no resistance, Nugent entered Florence on 16 April (the Neapolitan Guards had departed the day before) and marched into Rome on 3 May, just as Murat's fate was being decided at Tolentino.
Neipperg followed Murat and gained several bright successes, humiliating the Neapolitans and eroding their morale, but his pursuit lacked drive and energy. As a result, the Neapolitan king was able to concentrate his army, Guards and line, north of Ancona in late April. Operationally, his situation was good, indeed exciting in its possibilities. Though much weakened by desertion, Murat still commanded some 28-32,000 men and would outnumber his opponents if he could face them individually.
With five days' march separating the two Austrian columns, his united force, using interior lines, was in an ideal position to defeat Bianchi and Neipperg in detail. Even Murat could not fail to recognise his opportunity and he resolved to strike Bianchi with four divisions while Carascosa's men held off Neipperg. The army's morale bolstered by a victory, he then hoped to turn north, join Carascosa and defeat Neipperg.
Bianchi, meanwhile, reached Tolentino with his main body on I May, cutting Murat's principal line of withdrawal. Now in command of the Austrian Army of Naples (Frimont had been called away to the north), he established his men in a good blocking position astride the main road and ordered Neipperg to hasten his advance against the Neapolitan rear.
Although he knew he was outnumbered, he evidently had enough confidence in his men - or enough disdain for his foe - to expect them to hold Murat until Neipperg could arrive to complete the destruction of the enemy army.
For Battle
Learning that evening that Murat had arrived near Macerata with the 2nd Division and his Guard, and that Neipperg would not be able to provide support before the expected clash, Bianchi none the less disposed his troops for battle on the morning of 2 May. GM Senitzer commanded on the left with two battalions of Chasteler and one of Wacquant on the ridge in front of Madia, and one battalion each of Hiller and Simbschen along with a squadron of dragoons along the heights north of Casone.
Athwart the main road at the Osteria della Rancia and behind it in reserve were one battalion each of Simbschen and Erzherzog Karl, the 9th Jager Battalion, three or four squadrons of dragoons and four of hussars under Generals Starhemberg and Taxis. Vedettes were located as far forward as the Osteria di Sforza Costa and Monte Milone was occupied. Across the Chienti near Vamoccio were another battalion of Hiller, the Modena battalion and an hussar platoon. FML Baron Mohr was responsible for both the centre and the right. GM Eckhardt was posted at San Severino with a battalion of Erzherzog Karl and another hussar platoon to watch the extreme left. Tolentino itself, its homes loopholed for defence, was held by the remaining battalion of Erzherzog Karl. All in all, Bianchi had in hand approximately 9,800 infantry, 933 cavalry and 28 guns.
While Bianchi acted with resolution and celerity, Murat allowed his opportunity to slip away. His plan to exploit his central position was good but its success depended on speed and determination that Murat and his weak chief of staff proved incapable of providing. They failed, for example, to conduct reconnaissances of the terrain and roads near Tolentino and Macerata even though they expected to fight over this ground and had plenty of time to gather information before the Austrians arrived (they could have sent staff officers to scout the area as early as the 27th).
Intelligence on the enemy was also poor. The Guard cavalry and two battalions of the 10th Line (and perhaps the 'officers battalion') were in Macerata on the 29th and they were joined by the rest of the Guard and the king himself by the evening of the 30th, but Murat appears to have been completely ignorant of Habsburg strength at Tolentino. He thus wasted the first day of May with feeble and pointless reconnaissances despite his numerical superiority.
For much of the day, he faced only Bianchi's advance guard, but he allowed his probes to be repulsed and permitted the outnumbered Austrians to occupy several key features of the prospective battlefield (such as the village of Monte Milone). Furthermore, he inexplicably left Lechi's 3rd Division nearly a day's march away to the north-east. General Angelo d'Ambrosio's 2nd Division. however, did arrive, giving Murat a slight numerical superiority over Bianchi for the next day's battle: some 10-12,000 infantry. 1,500-1,700 cavalry and 32 guns.
More Tolentino
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