On July 3, Brown led the First and Second Brigades across the Niagara River. There were insufficient numbers of boats so Porter's Third Brigade remained behind until the next day. The Left Division captured Fort Erie with little effort. Brown's soldiers spent the evening consolidating their toehold in Canada. Throughout the night and into the next day the river vessels and their oarsmen strained to transfer men, animals, guns, wagons and supplies to the Canadian shore. Brown ordered Scott to march the following day with his brigade to capture the bridge over the Chippawa River before the British arrived there in strength. Meanwhile, Porter remained in Buffalo with his brigade (Fenton's Pennsylvanians and Red Jacket's Iroquois) waiting to cross over. Swift's regiment of New York volunteers had begun the march from Batavia but they were still short of bayonets, sabers, and blankets. Porter was annoyed that it had taken the Secretary of War far too long to send equipment “or even [to take] any notice of the existence of such a corps.”
On the 4th of July, Scott's Brigade led the way toward the British lines north of the Chippawa River. This swift river flowed easterly across the Niagara Peninsula and into the Niagara a few miles south of the falls. Ripley's Brigade marched a few miles behind Scott's. Reaching the Chippawa late in the evening and finding the British position too strong to attack by himself, Scott bivouacked his men south of Street's Creek about two miles south of the British camp. Brown with the main body of the Left Division joined the First Brigade at 11 P.M. and immediately encamped south of Scott's men. Brown planned to attack the British on 6 July, after Porter's brigade closed on the division. Porter was irritated that Brown had the Third Brigade bringing up the rear, however, he hid it well. All day long and into the night his men, wagons, and equipment crossed the Niagara. Over one hundred of Fenton's Pennsylvanians refused to cross the border but almost five times that number followed their officers into Canada. Porter bedded down his men, determined he would march early on the 5th.
Early in the morning of 5 July, a party of Grand River Iroquois supported by some militiamen of the 2d Lincolns crossed the Chippawa, entered the woods, and moved directly south toward the American camp. Their mission was to harass the enemy pickets and to spy on the Americans. Riall wanted to know the strength of the opposition before him. These Indians and Canadians crossed Street's Creek and worked their way closer to the American camp. Before them, at intervals in the forest, were pickets, groups of soldiers whose mission it was to keep the enemy out of musket range of the camp and to sound the alarm in the event of a major attack. Secure behind this screening picket line, Brown met with Scott and Ripley to plan their attack for the next day.
Some Canadians and Indians passed around the pickets and fired their muskets from the woodline toward the encampment hundreds of yards away. This long-range fire was more irritating than effective. However, the Indians overran one picket and Brown was determined to remove this nuisance while he prepared for an attack the following day.
General Brown, riding south out of camp for three miles, met Porter at the head of his column. As they rode, Brown briefed Porter and ordered him to use his Iroquois "aided if necessary by the volunteers" to scour the woods and eliminate all enemy south of the Chippawa River. Brown needed the forest secured if he was to move through it the following day in an attempt to turn Riall's flank. Porter's men moved into an open field south of Ripley's brigade to rest and eat what little food was available, two pieces of hard bread per man. Porter had his men marching at sunrise and they had not eaten yet that day. Brown rode across Street's Creek bridge to issue his orders to his picket line.
Red Jacket's Iroquois
While Fenton's men ate, Red Jacket's Iroquois put on war paint. To distinguish themselves from their enemy, the natives painted red lines on their foreheads and black vertical stripes on their cheeks. They topped off this "uniform" with white headbands. When asked to accompany the native warriors into the forest, the tired and hungry Pennsylvanians balked. To inspire their men, several of Fenton's officers took off their swords, picked up muskets, and volunteered to enter the woods as privates. Three hundred militiamen volunteered to fight, taking off their hats to distinguish themselves from the Canadians. The two hundred who chose not to come forward were kept under arms and remained in camp.
Porter had about 850 men to make his sweep. In the open area south of the American camp he formed the Indians and militiamen into a single file perpendicular to the Niagara. The Iroquois were on the west flank and the Pennsylvanians the east. Red Jacket was at the front of the slender column and Porter positioned himself between his two battalions. With Porter was Captain Pollard, the senior war chief after Red Jacket. The line extended for three quarters of a mile. South of Porter was a company of regulars who would act as a reserve. On command, Porter's thin column walked quietly westward until the Iroquois were in the forest and the Pennsylvanians remained in the open. The men faced right (north), each one close enough to hold hands with the individuals on his flanks. Indian chiefs moved forward about twenty paces and Indian scouts advanced even further.
About 4 P.M. the long line paced forward slowly and quietly. The scouts found Riall's skirmishers, a body of nearly one hundred western Indians, behind the thick bushes along Street's Creek. The signal was passed back to stop. Porter's men prepared to meet the enemy.
Attack
Within minutes the signal to attack was given and Porter's line surged forward. The western Indians fired first and many withdrew as the Iroquois and Pennsylvanians waded the creek, emerged on the opposite shore, and gave chase. The fight was confused and fierce as only combat in dense woods can be. War cries and heavy musket fire pierced the air. Porter's Iroquois line disintegrated into smaller parties moving rapidly northward, bowling over Britain's native allies, scores of whom fought to the end rather than surrender. The Pennsylvanians were drawn into the woods and did their best to keep up with the New York Indians in a running fight. It was then that Brown saw a column of dust rising into the summer sky above a tongue of woods blocking his view of Chippawa bridge. A large number of men were approaching. Unable to recall Porter, who was probably unaware of the new threat, Brown galloped into camp, heading directly for Scott’s tent.
Riall started his division crossing the Chippawa bridge at about 4 P.M. His advance guard was Pearson's ad hoc battalion composed of the light companies of the three regular regiments and Lieutenant Colonel Dickson's 2d Lincolns. Also out front were about two hundred of Norton's Grand River Iroquois. Behind them marched the regulars and two batteries of royal artillery, each of three guns. When he heard the musketry and war whoops from Porter's attack, Riall responded by pushing Dickson's militiamen directly into the woods and sending Norton on a wide envelopment to the west of where the fighting was going on. Pearson's light battalion remained in the open area between the tongue of woods and the bridge. Riall was careful to protect the right flank of his column of regulars as they marched, one battalion at a time, through the defile formed by the tongue of woods and the Niagara.
Brown found Scott's brigade formed up in their camp. Scott was about to march his men across Street's Creek and drill them in the open area beyond. Brown ordered Scott to fight the British whom he believed were enroute to attack the American camp. Scott could not believe that Riall would come out from his strong defensive line and accept battle. Nonetheless, he directed his brigade and Towson's artillery company forward across the narrow bridge. As the Americans moved steadily over the bridge, shot and grape flew over their heads and landed in the Niagara. In moments the royal artillery would get the range right. Brown rode on to alert Ripley to ready his brigade for action.
Porter's Indians and militiamen met Dickson's militia in the forest and amid hand to hand combat momentarily forced the Canadians back, out of the woods and through Pearson's regulars. As some of the New York Iroquois emerged on the far side of the forest they were met with a volley from Pearson's regulars. This was enough to prompt their retreat. Porter, still in the woods with the Pennsylvanians, rallied those Iroquois he could and led them all to the woodline. Now it was their turn to face the concentrated firepower of Pearson's light infantrymen. Pearson's men fired one volley and then attacked! Porter ordered a retreat. That proved an unnecessary gesture; those still with him broke and fled, pursued by Canadians and Indians.
Porter lost control of his brigade. It disintegrated, although his men had suffered only light casualties. Porter later reported twelve dead among his command. The casualties on the British side were calamitous; the New York Iroquois searching the woods the next day found the bodies of eighty-seven Canadian Indians and eighteen militiamen. Lieutenant Colonel Dickson entered the forest fight with 110 militia in four companies. He reported forty-seven casualties including three of his company commanders killed in action. The loyalists on the Niagara Peninsula and their Indian allies paid a heavy price that day to repel American aggression. The result of the forest fight, however, was that as the regulars formed up in battleline the British had two secure flanks, while Brown still had to take measures to protect his forest flank.
The story of the firefight on the Plains of Chippawa has often been told. Scott's troops stood up to a fine Brigade of British regulars and beat them in fair combat. Scott won the laurels as Ripley's Brigade entered the field only after the British had withdrawn and the accomplishment of Porter's Brigade was minimized in light of the stunning victory by the regulars.
Porter did well, considering that his Iroquois and militiamen had not trained together. Given the mission to clear the enemy from a deep and dense wood, Porter chose an appropriate formation and moved with a sense of urgency. He probably knew that he would lose control once heavy contact was made but that is the nature of forest warfare. Porter had second thoughts on his handling of the brigade as it came to the northern edge of the wood and ran into Pearson's light infantry. He wrote to Governor Tompkins: "I rallied and led a scattered line, (formed to scour the woods and not to fight a regular force,) exhausted by the fatigue of pursuit a second time, against a compact line of British regular troops perfectly fresh ... by which I lost several valuable officers. Porter was probably concerned for the reputations of both his brigade and himself. In the glorious victory, Porter's men played what would appear to many to be an inglorious part. They had not left Brown's flank secure and many regulars saw Red Jacket's Indians and Fenton's volunteers fleeing the battlefield.
The regulars uncovered evidence of the ferocity of a forest fight and the fighting prowess of Porter's men in the days following the battle, as scores of enemy bodies were removed from the woods. In his official report to Armstrong, Brown wrote that Porter's conduct was "gallant." Brown, who had a good understanding of the brittleness of inadequately trained militiamen, was neither surprised nor disturbed that Porter's brigade had broken when confronted by regulars. He continued to give his Third Brigade missions consistent with their capabilities. To Porter's continued dismay, this often meant guarding prisoners and supplies.
Left Division
The Left Division spent much of 6 and 7 July moving the wounded, both friends and enemies, to Buffalo and burying the dead. About twenty Iroquois chiefs visited Porter with the scalps taken during and after battle, expecting the brigade commander to pay a bounty. When Porter refused to meet their demands, the disgusted natives destroyed the scalps by burning them or throwing them into the Niagara. Porter did agree, however, to pay for nearly twenty prisoners taken in the forest fight. The Iroquois then returned to the scene of their fight to recover the bodies of their comrades. Porter later recalled that upon their return from the woods, the Indians told him of finding three wounded enemy Indians. Red Jacket's men slit the throats of two of them but recognized the third as one of their own who had moved to the Grand River. This former comrade was given a canteen of water and left alone to die. The sight of so many dead natives, many of them Iroquois, left a powerful impression on Red Jacket and his war chiefs.
Over the next two days, Brown maneuvered to turn the British out of their position along the Chippawa. Riall withdrew his division northward toward Fort George. Red Jacket sent emissaries to meet with the Grand River Indians in council near Burlington. Many natives saw that the Iroquois Nation was being ground up in this dispute between white men, a pattern which had been repeated since the wars between France and Britain. As was the Indian way, the decision to continue the fight or to withdraw was left up to each individual. The majority of Grand River Indians agreed to honor Red Jacket's proposal of mutual neutrality and waited for word that the New York Iroquois had returned home. Norton, John Brant, and a handful of their followers would fight for the cause they held in common with Great Britain at Lundy's Lane and Fort Erie, but within days large scale Iroquois participation in the War of 1812 would be at an end. Red Jacket the nationalist had won; he got the Iroquois out of the war with honor.
Brown consolidated the Left Division at Queenston on 10 July. There, he was pleased to receive reinforcements into camp. Lieutenant Colonel Philetus Swift's regiment of New York Volunteers, about six hundred strong, joined Porter's Brigade. This made up for the loss of those Pennsylvanians who, refusing to continue, remained in Buffalo or were sent back to Fort Erie.
While they decided what to do next, both sides contested the forests and fields between their respective camps - the Americans to learn more about the British defenses and the British to prevent them from doing so. After Chippawa, Porter was joined by militia Brigadier General John Swift, older brother of Philetus. Swift was a veteran of the Revolution and was still an active man at age 52. His specialty was night time raids on British outposts. On 12 July Porter sent Swift and 120 New Yorkers to reconnoiter Fort George. Within a mile of that post, Swift and his small battalion surprised and overwhelmed a patrol of five or six soldiers of the 8th Foot. Most of the soldiers surrendered. General Swift tried to disarm one who had not yet surrendered and was shot. The sound of gunfire alerted Major Thomas Evans of the 8th and his Light Company who were also on patrol. The two forces collided, but numbers told and the British retired into the fort. Swift, to the grief of the New Yorkers, died in camp the following morning. Porter's Brigade paraded at the memorial service, rendering a final salute to the hero. Philetus Swift took the body back to their home in Palmyra and Hugh Dobbins took command of the regiment.
Shortly after Swift's death, an episode took place which tarnished the otherwise good reputation of the Third Brigade. The circumstances of the burning of the Village of St. David's are unclear. On 18 July, Porter sent New York Militia Lieutenant Colonel Isaac W. Stone on a mission to clear the enemy from that village. St. David's was reputedly a loyalist stronghold and a militia headquarters. Stone led a small battalion composed of Boughton's mounted company and a company of infantry, about 215 altogether. Stone claimed that he accomplished his task without incident and while enroute back to camp he saw St. David's in flames. At least eight structures were burned to the ground and livestock stolen. Brown had issued standing orders that the property of non-offending civilians was to be respected. Immediately, and without adequate investigation, Brown dismissed Stone from the Left Division. The militia officer vehemently protested his innocence and maintained that he had seen regulars enroute to St. David's. While Brown's action served to reinforce his injunction against unnecessary destruction, it could not have improved relations between his regulars and his volunteers. The day after the burning of the village, Riall reported that his militia "seem actuated with the most determined spirit of hostility to the enemy." No matter who burned St. David's, the American cause suffered as a consequence.
Lundy's Lane
On 25 July, the biggest battle of the war up to that time was fought - Lundy's Lane. In camp behind the Chippawa, Brown sent Scott and his brigade north of the river. Scott ran into the British Right Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond himself. The British and Canadian battalions were arrayed along Lundy's lane which ran perpendicular to the road along the river. Scott immediately formed line of battle and impetuously moved forward. The British artillery, being on a hill mass, easily outdistanced the American guns. Scott halted and opened a fire fight at the extreme range of his muskets. Hundreds of muskets blazing away caused little damage on either side but the British artillery relentlessly thinned the American ranks. Clouds of smoke covered the battlefield as the sun set but the musket and artillery fire continued.
When Scott departed the American camp, neither of the other two brigades were in position to come to his aid if that proved necessary. Ripley was unaware of Scott's mission and presumed that he was drilling his men somewhere north of the Chippawa. As many as two hundred of Ripley's men were outside the American camp washing their clothing or assigned to other duties. Porter's strength was even more degraded. He had about two hundred and fifty New York militiamen on the eastern shore and four other companies of the Third Brigade were guarding supplies between the Chippawa and Buffalo. So confident was he that the British were not present in large numbers, Brown had not warned his subordinates to prepare for possible combat.
When the sound of gunfire reached their ears, the American generals sprang to action. Porter and Ripley started to round up their men and prepare to march. Brown sent orders to Ripley to take his brigade as well as the artillery and march to Scott's assistance. He ordered Porter to prepare the Third Brigade for movement and to await orders. Brown, his aides, and his engineer mounted their horses and rode north. Within minutes, Second Brigade was on the move with about 750 infantry.
When Brown and Ripley reached the battlefield, they found that Scott's proud brigade was shot to pieces. Outnumbered and outgunned, Scott's troops could not move forward without risking destruction. Nor would Scott consider withdrawal. Brown threw Ripley between Scott and the British line atop the crest of the ridge. In the dark, the American movements were largely undetected. Brown sent instructions for Porter to bring up his brigade. He then organized an attack by Ripley's Brigade which, in the darkness, threw the British off the crest and captured their guns. Three times the British infantry attacked Ripley's brigade but they held on.
Shortly thereafter, Porter appeared with his diminished brigade, about three hundred men, and marched them to the far left of the American line, south of Lundy's Lane. He placed them at an oblique angle to the Second Brigade to protect the flank. Porter placed Lieutenant Colonel Dobbins' New York battalion on the left, the 5th Pennsylvania Volunteers under Major Thomas Wood in the center, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Willcocks's Canadian Volunteers on the right alongside the lst Infantry. Soon after, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Jesup and his command, the 25th Infantry, appeared on the right of the Second Brigade. Jesup formed his battle line just north of Lundy's Lane. Brown also brought the remainder of Scott's brigade, now a single battalion, to the center and rear of the American position. While Scott was organizing the defense, he placed Lieutenant Colonel Henry Leavenworth in charge of the remnants of his brigade. It was 10:30 now and the moon, which had weakly illuminated the battlefield, had set. The Americans were ready for a British counterattack which was certain to follow.
They did not have to wait long. Lieutenant General Drummond was determined to regain the top of the crest. He and his aides, working in the dark, organized an attack. The British and Canadian infantry, marching resolutely through the woods and up the north side of the ridge, stopped only yards from the American lines and opened a vicious fire. Aiming at the muzzle flashes of their enemy, both sides refused to budge. Neither side could detect the effectiveness of their fire and after about twenty minutes, the British wavered and slowly withdrew back down the slope. The Americans were battered as well. Their double line was a single line in many places.
Drummond refused to accept the result as final. Within half an hour he had organized yet another attack. This time the results were the same. Both sides traded musket balls at point blank range for long minutes. The American artillerists, who had manhandled their guns into the lines, were so shot up that they could not serve their pieces. The Americans were determined to stand their ground and the British were unable to make forward progress. Slowly the firing diminished as the British withdrew down the slope and into the cover of the woods.
And still Drummond would not accept defeat. Once again the British and Canadians formed ranks and on they came. The American ranks were so thin that even the officers were unsure they could hold on. Ripley and Scott were everywhere exhorting the men to stand fast. Brown arrived in the midst of the Third Brigade to find them wavering. Porter and his officers urged the men to stand and fight and they did so. Fortunately for these militia volunteers, the fire fight was over in about twenty minutes. The British pulled back for the last time.
The battle was the most severely contested of the war and to this day there is dispute over who won. Both Brown and Scott were severely wounded. Command of the Left Division went to Ripley until Brigadier General Edmund Gaines arrived some weeks later. The day after the battle, Ripley withdrew the army to Fort Erie where the Americans set about enclosing their camp with a ditch and breastworks. By the time Drummond arrived, the Americans were too strong to be attacked immediately.
The nature of the armies at Lundy's Lane suggests why the battle lasted as long as it did and why the casualties were relatively equal. The quality of the American army - regulars, volunteers, and militia; officers and soldiers - had improved considerably since 1812 to the point where it was the tactical equal of its British and Canadian counterpart. Fortescue judges that Lundy's Lane “was the best contested fight of the whole war.” The men of these two armies stood nearly toe-to-toe and exchanged deadly volleys of musket and artillery fire in the dark repeatedly until one general decided to stop. The 89th Foot charged the 21st Infantry six times in a matter of hours which speaks volumes for both corps. The soldierly skill, the valor, the dogged determination of the common soldier on both sides inspires both awe and admiration. Drummond's instructions to Riall before the battle had suggested boldness against an "undisciplined" enemy. Even after the battle, Drummond persisted in the belief that his soldiers were more steadfast and skilled than the Americans. The British Right Division would pay a heavy price for Drummond's error of judgement.
More Overshadowed Heroes
Part III: The Siege of Fort Erie
Next issue, Part Three - the Siege of Fort Erie
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© Copyright 2001 by Rich Barbuto.
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