Fenton's Pennsylvania Volunteers 1814
As often happens, military historians focus on those gallant units whose brilliant charges or heroic defeats captured the attention of contemporaries. One such unit from the War of 1812 is Winfield Scott's Brigade, the heroes of Chippawa whose gray jackets supposedly inspired cadet uniforms at West Point. Prints of this brigade marching across the battlefield as if on parade, regimental flags whipping in the wind, have adorned US Army mess halls and orderly rooms for decades. Scott's efforts at training and his brigade's undisputed battlefield success on that hot July afternoon are rightfully cited as a turning point in the development of the Army and are part of its lore.
However, another brigade was present that day in July and in fact at every battlefield that summer and fall fighting alongside Scott's First Brigade. Commanded by New York Militia General Peter B. Porter, the Third Brigade of the Left Division contributed in large measure to American success in 1814. Its battlefield exploits, less dramatic than those of its sister brigade, are no less worthy of our attention. The story of this brigade, composed of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, Iroquois Indians, and disaffected Canadians, has been overshadowed by that of Scott's well-trained and brave band. This paper will bring them, at last, into the light.
In order to place the story of the citizen-soldiers of the Third Brigade into context, it is worthwhile to revisit the Battle of Queenston. In the fall of 1812, American troops on the Niagara Frontier were commanded by New York State Militia Major General Stephen Van Rennselaer. Rennselaer's poorly equipped and virtually untrained force became known as the Army of the Center. Disaster befell that force on 13 October on Queenston Heights. The New York militia who made up the bulk of Rennselaer's army refused to cross the border thus squandering the success of the initial assault crossing. These same American militia who showed more constitutional awareness than courage at Queenston Heights, again stood upon their right not to serve outside the territory of the United States six weeks later when regular Brigadier General Alexander Smyth cancelled two attempts to invade Canada. Smyth claimed that hundreds of New York and Pennsylvania militiamen had refused to climb into the invasion boats ready to cross the Niagara River. Thus, these citizen- soldiers earned for all American militiamen an enduring notoriety in the mythology of the war - that their lack of courage was a characteristic of American military operations.
Third Brigade
The story of the Third Brigade begins the following year. In the very early hours of 19 December 1813, a body of British soldiers, armed with axes, scaling ladders and unloaded muskets, forced their way through a poorly guarded gate and over the ramparts of Fort Niagara. Mindful of Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond's order that "the bayonet is the weapon on which the success of the attack must depend," they went about the grisly work of quelling the sporadic resistance offered by the aroused defenders. The sick i1155n the hospital put up the stoutest fight; they, as well as others, were bayoneted even as they begged for quarter. This well-executed surprise attack yielded sixty-five American dead from the four-hundred-man garrison. It was also the precursor of a devastating assault upon the white and native communities of the American side of the Niagara River.
On the evening of 29 December, the British followed up their success at Fort Niagara by attacking the village of Black Rock. Alarmed by the loss of Fort Niagara, over 2000 American militia and a handful of Iroquois Indians and Canadian volunteers rallied to defend Black Rock and nearby Buffalo. The untrained and largely inexperienced militia was no match for Major General Phineas Riall's regulars and Indians; after feeble resistance they broke and fled. Over the next two days, nearly every structure along the thirty-seven mile course of the river except for Fort Niagara itself was burned by soldiers and Indians. A few of Riall's Indian allies killed and scalped about a dozen civilians. Nearly the entire population fled eastward into the snowy forests, fugitives in what had become a cruel war.
Campaign Strategy
The American campaign strategy for 1814 ignited from the embers of a burned Buffalo. In January, Governor Daniel Tompkins of New York sounded the alarm with President James Madison and Secretary of War John Armstrong that the British would surely follow up their attacks upon the Niagara Frontier with a campaign to regain all they had lost in the west the previous year. This was not hyperbole. British Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond shared the same thought, at least until the warm weather dashed his plans to cross Lake Erie on the ice. Tompkins proposed offenses aimed at Kingston and Burlington and promised five thousand New York volunteers to accompany the regulars. Such a pledge seems implausible in consideration of the repeated failures of militia, even volunteer militia, to cross the border.
Secretary of War Armstrong heeded Governor Tompkins' pleas. He appointed Major General Jacob Brown, a New Yorker, to command yet another invasion of Canada. Armstrong hoped to seize a large portion of Upper Canada before the British could reinforce their army in Canada with troops no longer needed in Spain following Wellington's victories there. Armstrong ordered several thousand regulars to the Niagara Frontier where Brown organized them as the Left Division.
Governor Tompkins was squarely behind the effort to supplement Brown's invasion force with militia. In theory, New York could support the invasion by drafting large numbers of militia for three-month terms. Of course, the operational and political drawbacks were many.
- First, the militia could refuse to cross the border.
Second, most militiamen could be depended upon to leave the colors when their time was up regardless of where they were or the state of the campaign.
Third, the militia of the western counties had been called up repeatedly to defend the frontier; the burden of militia service was being borne unevenly so far. Yet militiamen drafted from areas far from the frontier has less at stake than their frontier cousins and presumably would be less likely to risk their lives in defense of the border regions.
Fourth, there remained strong Federalist sentiments in New York, a heavy reliance on the draft for offensive operations might cost Tompkins and his party a heavy price, particularly if the invasion was as unsuccessful as all those prior.
Alternative
Governor Tompkins understood the issues and chose an alternative. On 13 March, he issued a general order which authorized the raising of about 2700 volunteers for six months of service. He nominated Peter B. Porter as the commander of this contingent and he promised the volunteers the same pay and allowances as federal troops. Tompkins reminded his citizens why this step was necessary. Citing the barbarous behavior of the British and their native allies on the Niagara Frontier, Tompkins knew that upon reflection these facts would "produce a universal zeal to promote the success of this effort." Tompkins's choice of Porter as commander was notably fortunate. While unschooled in the technical aspects of military operations, Porter was well respected, intelligent, and like Jacob Brown and Brigadier General Winfield Scott whom he would eventually join, aggressive and brave. Porter also had a personal stake in the outcome. As a Congressional War Hawk, his efforts helped bring about the war. As a resident of Black Rock, his home overlooking the Niagara River was consumed by fire with the rest of that village.
Porter's brigade was competing for recruits from the same pool as two regular regiments were currently recruiting in central New York. While service in the regulars promised a plot of land upon mustering out, it also carried a twelve-month tour of duty. More New Yorkers chose the opportunity to serve for a shorter period under officers selected democratically.
Additional Manpower: Iroquois Indians
While New York Volunteers were one component of what was to become the Third Brigade, other sources of manpower existed. As a result of British raids onto the Niagara Frontier in 1813, the New York Iroquois, particularly the Seneca on the Niagara Frontier, were willing to defend their lands even if this meant fighting their cousins in the Grand River settlement in Upper Canada. The Seneca chief was Sa go ye wat ha (he keeps them awake) but he was known in the white community as Red Jacket. He earned that name for the scarlet British coat given him late in the Revolution for services to the Crown. Now in his sixty-fourth year and a fervent nationalist, Red Jacket believed that Iroquois interests were best served if Indian lands remained within American boundaries. Red Jacket was an eloquent speaker. He was complemented by the war chief, Ho na ye wuo (also known as Farmer's Brother).
Now in his eighties, Farmer's Brother had been present at Braddock's defeat in 1755. In 1813, he led about thirty Seneca to chase off a party of British and Grand River Indians raiding Black Rock. In the spring of 1814, he was anxious to lend at least his moral support to the Seneca effort. Other key players in bringing Iroquois into the war in an organized way were Erastus Granger, chief Indian agent to the Seneca, and his assistant Jasper Parrish. Granger held a militia commission as a lieutenant colonel. Like Porter, Granger also lost his home to the British winter raid. He spared no efforts in ensuring a strong native contingent to support Brown's impending invasion.
Both sides understood that the service of native warriors could be useful. In their own mode of fighting - the ambush - the Indians were unsurpassed. Previous wars had established their value in terrorizing the enemy to withdraw or surrender. However, the Iroquois had no consensus regarding with which camp their interests lay. Iroquois history was replete with bad experiences and broken promises. The Iroquois Confederacy, which had reached its height of power in the seventeenth century with the subjugation of all neighboring tribes, was clearly in a slow but steady decline by 1812. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 ignored native issues and all Indians remembered that the British garrison of Fort Miami closed the gates to those Indians fleeing Anthony Wayne’s army at Fallen Timbers. The Confederacy was physically split when Joseph Brant led many supporters of the British, nursing feelings of betrayal by their allies, to the Grand River settlement.
Despite many setbacks, the Iroquois Confederacy had never been conquered. While Britain and the United States might claim sovereignty over the land, it was clear to the Iroquois that they were an independent nation who would fight, if at all, as independent allies under their own war chiefs. To declare war, as distinct from raiding for the purpose of exacting vengeance, the tribe required a just cause. Without a just cause, the Great Spirit would withhold his support.
The British, short of manpower from the outset, viewed Indian participation as potentially decisive. While the government might try to persuade Indians to take up arms, they could not conscript warriors as they could their own citizens. Still, the British enjoyed partial success. In May 1812, British Major General Isaac Brock addressed a council of Grand River Indians to solicit their active allegiance in the impending conflict. Te yon in ho kar a wen, whose English name was John Norton, was the acknowledged leader of the Grand River settlement and he gave strong support to Brock. However, no consensus to aid the British emerged.
Little Billy, a chief of New York Iroquois, visited the Grand River settlement in June 1812 to plead with his brothers to maintain a unified position of neutrality. He argued that the British had abandoned them in the American Revolution and that the Iroquois should not risk their lives aiding inconstant allies. He further argued that the Iroquois had no interest in the outcome of the impending war. But the Grand River Indians remained divided. The result of the June council was that the neutrality of the New York Iroquois would be respected but the Grand River Indians reserved the right to support the British. In no event, agreed the delegates, would Iroquois fight Iroquois. Nonetheless, Norton's band of Grand River Indians participated in many of the battles of 1812 and 1813 and raids into New York resulted in casualties among the Iroquois living there. After the destruction of the Tuscarora Village following the capture of Fort Niagara, the New York Iroquois were ready to form an alliance with the Americans.
A third component of Porter's Brigade was the small contingent of Canadian Volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Willcocks and his two majors, Benajah Mallory and Abraham Markle. The history of the Canadian Volunteers begins with its leader Joseph Willcocks. Immigrating from Ireland in 1800, Willcocks was sheriff of the Home District of Upper Canada from 1803 to 1807 and served in the legislative assembly from 1808 to 1812. During these years, Willcocks was critical of the provincial government and a gadfly to the lieutenant governor.
Following the capture of Fort George, Willcocks offered to raise a volunteer corps of Upper Canadians who would fight as part of the American Army. Major General Henry Dearborn accepted the offer and armed those volunteering to fight in this renegade band. By September 1813, Willcocks had about 130 pro-Americans in his force. The Canadian Volunteers roamed the Niagara Peninsula scouting for the Americans, plundering the homes of loyalists, and capturing their leaders. In November Willcocks was joined by a party from western Upper Canada under Mallory. The Canadian Volunteers participated in one of the most notorious events of the war. On a cold and snowy day in December 1813, New York Militia General George McClure decided to evacuate Fort George and return to New York. Before doing so, however, he burned the nearby unoffending village of Newark. The population, consisting of women, children, and old men, were given little time to remove their belongings before their homes were torched. It is unclear how much influence Willcocks exerted over McClure in his decision to burn Newark. However, witnesses testified that it was Willcocks who personally directed the burnings.
The status of the Canadian Volunteers was somewhat ambiguous. They were not paid by the federal government nor were the commissions of the officers granted from the President. Willcocks, for example, was commissioned by Dearborn. Peter B. Porter interceded on behalf of the Volunteers; in April 1814, Armstrong legitimized the corps and the commissions of its officers by declaring the unit as Volunteers of the United States. Because they were familiar with the territory, the Canadian Volunteers could be valuable as scouts during the invasion. Of course, the men were somewhat desperate. Capture while in Upper Canada would lead directly to trial for treason for the British would not give them prisoner of war status and its traditional protections. Vilified by Canadian loyalists, the Canadian Volunteers performed well for their American commanders.
Spring 1814
In the spring of 1814, Jacob Brown placed Winfield Scott in charge of preparing the regulars then concentrating at Buffalo for the upcoming invasion. The regulars were eventually organized as two brigades - the First under Scott and the Second under Brigadier General Eleazar Ripley. While Scott was preparing his and Ripley's brigades of regulars for the invasion, the non-regular forces of militia and native warriors were also gathering and preparing. Scott himself held militia forces in low regard, and had no qualms about sharing this opinion. In October 1813 while in command of Fort George, for example, Scott reported to Brigadier General Wilkinson of a raid led by Porter and McClure of one thousand volunteers, militia, and natives to find and fight the enemy west of the fort. "There is no danger of their coming up with the enemy or they would be in great danger of a total annihilation.... Porter, then the quartermaster general of New York's militia force, was aware of Scott's opinions, and relations between the two general officers would remain professional yet cool throughout the summer.
For his part, Porter was optimistic that he would command a sizeable force into Canada. Early in April he asked the Iroquois for their support and was confident that hundreds of warriors would accompany his brigade as auxiliaries. As for the state militia, Porter expected well over a thousand volunteers to sign up to join the brigade of six-month volunteers authorized by Governor Tompkins in March. While most would come from the regions close to the war, he expected company-sized contingents from the counties of the more secure interior.
The notional brigade organization proposed by Governor Tompkins was more advanced than the hodgepodge of units that reported to Van Rensselaer in the fall of 1812. Porter's brigade, assuming Tompkins' model was followed, was to consist of two regiments of infantry and a separate battalion of light troops. The infantry regiments would be virtually identical to their regular counterparts. Each would consist of ten companies of 108 men each. With addition of regimental headquarters, the regiment at full strength would number eleven hundred troops. The separate battalion consisted of four companies: one of riflemen, two of light infantry, and the last of mounted riflemen.
In some regards Tompkins' brigade organization was well-matched to the requirements of warfare along the Canadian border. The bulk of the brigade, twenty companies, comprised musket-firing infantry. These would form line of battle and presumably stand up to their counterparts, the Canadian militia, or if need be British regulars. But little of an army's time is spent in battle. Much more is spent marching and if all went well, this brigade would do most of its marching in enemy territory. The separate battalion with its four specialized companies provided security for the force until it entered into the fight. The mounted riflemen could patrol at a distance while the riflemen and light infantry would guard the front and flanks of the marching column or the bivouac. These elite units would keep the enemy skirmishers and natives away from the bulk of the brigade, leaving it free to march quickly or rest securely.
What Tompkins did not include was artillery integral to the brigade. For this Porter must depend upon the regular artillery of the Left Division. Tompkins also authorized only one type of mounted soldier - the rifleman. These troops could be highly effective in providing security at a distance or reacting quickly to changing requirements, but their use on the battlefield was somewhat limited. Mounted riflemen, unlike the saber and pistol-wielding dragoon, were not well-suited for mounted attacks. While the infantry arm of Porter's brigade would be secure in its movements and capable of delivering a large volume of small arms fire, it was still dependent upon the regulars for artillery and battlefield cavalry.
Tompkins' order stipulated that the officers were to be selected by the volunteers of each company. The elected company officers would then meet to choose the regiment's field grade officers. Tompkins emphasized that ability, not current rank should be the criteria for selection. By 1814 the better candidates for commissions among the militia had probably been identified on battlefields at Queenston, Fort George, and Sackett's Harbor. Tompkins was so optimistic as to the outcome of the campaign that he included in the order the statement that there was "every reason to believe" that the brigade would be mustered out of service before six months had elapsed.
Tompkins' hopes collapsed because of lack of equipment! While volunteers collected in their various counties and selected their officers, Porter refused to order a muster at the brigade rendezvous at Canandaigua until there were sufficient quantities of tents, cooking kettles, cartridge boxes, knapsacks, blankets, axes and other tools. The federal and state supply depots in upstate New York had been virtually emptied after two years of war. Porter postponed the 1 May rendezvous until June. Recruiting slowed down as word got out that there was insufficient equipment for those who had already come forward. Porter informed Brown that the company of mounted riflemen was ready but that the organization of the infantry was at a standstill.
He appealed to Brown for assistance in the form of money and equipment. Brown sent $2000 and assured Porter that he should consider his command "on the same footing with the regulars as to all expense. Brown requested Armstrong's assistance and the Secretary of War had his staff start the necessary equipment toward New York but not without advising Brown of the great quantities of federal equipment that had been previously issued and apparently wasted by the militia of New York. Brown, who gained national prominence as a general of New York militia, offered no opinion about Armstrong's statement. As camp equipment trickled in, Porter, on 8 June, decided to order his volunteers to Canandaigua.
By mid-June Porter's brigade of volunteer militia consisted of the company of mounted riflemen and a single regiment of eight companies of infantry under its colonel Philetus Swift. This was far short of Tompkins' vision of a 2700 man brigade. Swift's second in command was Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Dobbin who had commanded a regiment of detached militia under Van Rensselaer at Queenston Heights. On 23 June, Brown ordered Porter to send his volunteers and native warriors to Buffalo immediately, ready or not. Porter rode with his mounted company while Swift's regiment slowly marched behind. More companies continued to muster in the interior of the state but these would miss the opening battles. Largely for lack of equipment, Porter's men were neither trained nor disciplined to the level achieved by the regulars.
Porter was disappointed at the amount of time it took to raise these thousand volunteers. He was more disappointed with having to deal with the regulars, Scott and Ripley. To Tompkins Porter revealed that if he knew how things would turn out, he never would have undertaken the task of raising the volunteer brigade. Porter's animus toward Scott was returned. Scott was convinced that Porter and Tompkins were conspiring to replace him as the commander of the invasion force. Scott wrote to Brown that Porter was concealing a militia commission of major general or perhaps even lieutenant general. Porter, thought Scott, would someday reveal this commission and assume control of the invasion force that Scott had trained. Scott's suspicion proved unfounded.
Contrary to his opinion of militia, Scott called the Iroquois "powerful auxiliaries" and he was pleased to have native warriors with him on campaign. Gathering a force of natives went smoothly for Porter. He, Erastus Granger, and Joseph Parrish had met with Red Jacket in early May and the Seneca chief assured them that five hundred warriors would volunteer to serve. In the event, over six hundred joined from among the Onandaga, Oneida, Tuscarora and Seneca tribes. Many were motivated by a desire to avenge the burning of the Tuscarora village by the Grand River Iroquois the previous winter.
The natives were given unofficial ranks by the Indian agents and pay ranging from $8 a month for warriors and $40 for their native captains. About half were armed with their own firearms, some used bows, and all carried tomahawk and knife. While some wore pieces of uniforms, most were in native dress. Captains were distinguished by sashes worn over the right shoulder and tied at the left hip. Some wore their hair in the traditional mohawk cut and others wore small skull caps with clusters of feathers falling down and a single eagle feather standing at the crown. Warriors might wear untucked shirts or go bare-chested but nearly all were in leggings and moccasins; Iroquois believed that moccasined feet helped the dead find their way to heaven. Several women carried weapons and would fight alongside their men. By mid-June Porter's native contingent was gathered at Buffalo waiting for the signal to cross the Niagara.
Although Porter's New York volunteers were undersubscribed, additional manpower appeared from an unexpected source. In March at Gettysburg hundreds of volunteers mustered into Colonel James Fenton's Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. As companies formed, they marched off to Erie. Once there, the Pennsylvanians, over nine hundred of them, began their training. Fenton wrote to Scott on 3 May revealing that the governor of Pennsylvania had ordered the regiment to report to the Left Division. Scott was surprised for he was unaware of any militia reinforcements coming from that state. Certainly he was disappointed; Fenton noted that his men were without ammunition and in danger of famine. Scott did not hide the disdain he held for the Pennsylvanians. He later wrote to Brown: “Col. Fenton and his militia are already in march for this Place. I am sorry for this circumstance, for I had rather be without that species of force, than have the whole population of New York & Pennsylvania at my heels. I now give it as my opinion that we shall be disgraced if we admit a militia force either into our camp or order of battle.”
Mutiny
Several hundred volunteers from Fenton's command raided into Upper Canada in May. Shortly thereafter Fenton ordered his men to march to Buffalo. The order was met by seething discontent from a large minority of the enlisted men who were hungry, without pay, and many of whom were shoeless. Some of the officers, apparently without Fenton's orders, arrested a few ring leaders. A regular officer assisted by ordering his cannon, loaded with grape shot, turned on the masses. The incipient mutiny collapsed and the men marched off. As they arrived at Buffalo, starting on 14 June, Brown issued them two months pay and integrated the regiment into Scott's training program. When the invasion began, Porter's force, designated as the Third Brigade, would be composed of the mounted riflemen, the Iroquois warriors, and Fenton's Pennsylvanians.
More Overshadowed Heroes
Part III: The Siege of Fort Erie
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© Copyright 2001 by Rich Barbuto.
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