The Battle of Chateauguay

Hampton's Official Report
1 November, 1813

by Rich Barbuto

From General Wade Hampton to Secretary of War Armstrong, 1 November 1813, Four Corners, New York

Sir,

On the morning of the 21st ultimo, the army commenced its movement down the Chateauguay, for the purpose of placing itself in a situation which would enable it to fulfil its parts of the proposed combined operations, on the St. Lawrence.

An extensive wood, of 11 or 12 miles in front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a serious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier General Izard, with the light troops, and one regiment of the line, was detached, early in the morning, to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below; while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measure, as will be seen by the report of Brigadier General Izard, which I have the honor to enclose, completely succeeded; and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22nd; the 23rd and 24th were employed in completing the road, and getting up the artillery and stores.

I had arranged, at my departure, under the direction of Major Parker, a line of communication, as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdenburgh, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty-four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had, in advance of me, seven miles of open country; but at the end of that distance, commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an abatis, and filled by a succession of wooden breast-works, the rearmost of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force, and light corps of the enemy; and in the rear, all his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Lawrence, it was cause of regret that all communication, from yourself or Major Parker, seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength, in this position, if free from the apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge him; and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubt remained of what was passing above, and of the real party to be assigned us.

Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy's defences; and that the wood, on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy, with the light corps and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached, at an early hour of the night of the 25th, to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in the rear; and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front; and it was believed, the pass might be carried, before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

I had returned to my quarters, from Purdy's column, about 9 o'clock at night, when I found Mr. Baldwin, of the Quartermaster General's department, who put into my hands an open paper, containing instructions to him, from the Quartermaster General, respecting the building of huts for the army, in Chateauguay, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated; I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable. I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage etc. on the ground of encampment.

On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column, on the opposite side, was not as far advanced as had been anticipated; the guides had misled it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only awaited the attack below. About two o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire, but Brigadier General Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him everywhere behind his defences, and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward, as far as courage, skill, and perseverance could have carried it; but on advancing, it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained. The enemy retired behind his defences; but a renewal of his attack was expected, and the troops remained some time in their positions to meet it. The troops, on the opposite side, were excessively fatigued; the enterprize had failed in its main point; and Colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal, four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and general Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position, three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

The slowness, and order, with which General Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect; they presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss. These attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost. Our entire loss, of killed, wounded, and missing, does not exceed50. In its new position, within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 12 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that Sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived, with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences; and a letter from Major Parker, (by express, received on the evening of the 26th,) having informed me that no movements of our army, down the St. Lawrence, had been heard of at Ogdensburgh, and for some distance above.

The following questions were submitted to the commanding officers of brigades, regiments and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council, convened for the purpose: "Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position; and if not, what position is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words: "It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army, and the fulfillment of the ostensible views of the government, that we immediately return by orderly marches, to such a position, (Chataugay) as will secure our communications with the U. States, either to retire into winter quarters, or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion, the army has returned, by slow marches, to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government. Its condition will be stated by the bearer, Colonel King, who can give you, upon every point, more full and perfect information, than could be contained in a written detail.

I have the honor etc.

Wade Hampton

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