Notes on contemporary warfare

It is now evident to me that wargaming contemporary scenarios, if we will sometime from now be interested in a simulation, needs a deep rewrite of any modern ruleset available, both in terms of visibility of the overall battlefield and the effectiveness of contemporary artillery. Drones play a major role on both spotting and air attacks.

Also the capability of units to sustain losses and keep fighting should be greatly reduced. Nowadays for the US doctrine a unit with 30% losses is considered completely destroyed.

The Ukraine battlefields are enlightening but I have also ordered a book on the late Nagorno-Karabach war.

In this context I am interested in trying to model operations, at a scale like the one defined by the Modern Wargame rules called Spearhead. These rules have been originally developed for the 1967-1991 period and have been extended to cover warfare up to ten years later.

It seems now that the advent of drones and precision artillery ammunition have changed the battlefield appearance, moving towards armies in full view of the enemy (drones) and subject to precision attacks from artillery (or drones again).

Most of these notes are taken by Tom Cooper’s blog. Here I just summarise what is relevant to understanding what contemporary warfare is.

The notes below are just cut and paste from Tom Cooper blog, they will become more useful in e few days when I will try to elaborate them.

June

• 24 June: Have been asked if the RFA really has 55–60% of all its BTGs deployed between Izium and Popasna: AFAIK, yes. Though, one should keep in mind that about 50% of ‘battalion tactical groups’ in question could only be described as ‘weak companies’: have suffered such losses, that their ‘average’ strength is something like 4–5 APC/IFVs, 2–4 MBTs, and two companies of 15–20 surviving combatants (this is also the average ‘size’ of local Russian attacks, nowadays). Airborne units (like 76th VDV Division, for example) have been completely withdrawn from Ukraine: they were shot to pieces and have to be re-built from the bottom. Only the Wagner BTGs and some of Separatist units seem to be in seriously better shape. Means, the RFA has to concentrate as many BTGs just to hold the frontline, not to talk about continuing to push — and even then, what is keeping the Russian lines glued together nowadays is foremost the RFA’s artillery, of which there is ever less, because it suffered heavy losses to the Ukrainian counter-battery operations of the last week.
• Is it any ‘better’ on the Ukrainian side? In some cases — not — but overall: yes. The 57th Mech and 118th TD Brigades were badly damaged in latest fighting. It’s going to sound cruel, but each appears to have lost about a battalion in killed and wounded. The former was withdrawn and replaced by the 28th Mech, the latter seems to be still holding at least a part of the frontline south of Lysychansk. The 17th Tank was also pulled back and now serves as tactical reserve.
• Foremost, Ukraine has still not touched its strategic reserve — of about 30–35 battalions. Seems, this is continuously built up, trained on NATO-provided weaponry etc..
• That said, RUMINT has it that Dvornikov and Zhidko are building up their new ‘operational reserve’ consisting of about 14,000–15,000 reservists that are currently drafted all over Russia, for some kind of a new offensive, probably on the Severodonetsk Cauldron.

• From mid-2014 to early 2015, Russian and Ukrainian troops clashed in the Donbass, and the latter suffered several severe defeats. One of the keys to Russia’s early successes was the initial superiority of its ‘fire-reconnaissance’ complex: that is a combination of reconnaissance drones, electronic warfare and communications equipment and artillery batteries. This complex allowed them to drown enemy positions or units in a deluge of fire within fifteen minutes of their detection. 80 per cent of Ukrainian losses during the period were caused by Russian artillery as a result.
  • The Ukrainian army was in a sorry state after years of insufficient funding and had to be reconstituted in a hurry, to the point where the Ministry of Defence was ready to accept the support of various patriotic associations. One of them, Army SOS, inquired about the needs of the military and within a few months developed Kropyva (Urtica or nettles), a mapping intelligence application running on Android that allows a person with a terminal, usually a tablet, to easily mark an enemy position. The software then transmits the indication to nearby artillery pieces while allowing the coordination of their fire, resulting in synchronised fire against the same target from several separate positions.
  • The average time required to deploy a howitzer battery has been reduced by a factor of 5 — to three minutes -; the time required to engage an unplanned target by a factor of 3, to one minute; while the time required to open counter-battery fire has been divided by 10, down to 30 seconds. In a nutshell, and combined with the systematic use of drones for fire correction, Kropyva has increased the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery by an order of magnitude, acting as a force multiplier.
  • It can now be used for de-mining tasks too.
  • At the start of the hostilities in late February 2022, Russian cyber units mainly launched a systematic attack on Ukrainian satellite connection terminals to disrupt their communications. Kyiv responded by switching them to Starlink, the satellite network set up by SpaceX. Since then, Elon Musk’s company has proved itself to be an expert in neutralising Russian cyber and jamming attacks, ensuring, among other things, that Kropyva remains up and running.
• And Ukrainians are complaining about a massive increase in deployment of means of electronic warfare by the RFA in Donbass. Correspondingly, the same is jamming all possible signals, from radio communications to Ukrainian UAV operations. Well, ladies and gentlemen: electronic warfare is something that never ends: a literal ping-pong game, something that’s constantly evolving, and thus it’s unsurprising if you enjoy advantages on one day, and then find yourself at a disadvantage on the other. Point is: Ukrainian Armed Forces are heavily dependent on UAVs for tactical reconnaissance — especially in Donbass (where the battlefield is much too far away for real-time reconnaissance by the NATO).
• My assessment is that the RFA and Separatists are going to need such a big number of BTGs alone because most of units in question are down to about 50% of their nominal strength — if not worse. 
• AA systems:
  • Ukraine might get 2,5–3 IRIS-T SLs by the end of this year. Sure, each is capable of defending something like a city the size of, say, Zaporizhzhya.

• Artillery:
  • process of resulting in delivery of 118 M777s from USA, Canada, and Australia; 72 Krab self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) from Poland (18 are already in Ukraine); 20 M109A3GN from Norway, on top of at least 8, probably more of Zuzana-2s from Slovakia, and about 30+ Dana/Dana M2s from the Czech Republic, etc…. well, with Estonia- and Italy-provided FH.70s, and French-delivered Caesars…. plus all the possible support equipment and about 400,000 rounds of associated ammunition….sometimes by July or August
• Troops infos:
  • Putin is using Wagner PMC as his ‘Stosstruppen’ — ‘shock troops’ for attacks on particularly important sectors of the frontline. 
  • Word is that many of about 12–15 BTGs within the bulge are down to 200–250 troops, and about a dozen of operational vehicles 
  • Ukrainian nowadays operate so that they move in one of regular units, repel Russian attack or take some place; then withdraw the regulars and replace them with Territorial Defence troops.
  • average BTG, when at full strength, is expected to defend a frontline of about 7–8km: one russian units have to defend frontlines of 20–25 kilometres)

May

• Troops infos:
  • there is no indication russians are improving at operational- or tactical levels. The story with massive concentrations of artillery to achieve this or that — like at Lyman, the last few days, just for example — is nothing new: they were doing this during the Second World War, in Afghanistan, in Ethiopia and Angola (as advisors), in Ukraine of 2014–2015, and Syria of 2015–2018. Following up by Spetsnaz is nothing new at least since Afghanistan of the 1980s, either. At most, they have learned that the only way forward left is one of securing areas that have a good railway network (or are near such areas). They might have learned they have the advantage whenever the Ukrainian forces are ‘fixed’ in specific villages and/or towns. However, as soon as Ukrainians start to manoeuvre, the RFA artillery is behaving like an elephant in a china store, and simply finding no solution. They are poor in counter-battery-business, too — principally because Ukrainians are widely dispersing their artillery, and constantly moving it.
  • end of May M777s are coming forward relatively slowly: 2 battalions with a total of 18 pieces are in operation
  • M777s are coming forward relatively slowly: 2 battalions with a total of 18 pieces are in operation
  • the Russians pounded the town with all the air power, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, heavy mortars they could get together. The barrage went on for hours and, regardless how much lacking precision (the RFA artillery lacks support of UAVS and obviously has a major problem with zeroing-in on Ukrainian trenches and other fortifications), seems to have caused heavy losses, collapsing defences almost as soon as the Russians initiated their pincer attack
  • photographs, taken somewhere along the T1302 between Popasna and Severodonetsk, between 24 and 27 May: because Ukrainian artillery was not around, the RFA was free to line-up tanks and BMTPs of the 90th Tank Division on surrounding hills, and pound the defenders as it wanted… once Ukrainian artillery returned fire, the Russians rapidly withdrew.
  • Ukrainian and VKS Su-25 armed with either four B-8M pods for unguided rockets calibre 80mm, or two B-13 pods for unguided rockets calibre 130mm. The video-still above shows a VKS Su-25 armed with two B-13s, and the two below are shown a VKS Su-25 armed with a total of four B-8M pods:
  •  both Russian and Ukrainian Su-25-pilots are ingressing as low as this (which is 30–50m altitude); sometimes even lower, between buildings and trees. It’s quite certain that this is enabling them to approach undetected by the enemy until less than 5,000 metres away, thus leaving the opponent minimal time to react — whether by MANPADs (Strela, Piorun, Stinger, etc.), or by heavier SAMs (Osa-AKM/SA-13, Tor/SA-15, Pantsyr/SA-21, Buk/SA-17, or S-300/SA-10). So far, everything’s OK, and nobody gets hurt.
    • When about 3,000 metres away from enemy position, they all enter a shallow climb, and, when the range is down to less than 2,000m, fire all of their unguided rockets at once — ‘in general direction of the enemy’,
    • When about 3,000 metres away from enemy position, they all enter a shallow climb, and, when the range is down to less than 2,000m, fire all of their unguided rockets at once — ‘in general direction of the enemy’,
    • Problem is aiming. While flying this kind of attack, pilot can’t see the target. Immediately after releasing their rockets, all the Su-25s are making a hard break and releasing flares
  • volley of Kalibrs was intercepted by Ukrainian Air Force, and two were shot down by MiG-29s. RFA have spent 60–70% of their ‘high-precision’ ballistic- and cruise missiles by now, and, instead of targeting the same object by 2–4, as early during the war, are now firing 8–12 at the same target.
  • Russians suffered such losses to Ukrainian artillery and anti-tank guided missiles
  • the RFA brought in at least a BTG, if not two, equipped with BMPT Terminators
  • The RFA is fighting in battalion tactical groups, and these BTGs have a minimal capability to keep themselves supplied. For this purpose, each of tactical armies (every tactical army is controlling between 2–3 and 20 BTGs) has its own supply brigade. The number of such highly-specialised units is very limited: I think there are only 10–12 in all of the RFA, and they rely on trucks. However, this is not as important as it might appear because the RFA is even more dependent on the use of railways to keep its troops supplied. Not sure about the total number of railway brigades of the RFA, but think to recall reading there are about 20 of these. In this war so far, the shortage of supply brigades resulted in a situation where every single tactical army was capable of simultaneously supporting the advance by only one BTG. But, in the Popasna area, the RFA is running an offensive involving some 5–6 BTGs. How comes? It’s simple. Contrary to the situation elsewhere in Ukraine, there is a excellent railway network in the Kadiivka-Alchevsk area, only 30km east of Popasna — i.e. in the area controlled by the Separatists already since 2014. With other words: the way this operation is run, they can bring their supplies by train straight to the frontlines. No need to try doing that by truck convoys: not only is the RFA meanwhile critically short on trucks, but its truck convoys remain one of primary targets for the Ukrainian artillery.
  • The Russian military doctrine emphasises bypassing urban areas while on advance: if defended, these are to be isolated by foremost units (‘first echelon’) and then invested by troops of the ‘second echelon’. With other words: outflanked and besieged, if necessary, but not assaulted by advancing units. On the contrary, the Russians are all the time rushing to capture every village and town, regardless how minor, and regardless of losses. Nominally, at least, this was ‘logical’, considering Putin’s illusions about Ukrainians not being keen to fight, and the RFA receiving the order to bring as much of Ukraine under control within the shortest possible period of time, while all the time operating at the end of critically thin supply links. With other words: it needed roads to keep its troops supplied. And, well, roads are usually connecting urban areas: nobody is constructing them from nowhere to nowhere…Well, after all of this, somebody there in Moscow came to his senses, and the RFA is now back to its original tactics — apparently with quite some success.
  • BMTPs are made to combat infantry — precisely such, highly-mobile, but heavily armed infantry like that of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They are offering the same protection to their crew like tanks do, while their 30mm autocanons have already proven as a major — and very unpleasant — surprise for Ukrainians, right from the start of this war: due to the combination of these guns with 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided missiles (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AT-9 Spiral-2’), and AGS-17D or AGS-30 grenade launchers — they are far more flexible than any of Russian tanks.
  • The VKS continues flying 250–300 combat sorties a day. Most of these are directed by A-50 SRDLOs (Russian AWACS) against targets in the Donbass area. However, the Russian Air-Space Force continues its efforts to suppress the build-up of Ukrainian air defences between Sumy and Kharkiv, too.  Contrary to its usual practices, the VKS is targeting not only the frontlines, but also places 10–15km behind.
  • That Popasna is the new Russian Schwerpunkt is obvious from the appearance of the 76th VDV Division, units of the 1st Guards Tank Army equipped with BMPT Terminator-2 tank support combat vehicles, and a BTG of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade equipped with T-80BVM tanks in that area. The 76th is staffed by the best troops the RFA has to offer, while Terminators are armed with — between others — two 30mm 2A42 autocanons, which have already proven as an extremely unpleasant surprise for Ukrainians (thanks to combination of their range and punch). 
  • Few things about Kh-59s. Theoretically, deploying such weapons sounds very simple: enter target coordinates, release and, when the time comes, power up the TV-seeker and then guide into the target. In reality, lots of things can go wrong. Foremost: the mass of Kh-59s in VKS’ stocks was manufactured back in the 1980s, at least in early 1990s. One can stretch the shelf life of such weapons through periodic maintenance, but nobody in Russia can say if this was undertaken ever since. And Soviet-made ‘high-tech’ of the 1980s was well-known as ‘temperamental’, and extremely sensitive to proper handling, too — at least between its users. Unsurprisingly, up to around 60% of Kh-59s are malfunctioning already on release, or shortly after. Even if the missile works as expected, it still has to be guided into its target. For this purpose, the Kh-59 is equipped with ‘electro-optical’ seeker head. Essentially: a TV-camera, images of which are then transferred to the aircraft that launched it, so the crew there can steer it (that’s why ‘that’ with the functioning data-link is as important). What might appear ‘easy’ in a PC-simulation or -game, is anything else than that while one is confined to the cockpit of a combat aircraft flying a real-world combat mission: the missile is travelling fast, the cockpit display is small, aircraft is shaking while flying, and thus the operator has all sort of problems just with trying to find his actual target — especially so if the target is situated in a densely built-up area. What a surprise then, the Kh-59 fired at Kyiv during the visit by UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, missed its target (arms factory) by about 500+ metres, few weeks ago…
  • Sometimes during 14 May, the VKS was busy trying to track down and destroy a Ukrainian S-300/SA-10 SAM-site that was recently deployed in the Sumy area. 
  • By now it does seem like the RFA’s attack over the Siversky Donets was brought to a halt: not sure if all the 3–4 bridgeheads were completely eliminated, but at least the’ve suffered such losses that they can’t keep on assaulting south of the river. 
  • the Ukrainians are not engaging in tank battles at all. While retiring, they are targeting supply columns, regularly letting Russian tanks to run out of ammunition or fuel. If there is an engagement then at ranges of 3,000–4,000 metres, with Ukrainians targeting RFA’s tanks by Stugna-P and Javelin anti-tank guided missiles.
  • the Ukrainians target them by artillery, Ukrainian artillery spotters are using ‘NATO-standard’ the Krapiva automatic tactical management system (ATMS), which is including laser-rangers that are providing GPS-coordinates (hear, hear… wasn’t it so that somebody bragged — or complained — that all the GPS in Ukraine is severely disturbed?): coordinates are ‘automatically’ forwarded to artillery units. 
  • the Russian (i.e.: at earlier times: the Soviet) problem was always the lack of advanced high-tech: their early ATMS’ — like Vozdukh, just for example, which was coordinating the work of 2–3 air defence divisions, back in the 1960s — were based on ‘computers’ the size of an average family home, yet was capable of coordinating simultaneous operations only against 41, then 82 targets.
  • their Metronome ATMS. This in turn prompted lots of usual sensationalising in the West. However, already at the time it became obvious that the system was limited to use by the VKS and heavily dependent on near-perfect function of the GLONASS satellite positioning system. Much of the GLONASS was still in disrepair even as of 2015, even more so over Syria. Thus, the RFA was forced to deploy dozens of so-called differential stations (essentially: a mast enhancing and correcting the signal from the satellite navigation system) — and that for a battlefield, essentially, some 60 by 50 kilometres in size (northern Lattakia and western Idlib). With this still proving insufficient, the VKS ended flying that campaign on basis of coordinates collected by communication intelligence and photo-reconnaissance by old aircraft like Antonov An-30 and (Syrian) Su-22M-4s equipped with KKR-1 reconnaissance pods. It rarely operated with help of forward air/artillery controllers. Rather unsurprisingly, by around 2017, the Metronome ATMS was, reportedly, concluded for ‘near useless’ and replaced by…. ‘something better’. What exactly was that ‘something better’ remains unclear to me — because reports are much too contradictive. ….and, well, gauging by maps, seems the battlefield in Ukraine is about 10 times bigger than that in north-western Syria where the Russians were seriously involved, back in 2015–2017. Thus, it could be the actual problem is once again the same: ‘that’ with GLONASS coverage.
  •  If you check my earlier reporting, you can find a video supposedly released by the Keystone Cops and supposedly shown forward air/artillery controllers of the 150th Motor Rifle Division operating something of this kind in Mariupol. However, that was an official release: all one gets to hear from the frontlines (and then the Russian side of the frontlines) is that the coordination between the RFA’s ground troops, artillery, and VKS is extremely poor, and no forward controllers are present at all.
  • 10-11-12 May ballistic- and cruise missile strikes, the last three days — but the total number of such attacks significantly decreased. Moreover, they’re meanwhile primarily using Kh-22s and Kh-59s, neither of which can reach deeper into Ukraine. Initially, such operations were run with help of cruise missiles like Kh-101 and Kh-555 (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AS-15 Kent’). These were launched exclusively from strategic bombers like Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160. Quite often, the Russians deployed ship- and submarine-launched 3M-54 Kalibr (‘SS-N-27 Sizzler’), too. As the stocks of these decreased, they began deploying P-600 Onix/Yakhont missiles of the K-300P Bastion-P coastal-defence system (‘SS-C-5 Stooge’), from sites on the occupied Crimean Peninsula. …and, of course, they are all the time deploying ballistic missiles, like 9K720 Iskander (‘SS-26 Stone’): About two weeks ago (if not earlier), the Russians depleted their stocks of ballistic- and cruise missiles to the degree where they began deploying their old Kh-59s (‘AS-13 Kingbolt’): these are actually tactical, electro-optically guided missiles with a range of about 100–150km (the Russians claim much more; but Russian advertisements and reality are two entirely different things). They are released from Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers, but the mass of examples ‘still in service’ with the VKS is so old (made in the late 1980s, early 1990s), RUMINT has it that up to 60% are malfunctioning upon release (definitely: before getting anywhere near their target). Moreover, guiding a missile like Kh-59 under combat conditions is anything else than ‘fun’….
  • it seems that the RFA is ‘coming down’ to just one bridge with an entire BTG (about 50–60 armoured vehicles). And that is just one of bridges, and then one I’m assessing as ‘decoy’: keep in mind, there are three other such bridges. Gauging by the number of bridges reported by Russian sources, this means the RFA has engaged ‘at least’ four BTGs for this operation — along a frontline of about 10km.
  • 9-May North of Kharkiv, the Ukrainian counteroffensive initiated on 2 May is…. Well, ‘coming forward’. It’s no ‘blitzkrieg’, but a slow, cautious, methodical advance — and then one heavily dependent on the ‘territorials’, no ‘official regulars’. That is: 113th TD Brigade is leading the western flank of this offensive. Arguably, the Russians opposing it are consisting of 4–5 depleted and shaken BTGs, including the 437th Motor Rifle Regiment and two Naval Infantry Regiments, reinforced by what is colloquially known as the ‘Donbass Meat’ (see: poorly trained Donbass Separatists). The 113th has entered Tsupivka, but the Russians there are still resisting. Further east, the 92nd Mech is pushing on Lyptsi and Bairak, defended by a BTG of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade. Indeed, the 92nd Mech has already liberated Bairak. Behind it, the 227th Battalion TD and the Sheikh Mansur Battalion(Chechens fighting for Ukraine) are mopping up and securing villages like Vekhnii Saltiv, Zamulivka etc.
  • BTW, this is meanwhile the ‘classic’ RFA tactics: shell an area for 1–2 days, especially by night, then follow up by Spetsnaz attacks in the morning, before following up with the main force. 
  • RFA officers might not have equal training to that of their Western and Ukrainian counterparts. But, they do have a very clear training in regards of terms ‘bridge’ and ‘bridgehead’. Wherever there is one, that’s their Schwerpunkt: their focus — and they’re going to pump all their resources into crossing, securing and then expanding the bridgehead, and then pushing out of it. It doesn’t matter how many bridges have the Ukrainians destroyed there at Bilohorivka: the Russians are going to bring in more equipment, and build new bridges, and then two, and, if necessary, four and five, and they’re going to bring in all the artillery and air strikes they can get — to protect the resulting bridgehead.
  • 7-8 May Ukraine Troops are sent to the frontlines with minimal (if any) training: there are entire units that were first rushed to recover, for example, Irpin — before being given any kind of training at all. Brigades of the Territorial Defence, supposed to defend the territories where their staff is living, are meanwhile converted into manoeuvring units, re-deployed and rushed into combat to replace losses — well away from their homes.
  • 3-4 May Of the VKS aircraft, the most active the last 7–10 days were Su-25s. deployment of advanced mobile radars for detection of low-flying aircraft and helicopters, and 9K37M3 Buk-M3 (SA-17 Grizzly) SAM-systems
  • 1-2 May RFA lacks the means at least to find, not to talk about precisely strike and thus interrupt the flow of Western arms into Ukraine. Instead, the RFA reverted to the most primitive means of searching for targets: ‘scouting by fire’. That is, the Russians are wasting their continuously decreasing stock of cruise missiles to target whatever storage facilities they think might be used to hide Western weapons.
  • most active over the last two days were Russian Orlan reconnaissance UAVs — and then over all the frontlines in eastern and southern Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the defenders claimed ten of these shot down on 1 May alone. Another eight were claimed as shot down on 2 May, including a Forpost that attempted to reach Odessa (Forpost is the Russian version of the Israeli-made Searcher).
  • Ukrainians have concrete bunkers inside Popasna, equipped with armoured shutters: whenever encircled by the Russians, they call artillery fire on their own positions, until the Separatists and Russians are either destroyed or forced to withdraw. ….and they are reporting murderous attacks by Ukrainian Bayraktar UAVs: just one of these should’ve killed 19 troops.

April

• BTGs in Ukraine increased to 92, the last week. Command-wide, i.e. on unit-by-unit basis, this might be correct. However, the mass of units in question is severely depleted and in such a disorder, that BTGs from 2–3 different combined arms armies — and thus from multiple different commands — have to operate next to each other. 
• 230 — of T-72Ms to Ukraine. Atop of this, the Ukrainians received ‘several dozens’ of (obsolete) BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers calibre 122mm, and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.
• 30th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade, 201st Military Base, 74th Independent Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, and the 239th Guards Tank Regiment, all of them ‘led’ by ‘cannon fodder’ of the 7th and 9th Separatist Brigades — are pushing mightily all the way from Losove on Yatsivka and on Koroviy Yar (which the Ukrainians might have lost by now), from Zelena Dolyna and Zarichne on Lyman, Ozerne, and Yampil. With the withdrawal of the 17th Armour, Ukrainians seem to have only the 15th Slavic Regiment, the 57th Motor and the 95th Airborne to defend this area (the 3rd Tank is busy defending Dibrovne and Dovhenke; the 4th seems to be held in reserve).
• the Ukrainians are under enormous pressure, but their units appear to be manoeuvring well: scattered in small detachments, they’re racing around the flanks of Russian advances, making short stops to destroy one or another of enemy vehicles, then moving out again. In this way, the Russian progress remains painfully slow and every metre they come forward is paid by additional losses.
• The RFA is replacing its short-range air defence systems knocked out by Ukrainians — like ‘Wunderwaffen’ Pantsyr and Tor — by ‘ever more modern’ systems, like this ZU-23 twin-barell autocanon calibre 23mm (about 60-years-old) mounted on a truck….
• The transfer of Western howitzers calibre 155mm — and related ammunition — to Ukraine is meanwhile in full swing. Transfer of (additional) air defence equipment is about to follow.
• RFA has deployed two BTGs of the 76th VDV Division from Russia to the Izium area. It might sound like if I’m ‘obsessed’ by that unit, but its considered ‘the best’ the RFA has to offer, no matter where, and its presence is meaning this is the new Schwerpunkt in the Russian aggression on Ukraine
• the VKS is bombing and rocketing, but because of Ukrainian air defences, its pilots are releasing from such altitudes and distances, that the mass of their ordnance is missing. Moreover, air strikes are not coordinated with ground troops: indeed, there are no UAVs to fly recce and no forward air/artillery controllers. As result, even the artillery support is not coordinated. Thus, any attacking Separatists are cut to pieces while being thrown into one assault after the other.
• No doubt, Ukrainian defenders are exhausted, meanwhile, and supply problems are slowly growing, but so far they’ve got relatively little problems repelling up to a dozen of such ‘assaults’ a day — for weeks already.
• assaults on Velyka Novosilka. By side the fact that the 70th GMRR is constantly hit by Milan anti-tank guided missiles (of French origin, and operated by the Canadian-Ukrainian Brigade)
• Part of the 58th CAA’s problem is the vivid activity of Ukrainian ‘partisans’ (mostly special operations troops left behind the enemy lines): these are constantly ambushing supply convoys and, yesterday in the morning, they blew up a railway bridge Yakymivka, in the Melitopol area. 
• Ukrainians claim their Osa-AKs to have shot down a Ka-52 in the Kherson area.
• the Russians are, ‘still’, pushing forward with immense pressure, and they’re still advancing — especially south of Izium. But, make no mistake: all their gains are extremely slow and minimal by nature. They seem never to have something like ‘2nd echelon’ to exploit whatever little success they do have. Once again: I do not see them being capable of achieving at least some sort of major victory at operational level. Foremost, their operations are depending on massive volumes of artillery fire and air strikes, and, at least so far, the mass of these is not enough: Ukrainians are well entrenched and even if their forward-most units are beginning to get tired and short on supplies, still holding out.

Devo guardare da 21-22 aprile a prima.