"Push on with your whole force... without reference to anyone else."
--IX Corps commander John C. Parke's order to his Second Division commander, Robert Potter
In September of 1864, Major General Ben Butler approached General-In-Chief U.S. Grant with a plan to break the deadlock then existing on the Petersburg - Richmond Front. During the summer and fall four Federal offensives had failed to dislodge the Army of Northern Virginia from the defenses of these cities. By late September, a frustrated Grant was casting about for a way to break the stalemate. Consequently, he was quite willing to listen to 'Beast' Butler's ambitious plan.
Butler's intelligence information indicated that Rebel forces were spread thin north of the James River in the immediate defenses of Richmond. In addition to weakness in numbers, the Confederates on the Northside (of the James) were thought to be inferior troops. Butler wanted to attack these forces by throwing pontoon bridges across the James at Aiken's and at Deep Bottom (see Strategic Map), crossing the bulk of his Army of the James quickly to the north bank and then assaulting the right flank of the Richmond defenses in overwhelming strength. Butler felt he would have no trouble overrunning these weakly held defenses and punching through into Richmond itself.
Grant was not convinced of the soundness of Butler's plan, but contrived to incorporate it into a larger scheme of his own design. Grant decided to allow the Army of the James to assault Richmond as its commander desired. The General-In-Chief hoped Butler would successfully drive all before him. Grant realized, however, that whatever the outcome, Confederate reserves would certainly be directed to the sensitive and threatened Northside sector, thus reducing the number of lean Rebel brigades deployed south of the James protecting Petersburg and the vital supply lines running south from that city. Concluding that "they'll have to let us in somewhere," Grant resolved to strike at Petersburg with 24,000 men of the Army of the Potomac once Butler's attack was well underway. The Southside attack force (V and IX Corps, Army of the Potomac) would mass around Globe Tavern and would be prepared to assault the extreme right of the defenses whenever Grant should give the order. These extreme right flank defenses were known as the Squirrel Level Line. After capturing the works, the attackers would push to cut the supply lines, thus rendering Richmond and Petersburg untenable.
His attack plan approved, a confident Butler crossed the James on September 29th with 26,000 men and assailed the Confederate Northside positions covering the entrenched camp at Chaffin's Bluff. Stannard's division of Ord's Xth Corps captured Fort Harrison, a keystone of the Northside defenses. All day fighting raged, chiefly characterized by Unionist blundering as the Army of the James struggled bravely, but in vain, to exploit Stannard's initial success. By late afternoon, Butler had fully awakened from his dream of plunging through to Richmond and called off further attacks. He then issued orders for his troops to dig in and hold what gains had been made.
Although he had failed to capture Richmond, Butler's offensive did accomplish Grant's purpose of drawing most available Confederate reserves to the Northside. The works covering the supply lines leading south from Petersburg were virtually stripped of defending troops. Thus, at approximately 1:00 pm on September 30th, while Graycoats unsuccessfully counterattacked Butler at Chaffin's Bluff, the V and IX Corps, Army of the Potomac, rolled forward at Grant's order to attack the extreme right of the Petersburg defenses.
Major General Gouvernor K. Warren's Vth Corps spearheaded the offensive and quickly overwhelmed the Squirrel Level Line, which was hold by Colonel Joel Griffin's cavalry brigade supported by four guns. Having done their bit, Warren's soldiers halted to reorganize and rest while Brigadier General John Parke's IXth Corps passed through the ranks of the Vth Corps and pressed on toward the first important supply line, the Boydton Plank Road. But now the federal high command vacillated. Parke was ordered to halt while the generals considered the wisdom of penetrating further into hostile territory while they pondered the Confederates were rushing to the threatened sector what mobile reserves remained on the Petersburg Front. The Squirrel Level Line was overrun at approximately 1:00 p.m., but it was not until nearly 3:00 p.m. that the IXth Corps was finally ordered to resume the forward movement. Two hours had been wasted.
Brigadier General Robert Potter's Division led the belated advance northwest along the Church Road, supported by Brigadier General Orlando B. Willcox with three brigades of his First Division, IXth Corps. After more delays, the advance continued across Pegram's and over the Bald Ridge north toward Jones' Farm (see TAC MAP). Potter's orders were to "press on with your whole force as rapidly as possible without reference to anyone else." Consequently, at approximately 4:30 p.m., upon reaching the southern boundary of Jones' Farm, Potter halted only briefly to perfect his alignment before continuing his advance across Jones' toward the enemy works beyond.
Brigadier General John Hartranft's Brigade of Willcox's Division had been in support of Potter's left flank prior to the advance onto Jones'. Unfortunately, a large sorghum field obstructed Hartranft's view of Potter's line, and when the latter advanced, Hartranft's supporting troops did not conform to the movement, but remained in position fronting north at Dr. Boisseau's Farm. To make matters worse, Potter's right flank was also 'in the air.' Potter assumed that Brigadier General Charles Griffin's Division of the Vth Corps covered his right flank as had been the plan. Unfortunately, for reasons never satisfactorily explained, Griffin's Bluecoats still lingered far to the rear on Pegram's Farm, completely out of supporting distance, perhaps resting on laurels won that morning at Fort Archer.
The net result of these circumstances was that Potter's unsuspecting soldiers advanced alone and unsupported "without reference to anyone else," flanks in the air to assault Confederate defenses teeming with veteran troops.
As the head of Potter's column approached the North Fork of Old Town Creek, it was violently in counterattacked by Major General Cadmus Wilcox with two brigades of crack Confederate riflemen that had been lying in ambush in the creek bed (see TAC MAP). Almost simultaneously Major General W.H.F. 'Rooney' Lee's dismounted cavalrymen sallied forth to savage Potter's left rear and to attack Hartranft. Two brigades of Major General Henry Heth's Division and twelve guns of Lt. Colonel William 'Willie' Pegram's elite artillery battalion supported Wilcox's troops and lent weight to the assault.
In the fierce fight that erupted, Potter's Division was wrecked and driven from the field in confusion. Hartranft was borne back with grievous loss and the western edge of Bald Ridge was captured by the Rebels, who then surged forward to sweep the Yankees from Pegram's Farm. But on that farm, and along the eastern reaches of Bald Ridge, Bluecoat resistance stiffened and the reinforced Union line held. Confederate assaults continued unabated until dark, but all further efforts to drive the Federals from the ridge failed with heavy loss. Finally, the rebels withdrew to the incomplete works, leaving only sharpshooters to pester the exhausted but ultimately undefeated Northerns.
In this engagement, the Butternuts lost about 600 men while the Federals lost 2,256. Despite the lopsided casualty figures, the battle is considered only a marginal Confederate tactical victory. Given the great opportunity presented by the initial tactical situation, it seems that more decisive results could have been accomplished by the Rebels. As it happened, the contest was a draw. The supply lines remained in Confederate hands, but an important defensive line had fallen and the Southerners could not muster the resources to attempt its recovery. The stalemate in Virginia would continue for another six long, bloody, months.
For those wishing an in depth description of the battle, please refer to Richard J. Sommers definitive account of the battle contained in his excellent study, RICHMOND REDEEMED.
Because this scenario begins at the moment of Wilcox's surprise counterattack, it may appear at first glance to be a walkover for the Rebel player. Nevertheless, the scenario is actually quite well balanced, and it will be very difficult for the Graycoat to meet his victory condition against a vigorous and cunning Yankee defense.
Back to The Zouave Vol II No. 1 Table of Contents
Back to The Zouave List of Issues
Back to Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1988 The American Civil War Society
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com