The name Braxton Bragg has become synonymous with Confederate defeat during the American Civil War. Even today, you will not find too many people to stand in your corner should you wish to rehabilitate the South's most controversial general.

GOING TO MEET THE FEDEBALS IN THE GAP: Large 25mm figures are mostly Firing Line with some Elites. Buildings Created by HG Walls. Photo by Ivor Janci.

There is a story which, whether true or untrue, shows the depth of that feeling. As late as 1969, a respected author began what was to be a two volume biography on Bragg. However, by the time he had reached the battle of Murfreesboro, i.e. 1862, he was so disgusted by Bragg's character that he wound up the book and turned the project over to one of his students. I have yet to read the book, but the tale is indicative of the feelings most Civil War observers have of Braxton Bragg.

Bragg's trouble began when he took command of the Confederacy's second most important field command, the Army of Mississippi more famous later as the Army of Tennessee. Up until then, his career had been relatively distinguished despite his abrasive manner with brother officers and the men under his command. He had finished fifth from a class of fiftyfive at West Point in 1837. He was present with the army against the Seminole Indians in Florida, although never actually in combat. Thereafter, he spent his time on the western frontier of the expanding United States. It was here that Bragg committed the ludicrous theatre of arguing with himself.

Ulysses S. Grant recalled the infamous story when Bragg was acting both as company commander and post quartermaster. 'As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster - himself - for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing."

Unbelievably, Bragg carried on the altercation with himself over several communications and eventually referred the matter to the post commander who exclaimed, "My God Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army and now you're quarreling with yourself."

CONFEDERATES AT McLEMORE's COVE. Photo courtesy John Hill.

During the Mexican War, Bragg commanded Battery C, 3rd U.S. Artillery, and performed with valour, winning three brevets and impressing his superiors. Bragg resigned from the army in 1856 and by 1861 had risen to Major General in the Louisiana State Militia. On the plus side he was described as energetic, intelligent, of high moral character, a skillful planner and in Richmond circles, a "great General."

On the down side, he was vague, unpopular to the point of detestation, argumentative, and unable to compromise. A British observer during the war, Lt. James Fremantle, had this to say of Bragg: a sickly, cadaverous, haggard appearance, rather plain features bushy black eyebrows which unite in a tuft on the top of his nose, and a stubby iron-gray beard.

The constant quarrels and command crises, through which the Army of Tennessee suffered under Bragg, may have been used by some of his subordinates during and after the war, to deflect too close an investigation into their own mismanagement of operations. Which, if they had been carried out as Bragg had wished, may have rescued his reputation, or at the very least, toned down the effects of a seemingly endless stream of defeats.

By 1863, Bragg distrusted and was in turn despised by at least half his officer corp. These sentiments percolated through to the men in the ranks. In respect of his troops, one disgruntled footslogger wrote of Bragg: "He shot half of them himself in Kentucky, and the Yankees killed the other half of them up at Murfreesboro." Granted there are not too many instances where Bragg got it right. However, I would like to look closely at one in which the blame lies entirely with his commanders, and had his orders been carried out promptly, may have had a lasting effect on the war in the West.

After the battle of Murfreesboro it was anticipated that Union Major General William S. Rosecrans would advance on the important Confederate transport hub of Chattanooga. Indeed, Washington required Rosecrans to apply pressure against Bragg in order that troops from Bragg's army would not be used to support Pemberton at Vicksburg as the latter faced the troops of U.S. Grant. In a masterful stroke and without a pitched battle, Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg from his positions covering Chattanooga. The town itself however remained under Confederate control and was too well defended to be taken by assault.

Map courtesy John Hill.

Having fooled Bragg once, Rosecrans was confident he could do it again and therefore decided to approach the town from the west. The terrain immediately to the west of Chattanooga is not suited to the movement of large armies; the roads are poor and a series of barren mountainous ridges runs almost north-south interspersed by easily defended gaps. The area could not supply a large army, and should the Federals get bogged down in the mountains they would inevitably have to retreat.

Despite minor delays and irritations, Rosecrans got his men across the Tennessee River by September 4. A succession of fake deserters and faulty intelligence led the general to believe that the Confederates would not make a fight this side of Atlanta, and he was impatient to get his men through the mountains. The Union cavalry was sent to the extreme right flank to operate against Rome and Alpine, Georgia. Alexander McCook's XX Corps were to the left of the cavalry and were to seize Winston's Gap at the southern end of Lookout Mountain. George Thomas' XIV Corps was to take Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps in Lookout Mountain approximately 15 miles further north. Thomas Crittenden's XXI Corps was to follow behind Thomas, then strike out for the northern end of Lookout Mountain in order to threaten the rail line close to Chattanooga.

Rosecrans had stretched his army to the limit: the distance between both flanks was nearly 40 miles. In the city, Bragg was completely at a loss as to where Rosecrans' army was located, and from which direction it would strike. On September 6, Bragg's nerves gave way. He abandoned the city to concentrate his forces at La Fayette, Georgia, presumably to keep them out of harms way and to let the situation develop in order to make a counterstroke. By September 8, the Federals stood on Lookout Mountain looking into the fertile basin of McLemore's Cove. Columns of dust in the distance gave the lie that Bragg was on the retreat.

Astonishingly, Bragg was saved from indecision by a Northern newspaper report: "If Crittenden succeeds well in his efforts upon Chattanooga and will not need reenforcements, Thomas and McCook will move rapidly upon Rome, Georgia." Putting this intelligence along with the poor responses his scouts had delivered, Bragg could surmise that the Federals were about to debouch from the mountains.

If he moved quickly enough, the opportunity presented itself to defeat Rosecrans in detail. Despite his good fortune, Bragg was still unsure as to exactly where the Yankees would appear. On September 9, however, he at last received news that placed Negley's Union division at Davis' Crossroads in McLemore's Cove. Bragg ordered Major General Thomas Hindman (pronounced as in Golden Hind) to move directly on the crossroads and once there take command of Cleburne's division of Hill's Corps, which would arrive through Dug Gap, and attack immediately.

HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Lee and Gordon's Mills
September 9, 1863
11.45 P.m.
Maj. Gen. HINDMAN, comdg. Division:

GEN.: You will move with your division immediately to Davis' Cross-Roads, on the road from La Fayette to Stevens's Gap. At this point you will put yourself in communication with the column of Gen. Hill, ordered to move to the same point, and take command of the joint forces, or report to the officer commanding Hill's column according to rank. If in command you will move upon the enemy, reported to be 4,000 or 5,000 strong, encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain at Stevens' Gap. Another column of the enemy is reported to be at Cooper's Gap; number not known.

I am, general, &c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER, Assistant Adjutant-Gen.

HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Lee and Gordon's Mills
September 9, 1863
11.45 P.M.
Lieut. Gen. HILL, Comdg. Corps:

GEN.: I inclose orders given to Gen. Hindman. Gen. Bragg directs that you send or take, as your judgment dictates, Cleburne's division to unite with Gen. Hindman at Davis' Cross-Roads tomorrow morning. Hindman starts at 12 o'clock to-night, and he has 13 miles to make. The commander of the column thus united will move upon the enemy encamped at the foot of Stevens' Gap, said to be 4,000 or 5,000. If unforeseen circumstances should prevent your movement, notify Hindman. A cavalry force should accompany your column. Hindman has none. Open communication with Hindman with your cavalry in advance of the junction. He marches on the road from Dr. Anderson's to Davis' Cross-Roads.

I am, general, &c.,
KINLOCH FALCONER, Assistant Adjutant- Gen.

Major General James Negley's Union division on arrival in McLemore's Cove was informed by locals that the Confederates were in force on the far side of Pigeon Mountain. For the time being, Negley was aware that he was on his own. He was also aware that his orders were to push on as swiftly as he could.

As his advanced elements met Rebel outposts in Dug Gap, Negley's fears got the better of him and he decided to pull back and take up a position around the Davis Plantation to await the rest of the Corps. Corps commander Major General George Thomas concurred with Negley's decision, couriers were despatched to hasten the arrival of Baird's division which was a day behind, the divisions of Reynolds and Brannen were to come up on Negley's left via Cooper's Gap.

One of Rasecran's Bluebellies? Possibly. in truth it's our author of this article, George Anderson, as a Union reenactor. George hails from Scotland (and purportedly is brave, ahem), and is the coauthor of eight fine scenario booklets from Potomac Publications.

By the time Thomas withdrew, only Baird and Turchin's brigades would have turned up to support Negley. Rosecrans did not fully understand Thomas' position and was in no mood to accept any delay to his plan. He urged Thomas to move faster and threaten La Fayette in the belief that Bragg was fleeing south. At dawn on September 10, Hindman was within four miles of the Widow Davis Plantation when Bragg's plan began to unravel, Daniel Harvey Hill, no lover of Bragg, informed his commander that he could not obey his orders. He reported Cleburne sick and doubted whether the timber obstacles previously placed in Dug Gap could be cleared in time for his men to advance, or subsequently, for Hindman to use in the event of a withdrawal.

Still intent on grabbing the opportunity, Bragg altered his plan and ordered General Simon Bolivar Buckner to rush forward two of his divisions instead. As the day wore on, Hindman became even more cautious. Locals had reported not one, but two Federal divisions in the area, and he had heard nothing yet from Hill about Cleburne. Buckner united with Hindman at 4:45 p.m.

Meanwhile, on the other side of Pigeon Mountain, the obstinate Hill had changed his mind and ordered Cleburne forward into Dug Gap at 1:30 p.m. Despite Hill's previous protestations, the Irishman's excellent soldiers cleared the timber restrictions in the gap in record time. Believing things to be at last going his way, Bragg again attempted to move Hindman.

HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Gordon's Mills
September 10, 1863
7.30 P.M.
Maj. Gen. HINDMAN, Comdg.:

GEN.: The enemy is now divided. Ourforce at or near La Fayette is superior to the enemy. It is important now to move vigorously and crush him. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

KINLOCH FALCONER, Assistant Adjutant-Gen

Bragg arrived in La Fayette at 11:30 p.m. on September 10. Unfortunately for the Confederate cause and his own reputation he did not ride another dozen miles to kick Hindman's backside. A further despatch sent at midnight did not reach Hindman until 4 a.m. This time there was no room for misinterpretation.

HDQRS. ARMY OF TENNESSEE
La Fayette, Ga.
September 10, 1863
12 P.M.
Maj. Gen. HINDMAN, Comdg., &c.:

GEN.: Hdqrs, are here, and the following is the information: Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the south has advanced to within 7 miles of this point. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. Gen. Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.

I am, general, &c.,
GEORGE WM. BRENT Assistant Adjutant-Gen.

Despite all this, Bragg, Hill and Cleburne waited in vain the next morning at Dug Gap for the sound of Hindman's guns. The General moved out at 6:30 a.m. for the Widow Davis Plantation but stopped two and a half miles short in order to reconnoiter. These operations were not concluded to Hindman's satisfaction until noon, by which time the Federal forces had begun to withdraw to Bailey's Crossroads. Hindman's 'assault' therefore merely followed up this rearward move by the Yankees.

Bragg's first chance of destroying a part of Rosecran's army before that commander became aware of his danger faded as darkness settled over the Cove. Despite everything, Bragg had clung to his original idea of delivering a telling blow to the Union army. His only major failing throughout had been to rely on his unsupervised subordinates carrying out their orders. Something which we presume generals should take for granted, but which during the Civil War more often than not led to disaster.

Daniel Harvey Hill as usual caused trouble for his superior, a trait with which only Robert E. Lee seemed able to cope with. In the end however, he had acquiesced and moved his troops forward. Thomas Hindman, on the other hand, had chosen to misinterpret or ignore every order urging him in plain language to attack. The real blame for this lost opportunity must lie with him. Eighteen days later Bragg penned the following despatch:

NEAR CHATTANOOGA via Chickamauga
September 29, 1863
Gen. S. COOPER, Adjutant Inspector

Gen.: Maj. Gen. Hindman and Lieut. Gen. Polk have been suspended from their commands by my orders and sent to Atlanta, for not obeying orders on the 11th and 20th instant. This has been deemed necessary after grave consideration.

BRAXTON BRAGG, Gen., Comdg.

Scenario (#51)